

LIFE AND TIMES
OF
SAWAI JAI SINGH
1688-1743

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Impex India
Delhi

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November, 1974

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PV 86

Published by Sita Ram Goel for Impex India, 2/18, Ansari Road, Delhi-6
and Printed at Navchetan Press Pvt. Ltd. (Lessees of Arjun Press),
Naya Bazar Delhi-6.

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PREFACE

About a hundred and forty years ago, Lt.-Col. James Tod wrote in his *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* that "as a statesman, legislator, and man of science, the character of Sowae Jey Sing is worthy of an ample delineation", and that for such a work the materials of the Amber Court were more abundant than those of any other Court of India. Tod was not the only scholar to be impressed by Jai Singh's versatile personality and his achievements in fields as diverse as diplomacy and astronomy and town-planning, successive generations of scholars have also admitted that the founder of Sawai Jaipur was one of the most remarkable men India has ever produced. But no attempt was somehow made to write a full account of his life and many-sided activities. Dr. G.H. Ojha wrote only a brief biographical paper on him, and expressed the hope that a fuller work, commensurate with Jai Singh's significant role in the history of the eighteenth century, might be attempted. In the great works of Tod, Suryamal Mishran and Kaviraja Shyamaldas, valuable, though insufficient, information is found about Jai Singh's life and activities. Later, W. Irvine, J.N. Sarkar, M.K. Raghbir Singh, Q.S. Sardesai, V.G. Dighe and Satish Chandra also examined Jai Singh's role in the Imperial politics and his relations with the Marathas, but in a manner and to the extent it suited their themes, and their scholarly works did not in any way render the need of a larger and a fuller work on Jai Singh superfluous. Moreover, most of these scholars, for various reasons, had not full access to the Rajput records. This book, besides having its own independent value, will prove a useful supplement to the works of the above-mentioned scholars, especially because the archival records of the Rajput states, used in this work, are not only of much relevance to the history of the later Mughals, and of the Marathas during the most crucial phase of their development as a dominant power, but also because these records serve as a corrective to the accounts of the Persian authorities that often give an erroneous picture of the trends and movements antagonistic to the Imperial authority. The Rajput records, as a perusal of this work will show, give a more faithful picture of the relationship

between the Mughal government and other powers, including the Marathas, and the role played by them in the history of the times.

Jai Singh, as is well known, played a key role in the history of the later Mughal period. His role in the history of Rajputana was so important that about him it can be truly said that his biography is more or less the history of this region from 1707 to 1743 A.D. From 1714 onwards he took an increasingly prominent part in the history of the country. For about thirty years (1714-43 A.D.) he was undoubtedly one of the most influential figures in the country and played a decisive role in shaping the policies of the Mughal government, especially towards the Marathas. It is for this reason that this book often crosses the narrow confines of a biographical work.

There is another justification for writing this book. Jai Singh's policies towards the Mughals, the Marathas, and the states of Rajputana and Bundelkhand, towards the Nizam and other grandees have often been misunderstood, and his role as a great conciliator and peacemaker has not been fully realised. While his extraordinary abilities were readily recognised even by his contemporaries, his motives were often doubted. This work, it is hoped, will correct some of the erroneous notions about Jai Singh and his policies. Moreover, for yet another reason Jai Singh's life deserve a fuller treatment than has been hitherto given, for what place him apart from other eminent personages of this period, like the Nizam and Peshwa Baji Rao. were his remarkable intellectual attainments and his services to the Muses, described in Chapter XII. Though deeply involved in contemporary politics, he could yet make significant contribution in the fields of astronomy and town-planning, art and literature, and earn for himself the reputation of being "one of the brightest intellects of India". His attempt to revive Vedic learning, and the rites like the *Asvamedha*, the *Rajsuya*, etc., thrilled the Hindu mind, and excited wonder and admiration for his unlimited capacity to achieve high distinction in diverse fields in the midst of surging anarchy all-around. A study of the life of such a person should naturally be rewarding.

Any one who attempts to undertake this task is confronted with an overwhelming mass of contemporary records, including numerous letters received by him from the rulers of Rajputana, the states of Malwa and Bundelkhand, and from nearly all the

eminent personalities of India of that period, including the four Emperors in whose contact he personally came, the Maratha Chhatrapati, the Peshwas, and eminent scholars and Pandits of his time. There are also the drafts of his letters sent to them. The papers recording his daily activity literally run into thousands, and these, along with the *Wakil Reports*, the *Akhbarat*, the reports sent by various officials, and the letters received from the Imperial officers form a truly imposing pile. The records concerning the administration, described in Chapter XI, are even greater in number. This book is based mainly on these and the Marathi records though the works of the authors mentioned above have proved indispensable and to these scholars I am sincerely indebted.

In writing the account I have tried to follow the chronology as far as possible. In the transliteration of the documents, formal complimentary phrases have been dropped. I have not given the serial numbers of the documents as not all categories of the documents in the Archives are numbered, nor have the numbers remained unaltered during the course of their rearrangement during the last few years when I consulted the records. I have however given the *Samvat* and the *Hijri* dates of the documents (along with the corresponding date according to the Christian calendar). The designation of the officials, names of the departments, and of records, etc., have been given as pronounced in the State and as written in the documents. No conscious or consistent attempt has been made to give their correct nomenclature which, however, will be obvious to all who are acquainted with their correct form.

That the work leaves much to be accomplished, especially in the last two chapters, is regretted, but so inexhaustible are the materials on the life and varied activities of Jai Singh, and some of his activities, like his astronomical labours, require so much specialized knowledge that I am now placing it before the scholars in the shape I could give it. I do however hope that my modest attempt would receive approbation of those who are well acquainted with the problems and lacunae in the history of this period.

In the end, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all from whom I received help and encouragement. To Dr. M. L. Sharma, former Professor of History, University of Rajasthan, I am indebted for his guidance while I was engaged in my doctoral dissertation on *The History of Rajputana during the Eighteenth*

Century (1700-43 A.D.), which was approved by the University of Rajasthan in 1959, and out of which, to some extent at least, this monograph has grown. My grateful thanks are due to Dr. G.C. Pande, Tagore Professor and the Head of the Department of History and Indian Culture, University of Rajasthan, the late Dr. V.P.S. Raghuvanshi, and Dr. G.N. Sharma, Professor of History, University of Rajasthan, for their encouragement and kind interest in the work; to Dr. Satish Chandra, Professor of History, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, who first asked me to write this work and for helping me in various other ways; to late Prof. N.R. Khadgawat, Director, Rajasthan Archives, and the staff of the Archives Departments of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kotah, Bundi, and Udaipur for generously providing me with facilities to study the records; to Dr. Satya Prakash, Kunwar Sangram Singh, Dr. R.C. Agarwal and to my colleagues in the Department for their help and advice. I am also grateful to the authorities of the Saraswati Bhawan Library, Udaipur, Pustak Prakash Library, Jodhpur, Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner, Vidyapeeth, Udaipur, the Research Library, Department of History (Aligarh), and the staff of the Library of the University of Rajasthan and the Maharaja Public Library, Jaipur, for allowing me to use their collections. An abridged version of this book was published in 1972 by the Hindi Grantha Academy, Rajasthan. I am grateful to the Director of the Academy for allowing me to publish the book in its original and unabridged form. I am, finally, very grateful to Shri S.R. Goel of Impex India for undertaking publication of the work.

Jaipur
October 1974

V.S. BHATNAGAR

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Ahwal</i>	<i>Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin</i> by Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi.
<i>Ain</i>	<i>Ain-i-Akbari</i> by Abul Fazl. Eng. tr. by Blochmann and Jarret, 3 vols.
<i>Akhbarat</i>	<i>Farrukh-siyar Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Muala</i>
Ashob	<i>Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-siyar.</i>
Athar Ali	<i>The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb</i> by Athar Ali.
<i>B.I.S.M.Q.</i>	<i>Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal Quarterly.</i>
<i>B.N.</i>	<i>Balmukund Nama.</i>
Bankidas	<i>Aitihāsik Baten</i> by Bankidas.
Bhagwandas	<i>Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela</i> by Bhagwandas.
Bhimsen	<i>Nuskha-i-Dilkusha</i> by Bhimsen.
<i>Br.Ch.</i>	<i>Brahmendra Swanichen Charitra.</i>
<i>D.A.</i>	<i>Dastur-al-amal.</i>
<i>D.H.</i>	<i>Diwan-i-Hazuri Daftar</i>
Dighe	V.G. Dighe's <i>Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion.</i>
<i>D.K.</i>	<i>Dastur Komwar Papers.</i>
Duff	<i>A History of the Marathas, Vol. I and II</i> by J.G. Duff.
<i>E.I.</i>	<i>Epigraphia Indica.</i>
G.N. Sharma-	<i>Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan</i> by
<i>Social Life</i>	Dr. G.N. Sharma.
Hadiqat	<i>Hadiqat-ul-Alam.</i>
Heber	<i>Narrative of a journey through the Upper Provinces of India.</i>
<i>I.A.</i>	<i>Indian Antiquary.</i>
Iradat Khan	<i>Tazkira</i> , tr. into English by Jonathan Scott in <i>History of Dekhan</i> , Vol. II, part 4.
Irfan Habib	<i>The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707).</i>
Irvine	<i>Later Mughals</i> , 2 vols. by William Irvine.

<i>J.A.S.B.</i>	<i>Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal</i>
<i>J.B.R.S.</i>	<i>Journal of Bihar Research Society.</i>
<i>J.I.H.</i>	<i>Journal of Indian History.</i>
<i>Jodhpur S.A.</i>	<i>Jodhpur State Archives.</i>
<i>J.S.A.</i>	<i>Jaipur State Archives.</i>
<i>Juni Bahi</i>	<i>Pustak Prakash ri Juni Bahi.</i>
<i>Kamraj</i>	<i>Ibrat Nama.</i>
<i>Kamwar</i>	<i>Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtai.</i>
<i>Kane</i>	<i>History of Dharmasastra.</i>
<i>K.D.</i>	<i>Kapatdwara Records.</i>
<i>Kaye</i>	<i>The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh.</i>
<i>Khush-hal Chand</i>	<i>Nadir-uz-Zamani</i> by Khush-hal Chand.
<i>K.K.</i>	<i>Khafi Khan's Muntakhab-ul-Lubab</i> (Vol. II, Bib. Ind. Series).
<i>M.A.</i>	<i>Maasir-i-Alamgiri.</i> English tr. by J.N. Sarkar.
<i>M.K.R.</i>	<i>Mahakama Khass Records.</i>
<i>Malleson</i>	<i>An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India.</i>
<i>Malwa</i>	Raghubir Singh's <i>Malwa in Transition.</i>
<i>M.M.</i>	<i>Ibrat Nama</i> by Mirza Muhammad.
<i>M.U.</i>	<i>Maasir-ul-Umara</i> , 3 vols. Eng. tr. by Beveridge and Bains Prashad in 2 vols. cited.
<i>Nensi</i>	<i>Muhta Nensi ri Khyat.</i>
<i>Ojha, Jodhpur</i>	G.H. Ojha's <i>Jodhpur Rajya ka Itihas.</i>
<i>Ojha, Bikaner</i>	G.H. Ojha's <i>Bikaner Rajya ka Itihas</i> , etc.
<i>O.H.R.</i>	<i>Old Historical Records, Jaipur.</i>
<i>Parties</i>	Satish Chandra's <i>Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740.</i>
<i>P.A.</i>	<i>Persian Arzdasht.</i>
<i>P.I.H.C.</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.</i>
<i>P.I.H.R.C.</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission.</i>
<i>P.R.H.C.</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Rajasthan History Congress.</i>
<i>P.L.</i>	<i>Persian Letter</i> , Jaipur State Archives.
<i>P.W.R.</i>	<i>Persian Wakil Report.</i>
<i>P.P.</i>	<i>Persian Parwanah.</i>

Qasim	<i>Ibrat Nama</i> by Muhammad Qasim Lahori.
R.A.	<i>Rajasthan Archives</i> , Bikaner.
Rajwade	Rajwade's <i>Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhanen</i> .
Reu-Marwar	<i>Marwar Ka Itihas</i> , by Pt. V.N. Reu.
Reu-Glories	<i>Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors</i> by Pt. V.N. Reu.
Rustam Ali	Rustam Ali's <i>Tarikh-i-Hindi</i> .
Saran	<i>Provincial Government of the Mughals (1526-1658)</i> by Dr. Parmatma Saran.
Sardesai	<i>New History of the Marathas</i> by G.S. Sardesai.
Sarkar, Aurangzeb	<i>History of Aurangzeb</i> , 5 vols. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.
Sarkar, Fall	<i>Fall of the Mughal Empire</i> , Vol. I, by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.
S.C.V.	<i>Sardesai Commemoration Volume</i> .
Seir	<i>Seir-ul-Mutaakhkhirin</i> .
S.P.D.	<i>Selections from the Peshwa Daftar</i> , ed. by G.S. Sardesai.
Sharma-Kotah	<i>Kotah Rajya Ka Itihas</i> by Dr. M.L. Sharma
Shivdas	<i>Munavvar-ul-Kalam</i> .
Tod	<i>Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan</i> , 2 vols.
Vad, Selectiods	<i>Selections from Satara Raja's Diaries</i> .
Vamsha	<i>Vamsha Bhaskar</i> by Surya Mal Mishran.
V.V.	<i>Vir Vinod</i> by Kaviraja Shyamaldas.
Warid	<i>Mirat-i-Waridat</i> by Muhammad Shafi Warid
Wills' Report	<i>Report on the Land Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Thikanadars of the Jaipur State</i> .
W.R.	<i>Wakil Report</i> .
Yahya	<i>Tazkirat-ul-Muluk</i> .

CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY

The origin of the Kachhwahas of Amber; their relation with the Kacchapaghata of Narwar and Gwalior. Sawai Jai Singh belonged to the ancient Kachhwaha family of Amber. The origin and early history of the Kachhwaha Rajputs, despite a number of genealogical tables of considerable antiquity, bardic accounts, and a few epigraphic records, is shrouded in obscurity. The Kachhwahas of Amber claim descent from Kusha, son of Lord Ram of Ayodhya. The bardic tradition speaks of their westward migration, during the course of which they first founded the castle of Rohtas on the Son, and thence a section of the tribe under Raja Nal migrated further west and founded Narwar or Naisadha.¹ Their epigraphic records, however, neither attribute to them a mythical origin, nor speak of their migration, but abruptly introduce the founder of the various branches as *Kacchapaghata-Vamsatilaka*, or *Kacchapaghata-vaya-sarah-kamala-martanda*.² Though linguistically the word Kacchapaghata or Kachhwaha cannot be derived from Kusha, the statement that a section of the tribe settled at Narwar, is supported by Vir Singh's grant of V.S. 1177 (1120 A.D.), issued from Nalapura-mahadurga.³ There are other epigraphic records also which show that in the 10th and the 11th centuries, three families of Kacchapaghata were ruling in areas almost contiguous to eastern Rajputana—at Narwar, Gwalior and Dubkund. As the area over which they ruled was in the dominion of the Gurjara

1. Nensi's *Khyat* (Jodhpur: Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, 1959), Vol. I, pp. 288, 292, 295; *Koormavilas* (R.A.M.S.), ff. 1, 10a; James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, reprint 1957), Vol. II, p. 280.

2. H.C. Ray, *The Dynastic History of Northern India (Early Medieval Period)* (Calcutta, 1936), II, p. 821.

3. Bhandarkar, *A List of Inscriptions of Northern India*, No. 206; Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India Report*, Vol. II, p. 313.

Pratiharas, it seems they were feudatories of Kannauj.⁴

The most important record of the Gwalior branch is the Sasbahu temple inscription of Mahipal of V.S. 1150. The inscription describes Lakshman as the first prince of this line, and his son, Vajradaman, generally identified with Maharajadhiraj Vajradaman of the fragmentary Jain image inscription of Gwalior of V.S. 1034 (A.D. 977), is described as having conquered Gopadri or Gwalior. The next prince mentioned in the inscription is Mangalraj, who is followed by Kirtiraj (C. 1015-35 A.D.). Muladeva or Bhuvanapal, Devapal, Padmapal, and Mahipal whose inscription of V.S. 1150 (A.D. 1093) is the source of the above information.⁵

Turning to the bardic accounts of the Kachhwahas of Amber we find that Dhola Rai, son of Sodhadeo or Sora Singh, the Prince of Narwar, and thirty-third in descent from Nal, on being expelled from his paternal abode, laid the foundation of the State of Dhoondhar in 966 A.D.,⁶ i.e., about the time when Lakshman, or his son Vajradaman, whose earliest inscription is of 977 A.D., was

4. H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 821-22. The scholars are in general agreement with Cunningham (*Archaeological Survey of India Report*, II, p. 319) regarding a lineal connection between the Kachhwahas of Jaipur and the Kacchapaghatas of Gwalior. Rajpana and Nensi, both include the Kacchapaghata princes of Gwalior in their list, and Kharag Rai and Fazl Ali also connect the Kachhwahas of Amber with Kacchapaghatas of Gwalior. See Gopalchandra Raychaudhuri, 'The Early History of the Kachhwahas of Amber', *B.C. Law Volume* (Calcutta, 1945), Part I, pp. 684-85. Cf. A.C. Banerji, *Lectures on Rajput History* (Calcutta, 1962), pp. 28-29.

5. *IA*, XV, 33-46; H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 822-28.

6. Tod, II, 280-81. After Sodha Singh's death, says the account, his brother usurped the government of Narwar, and deprived Dhola, then an infant, of his inheritance. Dhola's mother happened to come to the kingdom of the Mina Chief of Khogong. When Dhola grew up, he wrested the territory from the Minas. (Tod, II, 281). The Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives gives Kartik Vadi 10, S. 1023 (A.D. 966) as the date of Sodhadeva's accession, and Magha Sudi 7, S. 1063 (1006 A.D.) as the date of Dhola's accession to the throne of Dhoondhar, while *Jaipur Khyat*, cited in *V.V.* II, 1270, gives Magha Sudi 6, S. 1063 as the date of Dhola's accession. Nensi says (I, 293) that after leaving Narwar, Sodhadeo came to Dhoondhar and founded his power there. But according to Rajpana (Nensi, I, p. 290), Dulahdeo made a gift of Gwalior to a Tomar prince. Ojha cites a tradition which says that when Raja Isa Singh gave away Gwalior to his daughter's son, a Tomar, Sodhadeva came to eastern Rajputana, seized Dausa from the Badgujars (A.D. 966-67) and laid the

ruling at Gwalior. But the genealogical table of the Kachhwahas dictated to Nensi by Rajpana, Bhat of Udahi, thus describes the successors of Nal (No. 121), the founder of Narwar: "122 Dhola; 123 Lakshman; 124 Vajradham, who built Gwalior; 125 Mangalrai; 126 Kratarai; 127 Muldeo; 128 Padampal; 129 Suryapal; 120 Mahipal", and then after mentioning the names of nineteen princes gives "150 Isa Singh; 151 Sodhadeo; 152 Dulahdeo, who gave Gwalior to Tanwar, his sister's son; 153 Hanuman; 154 Kakildeva, who founded Amber".⁷ It will be noted that in this table Dhola's name occurs between Nal and Lakshman, and excepting one prince, the names of all the rulers from Lakshman to Mahipal occur in this very order in Mahipal's inscription of V.S. 1150 (1093 A.D.). In another genealogical table given by Nensi, Dhola is described as the son of Nal, and is again placed between Nal and Lakshman.⁸ In the *Kachhwaha Vamshavali* (in the Jaipur Archives) also we find Dhola's name immediately after Nal. A synchronous study of the inscriptions of the Kacchhapghatas, the bardic traditions, and genealogical tables, suggests that the Kachhwahas of Amber and Gwalior had emanated from the Narwar house, which was the main stem, and that the Kachhwahas of Amber had branched off immediately after Nal, with Dhola migrating to Dhoondhar, where, according to the tradition, he laid the foundation of Dhoondhar State in 966 A.D., while Lakshman, who flourished at this very time, established himself at Gwalior. Further, it seems, it was not Dulah Deva but Dhola or Dhola who founded the State of Dhoondhar. In the bardic accounts also it is Dhola who is credited with the foundation of

foundation of the Kachhwaha State. According to *Kacchavamshamahakavya* (Canto III, vs. 10) Sodhadeo ascended the *gaddi* of Gwalior on Kartik Vadi 9, S. 1023, but left the State to fulfil the promise of his father, Isadeva, to give away the *rajya* to his sister's son, Jai Singh Tomar. Though the Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives, *Kacchavamshamahakavya* (Canto III, vss. 10-23), *Jaiavamshamahakavya* (Canto I, vs. 13), and *Koormavilas* (f. 6b) say that Dhola came from Gwalior and that Sodhadeo was ruling at Gwalior, Nensi (I, 293, 295), Bankidas (No. 1405) and Tod (II, 281) say that Dhola came from Narwar, which seems to be correct. The point, however, remains controversial. For the name Dhoondhar for Jaipur see Tod, II, 280, n. 1; Cunningham, *A.S.R.*, Vol. II, p. 251; *Annual Report of the Rajputana Museum, Ajmer*, 1933-34, p. 4.

7. Nensi, I, pp. 289-90.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

Dhoondhar State, and the traditional date of the event (966 A.D.) indicates that he was a contemporary of Lakshman, which is suggested by the *Vamshavalis* also. Moreover, if the traditional date of the founding of Dhoondhar (966 A.D.)⁹ is accepted, it would mean that the names of the rulers from Lakshman to Mahipal in the genealogical tables of Amber house are there, the chroniclers having mixed up the different branches.

Though the Kachhwahas of Amber seem to have a lineal connection with the Kacchapaghata of Gwalior. in their inscriptions they claim to belong not to the Kacchapaghata or Kacchapari (lit. slayers of Kacchapas or tortoise), but to Kurma (i.e. tortoise) family itself.¹⁰ It is however likely that Kacchapa or Kurma is a shortened form of Kacchapaghata. If it is so, as seems likely, the possibility of Kacchapaghata and Kachhwaha being of different stock, the former being slayers or enemies of the latter, as their designation implies, does not arise. This view is supported by inclusion of the Kacchapaghata princes of Gwalior in the genealogies given by Rajpana and Nensi.

Amber secured. Dhola or Dulah Rai, before his death at the hands of the Minas, acquired Dausa (about 38 miles east of Jaipur) from the Badgujars,¹¹ and laid the foundation of the State of Dhoondhar by expelling the Minas from Machi (about 18 miles north-west of Jaipur) which he renamed Ramgarh, and also from Khoh (6 miles east of Jaipur). He also captured the Deoti fort near Alwar.¹² His son Kakil, who ascended the *gaddi* in 1036 A.D., wrested Amber (7 miles north-east of Jaipur) from

9. The date of the Kachhwaha migration to Dhoondhar is a subject of much controversy. Tod and Ojha accept 967 A.D., which Cunningham (*op. cit.*, 376) rejects. He proposes 1128 or 1129 A.D. (pp 375, 377). Raychaudhuri (*loc. cit.*, 689-90) examines the point in detail.

10. Adinath Temple inscription dated V.S. 1661 at Revasa (in former Jaipur State) in *Annual Report of Rajputana Museum, Ajmer, 1934-35*, p. 5; Sanganer Inscription dated V.S. 1658 (*Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Western Circle*, p. 49).

11. Their capital was the hill fortress of Rajor. Badgujaras appear to be a branch of the Gurjars who were ruling in the region to the west of Alwar. An inscription of S. 1016 (960 A.D.) describes Rajorgarh as the capital of Mathanadeva of the Gurjara-Pratihara lineage. (*E.I.*, III, pp. 263 ff.)

12. Tod, II, 281-82; *Kacchavamshamahakavya*, Canto III, vss. 24-30, 40, 49, 69; *Koornavilas*, 10a-11a,

the Minas.¹³ The place remained the Kachhwaha capital for about seven hundred years.

Kachhwahas pay allegiance to the Chauhans; common error about Pajvan. At this time the Chauhans of Shakambhari were emerging as an important power in northern India. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Kachhwahas paid allegiance to the Spadalaksha kingdom. Pradyumna or Pajvan, the fifth in descent from Dhola, is described as a *samanta* of Chauhan king Prithviraj.¹⁴ He also married a niece of the Chauhan ruler. But, confounding Prithviraj I with Prithviraj III, almost all the writers and poets have narrated Pajvan's career in the context of the events of Prithviraj III's reign and say that he died while covering his master's flight from Kannauj with Princess Samyogita.¹⁵ This error, however, makes the entire chronology, which from Dhola onwards seems to be fairly correct, entirely inconsistent with the well-established dates we know from other sources. Also, Pajvan's period, as given in the *Vamshavalis*, nearly coincides with that of Prithviraj I, while it is far removed from that of Prithviraj III.¹⁶

Kuntil faces Delhi's invasion; decline of the Sultanate a Rajput opportunity. We pass over the intermediate princes, and come to Kuntil, who succeeded his father, Kilhan, in 1276 A.D.¹⁷ Isami, apparently, refers to him when he says that Sultan Muhammad Tughluq, on his return to Delhi after Tarmashirin's invasion (1327-28), undertook an expedition against Kachhwaha Kotal, and then went to Ajmer to pay his respects at the shrine of

13. Nensi, I, 296; Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives; *Kacchavamshamahakavya*, Canto IV, vss. 1-19, 33, which say that Kakil died in S. 1096. See also Tod, II, p. 282, who says that Kankul (Kakil) conquered Dhoondhar and his son Maidul Rao made a conquest of Amber from the Soosawat Meenas.

14. Nensi, I, p. 296.

15. Thus, see Tod, II, 283-84; *Kacchavamshamahakavya*, Canto IV, vss. 86-94; *Jaivamshamahakavya*, Canto IV; *Koormavilas*, 19a-b, 21a; Narendra Singh, *Thirty Decisive Battles*, XLIX-L; *Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 534; Raychaudhuri, *loc. cit.*, pp. 691-92; Cf. Hanuman Sharma, *Jaipur ka Itihas*, pp. 23-25.

16. According to the Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives, Pajvan ascended the throne in V.S. 1127 and died in V.S. 1151. The earliest known inscription of Prithviraj I is of V.S. 1162. See Dasharatha Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties* (Delhi, 1959), pp. 37-38.

17. Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives.

Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti.¹⁸ We do not know the outcome of the campaign. However, even if Amber had succumbed to Turkish domination, which seems likely, it is certain that she soon regained freedom by taking advantage of the growing weakness of the Sultanate after 1335 A.D.¹⁹

Prithviraj; Kachhwahas fight under Mewar at Khanwah. From 1326, Mewar's grand recovery commenced under Lakha, and later under Kumbha and Sanga, till it became one of the greatest powers in northern India during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. Like most of the other Rajputs, the Kachhwahas too paid homage to Mewar, and Prithviraj, who ascended the throne of Amber in 1502 A.D.,²⁰ and his son Jagmal, along with a large number of their kinsmen, fought under Mewar's leadership against Babar at Khanwah (March 17, 1527). When Rana Sanga was wounded, and fell unconscious during the course of battle, Prithviraj, along with Rao Maldeo and the Sirohi chief, escorted the Rana to a safe place.²¹ Prithviraj died on November 19, 1527,²² two months before Sanga's death (January 30, 1528). The latter is believed to have been poisoned by a section of his nobles who were opposed to his resolve to face Babar again.²³ The possibility of Prithviraj having met an unnatural death like Sanga, and for the same very reason, cannot be ruled out, especially when we note that his successors, instead of maintaining the struggle against the foreign foe, readily paid allegiance to him.²⁴ Prithviraj had assigned to eight of his sons appanages in perpetuity; these and four of the collateral line became known as the twelve *Kotris*, and their holders formed the highest nobility in

18. Isami's *Futuh-us-Salatin* trans. Rizvi, 104.

19. Kuntil was followed by Junsi (Jawan Singh), Udaikaran, Nar Singh, Uddharan, and Chandrasen who was followed by his son Prithviraj, father of Bharmal. Udaikaran's three sons—Kumbho, Balo and Var Singh—became the progenitor of the Kumbhani, Shekhawat and Naruka branches of the Kachhwahas. (Nensi, I, p. 296).

20. Genealogical Table, Jaipur Archives.

21. G.N. Sharma, *Mewar and the Mughal Emperors* (2nd Ed., Agra, 1962), 23 and n. 43; 34.

22. Genealogical Table, Jaipur Archives.

23. G.N. Sharma, *op. cit.*, 39 and n. 112.

24. See Tod, II, p. 285, who speaks of Prithviraj's violent death. Prithviraj's son and successor, Puranmal, is said to have died fighting under Prince Hindal against Tatar Khan.

Amber State.²⁵

Confusion after Prithviraj. The record from Prithviraj to Bharmal is obscure. The genealogical tables give different versions of the seniority of Prithviraj's sons and the order in which his sons and grandsons succeeded one another.²⁶ It seems Bharmal (accession on June 25, 1547) was preceded by his brothers, Puranmal and Bhim, and Bhim's sons named Ratansi and Askaran, as the rulers of Amber.²⁷

25. These were Chomu Samod of Nathawats; Naila Samariya of Pachyanot; Achrol of Balbhadrot; Saivad, Naraina and Diggi of Khangarot; Bagru of Chaturbhujot; Kalwad of Kalyanot; Suroth Karada of Surtanot and Sand Kotda of Pratappota. The four which existed prior to Prithviraj were: Banskoh of Kumbhanis, Nindar of Shivabrahmapota, Watka of Banvirpota and Mahar of Kumawats. Cf. Tod, II, 352; Bankidas, No. 1468; *Jaipur Ka Itihas*, 63.

26. The Genealogical Table in the Jaipur Archives describes Puranmal as the eldest son of Prithviraj; the Genealogical Table in *Juni Bahi* does not mention him; but Nensi does (I, 313). Nensi, I, 290, *Juni Bahi*, 112 and Bankidas, No. 1409 describe Bharmal as the eldest son. As to the number of sons, Tod (II, 285) gives seventeen, Bankidas gives the names of thirteen and *Juni Bahi* records the following thirteen:

1. Bharmal (sons: Bhagwandas, Bhagwant, Jagannath, Sahalri, Sundardas, Sahul. But at another place, while describing the sons and grandsons of Bharmal, it first mentions Bhagwantdas followed by Bhagwandas).
2. Ratansi (sons: Vikmavad, Karn, Keso).
3. Bhim (son: Raja Askaran).
4. Sangi (died childless).
5. Balbhadra (son: Achaldas).
6. Surtan (sons: Tiloka, Sundardas, Sagat Singh, Mohandas, Chando).
7. Pratap (sons: Bhojraj, Khivkaran).
8. Jagmal (sons: Khangar, Sarangre, Jeso, Sidha, Ram Chandra).
9. Rupsibairagi (sons: Jaimal, Ramchand, Kevaldas).
10. Dungar Singh (childless).
11. Kalyandas (sons: Karamsi, Mohaldas, Jagannath, Rahosep).
12. Gopal Singh.
13. Chaturbhuj (son: Kirat Singh).

27. According to *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 1273-75, Prithviraj was succeeded by Puranmal, after whose death on January 18, 1534, his son, Suja, went away to his maternal grandfather, and Bhim Singh ascended the *gaddi*. Bhim was followed by Ratan Singh, a weak and dissolute man, while Sanga established himself at Sanganer. After Sanga's murder by a Charan, Bharmal established himself at Sanganer, and after Ratan Singh was poisoned by Askaran at his (Bharmal's) instigation, he took possession of Amber and expelled Askaran,

Amber acknowledges Mughal suzerainty; a new phase in her career begins. From Bharmal's time the history of Amber takes a decisive turn. He accepted the Mughal umbrella, a step which though proved fatal to Amber's independence, proved beneficial to her in many other ways. In July-August 1556, within six months of Akbar's accession, when the Emperor's position was far from stable and Delhi and Agra were about to fall to Hemu, Bharmal interceded in favour of Majnun Khan Qaqshal, the Mughal commandant of Narnaul, then being besieged by Haji Khan, an adherent of the Surs, and secured him a safe retreat. For this assistance, at Majnun Khan's instance, Raja Bharmal was invited in November 1556 to attend the celebrations to mark the victory over Hemu. Akbar conferred robes of honour on the Raja, his sons, and relations, and had a chance to witness the characteristic Rajput bravery when, in the midst of festivities, a drunken elephant ran towards the Kachhwahas, who, disdaining to fly, remained firm at their posts. "The Emperor made enquiries about the Raja and said with his mystery-interpreting tongue: 'we will make you happy'." From this time up to 1562, there is no mention of Bharmal having met the Emperor. In January 1561, Mirza Sharf-ud-Din was appointed to the government of Mewat and Nagor, and soon Ajmer was also added to his charge. While supporting Suja's claim to the throne of Amber on the plea that he was the son of Puranmal, the eldest son of Prithviraj, Sharf-ud-Din invaded Amber, took contribution from Bharmal, and carried away his son, Jagannath, and his nephews, as hostages. In this desperate situation Bharmal sought Akbar's protection through Chaghtai Khan, a Mughal noble, and met the Emperor, then on his way to Ajmer, at Sanganer, seven miles south of Jaipur, and on the advice of Chaghtai Khan and Maham Anaga, offered his daughter's hand to the Emperor. The nuptials were solemnised at Sambhar in February 1562 when Akbar was on his way back from Ajmer to Agra.²⁸ The marriage was followed by Akbar's marriages with

who went away to Delhi and received Narwar in *jagir* from Islam Shah Sur. See also R.N. Prasad, *Raja Man Singh of Amber* (Calcutta, 1966), p. 5. For the date of Bharmal's accession, see Genealogical Table, *J.S.A.*

28. See *Akbar Nama* trans. H. Beveridge, II, pp. 70, 240-44; A.L. Srivastava, "Amber's Alliance with Akbar", *Proceedings of Rajasthan History Congress*, 1967, pp. 49-55. For Maham Anaga's suggestion, Bankidas No. 2353.

the princesses of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, etc. This development, as well as Akbar's innate qualities and liberal outlook, which found a ready echo in the hearts of the Hindus, brought the Rajputs closer to the Mughal house, and, while ensuring continuance of their States and safety and honour of their religion, enabled them to play a significant role as soldiers and administrators in different parts of India. Mewar alone chose to fight for its freedom, and for more than fifty years maintained a highly unequal but most heroic struggle against the Mughal government, thereby adding one of the proudest and soul-stirring chapters to the history of India, and winning for itself the epithet '*Hinduain Suraj*', by which title it was again and again addressed in the subsequent centuries, by the Hindu rulers in distress.

Renown and prosperity of Amber under Man Singh. The wide and varied opportunities, which now offered themselves to the Kachhwaha rulers as a result of their alliance with the central power, gave an outlet to their remarkable abilities in the fields of war, diplomacy and administration, and enabled some of the gifted Kachhwaha princes to rise to the highest positions in the Empire, and to earn a lasting name for their military and diplomatic talents, and for their devotion to their religion and culture. Long before his death, Bharmal was appointed to the rank of 5,000, the highest open for those outside the Mughal family, and during the two Gujarat campaigns, Akbar even left the capital in his charge.²⁹ His son Bhagwantdas held the title of Amir-ul-Umara and the rank of 5000. He played a conspicuous role in the campaigns in Rajputana, Gujarat and Kashmir, and during 1583-89 served as the governor of Lahor *subah*. He died in November, 1589,³⁰ and was succeeded by his son, Man Singh,³¹

29. See *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, 409-11; A.L. Srivastava, *loc. cit.*, 54.

30. *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, pp. 404-405; Smith, *Akbar the Great Mughal* (New Delhi, Indian reprint, 1958) p. 174.

31. That Bharmal was succeeded by Bhagwantdas, who in turn was succeeded by his son Man Singh, is established by *Jamwa Ramgarh Inscription* of Phalgun Sudi 5, S. 1669; *Ishvaravilasamahakavyam*, Canto I, vss. 19-20; Bankidas, Nos. 1413, 1416, 1424; *Akbar Nama* (trans. Beveridge), II, 244. The doubts about the parentage of Man Singh (see Tod, II, 286; Ojha, *Nibandha Sangraha*, III, 41-50; Smith, 174 n. 3) have been examined in detail by R.N. Prasad, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-20. The genealogical table in *Juni Bahi*, Jaipur Archives, also mentions Bhagwantdas before Bhagwandas and other sons of Bharmal. It also gives the names of Bhagwantdas's sons viz. Raja Man Singh

a legendary figure in his own life-time, and the most distinguished and successful of Emperor Akbar's generals. He held a *mansab* of 5000, and later of 7000. He ably served as the governor of Kabul, and subsequently of Bihar and Bengal. Raja Man Singh left behind him a large number of temples and palaces at Amber, Brindaban, and in Bihar and Bengal. From his time Amber became one of the best known and most prosperous of the semi-autonomous states in the country. He died on July 6, 1614.³²

Brilliant career of Mirza Raja Jai Singh. We pass over Bhao Singh, and come to Jai Singh, the grandson of Jagat Singh, the eldest son of Raja Man, who succeeded to the *gaddi* of Amber in February 1622. Jai Singh, or Mirza Raja Jai Singh as he was better known, grew up to become one of the outstanding figures of his times. Beginning with a rank of 1000/500 in 1621, he rose to hold a rank of 5000/5000, of which 4000 were *du-aspa sih-aspa*, in 1649, when he was only forty years of age. He had till that time participated in all the major campaigns of the Mughals. He played a decisive role in the War of Succession which flared up towards the end of 1657. Aurangzeb, after his victory, confirmed Jai Singh's *mansab* (7000/7000, of which 5000 were *du-aspa sih-aspa*) granted to him by Dara during the succession war. In 1664 he was sent against Shivaji, whom he forced to conclude the Treaty of Purandar (June 13, 1665), and persuaded him to visit Agra. This was the crowning achievement of Mirza Raja's career. His letters to Emperor Aurangzeb, in which he urges his highly suspicious master to ratify the treaty he had made with the Maratha king and to permit him (Jai Singh) to proceed against Bijapur, show him to be a masterful personality. The Emperor agreed to every point that he had made in his letters. But for Mirza Raja's influence and position, the Emperor might

(born in V.S. 1607), Sur Singh, Madho Singh (born in V.S. 1610), and Pratap Singh. It says (p. 115) that Bhagwant or Bhagwat and Jagannath were sons of Phulwati Rathor, daughter of Rana Akhai Raj, son of Rao Ridmal, and describes Bhagmati Pawar, daughter of Panchain Karamchandot and mother of Man Singh, as the seniormost of the ten queens of Bhagwantdas. It does not use the title of Raja for Bhagwandas. It mentions Akhairaj, Arjun, and Har Ram as his sons.

32. *M.U.*, trans. B. & B. II, pp. 48-57. For a detailed account of Man Singh's life and career, see R.N. Prasad, *Raja Man Singh of Amber* (Calcutta 1966), and A.L. Srivastava, *Akbar the Great*, 2nd ed., Agra, 1972.

have done worse to Shivaji who, trusting the solemn assurances of the Raja, had agreed to visit the Court. Shivaji's spectacular escape from Agra on August 18, 1666, in which the Emperor strongly suspected the complicity of Mirza Raja's eldest son, Ram Singh, and the failure of the Bijapur campaign, clouded the last days of the Mirza's life. On August 28, 1667, he died at Burhanpur as a result of the injury received from an accidental fall from his elephant.³³ A few days later, the Emperor recognised Ram Singh as the ruler of Amber and granted him the rank of 4000/4000, an elephant, etc.³⁴

Mirza Raja Ram Singh; Amber's fortune under cloud. Though outwardly the Emperor had pardoned Ram Singh, he kept him away from Delhi, first in Assam (1669-1676),³⁵ and then in Afghanistan (1677-78), and again in Afghanistan from December 1681 to 1688. He served at Jalalabad (1677), Lamghan, Ali Masjid, Gandamak (1678), and Ghazni (1678) where his administrative talents were commended by his superiors.³⁶ On April 10, 1682, his only son, Kishan Singh, died in a brawl

33. For his career, see *M.U.* trans. B. & B., I, 731-34; Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, I-IV; for his *mansab Akhbarat*, September 6, 1658 and Bankidas No. 1440; for his role in the War of Succession, see the *farmans* of Shah Jahan and Dara's *nishans* of 1657-58 A.D., preserved in the Jaipur Archives. See his letters to Aurangzeb concerning his negotiations with Shivaji and the Bijapur campaign in *Rajasthan Records—Shivaji's visit to Aurangzeb at Agra*, ed. Sarkar and Raghubir Singh, Calcutta, 1963; and reports of Amber officials at the Court, preserved in the Jaipur Archives, for Shivaji's visit to Agra. His rank in 1664 was 7000/7000 *du-aspa silh-aspa* as per *Akhbarat* dated October 20, 1664. For his death, Ajitdas to Kalyandas, Asoj Sudi 7, S. 1724 (September 14, 1667), *J.S.A.* The writer makes no mention of any accident as is found in the *Akhbarat* (September 6, October 30, 1667) but gives the date on which the death took place. Bankidas (No. 1434) says that Jai Singh had suffered a stroke and died on Asoj Vadi 5, S. 1724 at Burhanpur. The date is the same as in Ajitdas's letter;

34. *Yaddasht*, Asoj Sudi 6, S. 1724 (September 13, 1667); *Arzdasht* to Kalyandas, Asoj Sudi 11, S. 1724 (September 16, 1667), *J.S.A.*

35. For his distinguished services during the siege of Gauhati, his *mansab* was raised by 1000/1000. He already held the rank of 4000/4000 vide Aurangzeb's *farmans* dated July 29, 1669 and March 7, 1670 in *J.S.A.* He was recalled from Assam in February 1676.

36. Shah Alam's *nishans* dated 17th Muharram, 23rd Shaban 1089 H. (1678 A.D.); *Farmans* dated December 6, 1681 and November 15, 1685; a brief sketch of Ram Singh's career is in *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., II, 591-93. In 1681, he was given the title of Mirza Raja.

at the Emperor's Court in the Deccan. Three days later, Kishan Singh's young son, Bishan Singh, then in his eleventh year, was given his father's place and the *mansab* of 1000/400.³⁷ In November 1685, Ram Singh was asked to send his grandson to the Court for training,³⁸ but since the child was the sole heir to the throne, Ram Singh procrastinated and succeeded in having Bishan Singh appointed with him at Kohat. Here Ram Singh died on April 10, 1688.³⁹ Bishan Singh then returned to Amber, and after the solemnities were over, ascended the throne on September 7, 1688. He was then in his eighteenth year. Shortly afterwards he was appointed on a *mansab* of 2000/2000 and 1000 *mashrut* or conditional,⁴⁰ and was posted under Prince Bidar Bakht, son of Prince Azam Shah, who was then conducting operations against the Jats.⁴¹

Birth of Sawai Jai Singh. It was in this ancient family, which had a long and distinguished record spreading over seven centuries, that Jai Singh was born on November 3, 1688, to Raja Bishan Singh's Rathor Queen, Indra Kunvari, the daughter of Kashi Singh Jodha of Khairwa.⁴²

37. *Akhbarat*, April 4, 1682; *M.A.*, trans. Sarkar, 134. In February 1683, he was granted Dausa (*jama* Rs. 26,250 per year).

38. *Farman*, 28 Zul Hijja 1096 H. (November 15, 1685); Kesho Rai (Amber's *wakil*) to Maharaja Ram Singh, *P.W.R.*, 13th Safar 1097 H. (December 20, 1685), *J.S.A.*

39. Kesho Rai, then in the Deccan with the Emperor, came to know of Maharaja Ram Singh's death on April 28, *P.W.R.*, 9 Rajab 1099 H. (April 30, 1688), *J.S.A.* According to *V.V.*, 1296, he died on Ashvin Sudi 5, S. 1746 (H. 1100, 4 Zul Hijja, 19th September 1689).

40. For his accession and the *mansab* see Kesho Rai to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.W.R.*, 9th, 13th Rajab 1099 H. (April 30, May 4, 1688). Bishan Singh was born on Jyestha Vadi 13, S. 1728 (1671 A.D.). The date of accession is from the *Jaipur Yamshavali*.

41. *Juni Bahi*, 113; Kesho Rai to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.W.R.* 10, 13 Rajab, 1099 H. (May 1, 4, 1688); Sukh Singh to Raja Bishan Singh (undated) condoling Maharaja Ram Singh's death and mentioning the *mansab* granted to Bishan Singh, *J.S.A.*

42. Sawai Jai Singh's horoscope in *J.S.A. Kacchayamshamahakavya* (Canto X, vs. 50) says that the child was named Jai Singh; Bankidas, No. 1445, *Jaivamshamahakavya* (Canto X, vss. 51-57) also say that he was named Jai Singh. Cf. *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, 735; *M.A.*, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

CHAPTER II

EARLY LIFE

Amber faces hard times; Bishan Singh's difficulties. When Bishan Singh succeeded his grand father in September 1688, the State of Amber was passing through difficult times. In fact Amber's prestige and influence had declined considerably after Mirza Raja's death in August 1667. Mirza Raja's son, Ram Singh, though recognised as the ruler of Amber, was distrusted by the Emperor who, as we have noted earlier, kept him away all the time, first in the far off Assam, and then in Afghanistan. Long and continued absence of a ruler in distant areas invariably affected the administration in the state, and continued absence of the officers from their lands led to a decline in their incomes, and made them sad and peevish. In the contemporary records, we find repeated mention of chronic scarcity of money felt by the officers of the Rajput contingents when posted in distant, barren, and inhospitable regions. As the *jagir* assignments granted to Raja Ram Singh were resumed after his death, and the small hereditary State was all that Bishan Singh had inherited, it was apparent that a long and strenuous struggle lay ahead of him before he could hope to restore even a part of his State's former prestige and position in the country.

His distinguished record against the Jats. Soon after joining the Imperial service, Bishan Singh, as noted, was posted at Mathura under Prince Bidar Bakht.¹ In July 1688, he was deputed to protect the caravans between Mathura and Agra.² Bishan Singh was a dashing young man and gained rapid promotions in the Imperial service. In August 1688, he was appointed *faujdar* of Mathura.³ The following month he received an increase of 500

1. Kesho Rai to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.W.R.*, 20 Rajab 1009 H. (May 11, 1688), *J.S.A.* Bishan Singh was granted a *mansab* of 2000/2000.

2. Aqil Khan to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.L.*, 23 Ramzan (July 1, 1689), *J.S.A.*

3. Muhammad Aziz to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.L.*, 1107 H., *J.S.A.*

in his rank for having captured Pithor and Kasot forts of the Jats.⁴ In January 1690, he rendered outstanding service in capturing Sinsani fort. In March he again received an increase of 500/1000 in his rank.⁵ These successes and the birth of two sons,⁶ which ensured continuity of the line, stirred up Bishan Singh's strong proclivity for pleasure, and led to a temporary reduction in his *mansab*, and a hint that he might be sent off to Kabul.⁷

After this incident, Bishan Singh displayed much energy and enterprise, and won recognition for capturing Soghar (May 1691), Harsoli (1693), Kasehrar (1693), Sonkher (1694), Raisin (1694), Pinghar, Bathaoli (1694), Jawahar ki Garhi (1695) and a number of other Jat fortresses.⁸ In 1692, he was granted *faujdari* of Hindaun and Bayana, and in 1695 he was also awarded a drum.⁹ Besides, that year he obtained leases of Toda Bhim, Sonkher and a few other *parganas*.¹⁰

Jai Singh's early education and training. By this time Jai Singh (referred to as 'Maharaj Kumar Bara Sahibji' or 'Shri Chimnaji' in the family letters) was seven years old, and his younger brother ('Chimna Sahib Chhota', 'Chhota Sahibji', or 'Chimna Sahibji'),

4. Jagjiwandas to Raja Bishan Singh, Asoj Vadi 9, S. 1745 (September 8, 1688), *J.S.A.*, Jagjiwandas Pancholi had replaced Kesho Rai as Amber's *wakil* at the court in 1692. (Megh Raj to Bishan Singh, 19 Jamadi I, 1103 H., *J.S.A.*).

5. Ram Chandra to Raja Bishan Singh, Asoj Sudi 3, S. 1747 (September 25, 1690), *J.S.A.*

6. Jai Singh was born on Margashirsha Vadi 6, S. 1742 (November 3, 1688) and Bijai Singh about two years later. Tod's statement (Vol. II, 393, n. 1) that Bijai Singh was elder to Jai Singh is incorrect, as Bijai Singh's letters (see Chapters III, V) show. *Vamshabhaskar* (IV, 2962) and *V.V.*, p. 1297 also describe Bijai Singh as younger to Jai Singh.

7. Aqil Khan to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.L.*, 6 Rajab 1102 H. (June 28, 1691), *J.S.A.* *Akhbarat*, 21 Zul Hijja, 1101 H. (1690 A.D.). Bishan Singh was a worshipper of Tripurasundari (see *Ishwaravilasamahakavyam*, Canto 2, vs7).

8. Qanungo, *History of the Jats* (Calcutta, 1925), pp. 43-44; *M.A. op. cit.*, 205; Aqil Khan to Bishan Singh, June 28, 1691; Qanungo, *op. cit.*, 44-45; Ami Rai to Bishan Singh, *arzdashit* 1693 A.D.; Shukr-ullah Khan (news-writer in Raja Bishan Singh's camp) to Bishan Singh, 15 Safar 1105 H. (October 6, 1693); Muhammad Ali to Bishan Singh, 12 Shawwal, 1106 H. (May 16, 1695); Shukr-ullah Khan to Bijai Singh, 25 Ramzan, 1104 H. (May 20, 1692) respectively for the forts mentioned. All these reports and letters are in *J.S.A.*

9. Shukr-ullah Khan to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.L.*, 25 Ramzan, 1104 H. (May 31, 1692), *J.S.A.*

10. Shukr-ullah Khan to Raja Bishan Singh, *P.L.*, 1695, A.D., *J.S.A.*

later known as Bijai Singh) was only five.¹¹ There are only a few extant letters, two or three in Jai Singh's own hand, which throw light on his upbringing and early education, but we may safely presume that neither was neglected. It had been a tradition in the Amber House to provide the best possible education to the young princes in order to equip them for the varied and arduous duties of the Imperial service, and to make them worthy of governing their own State. In their letters, the two princes report their progress in studies and assure their father that they had been learning their lessons with care and devotion. The letters¹² written in beautiful hand-writing indicate that considerable importance was attached to the cultivation of this art. The princes were usually taught three or four languages—Dingal, Sanskrit, Persian, and sometimes Arabic and Turki also. As they grew up, they read the *Shastras* and works on polity and literature, and learnt the fundamentals of Mathematics. Training in arms went on simultaneously and was given due priority. Thus we often find the Amber officials informing Raja Bishan Singh that his two young sons were practising riding and archery regularly.¹³ When about ten or twelve years old, the Princes were gradually introduced to the intricacies of the administration, and by the time they had crossed thirteen, they were saddled with some responsibility, unless some misfortune thrust upon them, as happened in case of Jai Singh, the burden of ruling the State even earlier. By fifteen or sixteen they were considered fully qualified to govern their principality as also to hold responsible assignments in the Imperial service.

Jai Singh must have been a promising student with special aptitude for Mathematics, for, later on, he became celebrated for his learning, and for his contribution in the field of astronomy, of which science he made his capital the foremost centre of study in the country.

Jai Singh's first visit to the Court. Jai Singh's lessons were interrupted for some time in his eighth year when he had to

11. Thus see Jauhar (a palace servant) to Raja Bishan Singh, Phalgun Sudi 6, S. 1750 (February 20, 1694) and of Chaitra Vadi 7, S. 1750 (March 8, 1694); Prem Singh (a State official) to Bishan Singh, Jyeshtha Sudi 13, S. 1751 (May 25, 1694) and Vaisakha Sudi 2, (April 15, 1695), *J.S.A.*

12. Amber Record, *J.S.A.*

13. Thus see Jauhar to Raja Bishan Singh, Jyeshtha Vadi 4, S. 1751 (April 22, 1695), and Phalgun Vadi 5, S. 1752 (February 13, 1696), *J.S.A.*

proceed to the Deccan in place of his father who was reluctant to visit the Court, and had secured permission, through the good offices of Zinat-un-Nisa Begum, the Emperor's second daughter and a supporter of Prince Azam Shah, to stay on at Mathura.¹⁴ Jai Singh reached the Emperor's camp in April 1699, and in a famous meeting, received from the Emperor, for his repartee, the epithet of *Sawai*, by which later on he became celebrated throughout the land.¹⁵ But it is clear from the contemporary letters that Jai Singh officially received the title of *Sawai* only in July 1713, from Emperor Farrukh-siyar. Though we find this title prefixed to his name in a few letters even before this time, these letters are of a private nature and were written by lesser persons,¹⁶ which only shows that the account of Emperor Aurangzeb calling him *Sawai* had gained currency, but officially the title was not used for him. Thus, Maharana Amar Singh, Maharana Sangram Singh, Maharaja Ajit Singh, Durgadas, Raja Chhatrasal Bundela and others do not use the title of *Sawai* for Jai Singh in their letters sent to him before 1713; they only address him as "Maharaja Shri Jai Singhji" or "Maharajadhiraj Maharaja Shri Jai Singhji". Even his own *wakil*, Jagjiwandas Pancholi, in his reports addresses him as "Shri Maharajadhiraj Maharajaji Shri Jai Singh", and uses the title of *Sawai* for the first time in his report dated July 12, 1713, in which he informed his master about its bestowal by the Emperor.¹⁷

14. See Ami Rai to Mishra Chakrapani (both Amber officials), Jyestha Vadi 3, 7, S. 1753 (May 9, 13, 1696) *J.S.A.*

15. Aqil Khan to Raja Bishan Singh, 21 Ramzan, 1107 H. (April 14, 1696), *J.S.A.*; *V.V.*, II, 1297-98; *Ishvaravilasamahakavyam*, Canto VII, vs. 47.

16. Thus see Mukundadas of Marwar to Biharidas Pancholi, May 8, 1708, in *Vir Vinod*, II, 768-69; Pema Badaran to Jai Singh, Phalgun Sudi 6, S. 1765 (February 4, 1709), *J.S.A.*, requesting him to visit Udaipur; or Bhikshu Jethmal (at Sadhaura) to "Maharajadhiraj Maharaja Shri Shri Shri Sawai Jai Singh Deoji" (1711 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

17. Thus see, "Shri Maharaja Shri Jai Singhji" to Raj Shri Durgadasji Rathor, Phalgun Sudi 3, S. 1767 (February 9, 1711); Maharana Amar Singh to "Shri Maharajadhiraj Maharaj Shri Jai Singhji", Pausa Vadi 3, S. 1766 (December 8, 1709) in *J.S.A.*; Pancholi Jagjiwandas to "Maharajaji Shri Jai Singhji", Dutika Bhadava Vadi 6, S. 1768 (1711); Pancholi Jagjiwandas to "Shri Maharajadhiraj Maharaja Shri Mirza Raja Jai Singhji", Phalgun Sudi 12, S. 1769 (February 26, 1713), received on Chaitra Vadi 2, (March 3, 1713) *J.S.A.* It is only in his *arzdasht* of July 12, 1713 that he uses the title of *Sawai*,

Jai Singh stayed on at the Court till early 1698, and then returned to Amber.¹⁸ Sometime later, his father was posted under Prince Muazzam in Kabul province.

Studies resumed; the long tradition as a source of instruction. After his return from the Deccan, Jai Singh resumed his studies under the care of his mother and learned tutors. Besides different works on polity, Dharmashastra, etc., another source of instruction was the long and rich past of his House. The story of his ancestors, stretching over a period of more than seven centuries—from Dhola to his own father—was long and absorbing, and could provide the young prince with unlimited thrill and also many points to ponder over. He heard this story from his sober teachers, gossipy courtiers, and the bards, each of whom described it according to his own viewpoint and understanding. The account had acquired new hues—dark as well as bright—from Bharmal's time, when Amber accepted the Mughal suzerainty and her rulers began to play a significant role in the Mughal service as commanders of the Imperial army, and as governors of the far-flung provinces of the Mughal empire. Numerous incidents and anecdotes were recounted to him about the Mughal court, the Emperors, the Begums, and the Princes, about their charm and dignity, intrigues and foibles, about the cool competence and cunningness of the Mughal nobles and officials, and about the great battles and sieges in distant lands and varying climes, in many of which his own ancestors had played a conspicuous role. The account, narrated in good idiom and interspersed with wise sayings, acquainted the Prince with the past history of the land and the political currents and cross-currents of the times. He must have heard about the palmy days under Mirza Raja, which, all of a sudden, were clouded by Shivaji's escape from Agra about thirty years before. Another spectacular escape, followed by a gallant struggle against the Mughal government, which must have deeply stirred his young heart, was that of Durgadas Rathor from Delhi on

while informing about its formal sanction by the Emperor. He addresses his master as "Shri Maharajadhiraj Maharajaji Shri Mirza Raja Sawai Jai Singhiji".

18. Budh Singh to Raja Bishan Singh, Magha Sudi 7, S. 1754 (January 8, 1698), *J.S.A.*, informing that the Emperor had granted the Prince an aigrette; *arzdast* of Sher Singh to Bishan Singh, Kartik Sudi 11, S. 1755 (November 4, 1698), *J.S.A.*, informing about the welfare of both the Princes. The letter shows that by November, Jai Singh had returned from the Court.

July 15, 1679. A few years later when Jai Singh himself defied the Imperial authority, he came in close contact with that heroic figure, the very model of Rajput chivalry and character.

Such was in part the oral education he had received at that time. It was not unusual till a few years ago, to come across elderly Rajputs and bards who were virtual store-houses of information about the past history of Rajputana. When old age prevented a Rajput from engaging in his favourite pursuit of arms, he received some satisfaction in narrating to the youngsters the adventures of his youth, and in conveying to them the wisdom of his mature years, devoted in the service of his land and in upholding the Rajput traditions of *aan* and *swamidharma*. Along with this account, the Princes heard from the ladies of the family devotional songs and stories from the religious classics, which moulded their character and equipped them to face the trials and tribulations of life with courage and equanimity.

Bishan Singh posted in Kabul province. During 1698-99, Jai Singh and Bijai Singh resided mostly at Amber. Their father's letters from Kohat used to arrive regularly. Bishan Singh was also kept constantly informed about the welfare of his family, the progress made by his two sons in their studies, the affairs of his State, the position of crops, the water level in different lakes, reservoirs and ponds (Man Sagar bandh, Bhagwant Sagar, Ban Talao, etc.), about revenue recovery, abstracts of treasury figures, etc.

Bishan Singh's premature death; Jai Singh crowned. Jai Singh's studies were rudely interrupted when news arrived of his father's untimely death at Kohat on December 19, 1699.¹⁹ Bishan Singh

19. *Jaipur Yamshavali*. According to *V.V.*, II, p. 1297, Bishan Singh died on Magha Vadi 5, S. 1756 (December 30, 1699); he was born on Jyestha Vadi 13, S. 1728 (May 26, 1671); *Kacchavamshamahakavya*, Canto 9, vs. 163. There are a few extant letters in the Jaipur Archives which show that Bishan Singh had good relations with the other princes. In early 1693, when complaints against him reached the Court, Maharaja Anup Singh of Bikaner urged him (letter Vaishakha Sudi 6, S. 1749) to cultivate good relations with 'Sasat Khanji' (Siyadat Khan, Superintendent of *Diwan-i-Khas*), and with the *Diwan* and *Bakshi* of Agra. Bishan Singh was also on good terms with Ajit Singh and Kanwar Amar Singh of Mewar. Thus, we find Ajit Singh enquiring in his letter dated Ashadh Sudi 15, S. 1749 (1692) to Bishan Singh about the possibility of restoration of his State. In a letter dated Phalgun Sudi 1, S. 1754 (1697 A.D.) Kanwar Amar Singh, then passing his days in isolation on account of serious

at that time had not yet completed his twenty-ninth year. Jai Singh bade good-bye to his books for the time being to shoulder the heavy responsibility of ruling his State, and to take care of his subjects and his family. After the solemnities to mark his father's death were over, he formally ascended the *gaddi* of Amber on Phalgun Vadi 1, S. 1756 (January 25, 1700).²⁰ A few days later he learnt that the Emperor had conferred upon him the title of Raja Jai Singh, and upon his brother the title of Bijai Singh, and that his *mansab* had been increased from 1000/800 to 1500/1200.²¹ It was a very modest beginning for a descendant of Raja Man and Mirza Raja Jai Singh.

differences with his father, Rana Jai Singh, (see Tod, I, 314) addresses Bishan Singh as Kakaji. The letter contains references to correspondence between the two earlier also. Letters in *J.S.A.*

20. *D.K.*, Vol. XXIV, Rajlok Maharaj.

21. *M.A.* trans. Sarkar, 256; *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, p. 735.

CHAPTER III

SERVICE UNDER AURANGZEB

Receives early tempering. At the time of his accession, Jai Singh was a few months over eleven years. At this age, a growing boy needs all the care of his elders and the sheltered atmosphere of his home, rather than being burdened with the cares of the government, or being exposed to the cold blizzards of a tricky world. But the untimely death of his father forced Jai Singh to receive an early tempering.

Jai Singh summoned to the Deccan; his reluctance. In April 1700, he received orders to join duty in the Deccan, and to enlist 2000 additional troops.¹ These were required to be thrown in in the never-ending Maratha war. Jai Singh was reluctant to accept a Deccan posting, which the Imperial officers generally wanted to avoid on account of the interminableness of the war, the inhospitality of the terrain, and, what then seemed, the eternal presence of the Emperor.² It was a tricky war whose end appeared as distant as it was when it had begun. We have noted that Jai Singh's father, who had distinguished himself so well against the Jats, was most unwilling to be posted in the Deccan.³ But as it was not possible for Jai Singh to ignore the orders, or to have them changed, he set out, though with a contingent of 2000 only, taking the longer route via Agra, instead of going via Lakheri. His mother accompanied him up to Mathura where she fed 2000 brahmans on the banks of the Yamuna. This was promptly reported to the Emperor.⁴

The Journey to the Court. As Jai Singh was late in starting, he instructed Megh Raj, his *wakil* at the Emperor's Court, to keep the imperial mace bearers contented, so that they might

1. *P.W.R.*, 9 Zul Qada (April 17, 1700), *J.S.A.*

2. Another reason probably was that a posting in the Deccan often entailed a *jagir* on a lower month-scale.

3. See above, Chapter II.

4. *Akhbarat*, 4-8 Zul Hijja (April 1-4, 1701), *J.S.A.*

not report adversely about him.⁵ He started from Agra about the middle of May 1701, and reached Gwalior on the 22nd. On his way to Narwar, where he arrived on May 28, he made a detour to visit Sheopur to marry Raja Uttam Ram's niece. It was an unauthorized halt, and he felt much relieved to learn that his *wakil* could prevent, by bribing the officials, the report of his visit to Sheopur from reaching the Emperor's ears.⁶

At this time Jai Singh was short of money. The land assignments, which his father had received for his services against the Jats, had lapsed to the Mughal Government after his death. In fact, Bishan Singh had spent considerable sums in suppressing the Jats in the areas which he had later received in *jagir*. But he died before reaping any benefit from these lands. The solemnities occasioned by his death, and the celebrations held to mark Jai Singh's accession had also involved considerable expenses. Moreover, since 1667, the rulers of Amber had been holding only subordinate commands in distant and barren areas, which precluded any possibility of improving their finances. Jai Singh, therefore, was keen to secure a good posting, and instructed his *wakil* to try for his appointment under some Prince, and not under any noble, failing which to try for his posting in the north.⁷ He also asked the *wakil* to try for an increase in the rank of his brother, Bijai Singh, who had recently joined duty under Prince Shah Alam in the Kabul province, and to get Rao Budh Singh's leave sanctioned, so that he might come down to Amber to marry his (Jai Singh's) sister.⁸

Despite rains, and the difficulties of the route which he had chosen, Jai Singh reached Sehore (22 miles west of Bhopal) at the end of June, but was stranded there for a week due to heavy rains. Meanwhile, the mace-bearers had arrived to hasten his arrival at the Court. After crossing the Narmada, he reached Handia on July 21. His *wakil*, in the meantime, had again managed

5. Jai Singh to Megh Raj, *wakil*, *P.P.*, 18 Zul Hijja, 1112 H. (April 15, 1701), *J.S.A.*

6. Jai Singh to Megh Raj, *P.P.*, 18 and 25 Zul Hijja (May 15 and 22, 1701), 21st Muharram, 1113 H. (June 17, 1701), *J.S.A.*

7. Jai Singh to Megh Raj, *P.P.*, 11 Muharram 1113 H. (June 7, 1701), *J.S.A.*

8. Jai Singh to Megh Raj, *P.P.*, 21 Muharram, 1113 H. (June 17, 1701), *J.S.A.*

to prevent the report alleging his master's reluctance to attend the Court from being submitted to the Emperor.⁹ About the middle of August, Jai Singh was again detained at Burhanpur due to heavy rains, but the *sazawal* reported that he was intentionally delaying his start. On this report, Megh Raj was turned out of the Court and Jai Singh's rank was also reduced by 500.¹⁰ About the imperial mace-bearers Jai Singh wrote to his *wakil* that they were constantly pestering him, and were demanding heavy bribes for sending favourable reports to the Court about him, but he had resolved not to pay them beyond a reasonable amount. This further exasperated the mace-bearers, with the result that when during his forced sojourn at Burhanpur his troops turned out their horses to graze, the mace-bearers reported that he had sent his men for plundering the neighbouring area. The complaint brought yet another *sazawal* to enquire into the complaint!¹¹

On October 16, Jai Singh sent word to his agent at the Court that he would be reaching the Emperor's camp on the 21st, and instructed him not to come for his reception.¹² As he was very late in reaching the Court, he wanted to arrive without any fanfare. Jai Singh's delay, however, cost poor Megh Raj his post; he was replaced by his elder brother, Jagjiwandas Pancholi.¹³ Jagjiwan was soon replaced by Pakshit Rai, but, after a few years, was reappointed as *wakil*. As we shall see, Jagjiwandas rendered excellent services to his master during 1708-13.

Posted under Bidar Bakht; makes a good beginning. On reaching the Court, Jai Singh was attached to Prince Bidar Bakht,¹⁴ under whom his father had initially joined service in

9. Jai Singh's *parwanahs* to Megh Raj, dt. 4, 21, 25 Safar 1113 H. (June 30, July 17, 25, 1701), *J.S.A.*

10. *Ibid.*, 29 Rabi II, 1113 H. (September 22, 1701), *J.S.A.*

11. Jai Singh to Megh Raj, *P.P.*, dated 5 Rabi II, 5th Jamadi I, 1113 H. (August 29, September 27, 1701), *J.S.A.*

12. Jai Singh to Jagroop, *P.P.*, 24 Jamadi I, 1113 H. (October 16, 1701), *J.S.A.*

13. Jai Singh to Jagjiwandas, *P.P.*, 2 Rajab (November 22, 1701), *J.S.A.*

14. Jai Singh to Raja Uttam Ram, draft, November 6, 1701, *J.S.A.*; Jai Singh to Fateh Chand Devidas, 25 and 26 Shaban, 1113 H. (January 14, 17, - 1702), *J.S.A.*

1688 A.D.¹⁵ In the second week of January 1702, the reduction of 500 made in his *zat* rank for his delay in reaching the Court, was restored, and *jagirs* worth 32,00,000 *dams* were also granted to him.¹⁶ Bidar Bakht, a gallant and capable general, and a favourite of his grandfather, had been summoned from Panhala to attempt conquest of the Khelna fort, and was posted on the Konkani gate side.¹⁷ On January 16, 1702, the Emperor himself arrived within a mile of the citadel. The main obstacle in capturing the fort was its *raumi* (terrace) which the Marathas were defending resolutely. It was taken on April 27, as a result of a gallant assault led by the Amber contingent under Jai Singh. Its capture sealed the fate of the fort.¹⁸ Jai Singh, in his letter dated 26 Zul Hijja 1113 (May 13, 1702) to Amber, proudly mentioned that the Pachranga flag of the Kachhwahas was the first to be planted on the outer tower of the fort. The assault was made at about mid-day on Jyestha Vadi 11. As a reward for his splendid service, an increase of 500 *zat* was made in his rank. He was also promised award of the kettledrum and *izafa* (in his rank). On May 14, Prince Bidar Bakht awarded him an elephant.¹⁹ Jai Singh had not yet completed the fourteenth year. At this age it was a satisfactory start in the Imperial service.

After the capture of Khelna, Jai Singh continued to serve under Prince Bidar Bakht. First he was posted in Khandesh to check the Maratha incursions. A few months later, in early 1703, he engaged a large Maratha army which had entered *pargana* Khargon, a part of *subah* Malwa to the south of the Narmada.²⁰ In August 1704, when Bidar Bakht was appointed to the Government of Malwa, while being allowed to retain that of

15. See above, Chapter II.

16. Jai Singh to Jagjiwandas, *P.P.*, 15 Shawwal, 1113 H. (February 18, 1702), *J.S.A.*

17. *M.A.*, trans. Sarkar, p. 271.

18. *M.A.*, trans. Sarkar, p. 272. For a detailed account of the capture of Khelna, see Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, V, 147-151.

19. Kishoredas to Jai Singh, *arzasht*, June 18, 1702, *J.S.A.*, in which, while acknowledging latter's *parwanah* of 26 Zul Hijja 1113 H. (May 13, 1702), the writer repeats its contents.

20. Kishoredas and Ram Chand to Jai Singh, *arzasht*, February 7 1703, *J.S.A.*

Aurangabad²¹, Jai Singh had his first experience of the problems and the advantages of that rich and settled province, now threatened by the Marathas.

The Emperor rejects Jai Singh's appointment as the deputy governor. In December 1704, when the Prince went to Malwa and was taken ill there, he appointed Jai Singh to act as his deputy in the province. The Emperor, however, did not sanction the appointment and laid down for the future that no Rajput would be appointed as *subahdar*, or even as a *faujdar*. He asked his grandson to appoint Khan Alam as his deputy in the province.²²

In Burhanpur against the Marathas. In March 1705, Jai Singh was recalled to Burhanpur to engage the Marathas. While complying with the orders, he asked his *wakil* to represent to the prince that he would not be able to do anything single-handed when the Prince himself, despite the assistance he had received from Najabat Khan, had earlier failed to deal with the enemy.²³

Continues to try for the deputy governorship of Malwa. Meanwhile, he continued to try to further his own position in the Imperial service. He was keen to secure a higher posting. When he came to know that Khan Alam was finding it difficult to manage the affairs in Malwa on account of the hostility of the Rajputs and the *zantindars* of the province, he asked Pankshit Rai to try for his (Jai Singh's) appointment as the deputy governor there.²⁴

Appointed deputy governor. Jai Singh's desire was realized on June 1, 1705 when Prince Bidar Bakht, while leaving for Burhanpur, appointed him as the deputy governor. Formal assent of the

21. Raghunath Singh, *Malwa in Transition, the first phase (1698-1765)*, Bombay, 1936, p. 35.

22. Raghunath Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Jai Singh, in his *parwanah* (dated 28 Muharram, 1117 H., May 11, 1705), to Pankshit Rai, mentions the *hasb-ul-hukm* which Bidar Bakht had received from his father asking him to have Khan Alam as his deputy in Malwa. The restraint in promoting the Rajputs seems to have become a deliberate Imperial policy. See Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb* (Bombay, 1966), p. 24.

23. Jai Singh to Pankshit Rai, *P.P.*, 6 Zul Hijja, 1116H., *J.S.A.*

24. See Jai Singh to Pankshit Rai, *P.P.*, dt. 15 and 28 Muharram (April 28, May 11, 1705), *J.S.A.* There were a number of chiefs in Malwa, e.g., of Shivpuri, Ahirwada, Rajgarh, Narsinghgarh, Umatwada, besides the Rathor states of Jhabua, Amjhera, and Sitamau. Badnawar was ruled by the descendants of Raja Bhim, brother of Maharana Jai Singh.

Emperor to this appointment was received a few months later.²⁵ Jai Singh, however, did not feel elated on securing this office. As early as June 21, 1705, we find him asking his *wakil* at the Court to try for his appointment as the governor of the province, in case the Prince was being transferred elsewhere. He even permitted Pankshit Rai, his *wakil*, to spend fifty thousand rupees for securing the appointment.²⁶ Though only sixteen and a half, he had by this time become familiar with the levers which had to be pulled to get things done at the Mughal Court where bribery was rampant at all levels.

As the deputy governor of Malwa, Jai Singh looked after the defence and law and order situation in the province, assisted the revenue authorities in realizing government dues, arranged for the safe transit of treasures and ammunition to the Deccan, and performed other duties required of a deputy governor. Towards the end of 1705, the Government of Aurangabad and Khandesh was taken away from Bidar Bakht's charge and was placed under Prince Azam. This spared Jai Singh the trouble of pursuing the Marathas every now and then from that region. In March 1706, he accompanied Prince Ali Tabar, the youngest son of Azam, to Gujarat to deal with a Maratha incursion, and won notice for his services. In May 1706, Bidar Bakht was appointed to the Government of Gujarat, and was asked to proceed there immediately to put down the Marathas. In July 1706, Khan Alam was made the governor of Malwa. Earlier, Abdullah Khan, son of Amanullah Khan, had been appointed deputy governor there.²⁷ It seems Jai Singh continued to serve in Malwa, for we know that he joined Prince Bidar Bakht, who was then advancing towards Dholpur under his father's instructions, at Shajapur.²⁸

Bijai Singh. Since 1699, Jai Singh's younger brother, Bijai Singh, had been serving in the Kabul province under Prince

25. Jai Singh to Pankshit Rai, *P.P.*, 14 and 21 Safar 1117 H. (May 27, June 4, 1705), *J.S.A.*

26. Jai Singh to Pankshit Rai, *P.P.*, 10 Rabi I and 2nd Rabi II, 1117 H. (June 21, July 13, 1705), *J.S.A.* Prince Wala Gauhar informed Jai Singh of the Emperor's approval (Jai Singh to Pankshit Rai, 12 Rajab 1117 H. October 19). In his letter of October 13, Multafit Khan also informed Jai Singh about the Emperor's formal assent.

27. See *Malwa*, pp. 34 ff.

28. See below, Chapter IV.

Muazzam, the eldest surviving son of Alamgir. Jai Singh's relations with his brother, which later on became very acrimonious, do not show any sign of strain at this time. Every few months, money was sent to him from Amber for his expenses and those of his contingent, whose officers, as Bijai Singh wrote, were put to inconvenience when money from their *jagirs* did not reach them in time and when they found it difficult to borrow money in the Kabul province.²⁹ In an undated letter which seems to have been written in 1704 or 1705, he requests for his brother's permission to have Hindon, Abhaneri, Toda and Mandava, which, as per information received by him, had been granted to him in his *mansab*.³⁰ In August 1706, Jai Singh secured for him a *jagir* worth 4,15,530 *dams* in *pargana* Dausa.³¹ In early September, he learnt that Bijai Singh was performing his duties satisfactorily under Muazzam who was intending to leave for Peshawar on September 25.³² The reports received from Kabul, besides informing him about the welfare of his brother, were not without interest and significance as regards the movement of Prince Shah Alam.

In the third week of January 1707, Jai Singh was rushed to Ghat Baba Piara to prevent the Marathas from crossing the Narmada, but on reaching there he found that the enemy had already withdrawn.³³ He returned and waited on Prince Bidar Bakht. Towards the end of January 1707, the Prince sent him to suppress the Kolis who were creating disturbances in southern Malwa. He felt satisfied with Jai Singh's service, and told the Amber *wakil* that the Emperor was considering his master's request for the grant of kettledrum, and that he had enquired about the honours received by his ancestors³⁴, of which, presumably, he had a fair idea.

29. Bijai Singh's two letters to Jai Singh's queen, (*J.S.A.*).

30. Bijai Singh to 'Siddha Shri Sarvopma Virajman Maharaja Shri Dada Bhaiji' (Jai Singh), undated letter, *J.S.A.*

31. Pankshit Rai to Jai Singh, *P.W.R.*, 28 Jamadi I, 1118 H. (August 27, 1706), *J.S.A.*

32. A letter of 1118 H. (1706), *J.S.A.*

33. Jai Singh to Prince Bidar Bakht, copy of the letter, 6 Zul Qada, 1118 H. (January 29, 1707), *J.S.A.*

34. Khem Karan to Jai Singh, *P.A.*, 12 Zul Qada, 1118 H. (February 4, 1707), *J.S.A.*

News from the Court about the coming upheaval. The news which Jai Singh received from the Court in early February 1707 forewarned him of the impending upheaval. He learnt from his *wakil* that Bidar Bakht had been urgently called to the Court, that the Emperor had granted Bijapur and Karnatak to Prince Kam Baksh, who informed the Emperor through his mother that his preparations were only meant to defend himself from Prince Azam and were not aimed against the Emperor.³⁵ On February 8, his *wakil* informed him that Kam Baksh had left for Bijapur and that Prince Azam would be leaving for Malwa on the 12th. One of his agents sent him a report on February 18 informing that Azam had refused to sign the agreement sent by the Emperor providing Bijapur to Kam Baksh and the remaining empire and *subah* Haiderabad to Azam, unless Prince Muazzam also signed it, and that Azam wanted the entire Deccan to himself.³⁶ These reports, which do credit to the competence and alertness of Jai Singh's officials, throw adverse light on the affairs of the Imperial family whose internal squabbles, in fact, were so public,

The Emperor dies; Jagjiwandas's report. The report last mentioned here seems to have reached Jai Singh after Aurangzeb had died near Ahmadnagar on 28 Zul Qada 1118 H. (February 20, 1707). Though it was on February 27, that Jagjiwandas sent a detailed report about the Emperor's death and the developments following it, he sent a brief message to his master immediately after the Emperor had passed away. In his report of February 27, he wrote that immediately after the Emperor's death, Amir-ul-Umara Asad Khan despatched seventy *sawars* to Azam, then halting on the other side of the river, fifteen to eighteen *kos* from Ahmadnagar, requesting him to come post-haste. Having left his camp in the morning Azam arrived at dusk. He was received by Asad Khan and other important

35. *P.W.R.*, 16 Zul Qada (February 8, 1707), *J.S.A.*

36. Basant Rai to Jai Singh, *P.A.*, 17 Zul Qada, 1118 H. (February 9), and an anonymous *arzdash*t of 26 Zul Qada (February 18, 1707). Iradat Khan writes (p. 9) that the Emperor wanted to avert a feud between his sons in the enemy country, and says that if Azam and Kam Baksh had remained together in the camp "such would have been the case as occurred afterwards on the death of Shah Alam."

nobles, and then all went into mourning immediately.³⁷

The end of an era; its moral. The death of Emperor Aurangzeb, after a long and ruinous reign lasting half a century, ended an eventful epoch in the history of the country. Though, till the very last, he assiduously fought to prolong the life of the Empire, his diagnosis of the disease was fallacious, and the treatment he prescribed only increased the malady without bringing any relief. After his death, those very forces, which all through his life he had tried to smother, emerged fresh and triumphant and his principles and policies stood discredited to be abandoned by his successors with little regret and no ceremony. He passed out of the scene leaving behind a crumbling empire, a corrupt and inefficient administration, a demoralized army, a discredited government facing public bankruptcy and alienated subjects, and the moral³⁸ that "the highest order of talent, either for government or war, though aided by unlimited resources, will not suffice for the maintenance of power, unsupported by the affections of the governed".

Jai Singh decides to join Azam. For the present, Jai Singh's eyes were set on the gathering storm of a war of succession. He had three alternatives before him: he might join Azam, or retire to his own country and, after the termination of the war, pay his allegiance to the victor, or he might rapidly move up and join Muazzam, then heading for Agra. He chose the first course. The second involved little risk but also precluded the possibility of any gain. At this time he was not important enough to be sure that his mere neutrality would be rewarded by the victor, as Mirza Raja's neutrality had reaped benefits about fifty years earlier. He was on good terms with Prince Bidar Bakht, whose father had a fair chance of winning the contest, the veterans of the Deccan wars and excellent artillery being at his disposal; in case of victory, he was sure to receive high rewards. The last course was the least attractive.

Having resolved to join Azam, Jai Singh stayed on at his post in Malwa and awaited the Prince's instructions.

37. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, *P.W.R.*, 5 Zul Hijja (February 27, 1707), *J.S.A.* Iradat Khan says (p. 9) that Azam Shah was aware of the dangerous illness of his father, and marched very slowly; nor did the Emperor press him after the first three marches.

38. The lines quoted are of James Tod in his *Annals*, I, 315.

CHAPTER IV

JAI SINGH AND THE WAR OF SUCCESSION

Jai Singh joins Bidar Bakht in Malwa. During the next few weeks, Jai Singh had little to do but wait for Azam's message. Shortly afterwards, he was asked to join Prince Bidar Bakht with 1000 troops.¹ From his *wakil*, he had come to know of Azam's enthronement on March 4 (10th Zul Hijja), and his departure for Hindustan four days later.²

Meanwhile, Prince Bidar Bakht, as per Azam's instructions, had started from Ahmedabad for Gwalior. He reached Shajapur on March 26, 1707, and waited for one month and twenty days in the neighbourhood of Ujjain for his father, till he received orders to reach Gwalior. Somewhere between Ujjain and Shajapur he was joined by Jai Singh.³

Azam's march towards Agra; high favours conferred upon Jai Singh and other Rajput chiefs. Leaving Ahmadnagar in the second week of March, Azam reached Aurangabad on March 24. A day earlier, Zulfiqar Khan, Rao Ram Singh Hada of Kotah, Rao Dalpat Bundela of Datiya, and other veterans of the Deccan wars joined him. The same day, orders restoring the *mansab* and *jagir* of Durgadas Rathor and calling upon him to join the Emperor, were passed. Also, the title of Raja was conferred on Rao Ram Singh Hada and also on Rao Dalpat

1. *P.W.R.*, 14 Zul Qada, 1118 H. (February 6, 1707), *J.S.A.*

2. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *P.W.R.*, 14, 17, Zul Hijja (March 8, 1707), *J.S.A.*

3. Iradat Khan, pp. 13-18; Kamraj, f. 15b; Irvine, I, pp. 14-15. Azam being suspicious of his son had asked him not to enlist more troops than what he already had, nor to march to Agra via Ajmer. He was told to reach Gwalior and to wait for him. The Prince, therefore, started with 3000 troops only, though he could have mustered much more, and made no effort to procure money beyond what was in his own treasury. Iradat Khan, who enjoyed Bidar Bakht's confidence, admits (pp. 13-14, 25-26) that the Prince harboured designs against his father.

Bundela.⁴ After a day's halt at Aurangabad, Azam Shah resumed his march towards Burhanpur. On the way, on April 12, an increase of 2500 *zat* and 3000 *sawar* in Jai Singh's rank, and grant of kettledrum to him, were announced.⁵

Azam reached Burhanpur on April 14. The following day he resumed his march taking the shorter but difficult route via Tumri pass.⁶ On April 17, he received a letter of congratulations and *nazar* sent by Maharana Amar Singh of Mewar.⁷ A few days later, *arzi* of Raja Islam Khan of Rampura was received in which he had requested that he might be permitted to deposit Rs. 2000/- in the treasury of *subah* Malwa as *nazar* to the Emperor.⁸ On April 26, Azam passed orders granting the titles of Mirza Raja and Maharaja to Jai Singh, and of Maharaja to Ajit Singh, and their *mansabs* were also raised to 7000/7000.⁹ These bounteous favours indicate the importance Azam attached to the Rajput support in the coming contest. His concessions to Ajit Singh and Durgadas signified a sharp departure from Aurangzeb's policy towards them. Indeed, it is possible that if Azam had won the war, the Mughal relations with the Rajput states might have regained the old cordiality and the Rajput war of 1708-10 might have been averted.

Attitude of Irani and Turani nobles towards Azam. It seems Azam's high offers to the Rajputs were, to some extent, due to the coolness which had sprung up between him and Zulfiqar Khan and Asad Khan, and the failure of the Turani nobles to

4. *P.W.R.*, 10 Muharram 1119 H. (April 2); *Akhbarat*, 29 Zul Hijja (March 23, 1707); Irvine, I, p. 11.

5. *Akhbarat*, 20 Muharram, 1119 H. (April 12). Jai Singh now had the rank of 5000/5000. See also Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, *P.W.R.*, 27 Muharram 1119 H. (April 19), *J.S.A.*

6. Irvine, I, p. 12; Iradat Khan, p. 13. At Duraha (about 22 miles north-west of Bhopal) Azam connived at the escape of Shahu, according to Khafi Khan (II, 581-82) at Zulfiqar Khan's instance. It is also believed that Azam had made an agreement with Shahu conceding him *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan, the *Swarajya* of Shivaji, and some other concessions. See Kincaid and Parasnis, 187-88. Cf. Duff, I, p. 343; *Parties*, pp. 18-20. Chitnis (*Thorale Shahu Maharaja*, pp. 8-9) mentions only restoration of *Swarajya* to Shahu and a promise to grant *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* if he proved loyal and serviceable to the Emperor.

7. *Akhbarat*, 25 Muharram, 1119 H. (April 17, 1707).

8. *Akhbarat*, 4 Safar (26 April, 1707).

9. *Akhbarat*, 6 Safar 1119 H. (April 28, 1707).

support his cause. Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, being unhappy at the manner in which things were being conducted by Azam, even tried to persuade him to leave them behind in the Deccan;¹⁰ and as for the Turanis, Chin Qulich Khan (future Nizam-ul-Mulk) did not join him on the pretext that his presence was required in his new Government of Aurangabad and Khandesh, and Muhammad Amin Khan, after accompanying Azam up to a few miles beyond Burhanpur, came away without leave or permission.¹¹

On reaching Sironj (about 60 miles north of Bhopal) in the beginning of May, Azam Shah despatched 45,000 troops under Zulfiqar Khan, Rao Dalpat Bundela, Ram Singh Hada, Ahmad Said Khan, and some other nobles to join Bidar Bakht who, as per his father's instructions, was then advancing towards Gwalior with the intention to seize the fords on the Chambal. On the way to Gwalior, Azam received the disconcerting news that Muazzam had already taken possession of Agra. He now proceeded by forced marches and joined Bidar Bakht at Dholpur, about 34 miles south of Agra.¹² On the way, Gaj Singh, son of Raja Anup Singh of Shivpuri, who was serving under Muazzam, joined him.¹³

Muazzam first to reach Agra. Azam Shah's elder brother and his chief rival, Prince Muazzam, was near Peshawar when the news of his father's death reached him on March 12, about twenty days after the event. He hurriedly started for Hindustan, crowned himself near Lahor, on which occasion he took the title of Bahadur Shah, and won the race for Agra by reaching there first on June 2,¹⁴ the distance covered by him from Jamrud to Agra being 715 miles — 15 miles more than the distance between Ahmadnagar and Agra, which his rival was required to cover. He was now sixty-four years of age, with no distinguished

10. See Irvine, I, p. 12. Azam Shah as well as Bidar Bakht distrusted Zulfiqar Khan. Later, some of their confidants even alleged that Zulfiqar Khan wanted to delay engaging the enemy till Shah Alam's approach (See Iradat Khan, p. 20).

11. See Irvine, I, pp. 8, 12.

12. Kamraj, ff. 19a, 20a; Irvine, I, p. 15; Iradat Khan, pp. 17-18, 26.

13. Raghbir Sinh, *Malwa in Transition*, p. 94.

14. Yahya, ff. 112a-113a; Iradat Khan, pp. 40-43; Kamraj, f. 20b; K.K., II, pp. 577-78; Irvine I, pp. 18-21.

achievement to his credit. As he was suspected to have intrigued for power in his father's life time, he had to pass nearly seven years (1687-94) in confinement.¹⁵ He seemed to have had great power of dissimulation, for, while secretly preparing for the contest for the throne, he had given out during the last years of his father's reign that, in case Azam claimed the throne, he would prefer to retire to Persia rather than contend for it.¹⁶ As subsequent events proved, he was conservative in his religious outlook. He had, however, the merit of readjusting his plans and policies as required by circumstances. Also, he had a kind disposition, a dignified bearing, and trustful nature.

After Azam had curtly rejected his offer of sharing the empire,¹⁷ Muazzam chose Dholpur where to give him battle, and on June 4, left Agra for that place. To capture the fords on the Chambal, he despatched 80,000 horse under his son, Azim.¹⁸

Bidar Bakht arrives near Ujjain; order of his army. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, Azam had joined his son Bidar Bakht at Dholpur. The muster showed the strength of his army at 65,000 horse and 45,000 match-lockmen. Unaware of his rival's movement, he started on June 8 for Samugarh, eight miles south-east of Agra. The place had proved lucky for his father in 1658, who too like him had come from the Deccan against his brother. He reached Jajau, a village seven or eight *kos* from Agra, the same day. The vanguard of his army under Prince Bidar Bakht was marching in the following order: immediately on Bidar Bakht's left was Jai Singh; further left was Zulfiqar Khan's large division under Ram Singh Hada, Dalpat Bundela and others: then there was Amanullah Khan. The advance guard of Bidar Bakht's large centre was under Aziz Khan Afghan, and still further in advance were Khan Alam Dakhini and his brother Munawwar Khan;

15. For his career see Irvine, I, pp. 2-4; Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, III, pp. 44-47. He also speaks of his cowardice and hypocrisy. The general opinion about his military experience and valour was rather poor. Thus see Iradat Khan, 28, 34. Cf. Yahya, f. 112a.

16. See Iradat Khan, 41; Irvine, I, 19.

17. Kamraj, f. 24a; Iradat, pp. 29-30. Shah Alam had sent the message from Mathura and had proposed: "Let us equally divide the empire between us. Though I am the elder, I will leave the choice in your favour."

18. Irvine, I, pp. 22-23.

on Bidar Bakht's left was Prince Wala Jah. A large force under Azam himself was following in a somewhat disorderly manner about three miles in the rear; as we will see, it joined the combat only about three hours before sunset.¹⁹

The battle. In the battle, which was precipitated somewhat unexpectedly the same day (June 8, 18th Rabi I) about four miles north-east of Jajau,²⁰ Prince Bidar Bakht's army was engaged by Bahadur Shah's two divisions, each consisting of about fifty thousand horse under Azim-ush-shan and Munim Khan.²¹ Jai Singh's younger brother, Bijai Singh, and brother-in-law, Budh Singh Hada of Bundi, were under Azim-ush-shan. They had accompanied Bahadur Shah from Kabul *subah* where they were serving at the time of Aurangzeb's death.

The actual fighting, preceded by a heavy cannonade by Muazzam's guns, commenced with Khan Alam's gallant charge. He sharply brought up his elephant alongside that of Azim-ush-shan, but was killed while trying to jump into that Prince's *howdah*. After his death, his brother retired, exposing Prince Wala Jah, and forcing him to retreat to Bidar Bakht's protection.²²

Baz Khan Afghan, Budh Singh Hada, Raja Raj Bahadur of Kishangarh, Raja Bijai Singh, Muhammad Rafi (later Sarbuland Khan) now made a furious attack on Zulfiqar Khan's division. Though they were repulsed with heavy losses, Ram Singh Hada and Dalpat Bundela, on whose valour Zulfiqar Khan most depended, were both killed at the same instant by cannon balls. On the fall of their chiefs, the Hadas and the Bundelas withdrew from the field. Zulfiqar Khan stood firm at his post for some time, but then charged by the entire division of Azim-ush-shan, he withdrew to the rear leaving the command in the hands of Saiyid Muzaffar, a servant of Asad Khan and a *mansabdar* of 500 only. Zulfiqar Khan made his way to Azam and tried to

19. Kamraj, ff. 21b-24a, 29a; Irvine, I, pp. 23-26; Iradat, pp. 30ff.

20. See Irvine, I, p. 25 and nil.

21. See Iradat, pp. 31-36; Irvine, I, pp. 27-28.

22. Iradat, pp. 36-37; Kamraj, f. 27a; K.K., II, 591. Azam had left behind his guns, both on account of the urgency to reach Agra, and his belief that he would hardly need the cannons against "a breeder of cattle". "I will not even draw the sword, but bruise his (Shah Alam's) head with a staff". (Iradat, p. 34). Cf. Yahya, f. 112a, for Azam's remark about the seriousness of his impending conflict with Shah Alam.

persuade him to postpone the main action till the next day, but on receiving a curt refusal, he left the field and rode off to Gwalior to join his father.²³ His departure sealed the fate of the left wing of Bidar Bakht's army.

Jai Singh leaves his post; goes over to Muazzam. It was now past mid-day. The battle was passing through the most critical stage, each side exerting its utmost to overcome the other. The day was exceedingly hot and a violent tempest was blowing right against Bidar Bakht's army with such fury that the arrows shot by his men often did not reach their targets but dropped down languidly on their way. Shortly afterwards, the dust-storm became still more severe, reducing visibility to a few paces only, and rendering it impossible for Bidar Bakht's soldiers to stand the tempest except by turning their heads. To add to their misery, Bahadur Shah's artillery continued to pour fire taking a heavy toll of his battered troops. These circumstances cast a most depressing effect on the soldiers of Azam.²⁴ At this critical moment, Jai Singh, who was on Bidar Bakht's left, and who had been wounded in his arm by an arrow, put his bow into his *howda*, covered his head with his shawl, and made his way to Prince Muhammad Azim. The gap caused by his exit, as also of his troops, was instantly filled by Prince Rafi-ul-Qadr, Khujista Akhtar, and by Munim Khan, Kokaltash Khan, Khan Zaman, Raza Quli Khan, Lutf-ullah Khan and others, who now threatened to turn Prince Bidar Bakht's rear.²⁵

Bidar Bakht and Azam Shah killed. Despite these grievous blows, the Prince and his troops continued to fight on determinedly

23. Iradat, pp. 37-38; Kamraj, ff. 24b-29a; Bhimsen, ff. 165a-166b; *Azam-ul-harb*, ff. 156b-161b, 186a-189a; Yahya, f. 113a-b; K.K., II, 591ff; *Yamsha*, IV, 2983 ff. It is difficult to ascertain the precise moment of Zulfiqar Khan's departure, the sequence of events during the course of battle being variously given by different authors. Thus compare Yahya, f. 113 and *Azam-ul-harb*, ff. 186a-189a, both of which give the impression that Zulfiqar Khan stayed on till about the time Bidar Bakht was killed, with Bhimsen's statement, f. 166a, who was present in the battle and speaks of Zulfiqar's early flight. Iradat Khan (pp. 37-38) also gives the same impression, and so also *Seir*, pp. 8-9.

24. Kamraj, ff. 25b-26a; *Azam-ul-Harb*, 162ff; Yahya, f. 113a; Iradat, p. 36.

25. *Azam-ul-Harb*, ff. 168 b-170b; Kamraj, f. 29; *Yamsha*, IV, 3000 for the wound and high fever that he developed consequently.

A number of his captains and soldiers dismounted and awaited charge of Saiyid Hasan Ali and Hussain Ali, who too were on foot. In the deadly hand to hand fighting, many prominent officers on both the sides were slain or seriously wounded. Shortly afterwards, Bidar Bakht was killed by a swivel gun ball, and about 4 p.m., Prince Wala Jah, who had fainted from loss of blood, had to be taken away to the rear.²⁶ At this stage, when all seemed lost, Azam Shah took the field personally. He fought on courageously till in the receding light of the setting sun a musket ball ended his life.²⁷ Between ten and twelve thousand men,²⁸ including almost all men of note on Azam Shah's side who had remained at their posts, perished that day.

Jai Singh's uncertain future. Bahadur Shah passed the night in a *shamiana* pitched on the battle-field. The next day, he marched in state to Dahr-Ara garden near Agra and held public audience.²⁹ Among many who were to receive rewards for their services in the recent war were Bijai Singh and Maharao Budh Singh. Jai Singh's own future was less certain; much depended upon the policy and attitude the new Emperor would adopt towards those who had sided with Azam. It was obvious that the Emperor's policy towards all such nobles could not be alike, and was likely to vary considerably depending upon the past relations of the officer with the new sovereign, the position of the group to which he belonged, the importance and influence of the officer himself, and many other factors. Jai Singh was not close to any group at that time. He had, during the preceding seven years, courted favour of none save Prince Bidar Bakht's; his position therefore was less secure than that of those nobles who headed or belonged to powerful groups. He was young, not even nineteen years old, and comparatively a junior officer, with no powerful Hindu noble at his back. At the moment his prestige also stood low for having deserted Bidar Bakht. His conduct, severely censured by the contemporary historians,³⁰ stood in sharp contrast to that of Rao

26. Kamraj, f. 31a; Iradat Khan, p. 38.

27. Yahya, f. 113a-b; *Azam-ul-harb*, 196ff; Iradat Khan, pp. 38-39; K.K., II, p. 597.

28. Irvine, I, p. 34.

29. Iradat, pp. 39-40; Irvine, I, pp. 35-36.

30. See *Azam-ul-harb*, ff. 163b-170a.

Ram Singh Hada, Rao Dalpat or Khan Alam, and many others, who had perished for the cause they had espoused.

Jai Singh's conduct examined. But, in fairness to Jai Singh, it must be mentioned that he abandoned his post after a number of notable commanders under Bidar Bakht had fallen, the whole left wing of his army had crumbled, the enemy artillery had shattered the morale of the Prince's troops, and the tide to the battle had decidedly turned against Azam. In fact, the moment had come when Jai Singh had to decide whether to continue at his post and perish for the cause which even his death was not likely to retrieve, or to save himself in the interest of his family and the State; staying any longer meant courting certain death and disaster. He was certainly no coward as his conduct at Khelna in April 1702 and his subsequent career show. In this predicament, he preferred, in the interest of Amber, his own safety to death, though the latter would have been in conformity with the accepted notions of Rajput conduct and ideals, but which, on account of the policies of the late Emperor, had already lost much of their meaning and sanctity so far as loyalty towards the Mughal house was concerned. As time proved, he was right in his judgement. A few months later, he actually saved his State from being merged in the Empire, and in course of time, raised it to unprecedented heights of glory. It was indeed fortunate that he did not perish that day and that he lived on for thirty-six years more to play a significant and useful role in the political and cultural life of the country.

CHAPTER V

THE RAJPUT RISING

Bahadur Shah promises to follow policy of pardon and conciliation. An early announcement made by the new Emperor that he would not penalize anyone for having joined Azam Shah and would re-admit to favour all such officers who would attend the Court, must have come as a great relief to Jai Singh. The policy was in keeping with the Mughal tradition and was likely to accelerate the restoration of normalcy in the empire. The basic assumption behind this policy seems to have been that most of the officers joining one or the other contestant for the throne often had no choice of their own and had to act under the compulsion of various circumstances, the chief among which was the place of their posting at the time of the commencement of the war. In pursuance of this policy, reassuring letters were sent to Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, then at Gwalior, and to Ghazi-ud-din Khan, his son, Chin Qulich Khan, and others, summoning them to the Court.¹

Policy implemented in case of Asad Khan, Zulfiqar Khan etc.; Munim Khan made Wazir. In early July 1707, Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan came to the Court. Though the post of *Wazir* was denied to Asad Khan, he was appointed *Wakil-i-Mutalaq*—technically a higher post than that of *Wazir*—and was given the rank of 8000/8000 *du-aspa*, and the title of *Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf-ud-daulah*. His son, Zulfiqar Khan, was reinstated to the post of *First Bakshi* with the rank of 7000/7000. Some time later the *Viceroyalty* of the six *Deccan subahs* was also conferred on him.² The key post of *Wazir* went to Munim Khan, till recently the *diwan* of *Kabul* and *naib subahdar* of *Punjab*, for rendering exceptional services to the Emperor in the recent war. His rank

1. See K.K., p. 600; Irvine, I, pp. 36-37. Iradat Khan gives credit to Munim Khan for this policy (p. 47).

2. *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, p. 274, II, 1037; Kamraj, f. 35a; Yahya, f. 113b; Irvine, I, pp. 37-39; *Parties*, p. 43.

was also raised to 7000/7000, and the title of Khan-i-Khana Bahadur Zafar Jang was conferred on him.³ Though sincere, honest and industrious, Munim Khan had never served on any high post at the centre, and had no experience of dealing with larger issues concerning the empire.

A different policy towards the Rajputs. Though the new Emperor had begun his reign on a liberal note, it soon became clear that the 'policy of pardon and conciliation' was not going to be followed in the case of the Rajput states of Amber, Marwar, Kotah and Narwar. Thus, we find that, though in conformity with the Emperor's declared policy, Asad Khan had issued orders on July 15 restoring Amber, Dausa and Chatsu *parganas*, yielding an annual revenue of 3 crores 30 lakhs dams,⁴ to Jai Singh, the decision was soon reversed. probably at Munim Khan's instance. About the 20th July, Jai Singh came to know that his State was being taken into *khalisa*, and that mace-bearers had already been sent to Ajmer and Amber with necessary instructions to the governor of the province. The orders, Jai Singh learnt, had been passed at the representation of his brother, Bijai Singh,⁵ who had fought on the Emperor's side in the recent war. Jai Singh's first reaction to this news was to instruct his *Diwan* at Amber to delay anyhow the implementation of the Imperial orders, which he hoped to get cancelled or modified.⁶ A few months later when the Emperor visited Amber on his way to Ajmer (January 1708), it was officially declared that Amber was being confiscated to the Imperial establishment as there was a dispute for the throne between Jai Singh and his brother, and the name of the Kachwaha capital was altered to Islamabad.⁷

Propriety of the Emperor's action; basic issues raised by it.

3. See Kamraj, f. 34b; Yahya, 113b; *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., II, pp. 293-96. For Munim Khan's services to Muazzam, see Iradat Khan, p. 43.

4. *Parwanah* with the seal of Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf-ud-daulah Asad Khan and Amir-ul-umara Nusrat Jang Zulfiqar Khan to Fakhr-ud-din Ahmad Khan, July 15, 1707, *J.S.A.*

5. Jai Singh to Diwan Ram Chand and Purohit Haras Ram, *parwanah*, Shrivana Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707), *J.S.A.* Jai Singh to Maharana Amar Singh, draft *kharita*, July 22, 1707, *J.S.A.* See also Bhimsen, f. 169b.

6. Jai Singh to Diwan Ram Chand and Haras Ram, *parwanah*, July 22, 1707, *J.S.A.*

7. *Bahadur Shah Nama*, 254-6; *M.M.*, 56a, cited in *Parties*, 30; Irvine, I, 46.

Before proceeding further, we may examine the appropriateness of the Imperial action in respect of Amber. Though after having fought on the Emperor's side in the recent contest, Bijai Singh had begun to aspire for the *gaddi* of Amber, and the Imperial authorities seem to have encouraged him in this, he had absolutely no legal title to the State. Jai Singh had been the ruler of Amber since 1699, and till July 1707, Bijai Singh had not even once put forth his claim to rule the State.⁸ How then could he now challenge Jai Singh's position, the law of primogeniture, which was well established among the Rajputs in matters of succession, being also in the latter's favour. In fact it was wrong on the part of the Imperial government even to have entertained Bijai Singh's claim. Besides, the Mughal government was not consistent in its stand and gave different reasons at different times for the grave step taken by it. For instance, Jai Singh in his letter dated July 22, 1707 to Maharana Amar Singh attributed the Emperor's action to his displeasure with him for taking Azam's side⁹ and not due to any claim put forth by his brother. But if this was the reason, as then seemed to Jai Singh, then too it was contrary to the Emperor's declared policy of pardon and conciliation, which was being actually followed in the case of the other nobles.¹⁰

It is therefore not surprising that the reason given by the Mughal government for resuming Amber did not convince the Rajputs¹¹ who considered the act as arbitrary and capricious as

8. Bijai Singh was no doubt a black sheep in the family. This is proved not only by his intrigues to displace Jai Singh, but also from an undated letter, which, from the contents, seems to be of the period 1704-1707, showing that he had applied for grant of some villages separately as *watan*, like Kirat Singh, son of Mirza Raja Jai Singh. (Misc. Papers, Persian, *J.S.A.*). See his sister's letter (Appendix) chiding him for aspiring to the *gaddi* of Amber to which he had no claim.

9. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft *Kharita*, Shravan Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707), *J.S.A.*

10. But Danishmand Khan (398) does not see any inconsistency in the Emperor's action and says that "according to the laws of war and revenge", Jai Singh should have been executed, but the Emperor, out of his kindness, only ordered the confiscation of "the *zamindari* of Amber" from that "infidel". See *Parties*, 30, n. 27.

11. This is amply borne out by a number of letters exchanged among the Rajput rulers, and their correspondence with the Court, used in the following pages.

the resumption of Jodhpur in 1679.¹² Then and again at this time the basic issue raised by the Imperial action was whether the government could ignore the time honoured procedure of succession followed in the case of hereditary states, and resume them without fair and adequate grounds. The hereditary rights of the chiefs in their patrimonies and internal autonomy were after all the two most precious rights which the chiefs had been enjoying ever since they had entered into a political relationship with the Mughal government, on condition of military service and homage to the paramount power. These rights and obligations, though seldom written, were well established by long observance. These were normally respected¹³ by both the sides and formed the very basis of the relationship between the chiefs and the Mughal government; the violation of these rights naturally caused friction or collision depending on the extent to which the spirit of this relationship was ignored or violated by either side. In fact the Rathor struggle, which had never ceased since 1679, aimed at asserting this very principle, and, as we shall see, both the Maharana and Jai Singh emphasized this principle more than once in their letters to the Court.¹⁴

As we will presently see, in the case of Jodhpur also, the new Emperor tried to cling to his father's policy of retaining the State under the direct Mughal rule.¹⁵ Even in the case of Kotah, which, along with Gagron, Shahabad, Barod, etc., was granted

12. The Emperor had continued with his plan to take the State in *khalisa*, ignoring the birth of sons to Jaswant Singh's queens, and repeated pleas of the Rathor ministers who said that "the State should pass upon Raja Jaswant Singh's death, by inheritance and of right, to his sons" (see *Waqā-i-Ajmer*, 245-6). It may be noted that the Rathor ministers were quite sanguine that in case a son was born to the Maharaja's queens, the "*mulk*" would automatically remain with them, and for this reason, had decided not to resist the Imperial occupation of the State till news was received from the queens. See *Khyat Maharaja Ajit Singhji*, MS, copy in the Department of History, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 51. Cf. Athar Ali, pp. 24-25.

13. Though there are a few instances when the Mughal Emperors disregarded the customary law of succession among the Rajputs, the small number of such cases, and the peculiar context of each of these cases, failed to create any precedent on this point which might have been acceptable to both the sides. Cf. Athar Ali, 25.

14. See below in this Chapter

15. See below in this Chapter. See also Athar Ali, p. 100.

to Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi soon after the battle of Jajau,¹⁶ thereby ending that State's separate existence as a patrimony of Madho Singh's descendants, the Mughal action, besides being inconsistent with the declared policy, was likely to lead, in course of time, to Kotah's absorption in the empire, the grant of that State to Budh Singh being resumable at any time. In brief, the new Emperor's policy towards Amber, Jodhpur and Kotah gives the impression that it was calculated to subvert these States.¹⁷

Motives of the Imperial government. It is not easy to give the reasons, or to explain the motives which induced the Imperial government to adopt this policy, as, in the face of resolute opposition, it remained mostly under a veil, and the motives were kept carefully concealed under a maze of vague and contradictory reasons given by the authorities from time to time to justify their action. The designs of the Government, however, can be read in its shifting stand during the course of negotiations with the representatives of these States, and in its persistent efforts, described subsequently in this chapter, to retain the central portion of these States under its direct control.¹⁸ While opinions might differ regarding the motives and the aims of the Mughal government in adopting this policy, it will be generally agreed that its successful implementation in respect of two or three ancient and well known states was likely to set into motion a process which, in course of time, would have brought extensive tracts of territory under the direct Mughal rule. This in turn would have gone a long way in solving the acute shortage of *paibaqi* lands, the scarcity of which was threatening the whole working of the *mansabdari* system, and had endangered the entire fabric of the Mughal administration as well as its military machinery.¹⁹ In fact the

16. *Vamsha*, IV, p. 2999.

17. Dr. Satish Chandra in *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740* (Aligarh, 1959) takes a different view. See pp. 30-31 and Introduction, p. xlix-1. He says (pp. 30-32), it seems the Emperor had no intention of establishing direct Mughal rule over Amber, but only wanted to replace one branch of the House, which he mistrusted, by another, as Aurangzeb had wished to do in case of Jodhpur, probably with a view to "gain greater control over Rajputana and the trade routes passing through it".

18. See below in this Chapter. See also *Waga-i-Ajmer* (pp. 80-83, 114) for Aurangzeb's attempt to keep Jodhpur proper under direct Mughal rule.

19. For the scarcity of land, and the resulting crisis in the *jagirdari*

problem had become so acute that, according to Bhimsen,²⁰ Munim Khan advised the Emperor to resume the Rajput state and to distribute the land, which would become available on the resumption of these states. Jodhpur had been under the direct Mughal rule for the past twenty-seven years, and on the plea of a dispute, the same could be done in respect of Amber also.

Emperor informs his decision to Jai Singh. It was about the middle of July when the Emperor told Jai Singh that Amber was being resumed, and asked him to proceed to Langarkot (in the Peshawar district). In vain Jai Singh pointed out to the Emperor that his people had been living in Amber and the neighbouring areas "since time immemorial" and never such an order had been issued before. His protest was ignored by the Emperor.²¹

system, see *Parties*, Introduction, xliii-xlvii; Athar Ali, pp. 92-94; Irfan Habib, pp. 269-70.

20. He says (f. 169b) that after Bahadur Shah's victory, appointments were made, and the Princes and the officials were granted large *jagirs*, but many remained who could not get *jagirs*. Munim Khan then submitted a plan that the *watans* of the Rajputs should be taken into *khalisa*, and after distributing them to meet the shortage, proceed to the Deccan. Bhimsen, we can safely presume, had a fair idea of the land which was likely to be released as a result of the annexation of the Rajput States. He was in the service of Rao Dalpat Bundela of Datia-Orcha and had come in close contact with the Hadas of Kotah and the other Rajputs. Though the total area viz. the *watan* areas recognised by the Mughal government, and such areas which though strictly speaking were not *watan* lands, but were nevertheless under complete and effective control of these states, has not so far been computed, the available information tends to support the view that the area was considerable. The point has been discussed in detail in Ch. XI. Besides these Rajput states, there were a very large number of semi-autonomous principalities in other provinces of the empire also, especially in Malwa, Gujarat, Bihar and Allahabad. If we take them into consideration, as we should, the total area covered by the semi-autonomous states was decidedly vast. It is only recently that exhaustive study of such principalities has been undertaken (e.g., A.R. Khan's unpublished thesis, 'The position of chiefs in the Mughal Empire during the reign of Akbar', Aligarh Muslim University, 1972), and the findings support the tentative conclusion noted above. Earlier, Irfan Habib had also arrived at this very conclusion (see pp. 188-89 of *Agrarian System of the Mughal India*). See also Moreland, *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, pp. 122-23. For Bahadur Shah's liberality in granting *jagirs*, growing crisis in the *jagirdari* system, and serious financial situation in his time, see *Parties*, 57-60.

21. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft *Kharita*, Shravan Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707), *J.S.A.*

Jai Singh seeks Mewar's help. In this dark hour, Jai Singh turned to Mewar, the only state which had in the past displayed courage in supporting a just cause, and which alone could lead, even in her days of decline, a Rajput Union. On July 22, 1707, Jai Singh wrote to Rana Amar Singh informing him about the Emperor's decision, and sought his advice. He informed that the Emperor, being displeased with him for taking Azam's side, had ordered to take Amber into *khalisa*, and had asked him to accept *jagir-i-tankhwah* instead. It was also heard that Amber might be given to Bijai Singh. Jai Singh also informed Ajit Singh about these developments.²²

On August 25, after waiting in vain for a reply, Jai Singh again wrote to the Maharana: "Earlier, I had informed Your Highness that the Emperor, objecting to my having joined Azam, resumed Amber, and posted me at Langarkot. . . . The news thereafter is as follows: my posting at Langarkot has been postponed; orders have been sent to the *Subahdar* and the *Diwan* of Ajmer to take possession of Amber; the troops sent by them have already reached there. Saiyid Hussain Khan has been given leave from the Court to proceed to Amber to take charge of the place". He further stated that he had done his utmost to induce the Emperor to change his decision, and also tried to gain support of the officials for his case, but with no result. He informed the Maharana that the Emperor did not seem inclined to restore Amber, to secure which Bijai Singh was doing his utmost. Jai Singh sent this letter through Budh Singh Kumbhani, and despatched an identical letter to Maharaja Ajit Singh.²³

Jai Singh's efforts to avert the implementation of the Imperial orders. While waiting to hear from Mewar and Jodhpur, Jai Singh, in the meantime, tried to avert the implementation of the Imperial orders. He asked his own state officials at Amber to induce the *Diwan* of Ajmer *subah* to advise the Court against resumption of Amber. The *Diwan* should clearly state in his

22. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft, Shravan Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707) *J.S.A.* Till this time Jai Singh had not in any way "colluded with Ajit Singh" in his "aggression against Jodhpur". The charge, (*Bahadur Shah Nama*, 398) that he had been "a rebel and disturber" was also baseless. See *Parties*, 30, n. 27.

23. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft, Bhadrpada Sudi, 9, S. 1764 (August 25, 1707), *J.S.A.*

report to the Emperor, wrote Jai Singh, that the Rajputs had been living in this region since long, and if they were treated harshly, the *mulk* (country) would be ruined, resulting in loss of revenue and widespread disturbances. "The report should be so worded that, while serving our purpose, it should not excite the Emperor's suspicion", he suggested.²⁴ At Agra, Jai Singh again represented to the Emperor that his people had been residing in Amber state since time immemorial, and even if the State was being resumed for some time, they should at least be given a few *parganas* for their residence. He asked for Vahatri, Dausa and Chatsu.²⁵ The Emperor agreed to grant him Deoti Sancheri and Chatsu. Though the *sanads* granting these *parganas* to Jai Singh were ready in August, they were not issued to him.²⁶

On August 28, Jai Singh sent instructions to Ram Chand, his *diwan*, to hand over the possession of Amber to Hussain Khan without offering any resistance in order to remove all doubts from the minds of the Imperial authorities. He also asked him to treat the Saiyid, his *push-dasht*, and other officials with all due courtesy, and to negotiate with the Saiyid the terms for securing Amber on *ijara*. "This seems to be the only way out for the present", he wrote. He also asked Ram Chand to extend to Shujaat Khan, *subahdar* of Ajmer, all due hospitality, and to give him such presents as had been given in the past to other governors of the province whenever they had passed through Amber. In the end he advised his *diwan* to induce the *waqia-navis* and the *khufia-navis* of the province to send favourable reports to the Emperor.²⁷

In his *parwanah* of September 1, 1707, to Ram Chand, Jai Singh explained why he wished to take Amber on *ijara*. It would.

24. Jai Singh to Diwan Sah Ram Chand and Purohit Haras Ram, *parwanah*, Shravan Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707), *J.S.A.*

25. Jai Singh to Diwan Ram Chand, Shravan Sudi 5, S. 1764 (July 22, 1707), *J.S.A.* He also wrote that Bijai Singh was trying to secure Amber and Vahatri, and the Emperor was well disposed towards him as the latter had served the Emperor only recently.

26. Emperor's orders with the seal of Rustam Dil Khan, dated 15 Jamadi I, 1119 H. (August 3, 1707) to *diwans* asking them to grant *sanads* for these two *parganas* (*J.S.A.*).

27. Jai Singh to Diwan Ram Chand, draft *parwanah*, Bhadrapada Sudi 12, S. 1764 (August 28, 1707), *J.S.A.*

he wrote, save them from humiliation, and keep others guessing as to their actual position. Moreover, if they took the State on *ijara*, it would continue to remain in their actual possession, and others would not be able to do any mischief. He asked Ram Chand to extend all courtesy to Rustam Dil Khan, who was coming that side probably to see the country with a view to securing *jagirs* for himself, but, at the same time, to keep at hand at least 2,000 horsemen, and to summon all the 'Sardars', asking them to turn up in good numbers, to give the impression to the Khan that the Rajputs were powerful in the region, and thus discourage him from asking for *jagirs*.²⁸ Jai Singh's *parwanahs* to Ram Chand indicate that at this time he had some hope that the Emperor might revoke his decision and restore Amber. Apparently the motives of the Emperor and the true nature of the Imperial policy became clear to Jai Singh only gradually.

Mewar promises to help Jai Singh. In early September 1707, Jai Singh received Mewar's long awaited reply which greatly heartened him. Expressing his gratitude to the Maharana, Jai Singh in his reply dated September 11 thanked him for his advice, which, in the light of the subsequent events, seems to have been that they would refrain from taking any precipitate action, but on failure of all other means would employ, at the right moment, the concerted strength of the Rajput states to secure their objective. Jai Singh assured the Maharana that he depended solely on his support.²⁹ From this time onward, till the desired object was gained, Mewar stood solidly behind Jai Singh.

Maharana and Jai Singh in correspondence with Ghazi-ud-din Khan. Jai Singh and the Maharana also got in touch with Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang, the leader of the powerful Turani group of nobles. In the middle of September 1707, Jai Singh received a letter from Ghazi-ud-din Khan. The Maharana also sent his *wakil* to meet the Khan.³⁰ Ghazi-ud-din Khan,

28. Jai Singh to Sah Ram Chand Dewan, draft *parwanahs*, Bhadrapada Sudi 12, S. 1764 (August 28, 1707) and of Asoj Vadi 1, S. 1764 (September 1, 1707), *J.S.A.*

29. Jai Singh to Rana Amar Singh, draft letter, Asoj Vadi 11, S. 1764 (September 11, 1707) *J.S.A.*

30. Mehta Jagannath (Ghazi-ud-din's *munshi*) to Jai Singh, Asoj Vadi 13, S. 1764 (September 12, 1707), *J.S.A.*

his son Chin Qilich Khan (future Nizam-ul-mulk), and his cousin, Muhammad Amin Khan, had kept themselves away from the War of Succession. After the war, as already noted, they had received offers of immunity and pardon from the new Emperor, and in September, overlooking Ghazi-ud-din Khan's reluctance to visit the Court, he was appointed to the Government of Gujarat. Despite this, his attitude towards the government had remained sullen and mistrustful. As Ghazi-ud-din Khan's relations with the Emperor and those of Muhammad Amin Khan's with Munim Khan were strained since Aurangzeb's days,³¹ their contacts with the Rajputs, who were about to defy the Imperial government, were significant. Later on we will see that Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang made (June-July 1709) a secret compact with the Rajputs, against whom he was being sent by Emperor.³²

Jai Singh negotiates for grant of Dausa, Chatsu etc. as tankhwah jagir. Meanwhile, at Agra, Jai Singh requested the Emperor that pending decision on Amber, he might be granted Vahatri, Dausa, Chatsu and Mauzabad as *tankhwah jagir*. The Emperor consented to it, but actually nothing was given to him during the coming months. Explaining his object in requesting for these *parganas*, Jai Singh wrote to his *Diwan*, "My object is really Amber. I thought that if delay is made in case of Amber, and Bijai Singh secures Vahatri and Dausa, then it might affect the attitude of the people towards us. If the Emperor restores Amber, well and good; in case he tries to alienate land by granting it to somebody else, then we would need some troops (to resist the move)". Jai Singh also requested the Emperor not to send Saiyid Hussain Khan to Amber, but his request was curtly turned down. His request for granting him³³ Amber *pargana* on *ijara*

31. See Irvine, I, pp. 40-41; *Parties*, 27. Chin Qilich Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan had their first audience with the Emperor on 10th Shaban, 1119 H. (October 26, 1707). Chin Qilich Khan was made governor of Awadh and *faujdar* of Gorakhpur, and Amin Khan was appointed *faujdar* of Moradabad.

Firoz Jang had been responsible for the disgrace and confinement of Bahadur Shah in 1687, and it was on Muhammad Amin Khan's complaint that Munim Khan's rank was reduced in 1702 during the siege of Khelna (See Iradat, p. *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., II, 293.

32. See below, in this Chapter.

was also declined, though, shortly afterwards, it was granted to another person, Sukhi Ajdasi (?). Jai Singh expressed his surprise that this person should have taken the *pargana* on *ijara*, even though it was lying desolate, and added that granting of Amber on *ijara* to Sukhi Ajdasi was unacceptable to him.³⁴

Developments in Marwar and Mewar; Ajit Singh's conduct. We may now turn to the developments in Marwar and Mewar following Aurangzeb's death. The first act of Ajit Singh on hearing the death of his mortal foe was to expel (March 19, 1707) the Imperial troops from Jodhpur. During the next few weeks he recovered Merta, Sojat, Pali and other towns of Marwar. It is said that Ajit Singh was acting on the Maharana's advice, who too had recovered Pur-mandal, Bednor, and Mandalgarh *parganas* soon after Aurangzeb's death.³⁵ Shortly afterwards, Ajit Singh received Bahadur Shah's letter inviting him to join his side in the contest for the throne. He, however, decided to remain away from the contest as he was busy in consolidating his own position in Marwar and in restoring the arrangements which had broken down during the long Mughal occupation of his country. After Bahadur Shah's victory, Ajit Singh was asked to hand over Jodhpur to the *faujdar* designate, but he ignored the orders. He did not even send the customary *nazar* and congratulatory message to the new Emperor.³⁶ It is, however, certain that even if he had observed these courtesies, it would not have affected in any way the Imperial decision to re-establish the Mughal rule in Marwar. The Mughal government was determined not to abandon her gains made in this region during the past twenty-seven years, or to permit such a flagrant defiance of its authority, which might set a bad example for others. Mewar's conduct also called for vindication of the Imperial prestige in Rajputana. For these reasons, and also to ensure satisfactory implementation of the decision in respect of Amber,

33. Jai Singh to Sah Ram Chand, copy *parwanah*, Margashirsha Vadi 2, S. 1764 (October 31, 1707), *J.S.A.*

34. Jai Singh to Kishan Singh Shekhawat, *P.L.*, 7 Shawwel, 1119 H. (December 21, 1707), *J.S.A.*

35. *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, 69-72 as cited by Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 528-29; *Vir Vinod*, II, 767, which says that Ajit Singh was acting on Mewar's advice. See also Tod, II, 59.

36. See Bhimsen, f. 170b; Irvine, I, 45.

the Emperor decided to march via Amber and Ajmer on his way to the Deccan.

Jai Singh wants to display his strength, but avoids provocation. When Jai Singh came to know of the Emperor's intention to visit Amber, he sent urgent instructions to his officials posted there to assemble a large force by summoning the Rajawats, Shekhawats, Narukas, and other trusted clans, in order to demonstrate to the Emperor "the weight of our *mulk*".³⁷ But, at this stage, he had no mind to take any precipitate step which the Imperial government might exploit to its own advantage. He, therefore, decided to submit quietly to each and every order of the Emperor who set out for Ajmer on November 2.³⁸

Amber evacuated. After a few marches, the *faujdar* designate of Jodhpur, Mihrab Khan, was given leave to proceed to his charge, and Jai Singh was told to arrange the evacuation of his capital before the Emperor's arrival there. On December 4, Hussain Ali's report arrived informing the Emperor that the Imperial troops had taken possession of the town after Jai Singh's men had evacuated it.³⁹

Emperor visits Amber; names it Mominabad. Passing via Toda, Dausa and Bassi, Bahadur Shah arrived in the vicinity of the Kachwaha capital on January 7, 1708.⁴⁰ On the 10th, Princes Jahandar Shah, Azim-ush-shan and Jahan Shah were sent in advance to inspect the buildings of the fort. About mid-day, the Emperor himself set out in a portable throne for Amber. He got down at the mosque built by Emperor Akbar inside the fort, offered prayers there, and then proceeded to see the palace. A few local *sahukars* were also in his retinue; the Emperor made enquiries about their mansions. Princes Azim-ush-shan, Rafi-ush-shan, Ali Tabar, Bidar Dil, and a number of officers were accompanying the Emperor. The palaces and the garden, which still wear a melancholy charm about them, formed a most favourable impression on the visitors. One *ghari* before sunset, the Emperor

37. Jai Singh to Diwan Ram Chand, *parwanah*, Margashirsha Vadi 2, (October 31, 1707), *J.S.A.*

38. *Akhbarat*, 17 Shaban, 1119 H. (November 2, 1707).

39. *Akhbarat*, 20 Ramzan (December 4, 1707); Irvine, I, 46.

40. See *Akhbarat*, 9-24 Shawwal (December 23, 1707—January 10, 1708).

returned to his camp.⁴¹ We do not find any mention in the records that the State of Amber was conferred on Bijai Singh.⁴² About two months later (March 1, 1708), orders were issued renaming Amber as Mominabad,⁴³ a provocative action, totally unwarranted, and bound to raise serious doubts in the minds of the Rajputs about the Mughal intentions. After all, if the object in taking Amber into *khalisa* was merely to settle a disputed succession, as was officially stated, then the question arises why the six century old name of the Kachhwaha state was altered.

When the Emperor set out for Ajmer on January 13, 1708, Jai Singh, quiet and unruffled, accompanied him as before. During the march he told the Emperor that as Amber had been confiscated and Deoti Sancheri had been granted to Bijai Singh, only Dausa was left with him, which was insufficient for the maintenance of his family. He requested that Mauzabad and Chatsu *parganas*, which were also *mahals* of his *watan*, be granted to him. But no attention was paid to his request.⁴⁴ Every evening, during the march, he used to take up the allotted position along with Rao Raja Budh Singh, Bijai Singh, Shatrasal Rathor, and a few other Rajput nobles, till the army reached in safety the next halting place.⁴⁵

Jai Singh's mother leaves Amber in tears. After the Emperor's visit to Amber it became apparent that the State was not likely to be restored to Jai Singh in the near future. He, therefore, sent orders to his officials to escort his mother, sister, and other ladies of the family, who were still residing in the buildings outside the fort, to Dausa. But Jai Singh's mother declined to leave Amber. She told the official, who had gone to request her to

41. *Akhbarat*, 26-27 Shawwal (January 9, 10, 1708), *J.S.A.* Among those who performed *nazr-i-mulazmat* on the Emperor's return to his camp was Raja Bijai Singh also.

42. There is no mention of Amber having been conferred upon Bijai Singh in any of the scores of letters exchanged between Jai Singh, Ajit Singh and the Maharana, or in their letters to Asad Khan, Prince Jahandar Shah, Ghazi-ud-din Khan or Sarbuland Khan, or in the reports received by them from their own *wakils* at the Court; nor do we find the Rajputs or their *wakils* objecting to the grant of Amber to Bijai Singh. Cf. *Parties*, 30.

43. *Akhbarat*, 19 Zul Hijja, 1119 H. (March 1, 1708), *J.S.A.*

44. Jai Singh to Emperor, *arzdasht* (draft), *J.S.A.*

45. Thus see *Akhbarat*, 1-2 Zul Qada, 1119 H. (January 13-14, 1708), *J.S.A.*

shift to Dausa, that she had vowed not to go elsewhere and to stay on at Amber even if she was cut down. It was with considerable difficulty that Jai Singh, who had been requested to intervene,⁴⁶ could persuade his mother to bear the misfortune and leave the ancient residence of the family till the return of better times.

Emperor's march to Merta; Ajit Singh submits on the advice of Maharana and Jai Singh. From Ajmer, the Emperor pressed on to Merta. The villages and towns on his way were lying deserted as the people had fled in fear of the Imperial army.⁴⁷ On January 26, a *farman* for Raja Ajit Singh, in which he had been asked to attend the Court and was assured favours, was given to Nahar Khan.⁴⁸ The Emperor was anxious to avoid, as far as possible, hostilities in Marwar, as he wished to reach the Deccan at the earliest to deal with Kam Baksh who was reported to have captured Gulbarga, Imtiyazgarh, Nurabad, and Wakinkera forts and had also occupied Karnatak.⁴⁹ The Jats were also creating trouble in the Mathura district, and twice in the past few months the army had to be sent against them, first under Shatrasal Rathor, and in October under Raza Bahadur.⁵⁰ For these reasons the Imperial authorities were keen to avert an entanglement in Marwar, and welcomed Ajit Singh's withdrawal from Merta (January 1708), which they gladly accepted as an indication of his willingness to submit.⁵¹ On February 2, a *hasb-ul-hukm* was sent to Durgadas. On the 5th, Ajit Singh's letter arrived in which he had agreed to wait upon the Emperor.⁵² We know that the Rajput rulers were acting in concert, and Ajit Singh was apparently acting on Mewar's

46. A *muttsaddi* to Jai Singh, *arzdashit*, Phalgun Vadi 3, S. 1764, *J.S.A.*

47. Kamraj, f. 36b.

48. *Akhbarat*, 14 Zul Qada (January 26, 1708), *J.S.A.*

49. For Kam Baksha's progress in the Deccan, *Akhbarat*, 16 Rajab (October 2, 1707), 17 Shawwal (December 31, 1707), 9 Zul Qada (January 21, 1708).

50. *Akhbarat*, 25 Jamadi I (August 13, 1707).

51. *Akhbarat*, 19 Zul Qada (January 31, 1708). It was reported to the Emperor that on Mihrab Khan's approach, the Rathors withdrew from Merta Cf. Irvine, 47.

52. *Akhbarat*, 21 and 24 Zul Qada (February 2, 5, 1708).

advice.⁵³ After sending a *farnan* to Ajit Singh, the Emperor asked Khan Zaman, the younger son of Munim Khan, to go and meet Ajit Singh and to escort him to the Court. An army of about 9000 horse and 2000 foot was placed at Khan Zaman's disposal, and soon after, at his request, additional troops and artillery were sent to him.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the Emperor had reached Merta on February 9. As the march of the Imperial army had caused considerable damage to the fields, the Emperor accepted the request of Tahavvar Khan, *faujdar* of Merta, for payment of Rs. 20,000 as compensation for the damage to the crops in that *pargana*.⁵⁵

On February 12, the Emperor was informed that Khan Zaman had met Ajit Singh on Sunday at Pipal Badh and that he would be going to Jodhpur along with Mihrab Khan, *faujdar* designate, to take possession of the town and the fort.⁵⁶ Khan Zaman wrote that he would soon be returning to the Court along with Raja Ajit Singh. On February 14, Khan Zaman arrived with the Raja, and after receiving the permission, entered the camp.⁵⁷ The next day, Khan Zaman conducted Ajit Singh, with hands tied with a scarf, to the Emperor's presence. The Emperor bade Ajit's hands to be untied, and conferred on him a dress of honour. On February 16, when Ajit Singh attended the *Diwan-i-Khas*, the Emperor awarded him a sword and a *jamidhar*. He was also given the rank of 3500/3000, of which 1000 were *du-aspa*, and the title of Maharaja,⁵⁸ but Jodhpur was not restored to him, which, a few days later (February 18), was named Muhammadabad.⁵⁹ Durgadas had already arrived two

53. *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, p. 78 mentions Jai Singh's letter to Ajit Singh, advising him to submit for the time being. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 533, n. 2.

54. *Akhbarat*, 24 and 29 Zul Qada (February 5, 10).

55. *Aklibarat*, 20 Zul Hijja 1119 H. (March 2, 1708).

56. Khafi Khan, in the usual rhetorical style of the Muslim chroniclers, speaks of Ajit Singh's "request" that Khan-i-Zaman and Qazi-ul-quzat might come to Jodhpur to rebuild the mosques, destroy the temples, enforce the provisions of the Shariat about the summons to prayer and the killing of cows, to appoint magistrates and to commission officers to collect *jizyah*. (K. K., 606-7).

57. *Akhbarat*, 1, 3 Zul Hijja (February 12, 14, 1708).

58. *Akhbarat*, 5 Zul Hijja (February 16); Reu, *Marwar*, I, 294-95; Irvine, I, 48.

59. *Akhbarat*, 7 Zul Hijja 1119 H. (February 18, 1708). Ignoring the

days before, and, on the Emperor's orders, was received by Khan Zaman at a distance of about 10 miles from the Imperial camp. For the time being, Ajit Singh had to console himself with solemn assurances of an early, just and, sympathetic review of his claim to Jodhpur. Like Jai Singh he now also joined the Emperor's train.

Mewar ignores the Emperor. Bahadur Shah reached Ajmer on March 14,⁶⁰ and after a brief halt, started for the Deccan. Passing via Shahpura, he reached Chittor, then lying deserted, as Rana Amar Singh had sent away his family and treasure to the hills. On March 18, Asad Khan, who had good contacts with the Rajputs, sent a reassuring letter to the Maharana. At the same time, the Rana was asked to wait upon the Emperor, who was passing well inside Mewar's territory. The orders, which were accompanied by a threat in case of disobedience,⁶¹ were contrary to Mewar's agreement of 1615 with the Mughal government, and were rightly ignored by the Maharana, causing much vexation to the Emperor. But, in view of the fact that Kam Baksh had entered Haidarabad and was besieging Golkunda, and Ghazi-uddin Khan, despite all the consideration shown to him during the past few months, had not yet left Burhanpur for Gujarat, punitive action against Mewar was deferred till the Emperor's return from the Deccan.⁶²

Rajput concern at the Emperor's attitude; Mumim Khan's policy. Jai Singh and Ajit Singh continued to march with the Imperial army which passed via Mandsaur and Nolai on way to the south. During the march, the two princes got many opportunities to discuss their future course of action in case their states were not restored.⁶³ As days passed, and the army moved further

basic issues involved in the Imperial decision, Danishmand Khan says (*Bahadur Shah Nama*, 398) that the Emperor did not restore Jodhpur to Ajit Singh as the latter "harboured the intention of rebellion and disturbance in his heart".

60. Bhimsen, f. 172a.

61. Bhimsen, f. 172a; *Vir Vinod* cites (II, p. 781) Asad Khan's letter of 7th Muharram, 1120 H., but in a wrong context.

62. See Bhimsen, ff. 172a, 172b; Irvine, I, 49. "The Emperor ruled that the matter of Kam Baksh was now more urgent. When by God's aid, that business has been settled, he would undertake the punishment of that unbeliever, i.e. the Rana". (See Irvine, I, 49).

63. See Bhimsen, 172b; *Pustak Prakash ri Juni Bahi*, f. 86, R.A.

southwards, they became increasingly suspicious of the vague assurances given to them by the Imperial government, a policy for which Mirza Muhammad blames Munim Khan. He says that the Rajputs should have been given concessions, but Munim Khan "remained oblivious of this. Rather, he advised His Majesty that they should be put off with sweet words and empty promises, while their countries were to be handed over to the charge of the Imperial officers, and they should be induced to remain at Court in the hope of obtaining large *jagirs* and their affairs prolonged till the action against Kam Baksh was over. Whatever was deemed suitable could then be done. In the meantime, Rajput resistance would have been crushed and their strength sapped".⁶⁴

Rajputs decide to part with the Emperor; leave the Imperial camp at Barod. For the past many days Rajput officers and nobles like Jagram, Durgadas, Mukanddas Champawat, etc., had been urging their masters to break away from the Imperial camp without waiting any further for a favourable response from the Imperial government. In any case, they argued, they should do so before the army had crossed the Narmada, as after that it would become difficult for them to leave the camp.⁶⁵ The Maharana also held the same view which he conveyed to Jai Singh and Ajit through his trusted diplomat, Biharidas Pancholi.⁶⁶ Indeed, it was the right time to break off from the Emperor who was likely to remain engrossed in the Deccan during the coming months, and was not likely to turn back in pursuit of them, his march to Deccan being imperative and urgent. In the early hours of 15th April, Ajit Singh visited Jai Singh's camp and settled a date and time of their flight from the Imperial camp.⁶⁷ On April 20 (Vaishakha Sudi 13).⁶⁸

64. See *Parties*, 34.

65. *Pustak Prakash ri Juni Bahi*, f. 86.

66. This is clear from Jai Singh's letter which he wrote to the Maharana immediately after leaving the Imperial camp (Letter in *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 768).

67. *Pustak Prakash ri Juni Bahi*, f. 86.

68. *Ibid.* Jai Singh only writes that they left the Imperial camp on the 13th, but it is clear from other letters of this time (e.g. letters of Mukanddas and of Deidan to Biharidas Pancholi, dated Jyestha Vadi 2 and Jyestha Vadi 7, S. 1764, in *Vir Vinod*, pp. 768-9) that the 13th in Jai Singh's letter is Vaishakha Sudi 13 (April 20). The date is corroborated by the Persian authorities which give 10th Safar as the date of flight (See Irvine, I, 49).

when the Emperor set out from Barod for the next stage, the Rajputs accompanied him in the rear for some distance, and then wheeled round and made off for Devlia.⁶⁹

Mewar welcomes Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. Soon after the flight, Jai Singh informed the Maharana that they had received his message brought by Biharidas. "For me, what you say is final. Therefore, after breaking away from the (Imperial) camp on the 13th (Vaishakha Sudi), Maharaja Ajit Singhji, myself and Durgadasji are coming to your presence."⁷⁰ They reached Bari Sadri on April 25, five days after leaving the camp. On April 30, the Maharana received them at Gadva village, from where he conducted them ceremoniously to Udaipur. The next day a formal darbar was held at which the Maharana accorded to the two princes a befitting welcome.⁷¹

Maharana marries his daughter to Jai Singh; the terms. Also, to close a long unhappy chapter in Mewar-Amber relations when all social intercourse had ceased between the two Houses, and to emphasize that Mewar was fully behind Jai Singh's back and would support him to the farthest limit, the Maharana offered his daughter's hand to Jai Singh.⁷² In return for this gesture, the political significance of which was no less than its social import, Mewar sought and received, before the nuptials were solemnised, Jai Singh's consent to the following terms: the status

Jodhpur Khyat, II, p. 82 gives Vaishakha Sudi 12. (See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 534, n. 2). But the date given by Jai Singh himself in his letter should be accepted.

69. The place where the Rajputs left the Emperor is not mentioned in any of the contemporary letters. *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, p. 82 gives Barod village; Ojha accepts Mandleshwar on the river Narmada (*Jodhpur*, II, p. 534). Karnidan (*Suraj Prakash*, II, Ch. VI, 76) speaks of their return from the bank of the Narmada. *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 768 also says that the Princes accompanied the Emperor up to the Narmada, though at another place (p. 834 n.) mentions that they are said to have returned from Nolai, and according to others from Barod; Irvine gives (I, 49) Mandeshwar town in *pargana* Mandeshwar, *subah* Malwa. Raghbir Singh accepts (Malwa, 96) Mandleshwar on the Narmada. Satish Chandra says (p. 34) Mahabaleshwar on the Narmada.

70. Jai Singh to Maharana Amar Singh, letter in *Vir Vinod*, II, 768.

71. See Mukanddas to Biharidas, *Jyestha Vadi* 2, S. 1764 (April 25, 1707) in *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 768-69. For details see *Vir Vinod*, II, p.p. 769-71.

72. Irvine, following *Bahadur Shah-nama*, says (I, 67) that a daughter of Jai Singh was promised to the Rana.

of chief queen for the Udaipur princess; her son's right to succeed irrespective of his seniority; and the promise that her daughter would never be married to a Muhammadan. The privileges which she was to enjoy as the chief queen of the Maharaja were also set forth in writing.⁷³

Of these the second term did portend trouble, being in violation of the time-honoured rule of primogeniture, which was well established among the Rajputs. But Jai Singh had no son at this time and the Udaipur princess could well be the first to be blessed with one. Moreover, he was not in a position to give undue weight to a distant contingency which he hoped to solve if and when it might arise. He, therefore, accepted the terms, and on May 25, amidst the usual eclat, married Princess Chandra Kunwar at Udaipur.⁷⁴

Jai Singh not deceived by the Emperor's offer. The day the Rajputs fled from the Imperial camp, a *farman* was despatched for Jai Singh informing him that his *mansab* and his State were being restored.⁷⁵ The move, probably intended to induce Jai Singh to break off from Mewar and the Rathors, failed. If, however, Jai Singh had accepted the offer, or had he believed in its earnestness, the events in Rajputana at this time would have run a different course.

Prince Jahandar Shah's letter to the Maharana. In early May 1708, the Maharana received Prince Jahandar Shah's *nishan* dated April 24, written four days after the Rajput flight from the Imperial camp. The Prince had asked the Maharana not to give shelter to Jai Singh, Ajit Singh, and Durgadas who, he wrote, had come away from Court "on account of the delay in payment

73. *Kapatdwara* document No. 14960, Jyestha Vadi 15, S. 1765 (May 9, 1708), *J.S.A.* The privileges specified in the agreement are: (a) The Maharaja would not disregard the wishes of Maharani Ranawat; (b) she would be accorded greater respect in the *seraglio* than other queens; (c) on all the festival nights, the Maharaja would stay in her palace; (d) the Maharaja on his return from a battle would first visit her; (e) inside the palace, her *palki* would precede those of the other queens. See also, Tod, II, 307 on the privileges of a *pat-rani*. Tod is not correct when he says (I, 318) that "renunciation of all connection, domestic or political, with the Empire" was also one of the stipulations.

74. *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 771.

75. Copy of the *farman* dated 11 Safar (April 20, 1708), received on 4 Rabi I, *J.S.A.*

of their salaries and in allotment of *jagirs*". The Prince asked the Maharana to send their petitions to the Emperor for pardon, and offered to intercede on their behalf. He also offered to secure *jagirs* for them. But, the Maharana, beyond sending formal petitions of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, attached little significance to the Prince's offer.⁷⁶

Rajputs drive out the Mughals from Marwar and Amber. Throughout the month of May and almost till the end of June, the Rajputs patiently waited for a clear and a definite assurance from the Imperial government regarding restoration of their States, which was their sole demand. They had no intention of declaring their independence, nor did they wish to break off from the Imperial government, if their patrimonies were restored.⁷⁷ But, on failing to receive any hopeful reply from the Emperor, they decided to take possession of their States by force. In late June, the combined Rajput armies besieged Jodhpur for five days and compelled Mihrab Khan to leave the fort (July 3, 1708). He was permitted to retreat to Ajmer unmolested.⁷⁸ The next day, Ajit Singh ascended his ancestral throne for the second time during the past sixteen months. Jai Singh was present on the occasion and applied *tika* on Ajit Singh's brow.⁷⁹ A few days later, after an initial failure, Amber's Diwan, Ram Chand, and Sanwaldas of Mewar, drove out Saiyid Hussain Khan Barha from Amber. In the sanguinary fight which lasted three *pahars*, the Saiyid lost about 500 dead. The Rajput casualties, dead and wounded, totalled 1000.⁸⁰ The Saiyid retired to Kaladera

76. Prince's *nishan* dated 14 Safar in *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 773-74.

77. This is amply borne out not only from Jai Singh's letter to Chhatrapati Shahu (see below in this Chapter but also from the negotiations which had been initiated from the very beginning and were carried all along, as described in the following pages. The story (*Vir Vinod*, II, 772) of their discussing the proposal to turn out the Mughals from Hindustan and to instal the Maharana as the Emperor, ought not to be accepted literally. At least Maharana and Jai Singh were quite clear about their own position and objective.

78. *Ajitodaya*, Canto 17, vss. 34-35; Bhimsen, f. 173a; *Suraj Prakash*, II, Ch. VI, vs. 81; G.H. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 537; *Vir Vinod*, II, 774-75; Reu, *Marwar*, I, p. 296. Bankidas, No. 391, gives Shravan Vadi 11 (July 3) as the date on which Mihrab Khan evacuated the fort.

79. Bankidas, No. 392.

80. A Persian *arzdast* of Lal Sahi (?), July 24, 1708 (*J.S.A.*) which gives the casualty figures; Irvine, I, 67. On July 13, the Emperor had conferred

(about 22 miles north-west of Amber) where he was again routed by Durgadas.⁸¹ He then fled to Narnaul where his brother was the *faujdar*. The news of the Rajput success reached the Court on August 11.⁸²

Prince Jahandar Shah's remonstrance; Maharana asserts his point. The first Rajput attempt to capture Amber in late June drew a sharp remonstrance from Prince Jahandar Shah who was trying to intercede on behalf of the Rajputs. On July 5, he wrote to the Maharana to instruct Jai Singh to dismiss Ram Chand, and informed him that, for the time being, the *arzis* sent by Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were not being considered.⁸³ In his reply, the Maharana naively blamed Ram Chand for his "indiscretion" (viz. attack on Amber), but made it clear that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were hereditary rulers, and if their patrimonies were not restored, there would be wide-spread disturbances in "Hindustan".⁸⁴ In his letter to Asad Khan, the Maharana made this point even more forcefully. He said that God had created different people for the different regions. In the past, the Emperors had bestowed upon the ancestors of the present rulers of this region *jagirs* in addition to their ancestral states, as a result of which they (Rajputs) had rendered excellent service to the empire. But, now, despite all the efforts of the Government, disturbances were gathering up everywhere in the country. The Rajputs, he added, would not rest till their *watans* were restored. It was, therefore, desirable to issue immediately the *sanads* restoring their *watans*.⁸⁵

Jai Singh betrothed to Ajit Singh's daughter. While at Jodhpur, Jai Singh accepted (July 26, 1708) the coconut sent by Ajit Singh proposing his daughter's hand.⁸⁶ The marriage, as we will see,

the title of Fatah Jang Khan on Saiyid Hussain Khan for repulsing the Rajput attack on Amber (*Akhbarat*, 6 Jamadi, I, July 13, 1708).

81. *Ibid.*

82. Irvine, I, 69.

83. Prince Jahandar Shah to Maharana, 27 Rabi II, 1120 H. letter (trans.) in *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 775-76.

84. Maharana to Jahandar Shah (late June or early July), letter (trans.) in *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 777.

85. Maharana to Asaf-ud-daula, letter (trans.) in *Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 777-78.

86. *Sialha Waqaya*, Bhadrpada Vadi 5, S. 1765 (July 26, 1708), *J.S.A.*

was solemnised long afterwards in December 1719 when the relations between the two had shown some improvement following a bitter spell lasting nearly four years.⁸⁷ Jai Singh stayed on at Jodhpur till August 1 and then reached Merta.⁸⁸ About this time (August-September), Mewar troops recovered Pur, Mandal, and a few other *parganas*. In the encounter, the commander of the Mewar troops, Jaswant Singh, son of Sanwaldas of Bednore, lost his life.⁸⁹

Jai Singh seeks Shahu's assistance; his letter to Shahu. Having wrested their States from the hands of the unwilling Mughal authorities, the Rajputs now strove to strengthen their position for the coming struggle, which could be long and arduous, by seeking support from the Marathas, Bundelas, and others. The Rajputs urged them to wage struggle in their respective regions against the Government which, they said, had betrayed their trust, and which was trying to ruin the Hindus on one pretext or another. If, however, the Mughal Government behaved, they had nothing against her. Soon after recovering Amber, Jai Singh sent a letter to Raja Shahu,⁹⁰ expressing these views and

87. See Ch. VII,

88. *Siaha Waqaya*, Bhadrapada Vadi 11, S. 1765 (August 1, 1708), *J.S.A.*

89. Ojha, *Udaipur*, II, 606. Irvine rightly places the battle in 1709 (Vol. I, 70), and not in 1707, soon after Aurangzeb's death, as does Shyamaldas (*Vir Vinod*, II, 767). There is no mention of the incident in the complaints of the Imperial government against the Rajputs; e.g., it is not mentioned in Jahandar Shah's *nishan* of 24 April 1708 (*Vir Vinod*, II, 773-74), nor the Rajput letters written upto 1708 mention anywhere the recovery of Bednore, etc. Maharana Amar Singh, however, could not secure *sanads* of these *parganas*. After his death in December 1710, Pur, Mandal, etc., were assigned (March-April) to Ranbaz Khan Mewati, and *pargana* Mandalgarh to Rao Indra Singh, mainly through Zulfiqar Khan's efforts. Munim Khan had died on February 18, 1711. Prince Azim-ush-shan secretly told Mewar's *wakil* that the Maharana might resist Ranbaz Khan when the latter would come to take the *parganas* under his possession, and that he would do what would be necessary if any complication arose. Maharana Sangram Singh then sent a select army against Ranbaz Khan. In a severe encounter, the Khan was killed. (For details, see Ojha, *Udaipur*, II, 611-14). When the news reached the Court, the *tika* on Maharana's accession was not sent. But as per his promise, Prince Azim-ush-shan intervened in Mewar's favour. (See *Vir Vinod*, II, 944).

90. Jai Singh to Shahu, draft *kharita*, *J.S.A.* There is a large collection of drafts of the *kharitas*, *parwanahs* and letters, etc. in the Jaipur Archives.

soliciting his support. "Your Highness must be aware of the cordial ties that existed among our elders.⁹¹ I hope, by the kindness of Shri Ramji, the ties between us shall grow still closer. Shah Alam, after becoming the Emperor, resumed my *watan*, and called Maharaja Ajit Singh to the Court assuring him that Jodhpur would be restored to him, but did not do so. This news must have reached Your Highness. I, on my part, spared no effort, to serve the Patshah, but he harbours malice towards the Hindus, and on one pretext or another wants to ruin them. For this reason, and as it was considered necessary, we broke off from the Emperor and came to Rana Amar Singh at Udaipur, and after (full) deliberations decided that if the Patshah even now becomes favourable towards the Hindus and restores *mansabs* and *watans*, as had been enjoyed by their ancestors, then it is all right, otherwise the Hindus will also do what they can. So far we have expelled the *faujdar*s and *qiledar*s from Amber and Jodhpur, and have established our control there, and shall now be leaving for Amber.⁹² Ranaji will also join (us) on Dashera (there). Your Highness is the *Sardar* of the Deccan. The honour of all the Hindus is one and the same. Hence, you take such measures that just as by entangling Patshah Alamgir in the Deccan, the honour of Hindustan was upheld, in the same manner this Patshah too should not be able to extricate himself from there. Earlier, Your Highness' servants⁹³ had accomplished this much, but now you yourself are there. Kam Baksh is also in Bijapur, Haidarabad. In alliance and in consultation with him, you will no doubt do what you think is proper, so that the

In the Jodhpur Archives, the drafts of the letters and *parwanahs* sent by the rulers have been copied down in *Bahis*. Kaviraja Shyamaldas in *Vir Vinod* has extensively used a large number of the drafts of letters sent from Udaipur. These original drafts, many of which have been used in the present work, have been accepted as reliable evidence on the same analogy which justifies acceptance of the draft letters in *Balmukund-namah*, *Ajaib-ul-Afaq* and other collection of letters.

91. Here Jai Singh is referring to Shivaji's relations with Mirza Raja Jai Singh and his son Ram Singh.

92. Though the Rajputs had captured Amber, Jai Singh continued to be with Ajit Singh at Jodhpur.

93. Jai Singh is referring to the successful struggle carried on by Ram Chandra Pant Amatya, Santaji, Dhanaji and others, following Sambhaji's capture and execution in 1689.

Hindus have an upper hand in this conflict. What more shall I write”.

(In the margin) “It has often been said that Alamgir was displeased with Raja Ram Singh on account of Shivaji’s case, and did not forget the hostility of Maharaja Jaswant Singh towards him. He retained in his heart ill-feeling on that account. Now we have to see to it.”⁹¹ The feeling expressed in his letter was no doubt the fruit of Alamgir’s discriminatory treatment of the Hindus in general and the Rajputs serving in the Mughal service in particular, especially after 1678.

Negotiations with the Mughal Government continue. Ever since the Rajput flight from the Emperor’s camp (April 20), Asad Khan, the *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*, and Prince Jahandar Shah had been corresponding with the Maharana with a view to arriving at an agreement with the Rajputs. In late June, Asad Khan informed the Maharana that the Emperor had passed orders restoring the *mansabs* of the two Rajas and that of Durgadas, and had granted Sojat and Jetaran to Ajit, Khandmani to Jai Singh, and Siwana *pargana* to Durgadas. He advised the Maharana against any attempt to use force to secure their objects, and assured him that if the Rajputs showed patience, he would be able to have Jodhpur and Amber restored by appealing to the Emperor in their favour.⁹⁵ The negotiations between the two sides continued even after the Rajputs had expelled the Imperial troops from Amber, Jodhpur and other towns of these

94. The letter shows that the Maratha resistance against the Mughal government had deeply impressed the Rajputs, who, being in the Imperial service, fought against the Marathas, and were opposed to their northward expansion, nevertheless they felt elated at their bold and successful struggle against the Mughal government. The growth of such a feeling among the Rajputs can only be explained by their alienation from the Mughal government, for which Aurangzeb’s discriminatory treatment of the Hindus, his deliberate restraint in promoting the Rajputs, and his Marwar policy were responsible.

95. Maharana to Asad Khan, letter (trans.) in *Vir Vinod*, II, 777-78. The letter shows that from the very beginning Asad Khan favoured restoration of Amber and Jodhpur. In contrast, Munim Khan did his best to prevent restoration of the states to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. As we will see, many other senior and experienced Mughal nobles, like Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang of the Turani group, were opposed to Munim Khan’s policy, and favoured restoration of *watans* to the Rajputs.

states, and the Government was making large scale preparations against them. Thus, while reinforcements were being sent to Saiyid Hussain Khan, *mansabs* were conferred upon Jai Singh (2500/2000), Ajit Singh (4000/3000) and Durgadas (3000/2000). Durgadas' title of Rao was also restored (September 30, 1708).⁹⁶ But shortly afterwards, a severe encounter between the Rajputs and Saiyid Hussain Khan near Sambhar terminated the negotiations for the time being.

Rajputs capture Sambhar; Churaman joins Saiyid Hussain Khan but later leaves him; his polite letter to Jai Singh In early October 1708, Jai Singh came to know that Saiyid Hussain Khan was intending to attack Amber, and that Churaman Jat had also joined him with a large force.⁹⁷ The Saiyid, after his expulsion from Amber, was being transferred under disgrace, but on his pressing request the Emperor agreed to stay his transfer for a few months, and even consented to send him financial and military assistance to enable him to recover 'Mominabad'.⁹⁸ On receiving the news of the impending threat to Amber, Jai Singh, Ajit Singh, and Durgadas, then at Merta, hurriedly set out with their combined armies, which included Mewar troops also, and, as a diversionary move, captured the prosperous town of Sambhar (October 1). The *faujdar*, after offering some resistance, took shelter in the fortress. The Rajputs broke open the treasury and disbursed its contents among the people.⁹⁹ This news drew Saiyid Hussain Khan to Sambhar. He was accompanied by his brothers — Ahmad Said Khan, *faujdar* of Mathura, and Ghairat Khan, *faujdar* of Narnaul—and some other officers,¹⁰⁰ but Churaman, for reasons which are only faintly discernible, had managed to separate

96. *Akhbarat*, 22 and 26 Rajab (September 26, 30, 1708), *J.S.A.*

97. Jaitra Singh (of Kaithwada) to Jai Singh, Kartik Vadi 9, S. 1765 (September 27, 1708), *J.S.A.*

98. See *Akhbarat*, 8 Jamadi II, 1120 H. (August 14, 1708), *J.S.A.*

99. Jai Singh to Chhatrasal Bundela, draft *kharita*, Kartik Sudi 13, S. 1765 (October 16, 1708), *J.S.A.* For the date of capture of Sambhar, *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, 89-90 in Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 541, n. 2. That they were at Merta when the news of the impending threat came is learnt from Jaitra Singh's letter of September 27, addressed to Jai Singh (*J.S.A.*).

100. Jai Singh to Chhatrasal Bundela, draft *kharita*, October 16, 1708 in *J.S.A.* Though Jai Singh mentions the names of the officers killed on the side of the enemy, he does not give the strength of the Saiyid's army.

from the Saiyid. It appears from a report sent by an Amber official some time later that Jai Singh had sent word to Churaman not to join the enemy. In return, he had offered to capture Kaithwada, whose chief, Jaitra Singh, was hostile to Churaman; the promise was fulfilled about a month and a half later. Afterwards, the Jat leader sent a polite message to Jai Singh, calling himself a servant of the Maharaja and offering to render any service in the Mathura district. He said that he had never shown any disinclination to wait upon the Maharaja despite the fact that most of the time he (Churaman) was running about evading arrest by the Mughal authorities.¹⁰¹

The encounter at Sambhar. The army of Saiyid Hussain Khan engaged the Rajputs outside Sambhar town on October 3, and was annihilated after a brief but fierce encounter. Three thousand enemy soldiers, as Jai Singh wrote to Chhatrasal Bundela on October 16, 1708, were killed in the bloody engagement. Among the dead were all the three *faujdars*.¹⁰² According to the Persian accounts, they were killed, along with many of their followers, by a deadly volley fired by about two thousand Rajput matchlockmen, who were loading their camels and were preparing to join the rest of the army which had already fled.¹⁰³ But Jai Singh's letter to Chhatrasal, and the report despatched by the commander of the Mewar troops soon after the battle, speak of a fierce clash. The latter wrote that on hearing the approach of Hussain Khan at the head of 4000 horse, the Rajputs took positions near the embankment of a large tank and awaited the arrival of the enemy. "Four *gharis* before sunset the battle commenced—a battle like Mahabharata—in which the *miyan*, his brother, relations, and the entire army perished."¹⁰⁴ The Emperor came

101. Kishan Singh and Zalim Singh to Jai Singh, Phalgun Vadi 2, S. 1765 (1708 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

102. Mahasahni Chaturbhuj to Pancholi Biharidas, Kartik Sudi 1, S. 1765, letter in *Vir Vinod*, II, 836-37. Jai Singh's letter to Chhatrasal written a few days after the battle gives the correct casualty figures. Chaturbhuj, who wrote immediately after the battle, was not in a position to give a correct idea of the losses suffered by each side.

103. *Akhbarat*, 12, 18 Ramzan 1120 H. (November 14, 20): *M.U.*, (trans. B. & B.), I, 640-41. See also Irvine, I, 69-70.

104. Jai Singh to Chhatrasal Bundela, Kartik Sudi 13, S. 1765, October 16, 1708 (Camp, Sambhar), *J.S.A.* Mahasahni's letter to Pancholi Biharidas,

to know of this reverse rather late (November 14).¹⁰⁵ He also learnt that the Rajputs had despatched their armies towards Rohtak, Delhi and Agra, and had established their outposts at Rewari and Narnaul. It was also reported that they were in touch with the Sikhs who were then fighting against the Mughal government in the Punjab.¹⁰⁶ The fate of the Saiyids evoked general sympathy, while some criticised them for their rashness. Thus, Yar Muhammad Khan, the governor of Delhi, blamed Saiyid Hussain Khan for the tragedy, and criticised him for going against the Rajputs on his own initiative.¹⁰⁷

Jai Singh's plan to spread resistance in other parts of the country also; his letter to Chhatrasal. We have already referred to Jai Singh's letter to Shahu seeking Maratha help against the new regime. His letter to Chhatrasal Bundela further reveals how the Rajputs were trying to inflame resistance against the Mughal government in other parts of the country also, on the plea that the policies of the Government were aimed at undermining Hindu honour and their vital interests. The contention of the Rajputs, no doubt, gained weight from Aurangzeb's policies and attitude towards the Hindus in general, and also from such measures of the new Emperor which were insulting to Hindu sentiments and unlikely to inspire in them feelings of loyalty towards the Mughal government.¹⁰⁸

Kartik Sudi 1, S. 1765 in *Vir Vinod*, II, 836-37. It is clear from the letter that the Rajputs had made a strategic withdrawal before engaging the enemy, and hence there is no question of their beating a retreat, leaving their tents behind with all their baggage "as a result of his (Saiyid's) first onset", or of their withdrawing "four or five miles when word was brought" that the Saiyids had been slain. Chaturbhuj's letter gives the impression that the Rajputs lay in ambush below the embankment of Talai Devayani and the army of the Saiyids was taken by surprise. Cf. Irvine, I, 69-70.

105. *Akhbarat*, 12 Ramzan, 1120 H. (November 14, 1708).

106. Jagjiwandas' report from Court to Jai Singh (Dec. 1708), *J.S.A.*

107. Khanazad Raju to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, Kartik Sudi 14; S. 1765 (October 17, 1708), *J.S.A.* Yar Muhammad seems to be the same person described as Yar Ali Beg in *M.U.*, II, 996-97. He was Turani.

108. Thus see the order of November 5, 1708, requiring dismissal of Hindu clerks in the service of the nobles and in Government departments. (*Akhbarat*, 3 Ramzan, 1120 H.); the order of 23 Ramzan (December 7, 1707) requiring the Imperial Kotwal to prevent the Hindus from using *palki*, and riding Arab and Iraqi horses, and to prevent them from coming to the Court wearing rings in the ears and with shaved beards. The *Jiziya* and pilgrim taxes continued to be levied. Later, in October 1711, he accepted the plea of the *amin* of *Jiziya*

In his letter dated October 16, 1708 to Chhatrasal, Jai Singh wrote that the trouble started when the Emperor, while granting them *mansabs*, incorporated the *parganas* of their *watans* into *khalisa*. "Your Highness knows well as to how one can live without a *watan* and what is (the importance) of a *mansab* without the *watan*". Informing Chhatrasal about the Rajput victory at Sambhar in which three thousand of the enemy were killed, and expressing his confidence that similar victories would be gained by them in future also, he wrote, "If *Sardars* like Your Highness gird up their loins, then the honour of Hindustan would no doubt be maintained. Other *zamindars*, *mansabdars* and the Rajas of the intervening region have already united and have removed the *thanas* of the Turks from their territories. Shri Ranaji too must have written to Your Highness (to do so). You will please join us early for the sake of the honour of the entire Hindu race. As we all Hindus have common ties, you will not delay in coming towards this side." He asked Chhatrasal to send the names of the prominent *zamindars* of the east whom they might contact and requested him to write letters to all such chiefs with whom he had intimate contacts. "This is no longer an issue which concerns any one person; now it concerns all the Hindu (rulers)", he concluded.¹⁰⁹

In the above letter Jai Singh had tried to emphasize that the resumption of the hereditarily held states was an issue which did not concern the Rajputs alone but all the chiefs, most of whom were Hindus, holding large or small patrimonies. Jai Singh's letter also explains why the Rajputs attached supreme importance to the restoration of their patrimonies without which the very nature of their relationship with the Mughal Government was likely to be altered. No *tankhwah-i-jagir*, however large, could in

that all the Hindus being alike, Hindu *mansabdars* should not be exempted from the obligation to pay the *Jiziya*, and passed orders accordingly. (*Akhbarat*, 17 Ramzan, October 18, 1711). The exemption was granted by Aurangzeb in December 1679 when embarking upon the Rajput war. Some of these measures, however, were timidly implemented and hastily withdrawn. Thus great laxity was shown in the collection of the *Jiziya* (See *Parties*, 57), and the restriction on the use of *palki* by the Hindus was withdrawn in January 1708 (*Akhbarat*, 5 Zul Qada 1119 H., January 17, 1708).

109. Jai Singh to Chhatrasal, draft, Kartik Sudi 13, S. 1765 (October 16, 1708), *J.S.A.*

fact have compensated for even a small patrimony.

Jagjiwandas' negotiations with the Emperor; Munim Khan's stand unacceptable to the Rajputs. We now turn to the negotiations which, ever since the Rajput flight from the Imperial camp, Amber's *wakil*, Jagjiwandas Pancholi, had been carrying on with the Emperor and his ministers for the restoration of the two States. Besides the *mahals* of the *watans*, he also asked for a *mansab* of 5000/5000 and the title of Mirza Raja (which had been conferred upon Bijai Singh after Jai Singh's flight) for his master. The Emperor was, however, disinclined to grant Jai Singh a rank higher than 3000/3000, and while offering to restore all the areas of the two States in the form of *jagir*, expressed his resolve to retain Amber, Merta and Jodhpur proper, each of which yielded annually about twenty lakh *dams*, under the direct Mughal rule. It may be noted that Munim Khan considered the Emperor's offer too liberal, and being anxious to retain larger areas in *khalisa* which should have an annual income of one crore and twenty lakh *dams* in each of the two States, he had the *sanads* prepared accordingly. Jagjiwandas informed Jai Singh about it and also brought this fact to Prince Azim-ush-shan's notice, who assured him that no shift in the Emperor's stand would be permitted.¹¹⁰ Here it may be noted that it was not the loss of the increased amount of revenue that was causing Jai Singh and Ajit Singh so much concern as the fear that their position as the hereditary rulers might be vitiated. They were also deeply concerned at the violation of the principle of undivided *watans*, especially when in the present case it was not the fringes but the very heart of their patrimonies that was sought to be retained under the direct Mughal rule. In his letter of January 18, 1707 to Sarbuland Khan, Jai Singh emphasized the incongruity of retaining parts of their patrimonies in *khalisa*. He wrote that the retention of Amber proper in *khalisa* was "incompatible with (the principle of) the grant of *watan* without any partition," and warned the Imperial authorities of deep unrest among his people on account of the resumption of his *watan*. In the end he expressed the hope that soon due attention would be paid to his case "in accordance with our wishes."¹¹¹

110. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh (December 1708), *J.S.A.*

111. Jai Singh to Sarbuland Khan, 18 Zul Qada 1121 H. (January 18, 1709), *J.S.A.*

Abdullah Khan appointed to the government of Ajmer; his extravagant demands accepted. Even before the Emperor came to know (October 2) of the defeat of the Saiyids at Sambhar, he had resolved to transfer Shujaat Khan, the governor of Ajmer, for his dismal failure in dealing effectively with the Rajput rising, and had decided to appoint in his place Saiyid Abdullah Khan. Formal orders appointing him to the new charge were passed in early October, and on October 7 he was given various presents, the rank of 4000/2000, and eighty lakh *dams* in *inam*.¹¹² On October 15, almost all his requests, or rather the pre-conditions for accepting the charge, were granted. He had asked for the acceptance of all his recommendations about the Rajputs coming over to his side, the *faujdari* of Ranthambor, and the *qiledari* of Jodhpur, Merta and Bairath, exemption from the obligation to pay *Dagh tashiha* for two years, and continuance of his *jagirs* in the Deccan. The only condition which the Emperor declined to accept was about the grant of the *qiledari* of Amber to his uncle, Asad-ullah Khan.¹¹³ The high tone of these terms and their acceptance reveal the great concern that was being felt at the Court at the mounting successes of the Rajputs in the Ajmer *subah*, and also Abdullah Khan's grasping nature which later manifested itself in a more dangerous manner.

Jai Singh's plan to intercept Abdullah Khan; Mewar stresses the need to maintain unity. In November, Abdullah Khan and the newly appointed *qiledars* of Amber, Jodhpur and Merta reached Burhanpur, where Jai Singh's *harkarah* passed them. He immediately reported to his master about their movements. Jai Singh favoured interception of Saiyid Abdullah Khan and his army while they were still on their way to the safe and sheltered surroundings of Ajmer. The Maharana was in agreement with Jai Singh, but he had some doubt about Maharaja Ajit Singh, whose attitude and conduct during the past few months were causing anxiety to his friends and well-wishers. Only about a month earlier he had cast off his saviour—Durgadas. However, knowing well that absolute unity was the need of the hour, the

112. *Akhbarat*, 2 Shaban, 1120 H., (October 6, 1708). Shujaat Khan was posted under Asaf-ud-daulah.

113. See *Akhbarat*, 11 Shaban, 1120 H. (October 15, 1708). See also Irvine, I, 71.

Maharana emphasized that if they wanted to intercept Abdullah Khan, then Ajit Singh must also be with them. Nothing should be done which might lead to differences among them. If all three acted concertedly, as at Sambhar in October 1708, he wrote to Jai Singh, it would look dignified for 'Hindustan', and the Mughals would also realize that they were of one mind.¹¹⁴ The need to intercept Abdullah Khan, however, did not arise as the Emperor reinstated Shujaat Khan. Saiyid Abdullah Khan remained unemployed for some time, and thereafter served in the Sikh campaign (1710). In 1711, prince Azim-ush-shan, then looking around for adherents, appointed him as his deputy in the Allahabad province.¹¹⁵

Durgadas leaves Marwar; causes of the rupture. Before proceeding further, we may take up Durgadas' self-imposed exile from Marwar. The reasons which led to the rupture between the master and his protector are only vaguely known; nor do the contemporary letters throw adequate light on the unfortunate developments which obliged the latter to migrate to Udaipur. One of the reasons is said to have been Ajit Singh's resentment at Durgadas' privileged position,¹¹⁶ which no doubt was much above that of the other Marwar nobles. He had the title of Rao and the *mansab* of 3000/2000.¹¹⁷ In February 1708, when he had come to the Court, the Emperor sent Khan-i-Zaman, the *Wazir's* son, to receive him at a distance of ten miles from the camp. In the letters of Maharana Amar Singh, Maharana Sangram Singh, Jai Singh, Asad Khan, Prince Jahandar Shah, and others, his name is separately mentioned along with his master's¹¹⁸ as if he had his own distinct position. In the councils of the Rajput rulers, he was heard with deference and shown courtesy rarely accorded to a servant of the throne.¹¹⁹ Though

114. Maharana to Jai Singh (December 1708), *J.S.A.* The use of the word 'Hindustan', here and in some other letters, in this very sense, is significant.

115. See Irvine, I, 71, 205; *Parties*, p. 89.

116. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 541.

117. At this time Jai Singh was holding a *mansab* of 2500/2000.

118. Thus see Jai Singh's letter to Maharana, sent soon after leaving the camp (letter in *Vir Vinod*, II, 768). Jahandar Shah to Maharana, 27 Rabi II, 1120 H. (letter in *Vir Vinod*, II, 775-76).

119. Thus in the *darbar* held at Udaipur in honour of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh after their flight from the Imperial camp, Durgadas shared a corner of

the intention of the Mughal government in treating Durgadas almost on par with the chiefs of some of the smaller Rajput states was not without a design,¹²⁰ and was likely to create misunderstanding between the great Rathor and his young master, as actually happened, his unique position in Rajputana was chiefly due to his priceless services to his country, his blemishless character, his vision, courage, and his remarkable capacity to organise and lead resistance against the enemy of the land. After Ajit Singh had acquired Jodhpur, he seems to have resented more than ever the privileged position and the *jagirs* of Durgadas, and wished to see him fall in line with others.¹²¹ The ship had reached the harbour; the pilot could now be dismissed, or shown his place.

Durgadas, it appears, was generally dissatisfied with the lack of constancy in Ajit Singh's character and conduct, both of which betrayed unreliability and unscrupulousness in a marked degree. His attempt to capture Bikaner soon after recovering Jodhpur, the murder of Mukunddas who had served him so loyally, and other instances betrayed his jealous and vindictive nature.¹²²

the cushion with his master. During their stay at Udaipur, while Jai Singh and Ajit Singh each received from the Maharana Rs 500/- per day, Durgadas was given Rs 200/- per day for his expenses (*Vir Vinod*, II, 770, 774)

120. Thus see Munim Khan's conversation with the Mewar *wakil* and his offer to fulfil Durgadas' wishes (Letter in *V V*, II, 784)

121. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 541, who assigns Durgadas' high prestige among the Rathor *sardars* and the Rajput princes as the cause of Ajit's displeasure with Durgadas. See also Tod, II, pp 73-74. It may however be noted that the *tankhwaah-i-jagirs* assigned to Durgadas in the Imperial territories, in a way, were of use to Ajit Singh himself, the Rathor contingent which he maintained against these *jagirs* being always at the service of Marwar. This actually happened more than once during 1700-1707. It seems Durgadas maintained a sizeable contingent (as appears from the amount of money given to him daily by Mewar on his arrival at Udaipur in April 1708, and again in December 1708), and he wanted to retain the *mansab* and *jagirs* to meet the expenses of his troops whom it would have been unwise to disband in view of persistently fluid political situation. Though Ajit Singh was right in principle, practical considerations justified Durgadas' stand. Besides, there is not the slightest evidence that, apart from his *jagir*, Durgadas coveted even an inch of Marwar's territory for himself as heritable *watan*, or that he wanted to create a state within a state.

122. Maharaja Anup Singh of Bikaner had pleaded with the Emperor Aurangzeb to recognise Ajit Singh. But Ajit Singh conveniently forgot it and attacked Bikaner without the least provocation. (See Ojha, *Jodhpur*,

Durgadas had no high opinion of Ajit's word.¹²³

After the victory at Sambhar (October 1708), Durgadas, who had played an important part in the encounter, pitched his tents not in line with those of the other nobles but in a separate quarter. When questioned about this 'breach', he replied that not many years were left to him, and after his death, his sons would no doubt camp along with the other nobles.¹²⁴ The growing bitterness between the two was further aggravated when Ajit Singh terminated the negotiations which Jai Singh and the Maharana were conducting for the restoration of *mansab* and *jagir* to Durgadas. Ajit Singh did not construe the issue in the right spirit, as Maharana Amar Singh wrote to Jai Singh, and terminated the talks thoughtlessly.¹²⁵ Apparently, Ajit Singh disapproved that Rathor nobles should hold high *mansabs* and *jagirs* directly from the Mughal government and it was for this reason that he had Mukunddas Rathor murdered, soon after capturing Jodhpur.¹²⁶ But Durgadas was holding a *mansab* of 3000 *sawar* as early as 1700 A.D., and his past record was ample testimony of his uncorruptible fidelity. Had Ajit Singh employed more patience and grace in dealing with Durgadas, the rupture, which harmed his own interests, and tainted his memory, might have been averted.

Durgadas in Mewar; his immortal career comes to an end. In late 1708 when Durgadas went to Udaipur, he stayed on there and did not return to Marwar. Maharana Amar Singh treated him with all due courtesy, paid him for some months five hundred

II, 529-30). For the murder of Mukunddas Champawat of Pali, *Vir Vinod*, II, 837.

123. Thus see Durgadas' letter to Biharidas Pancholi, Asoj Vadi 2, S. 1765 (1708 A.D.) in *V.V.*, II, 835. See also Ajit Singh's letter to Nilkantha Giri, April 24, 1708 in *V.V.*, II, 764-766, especially his remarks about Mewar.

124. *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, 116 cited in Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 541, n.2.

125. Maharana to Jai Singh, (ca. December 1708), *J.S.A.* Jai Singh in his letter dated Magha Vadi 7, S. 1765 (December 22, 1708) to Maharana informs the terms which the Emperor, on Azim-ush-shan's intercession, had agreed to grant to the Rajputs. The Emperor was willing to grant a *mansab* of 3000/3000 to Jai Singh, of 4000/4000 to Ajit Singh, of 3000 *zat* to his son (Abhai), and of 3000/2500 and the title of Rao to Durgadas. The negotiations however broke down on the issue of full and complete restoration of the *watans*.

126. See *Vir Vinod*, II, 837.

rupees a day for his expenses, and granted him Vijaipur in *jagir*.¹²⁷ In May 1711, *pargana* Idar in *subah* Ahmadabad was granted to him by the Imperial government. His title of Rao was also restored.¹²⁸ In September 1716, he was asked to join Sawai Jai Singh, who was then proceeding against Churaman Jat. Though he did not join the campaign, he sent his son who is mentioned in one of the *Akhbarat* of this period.¹²⁹ In 1717, Rampura was placed under his charge. His last known letter is of October 1717 which he sent from Rampura to Biharidas Pancholi and Devi Singh of Begun.¹³⁰ To the very end, as the contemporary letters show, he continued to serve Mewar, his adopted home, with complete devotion, so characteristic of him, and continued to enjoy full confidence of the Maharana and Jai Singh, who knew well that they could count upon him for any service or sacrifice which a situation might demand. On November 22, 1718, he died at Rampura, outside the land he had so ably served and saved from extinction. He was cremated on the banks of Kshipra river near Ujjain.¹³¹ His memory, hallowed by his noble deeds and exalted character, is cherished by all who are acquainted with his unique life and career.

Ajit Singh besieges Ajmer; Jai Singh does not join him; reasons. The differences between Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were further aggravated in early 1709. In the second week of February 1709

127. *Akhbarat*, 14 Shawwal (December 6, 1709); Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 542.

128. *Akhbarat*, 26 Rabi I, 1123 H., (May 3, 1711).

129. See below, Chap. VI.

130. Durgadas to Maharana Sangram Singh, Kartik Vadi 5, S. 1774 (October 13, 1717), letter in *V.V.*, II, p. 962. For his appointment at Rampura, see *V.V.*, II, p. 989. Biharidas had secured the grant of Rampura from Emperor Farrukhsiyar. Mewar restored to Rao Gopal Singh a major part of Rampura, retaining only a few villages. When Gopal Singh's grandsons, Badan Singh and Sangram Singh, expelled Mewar's officials from these villages, Maharana sent troops and reestablished his control over Rampura. Rao Gopal Singh was brought to Udaipur and made to sign an agreement. The agreement is most interesting and significant and sets out in minute detail the terms of service. By the agreement, Mewar retained land with an income of Rs. 376775 in *khalisa*, total income being Rs. 8,00,000. See *V.V.*, II, 957-59. Durgadas' two letters from Rampura are of Kartik Vadi 5. S. 1774 (Letters in *V.V.*, II, pp. 962-63).

131. Ojha *Jodhpur*, II, p. 543. See Tod's glowing eulogium on Durgadas (Vol. II, pp. 62-63, 74).

Maharaja Ajit Singh, then at Merta, informed Jai Singh that he would shortly surprise Ajmer, and desired the latter to join him in time. On February 8, Jai Singh sent instructions to his nobles to keep their contingents ready to join him immediately on receiving intimation about Maharaja Ajit Singh's march from Merta.¹³² Jai Singh was thus sincere in his desire to join Ajit Singh in this enterprise. But, curiously enough, Ajit Singh, at the head of 20,000 troops, had already reached Ajmer three days earlier, i.e., on February 5.¹³³ It is clear from Jai Singh's letter of February 8, that till then he had no knowledge of Ajit Singh's arrival at Ajmer on February 5, or of his start from Merta. This led to a serious misunderstanding between the two, and Jai Singh did not join Ajit Singh in besieging Ajmer.

It is said that Ajit Singh had gone to Ajmer in response to a false invitation from Shujaat Khan, the *subahdar*, inviting him to come and take possession of the town. He had written to Ajit Singh that the Emperor was displeased with him due to the recent successes of the Rajputs and was transferring him from the *subah*.¹³⁴ It seems, on receiving this invitation, Ajit Singh decided to take possession of Ajmer before Jai Singh's arrival there. He therefore reached Ajmer in a great hurry, without even making the necessary preparations for besieging the fortified town, and without informing Jai Singh of his march to that place. Ajit Singh, like all Marwar rulers, coveted Ajmer. It was only when he reached there and discovered that he had been duped that he sent for the guns, etc., and commenced the siege of the town on February 19; fourteen days after reaching there. It seems Jai Singh did not favour this siege; the town was well-fortified and garrisoned, and it was not possible to take it without sufficient time and heavy artillery. There was every chance that the imperial troops might arrive any moment and compel the Rajputs to retreat. Moreover, even if the town was captured, the Mughal garrison could easily hold on in the fort. It was one thing to take

132. Jai Singh to Kushal Singh Rajawat, *parwanah*, Phalgun Sudi 10, S. 1765 (February 8, 1709), *J.S.A.*

133. *Akhbarat*, 26 Muharram (March 27) which mentions 6 Zul Hijja (February 5, 1707); but the actual siege seems to have commenced a little later.

134. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 546. He gives February 19 as the date of the commencement of the siege.

possession of Ajmer with Shujaat Khan's connivance, and quite another to take it by storm. The second proposition was unlikely to benefit the Rajputs in any way. Shujaat Khan was happy that Jai Singh did not join Ajit Singh in besieging Ajmer. To ensure that Jai Singh might continue to maintain this attitude, Shujaat Khan sent him a letter on February 23 praising him for keeping himself aloof from Ajit Singh's "short-sighted" conduct, and urging him to persuade the latter to raise the siege.¹³⁵

Misunderstanding between Jai Singh and Ajit Singh lingers. The misunderstanding that developed between Jai Singh and Ajit Singh on this occasion lingered on for quite some time. Later, in January 1710, when the Emperor was returning from the Deccan, and Jai Singh, though more for effect than anything else, favoured an attack on Ajmer, and sent an official to persuade Ajit Singh to join him, the latter expressed doubts that Jai Singh would carry out his part of the plan. The Amber official, Daulat Singh, wrote to Jai Singh on January 14, 1710. "Earlier Your Highness did not reach Ajmer. With great difficulty, we could remove misunderstanding and doubts from his (Maharaja Ajit Singh's) mind on that account. If there is any delay this time (in starting for Ajmer) Your Highness should not hold us responsible for the consequences."¹³⁶

Ajit Singh continued the siege for about a fortnight, after which he went to Devlia to marry Rawat Prithvi Singh's daughter (March 11). He returned to Jodhpur on March 19, 1709.¹³⁷

Asad Khan and Ghazi-ud-din Khan entrusted with the Rajput problem; the Rajputs ignore Munim Khan. The siege of Ajmer was exceedingly humiliating for the Mughal government as its position in this province was considered particularly sound and secure. The Emperor came to know of the siege on March 23, and, when the news had been confirmed on the 27th, he ordered

135. Shujaat Khan to Jai Singh, 26 Zul Hijja, 1121 H. (February 23, 1709), *J.S.A.* See also Asad Khan's criticism of Shujaat Khan. (Letter, 11th Safar, R. 3, April 11, 1709 in *V.V.*, II, 840) which becomes understandable in the context of the account of the latter's invitation to Ajit Singh, noted above. This letter also gives us some idea of Shujaat Khan's contacts with the Rajputs.

136. Daulat Singh and Nensukh to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, January 14, 1710, *J.S.A.*

137. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 547; *Akhbarat*, 29 Muharram, 4, Safar (March 30, April 4, 1709), and *Waqaya* of 15 Safar, 1121 H., *J.S.A.*

Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur and a number of other nobles to proceed to Ajmer without delay.¹³⁸ The Emperor also decided to use Ghazi-ud-din Khan's services to deal with the Rajput problem. In early April, he was made the absentee governor of Ajmer *subah*.¹³⁹ Also, *Wakil-i-Mutlak* Asad Khan, who was already corresponding with the Rajputs with the full approval of the Emperor,¹⁴⁰ was now given greater freedom to negotiate with them.¹⁴¹ By this time it was clear that Munim Khan had grossly under-estimated the strength and the resources of the Rajputs, as well as the intensity of their feelings on the question of their patrimonies. The Rajputs too had no faith in Munim Khan, and they did not like to negotiate through him. In fact, as is clear from a large number of contemporary letters, they completely ignored him, and preferred to negotiate through Asad Khan and Ghazi-ud-din Khan; Munim Khan's name hardly occurs in their correspondence except on the eve of peace.

Asad Khan makes a vital concession; Rajputs postpone acceptance of the Mughal offer. At first both these nobles advised the Rajputs to accept the Emperor's offer, viz., the restoration of all the areas of their States as *jagir*, excepting the towns of Amber, Jodhpur and Merta and some adjoining areas, and promised to secure for them further concessions after some time.¹⁴² But on finding the Rajputs determined to accept nothing less than their undivided States, Asad Khan made a fresh offer which meant in effect complete revocation of the stand hitherto taken by the Imperial government. The offer admitted for the first time

138. *Akhbarat*, 22, 26, 27 Muharram, 1121 H. (March 23, 27, 28, 1709).

139. *Parties*, p. 36, n. 47; *Akhbarat*, 21, 24 Rabi I, 1121 H. (May 20, 23, 1709), *J.S.A.*

140. Thus see *Akhbarat*, 10 Shawwal, 1120 H. (December 12) in which the Emperor commends Asaf-ud-daula's efforts to bring about peace with the Rajputs, and his remark that the Nawab had full authority to do what he might think right regarding the affairs of Hindustan. For Ghazi-ud-din Khan, see Mehta Jagannath to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, 1 Jamadi I, 1121 H. (June 28, 1709), *J.S.A.*

141. This is clear from increasingly important role of Asad Khan in solving the issue of the restoration of Amber and Jodhpur.

142. Basant Rai (*Wakil* of Maharao Budh Singh) to Jai Singh, July 23, 1709, *J.S.A.* Asad Khan to Shujaat Khan, 11 Safar, 1121 H. (April 11, 1709) in *V.V.*, II, p. 840, and Basant Rai to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, 26 Jamadi I (July 23, 1709), *J.S.A.* The author advises Jai Singh to accept the terms.

Mughal willingness to restore Amber and Jodhpur to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh on the condition that they would withdraw their troops from Sambhar and Didwana, and the former would agree to go to Gujarat and the latter to the Kabul province. Jai Singh sent copies of Asad Khan's letter to Ajit Singh and the Maharana saying that personally he was not in favour of accepting this conditional offer which was intended to throw them apart.¹⁴³ Ajit Singh was in agreement with Jai Singh. He wrote (July 12) that as per his *wakil's* report, two *farmans* addressed to them had been despatched to Asaf-ud-daulah Asad Khan. They should take a decision on Asaf-ud-daulah's offer only after going through the *farmans* which alone would give them a true idea of the Emperor's intentions. He also said that they should not accept any terms without prior consultation with each other. In case the Emperor was intending to shelve the restoration of their states, they should oppose him.¹⁴⁴

Ghazi-ud-din's close ties with the Rajputs; his secret agreement with them. On May 20, 1709, the Emperor sent orders to Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang to set out for Ajmer without delay. At the same time he permitted Firuz Jang to continue his negotiations with the Rajputs.¹⁴⁵ We have noted that the Rajputs were in touch with Ghazi-ud-din Khan from the beginning of Bahadur Shah's reign. Besides Jai Singh and the Maharana, Ajit Singh and Durgadas were also in correspondence with the Turani leader.¹⁴⁶ Early in December 1708, Ghazi-ud-din's messenger brought from Amber Jai Singh's reply to the Nawab's letter. In November-December, Ajit Singh and the Maharana had brisk correspondence with Ghazi-ud-din, and Pancholi Biharidas and Munshi Salamat Rai of Mewar had prolonged talks with the Nawab. Naraindas and Mehta Jagannath, the trusted secretaries of Ghazi-ud-din, were keen to safeguard and promote the interests of the Rajputs. Their letters amply show the cordial ties that existed between Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang and the Rajput Rajas.¹⁴⁷

143. Jai Singh to Rana Amar Singh, draft *kharita*, July 27, 1709, *J.S.A.*

144. Ajit Singh to Jai Singh, July 12, 1709, *J.S.A.*

145. *Akhbarat*, 21, 29 Rabi I, 1121 H. (May 20, 28, 1709), *J.S.A.*

146. See p. 45 of this chapter; Durgadas to Biharidas, Asoj Vadi 2, S. 1765 (1708 A.D.) in *V.V.*, II, p. 835.

147. Thus see Mehta Jagannath (Ghazi-ud-din's *munshi*) to Jai Singh,

In April 1709, when Ghazi-ud-din Khan was made the absentee governor of Ajmer, his earlier contacts with the Rajputs acquired added significance. In May, when Ghazi-ud-din's appointment as the governor of Ajmer province was announced for the second time, and it seemed that he might reach Ajmer soon,¹⁴⁸ Ajit Singh, by nature hasty and choleric, became suspicious of his friendly professions and vows of friendship. On Jai Singh's advice, he sent a reliable officer to the Khan. On July 11, Ajit Singh informed Jai Singh that the officer had returned after talks with Ghazi-ud-din. He wrote, "From his talks, he seems to be with us. But then who can be sure of the guiles of the Mughals. In any case, you need not worry on account of Ghazi-ud-din Khan. Save the Emperor or the Prince (?) none can (dare) come against me. And if at all Ghazi-ud-din Khan comes, then God willing, he will meet the fate of the Saiyids. I again remind Your Highness about the *farmans*. If the *farmans* mention restoration of our *watans*, it is well and good; if not, then there is no advantage (in accepting the Mughal offer). We shall remain prepared to give a rebuff to the Emperor." On a separate sheet Ajit Singh added: "In all the letters received till now from Ahmīadabad, Ghazi-ud-din Khan had asked that a responsible person should be sent to him. I had, therefore, sent Bhai Raghu-nath. With him, the Nawab has sent *kaval* and *roti* (wheaten cake),¹⁴⁹ and this message: 'It is my *kaval* (promise) that in

Pausha Sudi 10, S. 1765 (December 11, 1708), *J.S.A.*

148. *Akhbarat*, 21 Rabi I (May 20, 1709). This is also evident from Ajit Singh's letter of July 11, 1709 in *J.S.A.*

149. It is clear that Ghazi-ud-din Khan had sent the *chapatis* to emphasize the solemnity of his promise, as something which bound him to fulfil his vow. As we know the context in which he had sent the *rotis*, this should be helpful in understanding the meaning of the mysterious *chapatis* which were circulated in large numbers at the time of the outbreak of 1857. The occurrence gave rise to various opinions, and still remains an "insoluble mystery". Some regarded the dissemination of *chapatis* as a signal for the uprising; some believed them to be charms for spreading the revolt; some took these to be a propitiatory observance to avert some calamity or to ward off illness. Many people believed that the *chapatis* were circulated by the English to pollute the religion of the people, while some took these to be a warning of the coming danger to their caste and religion. The *chapatis* were also taken as an invitation to all the people to unite for some secret object to be disclosed afterwards. There was yet another view that these had originated in some vow, and those who partook of the *chapatis* were pledged to obey any order which they

case the Emperor sends me against the Rajas, I shall resign my *mansab* rather than agree to go against them, and I shall spare no efforts in writing (recommending) to the Emperor about both the Rajas'. With Raghunath, the Nawab has sent from his side Khoja Beroz with presents. . ."¹⁵⁰

Ghazi-ud-din Khan's solemn promise, to stress the inviolability of which he had sent the wheaten cakes to the Rajputs, and his assurance that he would not participate in any campaign against them, demonstrate his friendly feelings towards the Rajputs¹⁵¹

Ghazi-ud-din Khan keeps his pledge. On August 30, 1709, the Emperor was informed that about a fortnight back Ghazi-ud-din Khan had started from Ahmadabad for Ajmer¹⁵². But he seems to have covered only a few stages, as his march is not mentioned in any of the Rajput letters or reports of this time. It seems he continued his negotiations with the Rajputs, and advised the Emperor to avoid all that might aggravate the situation in the *subah*. He thus kept his pledge given to the Rajputs. In late September, he sent two of his *mumshis*, Rai Bholanath and Mehta Jagannath, to Udaipur. The Maharana, after detailed discussions with them, sent them to Jaipur with the remark that Ghazi-ud-din was sincere towards the Rajputs, and would give them the correct advice, unlike the Emperor whose intentions they knew

might receive at any time. Of these the last one seems to be nearest to the truth. (For the different views on the meaning and the origin of the *chapatis*, refer to Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War in India* (1857-58), Vol I, pp 566, 570-72, 631-38, 647, Thornhill, *The Personal Adventures and Experiences of a Magistrate during the Rise, Progress and Suppression of the Indian Mutiny*, 1884, pp 2-3, Malleon, *History of Indian Mutiny*, 1907 Vol IV, pp 63, 280, 292, 340-41, R. C. Majumdar, *Sepoy Mutiny*, 1963, pp 76, 338 ff, 366 ff, 375, S. N. Sen, *Eighteen Fifty-Seven*, 1958, pp 398-401)

150 Ajit Singh to Jai Singh, July 11, 1709, *J S A*. Ghazi-ud-din Khan had sent one *katar* (jewelled) and nine *thans* of cloth. The Nawab's son Chim Qulich Khan had sent one sword (plain) and seven *thans* of cloth.

151 Cf. *Parties*, p 28. The author says that Ghazi-ud-din Khan and other Turani nobles were dissatisfied with the Government probably "for having received less than their deserts" and on account of "the policy of concessions to the Rajputs, Marathas, etc, which had been adopted by Bahadur Shah at the instance of Munim Khan and Zulfiqar Khan. For this reason they felt themselves out of joint with the spirit and policy of the administration."

152 *Alkharat*, 5 Rajab, 1121 H (August 30, 1709)

so well.¹⁵³ Subsequently, on his recommendation, the Emperor sent a dress of honour and a horse to Rana Amar Singh.¹⁵⁴ On July 11, 1710, after the formal restoration of Amber and Jodhpur to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh respectively, the Emperor was informed that Ghazi-ud-din had marched up to Jalor, but he returned to his province on hearing that peace had been made with the Rajputs.¹⁵⁵

Emperor in a hurry to reach northern India. After the defeat and death of Kam Baksh on January 3, 1709, the Emperor did not stay on in the Deccan, though his presence was required there for a longer period,¹⁵⁶ and sent his advance tents on the road to Aurangabad (January 18). He reached Ahmadnagar towards the end of April and arrived at Aurangabad on June 9. Here he halted to pass the rainy season.¹⁵⁷ In Rajputana, there was comparative lull during August to October.

Rajputs start fresh offensive; Jai Singh exhorts Karauli chief to join the struggle. From October, the Rajputs gradually stepped up their activity. It seems the negotiations had again broken down on the issue of postings. The government, while offering to restore Amber and Jodhpur, was firm that Ajit Singh must agree to go to Kabul province and Jai Singh to Gujarat. The Rajputs were not prepared to yield on this point. In November-December, the Kolis plundered some villages near Ahmadabad at Ajit Singh's instigation. He also sent a small force to ravage some villages of Rampura, but the party was repulsed

153. Maharana to Jai Singh, Kartik Vadi 3, S. 1766 (October 10, 1709), J.S.A.

154. *Akhbarat*, 21, Zul Qada, 1121 H. (January 11, 1710).

155. *Akhbarat*, 25 Jamadi, 1122 H. (July 11, 1710).

156. See Iradat Khan, p. 57.

157. While the Emperor was at Aurangabad, Jai Singh received a message, which deserves to be quoted in full on account of its interesting contents. It reads:

"Bahadur Shah is free from the affair of Kam Baksh. During the rainy season, he is camping at Raj Sagar. He has declared 'I will sleep peacefully only after I have finished the Rana and both the Rajas'. Hence, remain united. If the three Rajput clans — the Rathor, Kachhwaha and Sisodia — remain united, he can do nothing. Do not be taken unawares; be very alert. It appears that he would reach there (Rajputana) in four months from now (i.e. by November). During this period, replenish the treasury, mobilize the Rajputs, and take care that none betrays. The Emperor's relations with the Khan (?) are not cordial. He has told Chimna (Bijai Singh): 'God willing,

by Ratan Singh (Islam Khan).¹⁵⁸ In November, Jai Singh sent his emissary to Rao Ratan Pal of Karauli soliciting his support for the struggle. He tried to impress upon Ratan Pal that the Emperor was ill-disposed towards the Hindus, and that he himself and Ajit Singh would be attacking the Imperial territories shortly. The Rao should capture Hindaun and keep in check Hidayatullah Khan, the *faujdar* of Ranthambor. Ratan Pal replied that it was easy to capture Hindaun, but difficult to retain it after the Emperor's arrival in the north. But, in any case, it would be better if the conflagration were to spread, he pointed out. He offered to detach Babu Ram Jat, who received daily payment for his troops from Hidayatullah, provided Jai Singh would pay him more. He gave the assurance that he would act as desired by the Maharaja. "Akbarabad (Agra) and other places are near Karauli. If you give me your hand, and promise that you will be raiding the Imperial territories, I will join you with all the Jadams (Yadavas) on both the sides of the Chambal," he said.¹⁵⁹ We do not know the precise role played by the Karauli chief during the coming months, but in December 1709, Ram Chand, the *diwan* of Amber, did engage Hidayatullah for four days near Ranthambor.¹⁶⁰

Maharana tries to maintain the 'Concert'. In view of the Emperor's approach, the Maharana in his letter of December 1709 advised Jai Singh to meet Ajit Singh and decide the course of action to be pursued. As for himself he was ready to undertake any task, and so was Durgadas, he wrote. As Jai Singh and Ajit Singh had not met during the past many months, the Maharana was much worried on this account, and he strongly urged Jai Singh to meet Ajit and confer with him about their future plans.¹⁶¹

Emperor keen to avoid a war in Rajputana; agrees to restore

we shall grant you Amber'. " The undated and unsigned message preserved in the Jaipur Archives begins with the polite address '*Shriji salamati*', showing that the writer was an Amber official. The tone of the letter suggests that he was an elderly person in long employ of the State.

158. *Akhbarat*, 6, 12 Shawwal (November 28, December 4, 1709),

159. Fateh Chand (a state official) to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Sudi 3, S. 1766 (November 12, 1709), *J.S.A.*

160. *Akhbarat*, 13 Zul Qada, 1121 H. (January 3, 1710).

161. Maharana Amar Singh to Jai Singh, copy of the letter, Pausha Vadi 3, S. 1766 (December 8, 1709). Jai Singh sent the original letter to Ajit Singh (*J.S.A.*).

undivided watans. In January 1710, when the Emperor arrived near Mewar, it was reported to him that the Maharana had retired to the hills after leaving 7,000 troops under Durgadas at Udaipur. It was also reported that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were intending to attack Ajmer with 70,000 horse.¹⁶² In view of the Emperor's arrival at Lamera, Jai Singh advised Ajit Singh to assemble their troops at one place. Ajit Singh suggested that they should meet at Didwana.¹⁶³ It seems Ajit Singh was intending to follow, in case of a large scale war with the Mughals, the same strategy (viz. to draw the imperialists in the sands of Marwar and the hills of Mewar where they felt out of element) which had paid the Rajputs rich dividends during 1680-81.

By this time it was clear that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were not going to give up their demand for full and complete restoration of their States and their postings in adjacent provinces. It was also apparent that nothing short of a long drawn out war could possibly impose upon the Rajputs the Imperial decisions which they had so flagrantly violated and so successfully defied during the past eighteen months. These facts, as well as the growing success of the Sikhs in the Punjab, which was reported to the Emperor "in highest colours", induced him "to lay aside for the present the design of totally expelling the Rajputs",¹⁶⁴ and to agree to their demand for the restoration of their undivided States. We have noted that Asad Khan and Ghazi-uddin Khan were already of the view that the dispute should be amicably settled in accordance with the wishes of the Rajputs. On January 11, 1710, on Ghazi-ud-din's recommendation, a dress of honour and a horse were sent to Udaipur.¹⁶⁵ For some time past, Rana's *wakil*, Baghmal, had been negotiating for the grant of Pur, Mandal, Bednore and Mandalgarh *parganas* and the title of Maharana to Rana Amar Singh. He also requested that instead of passing via Chittor, the Emperor might go to Ajmer by a different route.¹⁶⁶

162. *Akhbarat*, 17, 19 Zul Qada (January 7, 9, 1710).

163. Daulat Singh and Nain Sukh (Amber officials) to Jai Singh, acknowledging Maharaja's *parwanah* dated Magha Vadi 11 (January 14 1710), *J.S.A.*

164. *Iradat Khan*, p. 59.

165. *Akhbarat*, 21 Zul Qada (January 11, 1710).

166. *V.V.*, II, pp. 781-83.

Negotiations for peace and settlement; Munim Khan tries to come in the picture. Baghmal was negotiating for these favours through Mahabat Khan and his father, Munim Khan. The Emperor agreed to all these requests and decided to go via Mukund-darrah.¹⁶⁷ Munim Khan, however, regretted that while the Emperor had granted all that the Maharana had desired, the latter had failed to reciprocate the gesture, and had not even sent his son to wait upon the Emperor who was passing so close to Mewar's territory.¹⁶⁸ Anxious to repair his relations with the Rajputs, Munim Khan professed his cordial feelings towards them. He also told the Mewar *wakil* that the Maharana should ask Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to send their representatives to Court, and tried to impress upon the Mewar envoy that the settlement of the Rajput question was in his hands. The Emperor, the Prince and others, he said, were aware of this fact.¹⁶⁹ This was, however, a false claim. By this time peace was almost in sight through the efforts of Asad Khan and Ghazi-ud-din Khan; only the last minute hitch had to be overcome and certain formalities had to be gone through.

Jai Singh captures Tonk. On March 14, when the Mewar *wakil* came to the Court again, a *farman* addressed to the Maharana was given to him. He was also asked to contact Jai Singh and Ajit Singh.¹⁷⁰ Though peace was in sight, and negotiations were continuing between the two sides, Jai Singh sent a force under Kesari Singh Naruka, which captured Tonk on March 24.¹⁷¹ The negotiations, however, continued, and on April 7, the envoys of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh met the Emperor and delivered the letters sent by their masters.¹⁷² On April 10, the Emperor crossed the Chambal, and proceeded towards Ajmer via Toda and Malpura. He halted at Debigarh village, and arrived on the bank of the Banas on May 11.¹⁷³ The Emperor

167. He reached Mukund-darrah on March 11, 1710.

168. *Wakil's arzdasht* to Maharana Amar Singh, Shravan Sudi 10, S. 1767 (1710 A.D.) in *Vir Vinod*, II, 782-85.

169. *Ibid.*

170. *Akhbarat*, 24 Muharram, 1122 H. (March 14, 1710).

171. Kesari Singh Naruka to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, Chaitra Sudi, 1767 (March 25, 1710), *J.S.A.*

172. *Akhbarat*, 18 Safar, 1122 H. (April 7, 1710).

173. *Akhbarat*, 21, 29 Safar, 1122 H. (April 10, 18, 1710), 23 Rabi I (May 11).

was marching slowly as the final agreement had not yet been reached. The negotiations were also proceeding at a slow pace, the Rajputs being adamant on the issue of their postings after the conclusion of the agreement. They were also reported to be in correspondence with the Sikh Guru, which further alarmed the Emperor.¹⁷¹ In the end, as appears from subsequent developments, this understanding was reached that the whole question of postings would be reviewed by the Emperor after the Rajputs had made a formal submission.

Emperor sends Mahabat Khan and Chhatrasal Bundela to meet the Rajputs; the Emperor agrees to meet the Rajputs on their terms. On May 17, the Emperor asked Mahabat Khan to go along with Chhatrasal Bundela and Rao Raja Budh Singh and meet Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, and to arrange their audience at the Court.¹⁷⁵ Chhatrasal had cordial ties with the Maharana, from whom he used to receive letters which, sometimes, he showed to Munim Khan also.¹⁷⁶ His services were, therefore, utilized to facilitate the conclusion of peace. On May 24, the copies of the *farmans* to be delivered to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, after their formal meeting with the Emperor, were sent to them.¹⁷⁷ In the *farmans*, the Emperor had conceded the Rajput demand for the restoration of their undivided *watans* on the condition that they would serve the Mughal government as before and would attend the Court.¹⁷⁸ This the Rajputs had never objected to. On June 3, the Emperor, after invoking blessings on Mahabat Khan, Raja Chhatrasal, and others sent them to meet the Rajputs. A small force (200 horses, 100 matchlockmen) and a few light guns were placed at their disposal. On June 6, news was received that the two sides had met at a place about 6 miles from Ajmer, and that the Rajputs had agreed to wait upon the Emperor on June 10.¹⁷⁹ But shortly afterwards, at the desire of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, the Emperor agreed to receive them on

174. See *Akhbarat*, 10 Rabi I, 1122 H. (April 28, 1710).

175. *Akhbarat*, 29 Rabi I, 1122 H. (May 17, 1710).

176. *Wakil's* report to Maharana Amar Singh, Shravan Sudi 10, S. 1767 in *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 783.

177. *Akhbarat*, 6 Rabi II, 1122 H. (May 24, 1710).

178. *Farman*, 1 Rabi II, 1122 H., J.S.A.

179. *Akhbarat*, 16, 19, 23 Rabi II, 1122 H. (June 3, 6, 10, 1710).

*the line of his march on June 11.*¹⁸⁰

Prince Azim-ush-shan goes to meet the Rajputs. Soon after mid-day on June 11, the Emperor set out in his portable throne for Deorai. When he had covered some distance, he asked Prince Azim-ush-shan to escort the two Rajas to his presence.¹⁸¹ At this time the prince was in high favour of his father, his brother Jahan Shah's influence having waned.¹⁸² Azim-ush-shan, like other sons of the Emperor, had his eyes on the throne, and was anxious to establish close ties with the Rajputs. Munim Khan's son, Mahabat Khan, the *Third Bakshi*, had come close to him, partly because he had better chances of succeeding his father, and partly on account of the prince's hostility towards Zulfiqar Khan, with whom Mahabat's father, Munim Khan, was on the most unfriendly terms. The prince took a horse, repaired to the Rajput camp, and soon returned accompanied by Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. Meanwhile, the Rajput troops, including several thousand men on camels fully armed with matchlocks or bows and arrows, had taken up position on the hills and the plains around the place where the interview was to take place. The prince presented Jai Singh and Ajit Singh with their hands tied with scarfs. The Emperor ordered that their hands be untied. This formal ceremony of submission, however, did not correctly depict the actual position of the two sides, the Mughal government having yielded to each and every demand of the Rajputs. Each of the two Rajas offered the Emperor 200 gold coins and 2000 rupees. The Emperor formally pardoned them and conferred upon them dresses; etc.¹⁸³ They were also granted two months' leave to enable them to restore the arrangements in their States.¹⁸⁴ The audience being over, Jai Singh and Ajit Singh first went to the sacred Pushkar lake near Ajmer for the *Parb* bathing, and, after

180. *Akhbarat*, 23 Rabi II (June 10, 1710).

181. *Akhbarat*, 24 Rabi II (June 11, 1710).

182. See Iradat Khan, 60.

183. For the Prince's visit to the Rajput camp and the audience granted to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, see *Akhbarat*, 24 Rabi II, 1122 H. (June 11, 1710). For the Rajput troops which stood guard to prevent any revenge or treachery, see Iradat, pp. 60-61; Irvine, I, 73. Iradat Khan criticises Prince Azim-ush-shan for allowing "such uncommon honours" to the Rajputs (pp. 60-61).

184. *Akhbarat*, 29 Rabi II. 1122 H. (June 16).

a month's stay, left for their respective States.¹⁸⁵ The Emperor, meanwhile, had reached Ajmer on June 17; after a brief halt there, he left for the Punjab, where the Sikh War was raging furiously. He reached Sambhar on July 4, and was at Kaladera on July 15. Here Rao Sakat Singh, the *zamindar* of Manoharpur, was granted audience through Mahabat Khan.¹⁸⁶

Rajput stand fully vindicated. Thus was the Rajput stand that the Mughal government could not arbitrarily deprive the hereditary rulers of their patrimonies was vindicated by this struggle, the most successful of all the struggles waged during the Mughal period by the subordinate chiefs against the capriciousness of the paramount power. With the restoration of Jodhpur to Maharaja Ajit Singh, the thirty year old Rathor struggle also came to a successful end. The rising materially altered the attitude of the Rajput rulers towards the Mughal government by sweeping away the remnants of their sentimental loyalty towards the Mughal throne; hereafter, reciprocity became the guiding factor in their relationship with the Mughal government.

After leaving Ajmer, the Emperor reached Sadhaura in late November 1710. Meanwhile, Munim Khan repeatedly asked Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to join duty at Ahmadabad and Kabul, respectively.¹⁸⁷ When Jai Singh sought the Maharana's opinion about it, the latter advised him to discuss the matter with Maharaja Ajit Singh, and to try to get the posting orders cancelled. In case they found the Mughal government adamant, wrote the Maharana, they would do what the situation would demand.¹⁸⁸

A grievous loss to Rajputana; Amar Singh dies. A few months later, the Rajputs suffered a grievous loss by the death of Rana Amar Singh (December 10, 1710).¹⁸⁹ He was only thirty-eight years of age. Had he lived longer, he would have undoubtedly played a leading role in the affairs of the times. Probably he

185. Irvine, I, p. 73.

186. *Akhbarat*, 18, 29 Jamadi I (July 4, 15, 1710). In October 1711, the title of Rao was conferred upon him, and his son, Jaswant Singh, was given a *mansab* of 100/50.

187. *Wakil's arzdasht* to Jai Singh, August 6, 1710, *J.S.A.*

188. Maharana Amar Singh to Jai Singh, S. 1767 (1710 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

189. *Vir Vinod*, II, p. 789; Ojha, *Udaipur*, II, p. 609. He was born on Margashirsha Vadi 5, S. 1729 (1672 A.D.). Tod's date (1716 A.D.) for Amar Singh's death is incorrect (I, 321).

might have prevented Ajit Singh from drifting apart from the other Rajput princes, and might also have averted Budh Singh's deposition. In view of the crumbling state of the empire and the on-rush of the Maratha tide, he might have enunciated, in concert with Jai Singh, a more dynamic policy to safeguard and further the Rajput interests. Rana Amar Singh played the noblest role of his life when he led the Kachhwahas and the Rathors out of the storm to success and victory. He was courageous, wise, and of a generous disposition, and left behind him, in Tod's words, "the reputation of an active and high-minded prince who upheld his station and prosperity of his country."¹⁹⁰ He left a worthy successor in his son, Sangram Singh, who, until his death in 1734, played a prominent and beneficial role in the history of the country. He maintained to the very last closest and warmest ties with Sawai Jai Singh.

Emperor likely to invade Rajputana again; Jai Singh's plan to invite the Marathas. Either in December 1710 or in January 1711, Jai Singh learnt that Mughal victory over the Sikhs culminating in the capture of Lohgarh (December 1, 1710) and the death of Rana Amar Singh (December 10) had encouraged the Emperor to think in terms of invading Rajputana again. In his letter dated January 9, 1711 to Biharidas, Jai Singh asked him to send a capable emissary to the Marathas to invite them into Malwa with a large army. He also sent a letter to Durgadas in this connection. He wrote that in case the Marathas came into Malwa, he as well as Ajit Singh would join them, but in case they went to Gujarat, and, meanwhile, the Emperor came upon Amber, he would succeed in creating a suitable diversion. If, however, the Emperor went straight to Mewar, he (Jai Singh) would harry his troops. He asked Biharidas to keep Durgadas ready, so that he might join him with a large force without delay, and to discuss all these points with the Maharana.

In a separate letter to the Maharana, Jai Singh requested him to discuss with Durgadas and Biharidas the problem which another

190. Tod, I, p. 321. From the preceding pages as well as from the subsequent account it will become clear that Mewar, after Maharana Raj Singh's death (October 2, 1680), had not fallen in what J.N. Sarkar says (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 130) "complete isolation and obscurity", but continued to play a prominent and useful role till 1734 AD.

visit of the Emperor to Rajputana would create for them.¹⁹¹ As the Emperor's apprehended visit did not take place, the need to take suitable measures against him did not arise.

Jai Singh was anxious to attend Maharana Sangram Singh's coronation ceremony (April 26), but had to give up the idea as he was being constantly pressed to reach the Court at the earliest.¹⁹²

Rajputs reluctant to join duty; they reach Narnaul after Munim Khan's death and after the Emperor had crossed the Sutlej. During the past few months, Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were repeatedly asked to attend the Court. In January 1711, Jagjiwandas Pancholi, Amber's *wakil*, urged his master to reach the Court without waiting any further for Maharaja Ajit Singh's arrival. He informed him that Munim Khan was very insistent on it.¹⁹³ Bhikharidas, Amber's *diwan*, then with the Emperor, also advised Jai Singh to attend the Court. In his report of February 4, 1711, he advised his master to reach Narnaul, and from there to inform the Imperial authorities that he was waiting for Maharaja Ajit Singh's arrival, and would be joining duty soon.¹⁹⁴ A few days later, Bhikharidas had to execute a bond assuring the Emperor that his master would present himself at the Court within a period of one month. Meanwhile, he had secured the grants of Chatsu and Newai, but he could not obtain the formal *sanads*, as Munim Khan was ill. He informed that Maharaja's arrival at Narnaul had been noted in the *Waqiya*,¹⁹⁵ though actually it was on June 26 that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh reached Narnaul.¹⁹⁶ By that time Munim Khan was dead, and the Emperor had crossed the Sutlej (May 1711) on

191. Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi, draft *parwanah*, Magh Sudi 2, S. 1767 (January 9, 1711), *J.S.A.*

192. Jai Singh to Shrinivas (a Mewar official), Jyestha Vadi 9, (April 30, 1711), *Udaipur S.A.* In his letter of Phalgun Sudi 3, S. 1767 (February 9, 1711) to Durgadas, Jai Singh expressed profound sorrow on the untimely death of the Maharana, and advised him to keep his successor pleased with his services. (Draft *parwanah*, *J.S.A.*)

193. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, (January 1711), *J.S.A.*

194. Diwan Bhikharidas of Amber to Jai Singh, Phalguna Vadi 13 (February 4, 1711), *J.S.A.*

195. Diwan Bhikharidas to Jai Singh, Phalgun Sudi 12, S. 1767 (February 19, 1711), *J.S.A.*

196. Jai Singh to Bhandari Khivsi (of Jodhpur), July 9, 1711, *Jodhpur S.A.*

his way to Lahor.¹⁹⁷ The reluctance of the Rajputs to visit the Court arose partly out of their mistrust of the Imperial authorities, and partly from their dissatisfaction with the proposed postings. On June 7, 1711, Jai Singh wrote to Biharidas Pancholi that they would carefully observe the attitude of the Emperor, and inform him about it.¹⁹⁸

Sikh spies with Maharana's letters caught. A few days back some Sikh spies had been apprehended by the governor of Agra, and, on search, letters written by the Maharana were found on their person. The matter was reported to the Emperor. Jai Singh, in his letter dated April 30 to Biharidas, advised him to be more careful in future.¹⁹⁹

These facts demonstrate the extent of 'alienation of the Rajputs from the Mughal government at this time, the chief reason being the policies of the Emperor and those of his predecessor towards them.

Bijai Singh's flight from the Imperial camp; does not return to Court. Soon after leaving Ajmer, the Emperor had granted Tonk and Bhusawar to Bijai Singh as salary assignments (June 28, 1710). Bijai Singh, now a frustrated man, accompanied the Emperor up to Sutlej. In late April 1711, he fled from the Imperial camp on the pretext that he was going for hunting.²⁰⁰ After his flight, Tonk was resumed, and, till his return, was granted to Shujaat Khan. At the same time, letters were sent to him advising him to return to the Court after he had looked into the affairs of his *jagir*.²⁰¹ On November 28, Bijai Singh's *diwan*, Daya Ram, submitted to the Emperor his master's *arzdasht*. At this time, Bijai Singh was either at Hindaun or at Bayana.²⁰² On December 18, 1711, another *farman* was sent to him informing him about the restoration of *pargana* Tonk and advising him to attend the Court²⁰³.

197. Irvine, I, p. 129.

198. Jai Singh to Biharidas, draft *parwanah*, Ashadha Sudi 2, S. 1768 (June 7, 1711), *J.S.A.*

199. Jai Singh to Biharidas, draft *parwanah*, Jyestha Vadi 9, S. 1768 (April 30, 1711), *J.S.A.*

200. *Akhbarat*, 19 Rabi I, 1123 H. (April 26, 1711).

201. *Akhbarat*, 28 Shawwal, 1123 H. (November 28, 1711), 29 Zul Qada 1123 H. (December 18, 1711).

202. *Akhbarat*, 1 Zul Qada 1123 H. (November 30, 1711),

203. *Akhbarat*, 29 Zul Qada (December 18, 1711).

Imprisoned at Sanganer; Jai Singh's letter to Ajit Singh about it. But Bijai Singh did not return to Court. He sent a letter to Jai Singh by the hand of one Baba Narhardas expressing his desire to visit Amber. Jai Singh, in his letter dated November 25, 1711, assured his brother that whatever he had was as much of his brother's as his own, and "whatever I am doing is for your welfare. You need not have any doubts." Jai Singh also sent ten thousand rupees to his brother.²⁰⁴ But when, after a considerable hesitation, Bijai Singh came to Sanganer in May 1713, he was arrested by stratagem. On May 23, 1713, Jai Singh wrote to Ajit Singh, "From Sanganer, I have brought him to Amber. Many of his soldiers I have employed myself and many have escaped. He (Bijai Singh) is now a prisoner at Amber. The task has been accomplished as desired by you. . . .". In his own hand Jai Singh wrote that Shyam Singh had done a good job in making Bijai Singh a prisoner, and requested Ajit Singh to send a letter commending his services on this occasion.²⁰⁵ More about Bijai Singh later.

Leisurely and defiant march of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to Sadhaura; Emperor orders enquiry. Even after reaching Narnaul (January 26, 1711), Jai Singh and Ajit Singh made no effort to reach Sadhaura early. They proceeded at a most leisurely pace, sparing no occasion to show their scant regard for the Imperial authority. By the beginning of August, they had arrived at Badli near Delhi. Here, they forced their entry into the Emperor's hunting preserve by forcing open the gates, and shot a few deer. On reaching Delhi some Rajput soldiers killed a butcher and a *jiziya* collector. All this was reported to the Emperor who ordered Mahabat Khan to enquire into these complaints. The Mewar *wakil* informed the Maharana that though the Emperor, after reading the report, did not utter a word, he seemed to have taken strong exception at the conduct of the two Rajas. Prince Azim-ush-shan, through whom the Rajputs had been negotiating, and who had recently secured postponement of Ajit Singh's posting at Kabul, told the Mewar *wakil* that the conduct of Jai Singh and

204. Jai Singh to "Barkhurdar Chimna" (Bijai Singh), Margashirsha Vadi 11, S. 1768 (November 25, 1711), *J.S.A.*

205. Jai Singh to Maharaja Ajit Singh, Jyestha Sudi 10, S. 1769 (May 23, 1713), *Jodhpur Kharita Bahi*, No. 3, *R.A.* (cf. Tod, II, 292-93).

Ajit Singh and their undue delay in reaching the Court had made his position very embarrassing and had harmed his prestige. If they were not prepared to listen to him, he asked, with what face he could give assurances to the Emperor on their behalf. He said that on arrival of Ajit Singh and Jai Singh at Sadhaura, he would either arrange their visit to the Court or would get them posted in the east or in the Deccan, and if they were unwilling to accept either of the alternatives, then he would secure for them leave to return to their States. But, he said, it was not proper on their part to misbehave while sitting at Delhi. If this was their intention, then why at all did they come even up to Delhi? Even now either they should reach Sadhaura early, or should return to their homes; the Emperor would deal with them.

Azim-ush-shan and Mahabat Khan wanted that Bhandari Khivsi (of Jodhpur) and *Diwan* Bhikharidas Kayastha of Amber should go to their respective masters and convince them about the desirability of their reaching Sadhaura. As the Mewar *wakil* reported, Bhandari was unwilling that Bhikharidas should also accompany him to Delhi. He wrote that Bhandari had been lying and giving false assurances to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, that he would secure for them the Governments of Gujarat and Malwa if they would reach Delhi, and now he feared that if Bhikharidas, who was an honest and trustworthy person, were to accompany him, he would be exposed.²⁰⁶ Later on we will see more about Khivsi Bhandari's mischievous conduct which landed his master in trouble in 1714.

Jahandar Shah complains against Azim-ush-shan for large army of the Rajputs. At this time Jai Singh and Ajit Singh had with them about 25,000 — 30,000 horse. This fact was exploited by those who were antagonistic to Prince Azim-ush-shan, in poisoning the Emperor's ears against him. Thus, Prince Jahandar Shah complained to the Emperor that it was with Azim-ush-shan's connivance that the Rajputs had assembled 30,000 horse, and alleged that some trick was being played upon the Emperor. He offered to go against the Rajputs, but the Emperor decided that the Rajputs should first come to Sadhaura. The Emperor, however, asked Azim-ush-shan as to why the Rajputs had collected such a large army, and

206. Jai Singh to Maharaja Ajit Singh, Jyestha Sudi 10, S. 1769 (May 23, 1713), *Jodhpur Kharita Bahi*, No. 3, R.A. Cf. Tod, II, 292-93.

told him to instruct them to come with only two to three thousand horse. Azim-ush-shan then told the Rajput *wakils* to write to their masters to come with a small force.²⁰⁷

Azim-ush-shan's plan for large scale Maratha disturbances in the Deccan and Malwa; seeks Mewar's help. It is most revealing that Prince Azim-ush-shan was planning large scale Maratha disturbances in the Deccan to finish off Daud Khan, Zulfiqar Khan's deputy, and to destroy the power and position of Zulfiqar Khan. He was in correspondence with the Marathas and wanted them to invade Malwa. He did not unfold his full plan to the Mewar envoy, but desired that Durgadas should join the Marathas, so that the disturbances might gain in weight and proportion. What the Prince had only hinted at was explained on his advice in fuller detail by Qudrat-ullah, a confidant of the Prince, who was subsequently hanged by Mir Jumla. The raid into Malwa was expected to ruin Prince Jahan Shah, the absentee governor of Malwa since 1707, financially. The Mewar envoy replied that the Maharana would do whatever the Prince desired. The Maharana, being aware of the fact that Azim-ush-shan's position was the strongest among all the sons of the Emperor, asked his *wakil* to establish closest possible ties with the Prince to gain his favour.²⁰⁸

Jai Singh and Ajit Singh reach Sadhaura; negotiations regarding posting; Dacca declined by Ajit Singh. Jai Singh and Ajit Singh reached Thaneshwar on September 22, and arrived at Sadhaura on October 7, 1711,²⁰⁹ thirteen months after the expiry of their two months' leave which had been granted to them in June 1710. The negotiations regarding their postings were being

207. Report of the Mewar's *wakil* in *V.V.*, II, 950.

208. Report of the Mewar's *wakil* in *V.V.*, II, pp. 944-45, and Report dated Bhadava Sudi 2, S. 1768 (August 4, 1711) in *V.V.*, II, p. 950. Prince Azim-ush-shan told Amber's *wakil* that Tara Bai's *wakil*, Yadu Kesho, should reside at Udaipur, and from there arrange for the Maratha depredations. When Mewar's *wakil* said that if the Mewar troops joined the Marathas, they would definitely come in the Emperor's notice, Qudrat-ullah replied, "Let the Marathas come into Malwa, and Mewar should do as desired by the Prince, without the least worry." (Mewar *wakil's* report in *V.V.*, II, p. 950). Sheikh Qudrat-ullah's tongue betrayed his mind too easily. Later, his curt and laconic reply to Zulfiqar Khan's offer to join Azim-ush-shan, following Bahadur Shah's death, drove Zulfiqar Khan into the opposite camp. He was hanged by Mir Jumla during Farrukhsiyar's reign (Irvine, I, 160 n.).

209. *Akhbarat*, 8, 15 Ramzan, 1123 H. (October 9, 16, 1711).

conducted by Bhikharidas of Amber, Kanha Pancholi and Kishore-das of Mewar, and Bhandari Khivsi of Jodhpur. In his report of October 27, Bhikharidas sent to Jai Singh a detailed account of these negotiations. On October 25, he met Mahabat Khan, son of Munim Khan who had passed away in February 1711. The Khan said that Ajit Singh should agree to go to Dhaka (Dacca) and Jai Singh to the Deccan. Bhandari thereupon told Mahabat Khan that if Maharaja Ajit Singh was sent to Sorath, he would agree to go there, though Kanha Pancholi remarked that Sorath posting, being under the *subahdar* of Gujarat, was neither high nor an independent appointment. On October 26, when the *wakils* met Shah Qudrat-ullah Khan, they were told that the Emperor wanted to send Ajit Singh to Dhaka and Jai Singh to the Deccan. To this Bhandari replied that the Maharaja would never agree to go to Dhaka, but if he was sent to Sorath, then after staying there for a year, he would agree to go anywhere. Qudrat-ullah then promised to convey Bhandari's request to the Emperor provided Jai Singh would agree to be posted in any of the eastern provinces. Bhikharidas replied that posting at Dhaka would be most inconvenient. The country, he said, was no good, and was sparsely populated; that it would be difficult to send expenses from the '*desh*' ; and on account of the Maharaja's prolonged stay in a distant land, the *hasil* from the *jagirs* would also decline sharply. If the Emperor wanted to send Jai Singh to the east, then the deputy governorship of Patna or of Allahabad be granted to him. The Khan observed that at present the Emperor was not prepared to grant *subahdari* or even *naib-subahdari* to the Maharaja, but in course of time, after the latter had rendered service in the east, he might be appointed as the governor or the deputy governor of a province. He advised that Jai Singh should agree to go to the Allahabad *subah*. To this Bhikharidas replied that Saiyid Abdullah Khan was there and the Saiyids and the Maharaja would not be able to stay in the same region. Qudrat-ullah then said that they would create a separate *faujdar* in the *subah* under the direct control of the prince (and not under the deputy governor). Bhikharidas then agreed to Jai Singh's posting in *subah* Allahabad, subject to his master's approval. Though Bhikharidas did not receive any reply from Amber till October 26, Khivsi Bhandari, ignoring Bhikharidas' objections, put Amber's seal on the *muchalka* which the *wakils* had to sign at Prince Azim-ush-shan's instance, on behalf of their masters,

accepting postings at Sorath and Prayag.²¹⁰ Two days later (October 28) Bhandari Khivsi sent a long report, which Jai Singh received on November 1, giving details of the jurisdiction of the *faujdar* of "Sarkar Ahmadabad Gahora (Khora), thirty to thirty-five *kos* on the western side of Piragji", the number of *parganas* which were in the *zamindari* of Chhatrasal Bundela, the names of the neighbouring chiefs at Mau, Elich, Bhandawar, etc. In all, there were fourteen or fifteen *parganas* with an annual income of fifteen lakhs of rupees. Bhandari further wrote that the *faujdar* of Gahora maintained direct connection with the *subahdar*, that the former *faujdar*s were men of eminence, and that there was an income of lakhs of rupees in the *faujdar*i of "Gahora". He further wrote that there was no harm in accepting the appointment. Raja Chhatrasal would also be near him.²¹¹

Jai Singh declines faujdari of sarkar Ahmadabad Khora. Jai Singh, however, was unwilling to accept the posting for two reasons which he meant to be conveyed to the Imperial authorities : firstly, it was far off from his *desh*, and secondly, he would require there an army of at least 5000 *maujudi*, whereas he had with him 2000 horse only, and, hence, unless the expenses of the remaining 3000 horse were met from the resources of Prince Azim-ush-shan, the governor, he was bound to land himself in financial trouble.²¹²

Jai Singh and Ajit Singh return to their States. Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, being dissatisfied with these appointments, decided to return to their States. The Emperor's health was also failing, drawing nearer everyday yet another war of succession. With the bitter experience of 1707 fresh in his mind, Jai Singh was unwilling to participate in this mad affair again. In January 1712,

210. For the above see Bhikaridas to Jai Singh, Kartik Vadi 12, S. 1768 (October 27, 1711), *J.S.A.* It may be noted that at this time the Rajputs had much closer contacts with Azim-ush-shan than with Jahandar Shah or even Zulfiqar Khan. Ever since the Emperor on his return march from the Deccan crossed the Narmada in December 1709, Azim-ush-shan's influence with the Emperor had greatly increased. Later, Azim-ush-shan's son, Farrukh-siyar, maintained the best of terms with Jai Singh and the Maharana.

211. Bhandari Khivsi (of Jodhpur) to Jai Singh, undated *arzdast* (in reply to Jai Singh's *parwanah* of Kartik Vadi 13, October 28, 1711), received on Kartik Sudi 2 (*J.S.A.*).

212. Copy of Jai Singh's *parwanah* dated Kartik Sudi 8, S. 1768 (November 6, 1711) to Bhandari Khivsi, *J.S.A.*

he secured leave to go home to celebrate his marriage. Maharaja Ajit Singh also managed to secure leave, and the following month both of them set out on their return journey.²¹³

Bahadur Shah's death; Jai Singh hopes for better times. A few days later (February 17, 1712), Emperor Bahadur Shah passed away at Lahor. With him the surviving traditions of Aurangzeb's times were also buried. His death marked the end of an important and stirring chapter in the history of Rajputana which he left much different from what he had found at the time of his accession. The relations between the Rajput princes and the Mughal Emperors, which had been undergoing silent yet perceptible change since Aurangzeb's time, entered a new phase during this period. Henceforth, their relations with the Mughal government were based strictly on reciprocity. They now knew well the desirable and the practical limits of their loyalty towards the Mughal House. They had also realized their own strength, which gave them a new sense of pride and confidence. In Jai Singh's life, a stormy period was over and he could now look forward to fair weather ahead.

213. Raja Todarmal to Jai Singh, Pausha Sudi 11, S. 1768 (January 8, 1712), *J.S.A.* Abdul Aziz to Jai Singh, 6th Muharram, 1124 H. (February 3, 1712), *J.S.A.*

CHAPTER VI

RISE OF SAWAI JAI SINGH (First Phase, 1712-19)

War of Succession at Lahor; important Rajput chiefs remain in their States. When the War of Succession flared up at Lahor following Bahadur Shah's death on February 17, the only Rajputs of note present there were Raja Raj Bahadur of Kishangarh and Raja Pratap Singh, the brother of late Rana Amar Singh. Islam Khan, the son of Rao Gopal Singh Chandrawat, was also at Lahor.¹ Maharao Budh Singh, Maharaja Ajit Singh, Raja Jai Singh, and the ruler of Bikaner, who had recently secured leave to go to their homes, were still in their respective States.

Jai Singh keeps in touch with the developments at Lahor. Though far away from the scene of contest, Jai Singh was in close touch with the developments at Lahor. First he learnt from Nahar Khan's letter about the Emperor's illness, and then received, in quick succession, reports from his own officials informing him about the Emperor's death, Azim-ush-shan's defeat (March 6), false news about the death of Jahandar Shah, and of Zulfiqar Khan when *naubat* was not played at Asad Khan's residence, the capture of Mahabat Khan, the defeat and death of Jahan Shah and Rafi-ush-shan, and finally, news about Jahandar Shah's accession (21st Safar 1124 H.).² He was also informed about the new Emperor's visit to Lahor for Friday prayers, his visit to Asaf Khan's mansion when he conferred upon Lal Kanwar the title of

1. For details, see Iradat Khan, 64-79; Irvine, I, 158-85. In his letter of March 1, 1712, Maharao Bhim Singh, then at Kotah, informed Jai Singh that as per report of the bankers of the Imperial camp, the Emperor had passed away on February 20, and enquired as to what he (Jai Singh) proposed to do. (Letter in J.S.A.).

2. Nahar Khan to Jai Singh, P.L., 2 Safar, 1124 H. (February 29, 1712); Nasratyar Khan to Jai Singh, P.L., 4 Safar (March 2); Diwan Bhikharidas (of Amber) to Jai Singh, Phalgun Sudi 14, S. 1768 (March 11, 1712). In Bhikharidas' report the letters are written vertically to make it difficult for a casual reader to understand the contents of the report. Bhikharidas also mentions reported death of Raja Raj Singh.

Imtiyaz Mahal, and granted her Shalimar garden.³

Jagjiwan reports new developments; his advice to Jai Singh. Soon afterwards Jagjiwandas Pancholi, Amber's able *wakil*, informed Jai Singh that Prince Aiz-ud-din was being sent to Agra, that Yar Muhammad Khan had been deputed to contact him (Jai Singh), the Maharana, and Maharaja Ajit Singh, and that the Emperor would be proceeding to Agra shortly. He advised his master that in case he came to Agra, he should first see Asaf-ud-daulah Asad Khan and then meet the Emperor. Zulfiqar Khan, Asaf-ud-daulah's son, who had emerged from the recent war as the most powerful figure on the political scene,⁴ was appointed *Wazir*, with the rank of 10000/10000 *du aspa*, and was also allowed to retain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. Asad Khan continued to hold the post of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq* with the rank of 12,000/12,000, and was granted absentee governorship of Gujarat.

Jiziya abolished; reasons and implications Soon after his victory, Jahandar Shah abolished the *jiziya* at Asad Khan's instance.⁵ This step signified a sharp departure from Aurangzeb's policy towards the Hindus, which his successor had also tried to maintain to some extent. The change, intended to reconcile the Hindus, had been made imperative by the circumstances. It was clear that the Mughal government, in its then enfeebled state, could no longer hope to continue a harsh policy towards the Hindus without arousing further opposition, which it was not in a position to deal with, and which was bound to hasten its dissolution. Also, it seems, the need to discard the invidious discriminations against the Hindus was increasingly felt among the saner elements of the Mughal nobility, who, apparently, were aware of the great harm which such a policy had done to the empire. The political situation in the country in 1712, and the possibility of a threat to the position of the new Emperor, and to that of Zulfiqar Khan, now at the helm of affairs, also required abolition of this tax, a step which was likely to gain for them wide Hindu support.⁶ As we will see, the Emperor's rival, Farrukh-siyar, and his advisers, also took this very step and

3. Diwan Bhikharidas' report (undated), *J.S.A.*

4. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh (incomplete report), *J.S.A.*

5. *Akhbarat*, 29 Safar (March 27, 1712).

6. Cf. *Parties*, 85.

promised to abolish the *jiziya* formally after their victory.

High ranks granted to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. To remove the long-standing grievance of the Rajput chiefs that they were being denied suitable ranks and appointments, the titles of Mirza Raja and Maharaja with the rank of 7000/7000 were conferred upon Jai Singh and Ajit Singh (April, 1712).⁷ Towards the other Hindu chiefs also, a more liberal policy in matters of rank and appointment was adopted at Zulfiqar Khan's instance. As regards the Marathas, Zulfiqar maintained his private arrangements with them, and his deputy, Daud Khan, continued to pay them a lump-sum in lieu of the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan *subahs*.⁸

Aiz-ud-din sent against Farrukh-siyar ; Jai Singh and others asked to join him ; Rajputs reluctant ; Chhatrasal seeks Jai Singh's advice. On April 21, Jahandar Shah left Lahor for Delhi. On the way he learnt that his nephew, Farrukh-siyar, son of Prince Azim-ush-shan, had crowned himself at Patna. He promptly despatched a large army under his son, Aiz-ud-din, to Agra.⁹ and sent urgent letters to Jai Singh (March 5), Maharaja Ajit Singh, Maharao Budh Singh, Chhatrasal Bundela and others asking them to join the Prince immediately.¹⁰ Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, after the bitter experience of 1707, were reluctant to involve themselves in any war of succession. They, therefore, did not move from their States and made excuses. In July, Jai Singh's *wakil* also advised him to keep his hands off from the contest.¹¹ Chhatrasal Bundela was inclined to send troops to join Aiz-ud-din, but had not made up his mind, and in his letter of August 27, sought Jai Singh's advice.¹²

Farrukh-siyar's progress ; Rajputs receive high favours ; Jai Singh and Ajit Singh granted subahs of Malwa and Gujarat and high mansabs. By the beginning of October 1712, Farrukh-siyar had

7. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, Chaitra Sudi 7 (April 2, 1712), *J.S.A.*

8. See *Parties*, 48.

9. Irvine, I, 190-91, Farrukh-siyar had crowned himself at Patna on the 29th Safar 1124 H. (March 27, 1712).

10. *Akhbarat*, 9th, 12th Rabi II, 1112 H. (May 5, 8, 1712), *J.S.A.*

11. See *Akhbarat*, 7 Rajab (July 30, 1712); Bulaqi Chand to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, 11th Jamadi II, 1124 H. (July 5, 1712), *J.S.A.*

12. Raja Chhatrasal Bundela to Jai Singh, 5 Shaban, 1124 H. (August 27, 1712), *J.S.A.*

reached Banaras. His position had improved considerably after the Saiyid brothers, Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali Khan, his father's deputies in the *subahs* of Allahabad and Bihar, and also Siddhishta Narain of Bhojpur, Saf-shikan Khan, deputy governor of Orissa, Chhabela Ram Nagar, *faujdar* of Kara-Manikpur, had joined him¹³. As Zulfiqar Khan did not trust the Turani nobles, who had not been reconciled so far, he tried to secure whole-hearted support of the Rajputs by granting them high concessions. Thus on November 10, i.e., fourteen days before Aiz-ud-din's route at Khajwah, orders were passed appointing Jai Singh to the Government of *subah* Malwa (rank 7000/7000). He was also granted eighty lakhs *dams* as *inam*, and his son Chimnaji was appointed to the *faujdari* of Mandasaur. The order regarding Maharaja Ajit Singh mentioned his appointment to the Government of Gujarat, an increase of 2000/2000 in his rank of 7000/7000, which had recently been granted to him at Lahor, and *faujdari* of Sorath, and for his eldest son a *mansab* of 2000/1500, grant of forty lakhs *dams* in *inam*, and *faujdari* of Patan, and that of Idar to another of his sons, Bakht Singh, besides granting all the *parganas* for which Bhandari Raghunath, the Marwar *wakil*, had requested on behalf of Ajit Singh, and also an *izafa* and *mansabs* for other Rathors of Jodhpur.¹⁴

Jodhpur wakil's petty-mindedness. It was Bhandari Raghunath, the Marwar *wakil*, who had foolishly secured through Raja Sabha Chand, the *diwan* of Zulfiqar Khan, and Mirza Qadir, a higher *mansab* for Ajit Singh, and thereby created unnecessary unpleasantness. He had assured Raja Sabha Chand, without even consulting Jagjiwandas, the Amber *wakil*, and Bhikharidas, Amber's *diwan*, that Jai Singh counted himself as one of Maharaja Ajit Singh's sons, and would not object if he was granted a *mansab* lower than the one granted to Ajit Singh. When Jagjiwandas came to know of it, he strongly remonstrated with Bhandari for his underhand methods. In his report of November 11, he complained to

13. Irvine, I, 206ff.; *Akhbarat*, 23 Ramzan 1124 H. (October 13) records that the news of Farrukh-siyar's start from Banaras with a large army was received at the Court. For a lucid account of the circumstances in which the Saiyids joined Farrukh-siyar, and for their early relations, see *Parties*, 89-95; Irvine, I, 198ff.

14. *Akhbarat*, 25 Shawwal, 1124 H. (November 14, 1712); Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Margashirsha Vadi 9, S. 1769 (November, 11, 1712), *J.S.A.*

Jai Singh that Bhandari had also tried to obstruct, on one ground or another, the grant of Malpura, Amarsar, Hindon, Khori and Kotputli *parganas*. As for Malpura, Bhandari said that he would try to secure it for the Maharaja who was now reconciled with Raja Bahadur. For Amarsar and Hindon he forwarded the plea that he would try to secure them for the Maharaja and Bijai Singh, respectively. For Khori and Kotputli, which were in the *jagirs* of Nur Khan and Khan Jahan Bahadur, he advanced the reason that any attempt by Amber to secure these *parganas* would create complications. The only *parganas* which Bhandari advised the Amber *wakil* to try to secure were Deoti Sancheri, Toda, Vahatri, Gijgarh, besides four other minor places. Later on, as we will see, the Amber officials succeeded in settling the accounts with Ajit Singh and his Bhandari officials by securing orders for the grant of *subahdari* of Thatta for Ajit Singh and the Government of Malwa for their own master.¹⁵

Farrukh-siyar's advance; the Emperor and Zulfiqar Khan repeatedly seek Rajput help. By this time it was clear that the final round of contest for the throne would be fought soon. In his report of November 11, Jagjiwan informed Jai Singh that Farrukh-siyar was advancing from Allahabad with a force of 60,000 to 70,000 horse, which meant that the fight was going to be severe, and its outcome uncertain. Although Jagjiwandas in his report of July 1712 had advised Jai Singh to remain aloof from the contest, he (Jagjiwan) changed his mind when Zulfiqar Khan and Raja Sabha Chand repeatedly assured him to fulfil all the demands put forth by him on behalf of his master. In his report of November 27, he wrote that the desired objectives would be easily realized if their forces joined the Emperor in time. He informed Jai Singh about the route of Prince Aiz-ud-din and added that Zulfiqar Khan was anxiously waiting for his (Jai Singh's) arrival.¹⁶

Jai Singh's policy. On November 29, Emperor Jahandar Shah set out from Delhi with a large army. Three days later, he sent his last letters to Jai Singh, Ajit Singh, Churaman Jat, and others, urging them to join him.¹⁷ Jai Singh, however, decided against

15. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Margashirsha Vadi 9, S. 1769 (November 11, 1712), *J.S.A.*

16. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Margashirsha Sudi 11, S. 1769 (November 27, 1712), *J.S.A.*

17. *Akhbarat*, 11th and 14th Zul Qada, 1124 H. (November 29,

joining either side, while assuring help to both.

On December 20, Jai Singh wrote to Ajit Singh that the Emperor was reported to have reached Mathura, and Farrukh-siyar was about 30 *kos* from Agra, and hence the battle was expected to take place early. He advised Ajit Singh to send a token force to the Emperor without delay, and to ask Bhandari to report to Zulfiqar Khan.¹⁸

Jagjiwandas reports Jai Singh the developments leading to the Emperor's defeat; collects a token force. At Delhi, Jagjiwandas, under Jai Singh's instructions, was recruiting troops, and had hired between 300-400 horsemen. He was, however, finding it difficult to recruit troops, who were more inclined to join the Emperor's army where they were being offered higher wages. He reported (December 29) that as was the Imperial practice, the mercenaries were asking for monthly salary, and two months' salary in advance. As for Farrukh-siyar's movements Jagjiwandas informed that he had moved towards Gau Ghat, where Abdullah Khan had found a ford, and, on this account, the Emperor, who was intending to cross the Yamuna at Ghat Samogar, had now encamped behind Bagh Dahra, having sent his advance tents towards Gau Ghat. Both Farrukh-siyar and the Emperor, he wrote, wanted to cross the river at a suitable point, and it was to be seen who would cross the river first.¹⁹

The two sides come face to face. But on the 29th December, Farrukh-siyar crossed the Yamuna at Gau Ghat. Reporting this on December 31, Jagjiwandas wrote that on December 30 the Emperor had started from his camp, and leaving Sikandara on the right, had encamped in a plain, and had arranged the artillery in front, while Farrukh-siyar, with his back towards the Yamuna, had encamped in the plain between Runakta and Serai of Beroz, the distance between the artillery of the two sides being one *kos*. He wrote that though both the sides were keen for a fight, incessant rain during the past one week had forced them to inactivity. Jagjiwandas also informed that he had with him only 400 *sawars*,

December 2, 1712), *J.S.A.*

18. Jai Singh to Maharaja Ajit Singh, Pausha Sudi 4, S. 1769 (December 20, 1712), *Jodhpur Kharita Bahi*, No. 3, *R.A.*

19. Jagjiwandas Pancholi to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Pausha Sudi 13 (December 29, 1712), received on Magha Vadi 2 (January 2, 1713), *J.S.A.*

but he expected to collect some more.²⁰ As hostilities were now imminent, the Emperor sent Ghazi-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan to bring the heavy guns, which had been earlier planted at Ghat Samogar, to the new position taken by the Imperial army.²¹

Jahandar Shah defeated. By three O'clock on the afternoon of December 31, the day Jagjiwan had sent the above report, the rain stopped, the mist lifted, and the two sides, weary of waiting, came to grips. Emperor Jahandar Shah, despite his apparently superior position, lost the day due to bad generalship of Zulfiqar Khan, the treachery of Chin Qilich Khan (Nizam) and Muhammad Amin Khan, and his own cowardice and misfortune.

The developments after the battle. After midnight, Jagjiwandas despatched a report about Farrukh-siyar's victory. The next day (January 1, 1713), he sent a detailed report to Jai Singh. He informed that there was no definite news about Jahandar Shah's fate, and it was not known whether he had been killed or he had escaped. Jagjiwan wrote that he had sent *harkarabs* to the camp of Farrukh-siyar and around, but could not secure any definite news as to who had managed to escape and who had lost their lives. In the city (Agra), Farrukh-siyar was proclaimed as the new Emperor. He wrote that Ghazi-ud-din Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan waited on the Emperor and were favourably received. Many people of the city also waited on the new Emperor. There was no news about the whereabouts of Khan Jahan Bahadur, Aiz-ud-din, Zulfiqar Khan, and Churaman who had come from the Muiz-ud-din's (Jahandar Shah) side but had escaped after plundering the treasure chests. In all, according to Jagjiwandas, about 250 men were killed in the battle. This report reached Jai Singh on January 6, 1713.²²

Asad Khan offers to surrender Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan. Then, from Jagjiwandas' report of January 8, Jai Singh learnt of Asad Khan's *arzi*, submitted to the Emperor on January 6, informing that he had confined Muiz-ud-din (Jahandar Shah) in Salimgarh, and his own son, Zulfiqar Khan, inside the fort at Delhi, and sought

20. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Pausha Sudi 15, S. 1769 (December 31, 1712), *J.S.A.*

21. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Pausha Sudi 12 (December 28, 1712), *J.S.A.*

22. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Magha Vadi 1, S. 1769 (January 1, 1713), *J.S.A.* After Jahandar's defeat, Jagjiwan invariably refers to him as Muiz-ud-din.

Emperor Farrukh-siyar's orders about them. The Emperor sent him a gracious letter. Jagjiwan further informed that when Farrukh-siyar paid a visit to Shah Jahan's mausoleum, the people of the city gathered in large numbers and appealed to the Emperor to abolish the *jiziyah*. Mehta Chhabela Ram, who was with the Emperor, then submitted that, earlier, on his request, the Emperor had ordered the abolition of this tax, and now he should do so formally. The Emperor then ordered that the *jiziyah* was being abolished forthwith. Also, in order to bring down the prices of foodgrains, the new Emperor ordered abolition of the duties on foodgrains. He fixed January 10 as the day on which he would leave for Delhi.²³

Ajit Singh starts for Gujarat; Jai Singh's advice to the contrary. Meanwhile, Maharaja Ajit Singh had set out from Jodhpur for Gujarat, the Government of which province he had received from Jahandar Shah a few months back.²⁴ He wrote to Jai Singh that soon he would be taking up the charge of the province, and advised Jai Singh to reach Malwa without delay. But in his letter of January 13, Jai Singh pointed out to Ajit Singh that Jahandar Shah's grants were no longer valid, and they would have to negotiate anew with the new Emperor for their postings, etc. He advised that they should meet at some place to discuss the altered situation.²⁵ Meanwhile, the Rajput rulers got busy in establishing contact with the new Emperor by sending congratulatory letters and presents.

Rajputs send congratulatory messages and nazars. On January 18, 1713, the *nazars* and formal letters sent by Jai Singh, Ajit Singh and Bhim Singh (Kotah) were received by Farrukh-siyar. Maharao Budh Singh's *nazar* (100 *ashrafis*) and *arzdasht* were received rather late (May 19). The Maharana also sent suitable presents with Thakur Kushal Singh Shekhawat; he was received by the Saiyids with much warmth and cordiality.²⁶

23. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Magha Vadi 7, S. 1769 (January 8, 1713) *J.S.A.*

24. See page 96 of this Chapter.

25. Jai Singh to Maharaja Ajit Singh, Magha Vadi 13, S. 1769 (January 13, 1713), *Jodhpur Kharita Bahi*, No. 3, *R.A.*

26. *Akhbarat*, 2 Muharram, 1125 H. (January 18, 1713), 5 Jamadi I (May 19); Kushal Singh to his son Lal Singh, Pausha Sudi 12, S. 1770, *Vijaipur Thikana Papers*.

Exit of Turani group. At Delhi, the situation was clearing only gradually. On February 1, Zulfiqar Khan was put to death, and his corpse was put to much needless ignominy. His father, *Wakil-i-Mutlaq* Asad Khan, was dismissed in disgrace.²⁷ The sudden exit of these two nobles of tremendous influence finished the powerful Irani group, thereby disturbing the equilibrium, which the Mughal Emperors had maintained in their own interest, among the different groups of nobles. Later on, it led to tragic circumstances, which could have been averted had the Irani group existed to put a check upon the Saiyids, and subsequently upon the Turani nobles.

The new set up; Saiyid Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali. In the new set-up, Saiyid Abdullah Khan secured the coveted post of *Wazir*, with the title of Qutb-ul-Mulk, and governorship of Multan, and his brother, Saiyid Hussain Ali, was made the *Mir Bakshi* with the rank of 7000/7000, and was granted the governorship of Bihar. The Saiyids, on account of their growing differences with the Emperor from the very beginning of the reign, and knowing well that their sudden elevation to power would be generally resented, tried to earn the good-will of the Rajputs and the Turanis by securing for them suitable *mansabs* and postings. To satisfy the Turanis (who had betrayed Jahandar Shah in accordance with their secret promise to Shariyat-ullah, afterwards Mir Jumla, that they would not fight on the day of the battle).²⁸ the Saiyids secured for Chin Qilich Khan the viceroyalty of the Deccan, a rank of 7000/7000, with the title of *Nizam-ul-Mulk*, and for Muhammad Amin Khan the post of Second *Bakshi*, and for his son, Qamar-ud-din Khan, that of the *Darogha* of the *Ahdis*.²⁹ To befriend the Rajputs, Hussain Ali Khan sent, shortly after the victory, personal letters (7-8 January) to Maharaja Ajit Singh and Jai Singh, conveying his desire to have cordial ties with them and promising to do his best in securing their objects.³⁰ As a proof of his friendly feelings towards the Rajputs, he secured, on Jai Singh's protest, cancellation of Nusrat Yar Khan's appointment to the Government of *subah* Ajmer. Jai Singh had conveyed to him that the Rajputs would not

27. Irvine, I, 248ff. Asad Khan died in 1716 at the age of eighty-eight years.

28. *Seir.* 52; Irvine, I, 233.

29. See Irvine, I, 258-59; *Parties*, 97.

30. Jai Singh to Pancholi Jagjiwandas, Magha Sudi 2, S. 1769 (January 17, 1713), *J.S.A.*

receive well Nusrat Yar Khan's appointment at Ajmer, and it would be consistent with the Nawab's professed desire to have cordial ties with the Rajputs (lit. "Hindustan") to post the Khan elsewhere.³¹

Jai Singh's letter to Chhabela Ram. Jai Singh also established contact with Chhabela Ram. Before the battle of Agra (December 31) was fought, Chhabela Ram Nagar had sent his messenger to Jai Singh urging him to send an army to Farrukh-siyar's aid. He had assured Jai Singh of their best intentions, and had averred that the Hindus would receive a better deal, and the country a more stable government, under Farrukh-siyar. In his letter of January 17, Jai Singh informed Chhabela Ram that he had sent an army to join Farrukh-siyar, but the engagement took place before it was expected. His troops were then thirty *kos* from Agra. He wrote that Anand Ram, who was with the army, would meet him and apprise him of his (Jai Singh's) demands, which, he hoped, Mehta Chhabela Ram would try to persuade the Saiyids to satisfy them.³² This important letter reveals why Jai Singh did not send troops to join Jahandar Shah while allowing Jagjiwandas to recruit troops at Agra.

Saiyids want Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to visit the Court. The letters of this period bear it out that, generally speaking, the Saiyids were responsive to the desires of the Rajputs, and were keen on improving the latter's relations with the Mughal government. There were two chief issues upon which depended the normalization of Delhi's relations with Jai Singh and Ajit Singh: the question of their visit to the Court, and that of their postings. In January 1714, Abdullah Khan called Nahar Khan, who had earlier taken part in the negotiations between the Rajputs and Emperor Bahadur Shah, and asked him to persuade Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to visit the Court. Nahar Khan replied that both the Rajas were loyal to the Emperor and entertained particularly friendly feelings for the Nawab. Giving his own assessment of the situation at Delhi, Nahar Khan informed Jai Singh that the Emperor was young and under the control of the the Saiyids, who had secured high *mansabs* for themselves. As for

31. Jai Singh to Pancholi Jagjiwandas, Magha Sudi 2, S. 1769 (January 17, 1713), *J.S.A.* Besides the *subahdari* of Ajmer, the Khan had also received the *faujdari* and *amini* of Sambhar and Didwana.

32. Jai Singh to Mehta Chhabela Ram, draft letter, Magha Sudi 2, S. 1769 (January 17, 1713), *J.S.A.*

the other nobles, the policy was to confirm Bahadur Shahi *mansabs* and titles, and to grant *izafas*.³³

A few days later, Hussain Ali also conveyed to Jagjiwandas (through Asad-ullah and Nusrat Yar Khan) that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh should come to the Court, especially as "all faith in their promises to attend the Court has been shaken. They should wait on the Emperor and stay at the Court like the elder Mirza Raja and Maharaja Jaswant Singh".³⁴

Hussain Ali desires Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to approach through him. It may be mentioned that even at this early stage, the relations between the Saiyid brothers were not entirely free from mutual jealousy and suspicion. Thus we find Nusrat Yar Khan confiding in Jagjiwandas Pancholi that Nawab Hussain Ali wanted the two Rajas to settle their *matalibs* by making use of his good offices and not those of Saiyid Abdullah Khan. Although there were no differences between the two brothers, it was necessary, said Nusrat Yar Khan, that Jai Singh and Ajit Singh should remain on the side of any one of the two Nawabs at a time, and that they should not keep shifting from one to the other. Jagjiwan replied that if they had any desire to approach through Abdullah Khan, they would have gone to him directly. "We are on the side of the Nawab (Hussain Ali) and have nothing to do with anybody else. We will approach Abdullah Khanji only if you ask us to do so." When Hussain Ali was told that Ajit Singh was on the way to Gujarat, he expressed his disapproval and said that it was improper to go there without receiving a formal grant of the province from the Emperor.³⁵

A few days later, Hussain Ali discussed with the Emperor the *mansabs* which might be granted to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, who had already received (about January 24) the titles of Mirza Raja and Maharaja, respectively. The Emperor agreed to confer upon them the rank of 5000/5000. Subsequently, Ajit Singh's *wakil* pressed Shyam Singh Khangarot, whom Jai Singh had sent to negotiate with the Saiyids, to accept a lower *mansab* for his master

33. Nahar Khan to Jai Singh, Magha Sudi 7, S. 1769 (January 22, 1713), *J.S.A.*

34. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Magha Sudi 9 (January 24, 1713), received on Magha Sudi 9. *J.S.A.*

35. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Magha Sudi 9 (January 24, 1713), received on Magha Sudi 9, *J.S.A.*

in view of the relationship between the two. Shyam Singh, after some hesitation, agreed for a mansab of 5000/4500 for Jai Singh to preserve a show of unity. Accordingly, *farmans* were written and despatched to Amber and Jodhpur. Hussain Ali promised to secure *izafa* of 1000/1000 in the *mansabs* of both Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. Chimnaji, Jai Singh's son, and Abhai Singh, son of Ajit Singh, were given equal *mansabs*. Jai Singh had instructed Jagjiwandas to secure a *mansab* for Bijai Singh also, but Hussain Ali declined saying that Bijai Singh was in confinement at Amber and no *mansab* could be given to him so long as he was in prison.³⁶ Hussain Ali also secured the cancellation of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan's posting as the governor of Ajmer and got it for Asad-ullah Khan, the son of the Nawab's sister and former *Mir Bakshi* of Bidar Bakht, who professed great friendship and cordiality towards Jai Singh.³⁷

Malarna, Amarsar, Lalsot taken on ijara from Nusrat Yar Khan. As regards the title of Sawai, for which Jagjiwandas had been representing for some time, it was decided to make a formal request for it to the Emperor only after other requests had been granted by him. Jagjiwan also took *parganas* of Malarna, Amarsar and Lalsot on *ijara* from Nusrat Yar Khan, who was badly in need of money, settling the *ijara* amount for the *Kharif* crop at Rs. 25,000. He also settled that from the next crop, these *parganas* would be held by Amber on *ijara* for a period of three years.³⁸

On his master's instructions, Jagjiwandas secured for Udai Singh a *mansab* of 1000/700, and *parganas* of Khandela and Varvasa in *jagir*. Reporting this, Jagjiwandas also informed that Sangram Singh's title of Maharana, given by Bahadur Shah, had been confirmed by the new Emperor.³⁹ In May 1713, letters informing the conference of *mansabs* and *jagirs* were sent to Amber under the seal of Hussain Ali, who also wrote a personal letter to Jai Singh. Jagjiwandas wrote that he would get *siaha* from the *Bakshi's* office and would have the *sanads* of the *jagirs* prepared in the *Diwan's* office. As the Emperor's one year old son had died on May 3, he

36. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Phalguna Sudi 9, S. 1769 (February 22, 1713), *J.S.A.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Phalguna Sudi 12, S. 1769 (February 26, 1713), *J.S.A.*

39. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Vaisakha Vadi 2, S. 1769 (April 1, 1713), *J.S.A.*

could not send these papers in time.⁴⁰

Emperor's attitude towards Jai Singh and Ajit Singh; Jagjiwan asks for Malwa and Gujarat. After settling the issue of *mansabs* for Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, Hussain Ali now turned his attention to the problem of their postings and attendance at the Court. Though three months had passed since Farrukh-siyar became the Emperor, neither of them had met the Emperor, nor had any decision been taken about their postings. In early July, Hussain Ali assured the Emperor that both the Rajas were willing to serve the government. Reciprocating these feelings the Emperor replied that he had no particular objec. in his mind in calling Jai Singh and Ajit Singh to the Court ; when their minds were free from all apprehensions and when they themselves wished to be called, he said, then he would summon them. Meanwhile, Jagjiwandas requested the Saiyids to secure for Jai Singh the *subahdari* of Malwa, and of Gujarat for Ajit Singh, but in case the Emperor was disinclined to post them there, then to obtain other appropriate postings. In his report of July 6, he informed his master that the Saiyids were considering his proposal. He also informed that as per *Waqia* of Ajmer, Maharaja Ajit Singh was constructing a fortress near Sambhar.⁴¹

Jai Singh receives the title of Sawai. Wakil Jagjiwandas Pancholi and Thakur Shyam Singh Khangarot had already rendered good service to their master by securing for him various favours. In early July 1713, they also secured for Jai Singh the title of *Sawai*, *izafa* (in the *mansab*), *palki*, and a *khilat khasa*. In the Mughal official records, informed Jagjiwandas, his master's title hereafter would be recorded as 'Mirza Raja Sawai Jai Singh'.⁴²

Ajit Singh provokes the Imperial government. Maharaja Ajit Singh, on the other hand, landed himself in trouble by causing avoidable provocation to the government. He first expelled Raja Pratap Singh, the brother of the late Maharana, from Toda, and occupied the town. When the Emperor came to know of it, he asked Mir Jumla to tell Hussain Ali that though the Nawab

40. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, *W.R.*, Jyestha Vadi 7, S. 1770 (May 5, 1713), *J.S.A.*

41. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Shravana Vadi 10, S. 1770 (July 6, 1713), *J.S.A.*

42. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Shravana Vadi 1, S. 1770 (1713 A. D.), *J.S.A.*

(Hussain Ali) was very friendly with the Raja, the latter would never come to the Court, nor would he render any service. The Emperor even expressed his desire to march to Ajmer against him. The Amir-ul-Umara, however, told Mir Jumla that he would be able to persuade Ajit Singh to wait upon the Emperor, and that he had sought Sawai Jai Singh's assistance in this matter. He expressed his hope that Jai Singh would be able to persuade Ajit Singh to vacate Toda. The Emperor then agreed to put off his idea of going against Ajit Singh.

Hussain Ali's friendly remonstrance. Hussain Ali, in the presence of Jagjiwandas and Shah Anand Ram, expressed his regret over Ajit Singh's conduct. He said that he regarded both the Rajas as his brothers, and made no distinction between their honour and that of his own. At the Court, he continued, Raja Raj Singh, Khan-i-Dauran, and Mir Jumla were trying their utmost to convince the Emperor that Ajit Singh would neither come to the Court, nor render any service, and that he (Hussain Ali) was deliberately misleading the Emperor. Hussain Ali told Jagjiwandas that he trusted Sawai Jai Singh, and the latter should advise Maharaja Ajit Singh not to spoil his relations with the Imperial government, and to remove his *thanas* from Sambhar and Toda.⁴³

Secures more favours for Jai Singh. In July 1713, Hussain Ali secured for Jai Singh the *faujdari* of Mathura and Hindon, and exemption from the assessment of Chatsu and Dausa *parganas*, though not of Amber, Deoti Sancheri and Khori. Jai Singh was also granted Mahmudabad in *jagir*, though his request for the grant of Mozabad and Atilo Bhabhari was declined. Hussain Ali promised to expedite the papers concerning the above concessions. He again expressed his confidence in Sawai Jai Singh and hoped that the latter would be able to bring round Ajit Singh to serve the Emperor.⁴⁴

Raja Bahadur's intrigues against Ajit Singh. Meanwhile, Raja Raj Bahadur Rathor of Kishangarh was trying his best to impress upon the Emperor that, in case the latter proceeded against Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, the Rathors and the Kachhwahas would welcome him. He offered to march in the van of the army along with

43. For the above account, see Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Shrivana Vadi 1, 1770, *J.S.A.*

44. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Shrivana Vadi 13, 1770 (1713 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

Mohkam Singh. From time to time he showed to the Emperor a handful of letters in Dingal purported to have been written by those Rathors who were hostile to Ajit Singh. As Jagjiwandas wrote, "God alone knows whether he sends replies to these letters, or keeps them in his home. . . . For this reason the Emperor is pleased with Raja Bahadur, while the Saiyids are on very bad terms with him, and talk about him (Raja Bahadur) in utter derision".⁴⁵

By the end of July 1713, Jai Singh's posting as the governor of Malwa was almost settled, but he tried to secure through Hussain Ali the *subahdari* of Burhanpur also. He also informed Jagjiwandas that as desired by Hussain Ali, he had written to Maharaja Ajit Singh urging him to come and serve the Emperor.⁴⁶

Mohkam Singh murdered. But shortly afterwards (August 16), Mohkam Singh, son of Rao Indra Singh, with whom Ajit Singh had to settle old scores, and who at this time was inciting the Emperor to proceed against Ajit Singh, was murdered at Delhi when he was returning from the mansion of Saiyid Abdullah Khan. Four days later, a servant of Ajit Singh, with three camels of his accomplices, was caught near the tomb of Qutub-ud-din. The *Jodhpur Khyat* mentions that the Maharaja rewarded about twenty to twenty-five persons on their return from Delhi after murdering Mohkam Singh. After Mohkam's murder, Farrukh-siyar called Rao Indra Singh and his son, Mohan Singh, to the Court, but Ajit Singh got Mohan Singh also murdered on the way.⁴⁷

Offer of Allahabad and Burhanpur to Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. How Ajit Singh was given Thatta? Though Ajit Singh's hand in these murders was apparent, Farrukh-siyar did not take any hasty action against him. In September, i.e., about nine months after Farrukh-siyar's accession, it was decided to appoint Jai Singh as the governor of *subah* Allahabad, and to

45. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Shravana Vadi 13, 1770 (1713 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

46. Jai Singh to Chaudhari Jag Ram, draft *parwanah*, Bhadrpada Sudi 2, S. 1770 (August 12, 1713), *J.S.A.*

47. *Akhbarat*, 5th, 15th Shaban 1125 H. (August 16, 26, 1713); *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, pp. 100-102, in Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, p. 555 n. 1, which also says that the *Jodhpur wakil* had informed Ajit Singh that Mohkam Singh was trying to secure the grant of Jodhpur from the Emperor and therefore Ajit got him murdered. See also *V.V.*, II, p. 841. Ajit bore old grudge against Mohkam. In 1706, Mohkam Singh, then *faujdar* of Merta, had suddenly attacked Jalor with the intention to capture Ajit Singh, who managed to escape and, after collecting a large force expelled Mohkam Singh from Jalor. See *V.V.*, II, 763-64.

grant the *subahdari* of Burhanpur to Ajit Singh. Though Jai Singh was keen to be posted in Malwa, and was trying for it through Asad ullah Khan, the Saiyids' uncle, he seems to have been willing to go to Allahabad also. We get this impression from his letter of October 15 to Ajit Singh in which he had urged him to leave for his charge without delay. He informed Ajit Singh that the Emperor's *farman* about the grant of the *subahs* was on the way, and sent to him a letter from Abdullah Khan.⁴⁸

But on October 16, Asad-ullah Khan arrived^d in Delhi and met the Emperor and Abqullah Khan. In his talks with Jagjiwandas and Shah Anand Ram he acknowledged his gratitude to Sawaiji. The next day (October 17) when he met Hussain Ali and Abdullah Khan, he said that he had settled with Sawai Jai Singh for the grant of *subah* Malwa to him (Jai Singh), and *subah* Thatta to Ajit Singh. Abdullah Khan remarked that orders had already been passed granting *subah* Burhanpur to Ajit Singh and *subah* Allahabad to Jai Singh. Asad-ullah Khan replied that the two Rajas were keen to be posted in Malwa and Thatta. Abdullah Khan then met the Emperor and discussed Asad-ullah Khan's proposal. The Emperor gave his assent to it. The letters "by order" (*hasb-ul-hukmi*) and *farmans* were now written and Asad-ullah Khan was told to send *sazawals* to make Jai Singh and Ajit Singh leave for their respective charges (Malwa and Thatta) immediately.⁴⁹

Soon the Saiyids must have realized their mistake in having recommended to the Emperor Asad-ullah's proposal regarding the postings of Jai Singh and Ajit Singh. By readily accepting the Saiyid's recommendation, the Emperor, on the one hand, obliged Jai Singh, and, on the other hand, shifted the responsibility of Ajit Singh's appointment to the Government of Multan and Thatta, which he was likely to resent, on the Saiyids. It may be mentioned that, subsequently also, Asad-ullah Khan's advice to send Mir Jumla to Lahor and Hussain Ali to the Deccan was accepted by the Saiyids,⁵⁰ and, either incidentally or as part of some scheme, his advice was in confirmity with the Emperor's desire.

Ajit Singh refuses to go to Thatta. When Ajit Singh came to

48. Jagjiwandas to Sawai Jai Singh, Kartik Sudi 8, 9, 10 (October 16-17 1713), *J.S.A.*

49. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Kartik Sudi 10, S. 1770 (October 17, 1713), *J.S.A.*

50. See page 113 of this Chapter

know that he was being given the governorship of Multan and Thatta, he wrote to the Saiyids (early November 1713) that the posting was unacceptable to him. He stated that he had sent his *wakil* to Saiyid Khan-i-Jahan, one of the uncles of the Saiyids, "who is elder to me and to the Nawab also", and whatever Khan-i-Jahan would settle, would be acceptable to him.⁵¹ But the Emperor was not inclined to go out of his way to satisfy Ajit Singh, who was negotiating solely through the Saiyids, and had not cared to contact him in the matter.

It was in December 1711 that Ajit Singh had been granted two months' leave to visit his State.⁵² Since then he had not attended the Court. Now his refusal to carry out the posting orders, recommended by the Saiyids themselves, placed the latter in a very embarrassing position. The Emperor, Mir Jumla, and Khan-i-Dauran had already been saying that Ajit Singh would never show proper allegiance to the government, and now this development had proved them right. The Emperor, goaded by Mir Jumla, Khan-i-Dauran, and Raja Bahadur expressed his desire to go against Ajit Singh, but shortly afterwards appointed Amir-ul-Umara Hussain Ali to lead the campaign. It was no longer possible for the Amir-ul-Umara to avert the campaign against his friend.

Besides the dangers inherent in any military expedition, one of the obvious possibilities of the present campaign was that the Saiyids, who, from the beginning, were trying to establish close ties with the Rajputs, were likely to be estranged with the latter, and in case Hussain Ali was successful and was asked to impose a harsh treaty upon Ajit Singh, their weakened ties were likely to snap altogether. If, however, the campaign failed, Hussain Ali's position at the Court was bound to be affected seriously. But the circumstances which had led to the campaign against Ajit Singh were known to the Amber *wakil* and the officials like Jag Ram, Shyam Singh Khangarot, Asad-ullah Khan, Tula Ram and many others.⁵³ Ajit Singh too must have been knowing as to who was chiefly responsible for the campaign against him. Hence, as we will see, despite the harsh treaty imposed upon him, he came closer to the Saiyids and drifted away from the Emperor.

51. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Sudi 7, S. 1770 (November 13, 1713), *J.S.A.*

52. See Chapter V, p. 82.

53. This is clear from Jagjiwandas' reports which he sent to Sawai Jai Singh.

Hussain Ali's Marwar campaign. Hussain Ali started on his Marwar campaign after making elaborate preparations. In late November, the Emperor approved a list of nearly 70,000 *sawars* submitted to him, and gave orders for the departure of the army.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, a *farman* had been sent to Ajit Singh, but, as his reply, received on December 22, was found unsatisfactory, Hussain Ali was given leave to depart. A number of prominent officers including Sarbuland Khan, Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, Itiqad Khan, Asad-ullah Khan, Raja Raj Bahadur, Raja Udawant Singh Bundela, Raja Gopal Singh Bhadauriya were appointed under him. A few of these officers were decidedly hostile to the Saiyids. From the Imperial magazine, 500 maunds of lead and gun powder, 100 *mahtabs*, 200 rockets, and five cannons were delivered to the Amir-ul-Umara. Beside, twenty-five lakhs of Rupees were given to him for expenses. These preparations indicate that the campaign was considered a difficult undertaking, though Ajit Singh at that time stood alone.⁵⁵ From this one may form an idea of the magnitude of the task which the Mughal government had to face in 1708 when Mewar, Amber, and Marwar defied the Mughal government unitedly.

It seems, Ajit Singh had not anticipated that the Imperial government would go to the extent of starting a campaign against him. Hence, soon after Hussain Ali's departure from Delhi (December 25), he sent Bhandari Raghunath to Nahar Khan to negotiate through him the terms of peace. After meeting the Khan, Raghunath came to see Hussain Ali, who was then encamped at Sarai Allahawardi. Hussain Ali rejected the terms proposed by Ajit Singh (which probably included the grant of *subah* Gujarat), and pressed on towards Ajmer.⁵⁶ From Ajmer, Hussain Ali sent a letter to Ajit. For obvious reasons, Hussain Ali wanted that the campaign might still be called off, which was only possible if Ajit Singh accepted his posting at Thatta. As Ajit Singh was not responsive to any such suggestion, Hussain Ali advanced towards Merta, thirty-seven miles north-west of Ajmer. When he had covered about seven miles in the direction of Merta, and Ajit was about sixteen miles from Hussain Ali's position, Bhandari and three of

54. *Akhbarat*, 13 Zul Qada, 1125 H. (November 20, 1713).

55. *Akhbarat*, 15, 18 Zul Hijja (December 22, 25, 1713); Irvine, I, pp. 286-87.

56. *Akhbarat*, 5 Muharram (January 10, 1714); Irvine I, 287.

the Marwar nobles arrived to negotiate peace. Ajit Singh had conveyed through them his willingness to send his son to wait upon the Emperor, and had pleaded fear for his failure to visit the Court. Hussain Ali detained the Jodhpur envoys and placed them under confinement. Abdullah Khan came to know of these developments from his brother's letter which reached him on March 25, 1714.⁵⁷

Attempt to discredit Hussain Ali. At Court, the atmosphere was generally hostile to the Saiyids. Thus, a few days back, Hussain Ali had informed the Court about Ajit Singh's flight from Sambhar towards Merta on the approach of his army. This gave a pretext to Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran to accuse Hussain Ali of allowing Ajit Singh to escape in order to give the impression that the campaign was difficult. When Abdullah Khan came to know of this, he remonstrated with the Emperor's mother (who was chiefly responsible for making the Saiyids agree to support her son in the contest for the throne) that while his brother had gone to Marwar to be killed, false allegations were being made against him at the Court. If the Emperor so desired, he might send somebody else against Ajit Singh. When the Emperor came to know of it, he denied that such allegations were made against the Saiyids, and told Abdullah Khan that whosoever had reported to him about these allegations was not his friend.⁵⁸

In his report of March 25, Jagjiwandas further informed his master that 2000 *sawars*, sent under Amanat Khan, Mir Jumla's son, had plundered some villages of Marwar, whereupon Hussain Ali warned his troops, but when the complaint reached him a second time, he ordered that the men of Mir Jumla's son be turned out of the camp. When the Emperor came to know of it, he agreed to reduce the rank of Mir Jumla's son after enquiring into the facts of the case.⁵⁹

These reports apprised Jai Singh of the growing estrangement between the Saiyids and the Emperor at this time. As the negotiations with Ajit Singh were in progress, Hussain Ali halted at Merta. On April 17, news reached the Court that Ajit Singh's twelve year-old son, Abhai Singh, had marched out from Jodhpur, but after

57 Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 5, S. 1771 (March 25, 1714), *J.S.A.* See also Irvine I, pp. 287-88.

58. Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 5, S. 1771 (March 25, 1714), *J.S.A.*

59. *Ibid.*

covering ten miles in the direction of Merta, retreated on learning that Hussain Ali was pressing forward towards Jodhpur. There was also some talk of installing Rao Indra Singh as the ruler of Jodhpur, and to leave the task of pursuing Ajit Singh to him. In early May, Ajit Singh, then reported to be moving towards the north-west in the desert, sent another envoy, Nand Ram, for negotiations with Hussain Ali ⁶⁰

Ajit Singh submits. Fearing that some fresh complications might arise in case he delayed submission, Ajit Singh accepted all the terms put to him. He agreed to send Abhai Singh to Delhi, to send his daughter's *dola* for the Emperor, and promised to attend the Court when summoned. He also agreed to take charge of the government of Thatta. Thus the object for which Ajit Singh had revolted was not realized at all. Ajit Singh avoided meeting Hussain Ali and informed him that he would soon be proceeding to his charge.⁶¹

Saiyids benefit from the campaign. As from the very beginning the Saiyids were opposed to the campaign and, after its conclusion, had continued to express friendly feelings for Aji Singh, these terms, especially the one about the marriage of the Jodhpur princess, did not in any way impair their relations with Ajit Singh. On the other hand, an unbridgeable gulf was created between the Emperor and Ajit Singh.

After the conclusion of peace, Hussain Ali returned to Delhi (July 6). On July 8, Abhai Singh came to the Court. His *mansab* of 1000/1000 was now raised to 3000/2000.⁶² In early August 1714, it was reported to the Emperor that Ajit Singh was on his way to Thatta.⁶³

Confrontation between the Emperor and the Saiyids; Hussain Ali goes to the Deccan. During the next few months, the Emperor's relations with the Saiyids worsened further, bringing to the surface their mutual ill-will, deep distrust, and feelings of acute hostility. The Emperor tried to elevate Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran to positions of strength and equality with Qutb-ul-Mulk and

60. *Akhbarat*, 13, 15 Rabi II, 1126 H. (April 14, 1714), 13 Jamadi I (May 16, 1714).

61. Kamraj, f. 56a; Irvine, I, 290; *Akhbarat*, 27, 29 Jamadi I, 1126 H. (May 30, June 1, 1714), *J.S.A.*

62. *Akhbarat*, 5, 7 Rajab, 1126 H. (July 6, 8, 1714), 4 Shaban (August 4).

63. *Akhbarat*, 2, 11 Shaban (August 2, 11, 1714), *J.S.A.*

Bakshi-ul-Mulk, so that they might be able to deal with the Saiyids, in case they offered resistance. He also tried to render the stay of the Saiyids in office as much embarrassing to them as possible, hoping that they might resign in exasperation and retire to their homes in disgust. Thus by November-December, Mir Jumla, to all intents and purposes, was acting as *Wazir*, and the Saiyids had shut themselves up in their mansion, and had stopped coming to the Court. They were even desirous of being relieved of their ranks and offices.⁶⁴ Had the Emperor at that time boldly led the troops at his command against the ministers, or had he offered the post of *Wazir* to some experienced noble of known courage and wisdom, instead of relying on men like Mir Jumla, he might have achieved his objective. But differences among his confidants, his own indecisiveness, and his tendency to shrink at the last moment when he ought to have leaped forward to grasp the opportunity, assisted the Saiyids to win the war of nerves. As Mir Jumla was regarded the root cause of all the trouble, the Saiyids accepted Asad-ullah's proposal for Mir Jumla's removal from the Court on the condition that one of the two brothers should simultaneously leave the Court. This time also the Emperor gave his assent to Asad-ullah's proposal just as in October 1714 he had agreed to appoint Ajit Singh to the Government of Thatta and Jai Singh to that of Malwa on his recommendation. In September, Hussain Ali's appointment to the Deccan *subah*, in supersession of the Nizam, was announced. The change, the Emperor thought, was likely to bring over the Nizam to his side by antagonizing him with the Saiyids. Moreover, Hussain Ali was likely to get entangled in the Deccan in an attempt to deal with the Marathas, and might well have been ruined in meeting their irresistible pressure. On November 18, the Emperor's mother paid a visit to Qutb-ul-Mulk, and, on her son's behalf, gave solemn assurances of his good feelings. On the 19th Qutb-ul-Mulk had a meeting with the Emperor, and in the beginning of December, Mir Jumla was conducted to Lahor under the charge of mace-bearers. In December 1714, Hussain Ali's audience of leave taking took place, but he delayed his departure till April 1715. He was given power to appoint or remove any official under him, and to transfer the commander of any fort in the Deccan.⁶⁵

64. Irvine, I, 291ff.

65. See Irvine, I, 300-303

Ajit Singh bargains ; secures Government of Gujarat. In May, Shaista Khan, the Emperor's maternal uncle, was sent to Jodhpur to escort Ajit Singh's daughter to Delhi. Ajit Singh is said to have demurred in sending his daughter, and asked for the Governorship of Gujarat, and grant of Maroth, Parbatsar, Bawal, and Kekri *parganas*. The Emperor preferred to accept these demands.⁶⁶ After his recent experience of dealing with the Saiyids with the assistance of Mir Jumla, Muhammad Amin Khan, and others, he was in need of maximum Rajput support. By appointing Ajit Singh to Gujarat, he probably hoped to heal the wounds inflicted upon the latter by the terms of 1714. Also, the Emperor's attention at this time was turned towards the Deccan where Daud Khan, on secret instructions from the Court, was going to fight Amir-ul-Umara Hussain Ali, who had started for the Deccan in April.⁶⁷ In view of these considerations, orders were passed on April 20 appointing Maharaja Ajit Singh to the Government of *subah* Gujarat. A conditional increase of 1000 *sawars* in his rank of 6000/5000, of which 2000 were *du aspa*, was made, and *jagirs* worth two crores twenty lacs *dams* were also granted to him.⁶⁸ Shaista Khan, accompanied by Ajit Singh's daughter, returned from Jodhpur on the 25th Ramzan (1715), after an absence of four months.⁶⁹ In late August, Ajit Singh informed Jai Singh that he would soon be leaving for Gujarat. Jai Singh in his reply, dated September 2, expressed the hope that the Maharaja would write to him in detail on reaching the province.⁷⁰

Maratha inroads in Malwa, 1707-13. Before taking up Sawai Jai Singh's governorship of Malwa, a brief account of the steadily increasing Maratha pressure on this province may be given here. The Maratha advance in Malwa was gradual. During Bahadur Shah's time, an army of about 10,000 Maratha horse under Ganga, formerly in the active service of Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firuz Jang (d. October 1710), crossed the Narmada in January 1711, but retreated on the approach of Sher Afghan, the deputy governor of the province. In March-April, about 30,000 Maratha horse and

66. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 560-61; Irvine, I, 304.

67. Irvine, I, 303.

68. *Akhbarat*, 26 Rabi II, 1127 H. (April 20, 1715).

69. Irvine, I, 304.

70. Jai Singh to Ajit Singh, Bhadrpada Sudi 15, S. 1772 (September 2, 1715), *Jodhpur State Archives*.

40,000 foot under Ganga, Kanhoji Bhosle, and Chimnaji besieged Amjhera, Nolai, and even Ujjain, but retired on the approach of Daud Khan. A few months later (August 1711), a Maratha force again entered Malwa but withdrew on Sher Afghan's approach. These probing raids fully exposed the vulnerability of the Mughal arrangements in the province, and lured the Marathas towards this rich prize. In May 1713, Ganga and Kanhoji again crossed the Narmada and advanced up to Ujjain, but retreated on the approach of the Nizam, then proceeding to the Deccan to take charge of the province.⁷¹ It was in the midst of these persistent efforts of the Marathas to acquire a firm foot-hold in Malwa that Jai Singh took charge of the province.

Jai Singh in Malwa; restores order in the province. Leaving Amber about the middle of October 1713, Jai Singh proceeded towards Ujjain by forced marches. On November 22, the Emperor was informed that he had covered 28 miles on way to his charge.⁷² Shortly afterwards, orders were sent to him to reach Ujjain at the earliest as 30,000 Marathas were reported to have massed on the Narmada. Urgent summons were also sent to Chhatrasal Bundela desiring his presence in Malwa without delay.⁷³ On reaching Ujjain, Jai Singh took vigorous measures to prevent the Marathas from entering the province. He also tried to curb the lawless elements there. During February-March 1714, Diler Khan and Babu Ram Jat, with a force of 15,000 to 20,000 horse, created considerable trouble in Malwa. In March, Inayatullah Khan, at the head of 15,000 free-booters, also caused disturbances in the province. Besides these trouble-makers, Jai Singh had to deal with the Ahirs, who had rendered the Royal highway through Malwa entirely unsafe.⁷⁴ During the coming few months, Jai Singh's hands remained full with these problems. At the same time, he kept a watchful eye on the Marathas who constituted the chief threat to the province. This alertness and activity on his part was duly rewarded. In May 1714, Chhatrasal Bundela was in a position to write to

71. The above account of the early Maratha inroads in Malwa is based on Dr. Raghbir Singh's article, "The Marathas in Malwa (1707-19)", *Sardesai Commemoration Volume*, 1938 (hereafter abbreviated as *S.C.V.*), 61-63.

72. *Akhabrat*, 15 Zul Qada, 1125 H. (November 22, 1713), *J.S.A.*

73. *S.C.V.*, 64.

74. Qutb-ul-Mulk to Jai Singh, *P.L.*, February 8, April 1, 1714; Muhammad Saeed Khan to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, 5-6 March, 1714, *J.S.A.*

Jai Singh, "The Marathas wanted to encamp on this side of the Narmada but now have encamped on the other side on account of our presence. They have had intentions after the rains. When we three with our armies block their way they dare not cross the river. They will be beaten by the good luck of the Emperor. I am watchful and request you also to be equally alert as the Marathas are cunning and fraudulent."⁷⁵

In early March, Jai Singh received a letter from Raja Ratan Chand, the influential *diwan* of Abdullah Khan, urging him to reach the Court.⁷⁶ But in view of the troubled conditions in the province and cooling off of his relations with the Saiyids, he ignored the letter and continued his stay in Malwa.

In April 1715, Jai Singh, accompanied by Rao Budh Singh, Raja Chhatrasal Bundela, and Azam Quli Khan pursued Diler Khan Afghan, and inflicted a crushing defeat upon him near Sironj. Diler Khan escaped leaving 2,000 dead and large quantities of arms and ammunition; casualties on Jai Singh's side were 500 dead.⁷⁷ In the same month he suppressed Mohan Singh Adinat of Barwani, who was in league with the Marathas, and who had earlier successfully defied Prince Bidar Bakh't's attempts to subdue him.⁷⁸

Gains a notable victory against the Marathas. Shortly afterwards, Jai Singh achieved a notable victory against the Marathas. While moving towards Bhilsa after a severe encounter with Sher Afghan, Jai Singh learnt that 30,000 Marathas under Kanhoji Bhosle and Khande Rao Dabhade had crossed into Malwa (April 1-2), and a detachment of 4000 horse had advanced up to Ujjain. Another Maratha force, which had entered Malwa in the first week of April, was reported to have laid waste Barwah, while yet another was reported to be plundering around Dipalpur. Jai Singh at once turned to engage the Marathas, who, on his approach, hastily withdrew southward. This encouraged Jai Singh to pursue them. Accompanied by Budh Singh Hada, Chhatrasal Bundela, Dhiraj Singh Khichi of Bajranggarh and some other officers, he speedily arrived at Pilsud, nineteen miles east of

75. *S.C.V.*, 64.

76. Raja Ratan Chand to Jai Singh, *P.L.*, 5 Rabi II, 1127 H. (February 28, 1715), *J.S.A.*

77. *Akhbarat*, 17, 27 Rabi II, 1127 H. (April 11, 21, 1715) and of 5 Jamadi I, 1127 H. (April 28); *Waqia*, 16 Rabi II; *S.C.V.*, 64.

78. *Waqia*, 14 Rabi II, 1127 H. (April 8, 1715), *J.S.A.*

Maheshwar, two miles north of Narmada, reaching there an hour before sunset, and engaged the Marathas. The battle continued till late after dusk, after which the enemy retreated to Pilsud hill, six miles away, and encamped there for the night. But in the small hours of the morning (May 11), Jai Singh and his troops suddenly arrived and fell upon the Marathas, who fled in panic leaving behind the wounded and the plunder. The Emperor came to know of this victory on June 6 and ordered it to be recorded suitably in the *Waqia* of May 17.⁷⁹

In September 1715, Jai Singh engaged Prithvi Singh of Deolia, who was creating trouble in Sarkar Mandasaur, and had also struck coins in his name. Though Prithvi Singh was defeated, he continued to defy the Imperial authorities.⁸⁰

How Jai Singh's relations with the Saiyids were strained. We have noted that from the very beginning the Saiyids had tried to secure suitable appointments for Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, and were keen to forge friendly ties with them. But it seems that while Jagjiwandas and Shyam Singh were negotiating with the Saiyids for the grant of Malwa for their master, Jai Singh, in view of the growing differences between the Emperor and the Saiyids,⁸¹ also got in touch with the former through Khan-i-Dauran and Asadullah Khan. When Jai Singh received Malwa, he in a way owed the appointment to the Emperor, who, had he so desired, could have posted him at Allahabad, a posting which the Saiyids themselves had recommended for Jai Singh.⁸² At this time, as becomes very clear from the contemporary letters, the Saiyids were not in a position to defy the Emperor in the matter of appointments: the decisions were being taken by the Emperor himself. In fact, the Saiyids were so much dispirited as to contemplate quitting the Court. For these reasons Jai Singh preferred to maintain direct ties with the Emperor without unduly caring for the pleasure or displeasure of the Saiyids. It seems he did not like to play second fiddle to them, a course which to a person of his talents and ambition was unlikely to appeal or gratifying to his self-esteem. By

79. *S.C.V.*, 65-67. See also *Waqia*, 24 Jamadi I (May 17); 14 Jamadi II (June 6).

80. *Akhbarat*, 22 Rajab, 1127 H. (July 23, 1715), 5 Shawwal (September 23, 1715).

81. See *Parties*, 102ff.

82. See page 108.

upbringing and training he belonged to the old school of nobility, who, on finding the sovereign gracious to them, as Mirza Muhammad says, never thought of paying court to any one else.⁸³

From the middle of 1714, Jai Singh's relations with the Saiyids began to cool off, and in a short time virtually broke down. Jai Singh's contemptuous attitude towards Hussain Ali is amply reflected in his letter of January 26, 1715, to Rana Sangram Singh. Jai Singh wrote that Hussain Ali had intentionally chosen to pass via Ajmer on his way to the Deccan, and in case he intended any mischief, they should keep themselves ready to teach him a good lesson.⁸⁴ The feeling was fully reciprocated by the other side. Hussain Ali, when leaving for the Deccan, seems to have secured from the Emperor the permission to take such assistance from Jai Singh as might be deemed necessary for dealing with the Marathas. This was to make Jai Singh serve under him. Though it was not unusual that an officer, while continuing to hold charge of a province, served under another who was in overall control of a campaign, and in the present case it was the *Mir Bakshi* himself who had the supreme charge of the operations, Jai Singh did not like his appointment under Hussain Ali. In July 1715, when Hussain Ali passed through Ujjain on his way to the Deccan, Jai Singh, instead of waiting on him, went away towards Bhilsa to marry the daughter of a Chauhan chief, though the date of marriage had not been fixed earlier.⁸⁵ Hussain Ali strongly remonstrated with the Emperor for Jai Singh's conduct. "If this movement is in accordance with an intimation (from you)", he wrote, "let it be ordered that I return from this place. Otherwise Daud Khan will behave in the same way tomorrow". To this the Emperor replied that regarding Jai Singh, the Amir-ul-Umara (Hussain Ali) had been invested with full powers of appointing or dismissing him (from his army), and there was no likelihood of Daud Khan behaving in a similar manner.⁸⁶ The Emperor knew that the Amir-ul-Umara

83. Irvine, I, 327.

84. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft *kharita*, January 26, 1715, *J.S.A.*

85. *Vamsha*, IV, 3051-52. Among the queens of Sawai Jai Singh, we find mention of "Maharani Shri Chauhanji Nexti". During 1717-28, entries recording the presents given to her exceed those concerning all other queens. She survived her consort by seventeen years, the last entry about her in *D.K.* papers being of 1758 A.D.

86. *M.U.* (trans.), I, 632. *Akhbarat*, 28-Rajab, 1127 H. (July 19, 1715)

would do nothing to Jai Singh which might precipitate a crisis.

Jai Singh summoned to the Court; Emperor meets him graciously.
 In early June 1715, on the Nizam's return from the Deccan, which had been granted to the Amir-ul-Umara, the Emperor recommended with renewed zest his plans for overthrowing the Saiyids. The Nizam, however, could not pull on with Farrukh-siyar's favourites, and was soon out of favour with the Emperor.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, on September 28, the Emperor came to know of Daud Khan's defeat and death at Hussain Ali's hands (August 27).⁸⁸ The news greatly disappointed the Emperor who was optimistic about Daud Khan's success. A few days back he had resolved to recall Jai Singh from Malwa. Jai Singh was about to start for Delhi, but orders arrived from Hussain Ali bidding him not to leave Malwa in view of the Maratha threat to the province. Jai Singh, however, left Malwa in October, and after staying for some time at Ajmer and Amber, reached Delhi towards the end of May 1716.⁸⁹ He had already received Khan-i-Dauran's letter urging him to see the Emperor at the earliest, if possible before Ajit Singh's arrival.⁹⁰ When he reached Serai Khoja Sahil, Najm-ud din Ali Khan, brother of Qutb-ul-Mulk Abdullah Khan, and Raja Ratan Chand came to receive him. Later, Khan-i-Dauran met him at his camp at Idgah (May 28, 1716) and conducted him to Court. This was Jai Singh's first visit to Court since his meeting with Emperor Bahadur Shah on June 11, 1710, during the latter's march to Ajmer. The Emperor met him most graciously, granted an increase of 1000 *sawar* in his rank, and conferred upon him an elephant, a horse, a *khilat*, crest, etc. In September, he was given command of the expedition against Churaman Jat.⁹¹

informs that it was reported to the Emperor from the *Waqia* of Hussain Ali's army that Jai Singh, on hearing of his appointment in the army of Bakshi-ul-Mulk, went away towards Bhilsa.

Daud Khan had been promised the *subahdari* of the Deccan, and had since received secret instructions from the Emperor to oppose Amir-ul-Umara. He failed in his attempt and was defeated and slain in August 1715.

87. Irvine, I, 327-28.

88. *Ibid.*, 303.

89. *S.C.V.*, 68; *Akhbarat*, 3 Rabi II, 1128 H. (March 16, 1716). On March 30, 1716 the Emperor was informed that Jai Singh had started from his State and was coming to Court (*Akhbarat*, 17 Rabi II, March 30, 1716).

90. Khan-i-Dauran to Jai Singh (1716), *J.S.A.*

91. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft *kharita*, Ashadha Sudi 3, S. 1773

Jai Singh secures Bundi back to Budh Singh. Like Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi had also refrained from visiting the Court after the expiry of leave granted to him towards the close of Emperor Bahadur Shah's reign. His two attempts to establish his control over Kotah State having already failed, Bahadur Shah had restored Kotah to Bhim Singh, Maharao Ram Singh's son.⁹² Shortly afterwards, Budh Singh came under the influence of *Kaula-mata*, and night and day began to dissipate his energies in the esoteric practices of this sect.⁹³ Till May 1713, he did not send any presents, or a letter of congratulations to felicitate Farrukh-siyar on his accession,⁹⁴ nor did he care to wait on him to pay homage. On the other hand, Bhim Singh Hada of Kotah reached Delhi on August 28, 1713, and on September 12 was rewarded by the grant of the title of Maharao and transfer of Mau Medana, hitherto held by Bundi, in his favour.⁹⁵ This provoked Budh Singh to attack Kotah. When the Emperor came to know of it (November 22), he sent peremptory orders asking Budh Singh to withdraw his troops from Kotah. When Budh Singh ignored the orders, the Emperor, then in an assertive mood, cancelled Budh Singh's *mansab* (December 12), and granted Bhim Singh permission to annex Bundi.⁹⁶ Probably another reason for the Emperor's drastic action was the charge, repeatedly made by the Raja of Rupnagar, that Ajit Singh and Budh Singh were intending to join hands to create trouble in the Imperial territories. Ajit Singh had actually covered a few stages on his way to Bundi, but returned when Budh Singh did not stir to join him.⁹⁷

After losing his State, Budh Singh went away to Malwa, and, as has been already noted, served under Sawai Jai Singh in the campaigns against Diler Khan (April 1715) and the Marathas. Jai Singh first sought Mewar's intercession to secure Bundi's

(May 28, 1716), *J.S.A.* The third sheet of the letter is missing. Pancholi Biharidas, Mewar's *divan*, was also present on the occasion, and received from the Emperor an elephant, a pearl necklace, and a *siropa*.

92. *Vamsha*, IV, 2998, 3007-3009, 3022-3023; Sharma, *Kotah*, I, 254-57; *Akhbarat*, 27 Muharram.

93. *Vamsha*, IV, 3026ff.

94. *Akhbarat*, 5 Jamadi I, 1125 H. (1713 A.D.).

95. *Akhbarat*, 3 Ramzan, 1125 H. (September 12, 1713); *Kotah Records*, 1713, R.A.

96. *Akhbarat*, December 12, 1713; *Vamsha*, IV, 3040-43.

97. *Vamsha*, IV, 3042.

restoration, but finding Kotah unrelenting, he used his own influence with the Emperor. He represented to the Emperor that Budh Singh did not attend the Court as he was weighed down with grief on account of Emperor Bahadur Shah's death, and assured that the Maharao would be more careful in future.⁹⁸ In private, he might have told the Emperor that Budh Singh, then serving energetically and loyally in Malwa, could be counted upon for any service. As the Emperor was in need of support from all possible quarters in his struggle against the Saiyids, and as Jai Singh was one of his trusted adherents, he agreed to restore Budh Singh to favour. On December 20, 1715, orders restoring Bundi to Budh Singh were issued. The restitution was generally welcomed in Rajputana. The Maharana praised Jai Singh for extricating Budh Singh from a most difficult situation. In May 1716, when Jai Singh came to Court, he arranged Budh Singh's audience with the Emperor. Budh Singh returned to his State after receiving the *sanad* restoring Bundi to him.⁹⁹ In September, he received orders to join Jai Singh's Jat campaign.¹⁰⁰

Sawai Jai Singh's first Jat campaign; Churaman's record. The Jats inhabiting the region to the south of the Yamuna between Agra and Delhi and extending up to the Chambal, had survived the repeated Mughal attempts, made between 1666 and 1707, to crush their growing power. After Aurangzeb's death they emerged stronger than ever. The rise of Churaman, son of Bhajja of Sinsini (8 miles west of Deeg), commenced with the battle of Jajau (June 1707), in which so much plunder fell into his hands that he became a force to be reckoned with in this region. About the middle of August 1707, the Emperor had to send an army of 5000 troops under Shatrasal Rathor against him.¹⁰¹ But shortly afterwards, Churaman came to Court, and on September 15, presented *nazar* and *peslikash* to the Emperor. He was granted a rank of 1500/500.

98. *Vamsha*, IV, 3042-43, 3047-48. 3052-53, 3054; *Sharma, Kotah*, I, 264.

99. Jai Singh to Maharana, Draft *Kharita*, Pausha Sudi 5, S. 1772 (December 19, 1715), *J.S.A.* Jai Singh in his letter of July 1, 1716 to Ajit Singh informed him about the formal restoration of Bundi to Budh Singh. See also *Sharma, Kotah*, I, pp. 265-66 for the restoration of Baran and Mau to Budh Singh through Jai Singh's efforts.

100. *Akhbarat*, 12 Shawwal (September 18, 1716).

101. *Akhbarat*, 25 Jamadi I. 1119 H. (August 13, 1707).

In November 1708, he helped Riza Bahadur against Ajit Singh, the *zamindar* of Kama. In the encounter, Churaman was wounded and Riza Bahadur was killed. For this service he received some awards and his *mansab* was also increased.¹⁰²

During the Rajput rising of 1708-10, Churaman cleverly avoided (October 1708) crossing the path of the Rajputs, and managed to separate himself from Saiyid Hussain Khan, whom he had joined earlier. After the destruction of the Saiyid and his army, he sent a polite message to Jai Singh, asking for any service he might render to him between Agra and Delhi.¹⁰³ On July 24, 1711, he was asked to sign a bond which required that the fortress his brother Rat Ram was building at Thun would be demolished.¹⁰⁴ After the War of Succession at Lahor, he retired to his stronghold of Sinsini. A few months later, in response to Jahandar Shah's pressing summons, he marched to Agra, but instead of helping the Emperor, he fell upon the Imperial baggage at a critical moment of the battle, causing much confusion in the rear of the Emperor's army.¹⁰⁵ Early in Farrukh-siyar's reign Chhabela Ram Nagar, the govern^or of Agra province, made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to curb Churaman's activities.¹⁰⁶ In April 1713, the Emperor was intending to send Khan-i-Dauran against him, but he immediately sought forgiveness.¹⁰⁷ In the third week of September, he came to Delhi accompanied by 2000 horse, and waited upon the Emperor on September 24. On October 20, the title of Rao was conferred upon him, and his rank was also increased.¹⁰⁸ He was appointed to guard the Royal highway between Delhi and the Chambal, but soon incurred displeasure of the government on account of his harsh and arbitrary treatment of the travellers and the *jagirdars* of the region.¹⁰⁹ In October-November, he plundered Bathi and Dulhara villages. In November, it was reported that he had asked the *zamindars* of Sahar *pargana* not to pay their dues to the *jagir*

102. Irvine, I, 322-23.

103. See Ch. V., p. 62.

104. *Akhbarat*, 19 Jamadi II (July 24, 1711).

105. *Akhbarat*, 14 Zul Qada (December 2, 1712); Irvine, I, 234.

106. Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, 50.

107. *Akhbarat*, 13 Rabi II (April 28, 1713); Irvine, I, 323.

108. *Akhbarat*, 11, 15 Ramzan (September 20, 24), 11 Shawwal 1125 H. (October 20, 1713), *J.S.A.*

109. Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, 51.

holders. He was also reported to be realising Rs. 2/- as *nazrana* from all the *mansabdars* and *zamindars* of Thun *pargana*. He further angered the Imperial authorities by opposing Izzat Khan, *faujdar* of Mewat, who had been sent (March 1716) to establish order in the Mewat region. Shortly afterwards he fell upon *mauza* Dulhara, in Fatehpur Sikri, and there was much apprehension that he might plunder Sikri also.¹¹⁰

Jai Singh appointed to lead the campaign; Kachhwaha interest in the Jat lands. For these many reasons it became necessary to put an end to the growing menace of Churaman. The Kachhwahas had been averse to the growth of the turbulent Jat power in their neighbourhood. Nor were they disinterested in the Jat lands. We have noted that Jai Singh's father, Bishan Singh, had strenuously fought against the Jats during 1689-98, and had received in *jagir* extensive areas held by them. For the Kachhwahas it was the only direction in which they could hope to secure *parganas*, which being almost contiguous to their own State could, in course of time, permit them to lay claim over them on the plea that these had always been granted to them by the Imperial government. If the Jats were defeated, Jai Singh could have hoped to secure some of the *parganas* in this region. For these reasons the Kachhwahas were expected to strive more sincerely than others in suppressing the Jats. As Jai Singh had given a good account of himself in Malwa, and enjoyed the trust of the Emperor, he was given charge (September 1716) of the campaign against Churaman. The Emperor did not consult Saiyid Abdullah Khan when he entrusted the command of the campaign to Jai Singh, thereby causing much umbrage to the Nawab.¹¹¹

After completing the necessary preparations, Jai Singh set out for Mathura on September 15, 1716. He had received forty lakhs of Rupees as expenses for the campaign. Among the important officers appointed under him were Maharao Budh Singh, Maharao Bhim Singh of Kotah, Raja Gaj Singh of Narwar, Bijai Singh Kachhwaha (Jai Singh's brother), Rao Indra Singh, Bayazid Khan Mewati, and Rao Durgadas Rathor. Towards the end of September he reached Palwal, and in the last week of October,

110. *Akhbarat*, 28 Shawwal 1127 H. (October 16, 1715), 16 Zul Qada (November 2, 1715), 3 and 16 Rabi II, 1128 H. (March 16 and 29, 1716), 28 Shawwal (October 4, 1716).

111. Irvine, I, 327; *Parties*. 124.

arrived within 20 miles of Deeg. As Maharao Budh Singh and Durgadas Rathor had not yet joined him, urgent orders were sent to them to join the campaign without the least delay.¹¹² Though Maharao Budh Singh arrived a few weeks later, Durgadas did not come, probably on account of ill health, and sent his son who is mentioned¹¹³ in the despatch of June 4, 1717.

Jats resist Jai Singh's march to Thun. When Jai Singh approached Radha Kund, Badan Singh, Churaman's nephew, issued out of Kama (14 miles north of Deeg) with 2,000 horse, and charged the advance troops of Jai Singh's army under Bayazid Khan, but retreated on the arrival of the main army. Bayazid Khan was wounded in the encounter. Jai Singh reached Kaman on October 14, and made it the base of his future operations. From Kaman, Thun and Deeg were reported to be 12 *kos* and 7 *kos* away.¹¹⁴ During the remaining days of October, Jai Singh, escorted by Maharao Bhim Singh, Raja Gaj Singh, Rao Indra Singh, Avadhut Singh of Khandela, Deep Singh of Kasli, and some other officers, often went out of Kama to supervise the preparations for besieging Thun, where Churaman had taken up position.¹¹⁵ In the beginning of November, when Jai Singh's army arrived near Thun, Rupa, Churaman's nephew, attacked it with 2,000 troops, but he was wounded and his brother, Anai Ram, was killed. During this time

112. Shivdas, ff. 11b-12a; *Akhbarat*, 14 and 21 Shawwal (September 20, 27, 1716). For *gurzdars* sent to Budh Singh and Durgadas, *Akhbarat*, 27 Zul Qada 1128 H. (November 1, 1716). Bayazid Khan Mewati came with 500 horse. He joined Jai Singh in late October (*Akhbarat*, 17 Zul Qada, 1128). *Waqia*, 12 Shawwal (October 18) for summons to Budh Singh and Durgadas. See also Irvine, I, 324. In his letter of Kartik Vadi (n.d.), S. 1773 (September 21-October 4, 1716) Jai Singh informed Ajit Singh that as per the Emperor's orders, he was proceeding to Mathura against the Jats, and was encamped at Palwal, and had discussed at length the various matters with Khivsi Bhandari, who would write to him in detail (*Jodhpur S.A.*).

113. *Akhbarat*, 5 Rajab. 1129 H. (June 4, 1717).

114. *Akhbarat*, 11, 13, Zul Qada (October 16, 18, 1716), 15 Zul Qada, 1128 H. (October 20), 22 Zul Qada (October 27, 1716). On Jai Singh's approach Churaman's son, Muhkam Singh, withdrew from Bahrer fort, reported to be 20 *kos* from Khori. Jai Singh had reached *mauza* Sankarsi on 3 Zul Qada (October 8), then reached Mahrana. He had 10,000 horse, 5000 foot, besides his personal troops. Churaman was reported to be entrenched with 7000 horse. (*Akhbarat*, 11 and 15 Zul Qada, October 16, 20, 1716).

115. Thus see, *Akhbarat*, 14 Zul Qada (October 19, 1716).

several Jat villages had been burnt down by the Imperial troops.¹¹⁶

Thun besieged. On November 9, Jai Singh commenced the siege of Thun. During the next few weeks, a number of small fortresses were built, trenches were dug, and covered pathways and towers for mounting the guns were erected. The progress of the work was greatly hampered by the heavy and accurate firing and the audacious sallies of the Jats. Also, Churaman was receiving all help from the neighbouring *zamindars* and the peasantry, and had employed Mewatis, and also the Afghans of Shahjahanpur and Bareilly, paying each mercenary three rupees a day. The Jats, taking advantage of the dense jungle all around the fort and of their familiarity with the region, frequently ambushed the supply caravans and the foraging parties of the besiegers.¹¹⁷ At this moment of supreme crisis, they displayed the same skill and fierce obstinacy in defending their fort which later on baffled Holkar (1754 A.D.) and Lord Lake (1804 A.D.).

In early December, Jai Singh's troops captured Bhusawar fort, which was defended by Avat Ram, Churaman's brother. Churaman and Roopa tried to recover it but withdrew when the reinforcements sent by Jai Singh arrived.¹¹⁸

Jai Singh's difficulties. Despite Jai Singh's best efforts, the progress of the siege was slow, at which the Emperor expressed concern in his *farman* of March 1717. In May-June 1717, before the rains were likely to set in, Jai Singh procured from Delhi 84 guns, 52 carts laden with gun-powder, lead and iron balls, and additional supplies from his own State.¹¹⁹ But, save some freak showers in May, the rains totally failed that year, causing five-fold increase in the prices of foodgrains. The entire eastern Rajputana was in grip of a severe drought, and, in the countryside, about a hundred men were dying of hunger everyday. So terrible was the famine that many people sold their wives and children for petty sums or nothing to save their lives. But Jai Singh had to feed his army

116. *Akhbarat*, 5, 17 Zul Hijja, 1128 H. (November 9, 21, 1716).

117. *Waqi.*, 20, 29 Rajab, 1129 H. (June 19, 28, 1717); Shivdas, f. 13b; *Parties*, 124. In the *Akhbarat* of May-June 1717, there is frequent mention of the Jat sallies on the redoubts and the *damdamas* of Jai Singh's troops, and of hard fighting, but each time they were forced to withdraw. See also Irvine, I, 325; Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, 52.

118. *Akhbarat*, 5-6, and 9 Muharram (December 9-10, 13, 1717).

119. *Waqia*, 7 Jamadi II, 1129 H. (May 8, 1717), 10 Rajab (June 9, 1717), *J.S.A.*

anyhow. He procured supplies from Amber, and fodder from the western region. The Emperor even advised him to write to Bihari-das Pancholi to arrange supplies from Mewar.¹²⁰ Jai Singh also wrote to the chief of Karauli to arrange regular supplies for the the army through the *banjaras*.¹²¹

Jai Singh turns down Emperor's suggestion. During the past few months, Jai Singh had been repeatedly advised by Court to capture or murder Churaman by employing some stratagem, but his unchanging reply to these shady suggestions was that the fall of Thun fort was imminent and the problem would be resolved without taking recourse to such methods.¹²²

Jai Singh replaced in Malwa by Muhammad Amin Khan; Emperor's assurance and explanation. In November 1717, the governorship of Malwa was taken away from Jai Singh in contra-vention of the Emperor's earlier assurance to him, and Muhammad Amin Khan was appointed in his place. A few months earlier, in August, the Emperor had written to him that he was intending to appoint an officer as his (Jai Singh's) deputy in view of the great destruction wrought by the Marathas in the province. He had assured him to recall the officer after the task was finished.¹²³ But it seems on account of the prolongation of the Jat campaign, and as a senior noble like Muhammad Amin Khan was not likely to go to Malwa without being given an independent charge, the Emperor decided to send the latter as a full-fledged governor of Malwa.

Emperor's object in appointing Muhammad Amin Khan. It is a fact that during the past few months the Maratha activity in Malwa had acquired alarming proportions. Taking advantage of Jai Singh's absence, the Marathas had stepped up the intensity as well as the range of their incursions in the province. Besides plundering Depalpur, Maheshwar, Dharampuri and some other towns, a Maratha force had penetrated up to 10-12 miles from Ujjain. It however retreated on finding Rup Ram Dabhai, Jai Singh's deputy, ready to meet them (March-April 1716). On

120. Shivdas, f. 13b; Irvine, I, 326; Emperor's *farman* to Jai Singh, October, 1717.

121. Raja Kumvarpal of Karauli to Jai Singh, Agahan Vadi 7, S. 1774 (November 14, 1717), *J.S.A.*

122. Kapatdwara documents, Nos. 48, 117, 193 in *O.H. Records, J.S.A.*

123. See *Parties*, 133 and n. 57.

account of increased Maratha activity, and in view of the report that 40,000 Marathas were likely to attack Ujjain after the Dashera, Jai Singh was asked to send reinforcements to his deputy. Orders were also sent to the Maharana and Chhatrasal Bundela to assist Rup Ram. But, before any help could reach him, a large Maratha force routed and captured Rup Ram and virtually destroyed the army of the *subah* (April 1717).¹²⁴ A few months later Muhammad Amin Khan was made the new governor of the province.

Amin Khan's appointment to the Government of Malwa was, however, an unfortunate decision at this juncture. While Jai Singh's removal from the *subahdari* of Malwa adversely affected his resources and position at a time when he was engrossed in a difficult siege, Muhammad Amin Khan totally failed to accomplish the assigned tasks. He could neither check the Maratha pressure on the province, nor Hussain Ali's dreaded return to Delhi. When in December 1718, Hussain Ali set out from Burhanpur and crossed the Narmada, Muhammad Amin Khan made no effort to bar his path, but precipitately withdrew to the capital without even obtaining permission of the Emperor. He was severely censured by the Emperor who even deprived him of his *jagir* and rank, but restored the same on the intercession of Qutb-ul-Mulk Abdullah Khan.¹²⁵

Jai Singh's charge against the Saiyids ; Abdullah Khan pleads for peace; his arguments; terms. In January 1718, Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor that Churaman, despite his being reduced to hard straits, was not inclined to yield, as he was receiving support from the Court. Indeed, Churaman had offered a present of twenty lakhs of Rupees to Saiyid Abdullah Khan and a *peshkash* of thirty lakhs of Rupees to the Government, in case the campaign was called off. Abdullah Khan saw in the offer an opportunity to bring discredit to Jai Singh, and to win over the Jats to his side. He, therefore, represented to the Emperor that when Churaman was willing to submit and to attend the Court with his sons and nephews, there was no point in continuing the siege which had already dragged on for about twenty months and had cost the exchequer a good deal of money.¹²⁶ To the conditions on which Churaman's submission was to be accepted, the Emperor now added

124. Rup Ram to Jai Singh, March 8, 1718, *J.S.A.*; *S.C.V.*, 69-71.

125. *S.C.V.*, 69-71. See also Irvine, I, 366-67.

126. Shivdas, f. 14b; K.K., II, 777; Irvine, I, 326-27.

two more: the dismantling of the fortifications of Thun, Deeg and other forts, which were not to be rebuilt in future, and service by Churaman and his sons and nephews, in *subah* Agra.¹²⁷ To Farrukh-siyar it must have appeared right to call off the campaign on these terms which fulfilled the main objective with which it was undertaken. Also, his relations with the Saiyids at this time were extremely strained and it was inadvisable to keep Jai Singh and a number of loyal officers locked up in the obstinate siege any further. He, therefore, sent orders to Khan-i-Jahan, the maternal uncle of the Saiyids, who had joined the campaign in June 1717, to bring Churaman, his sons, and nephews to Court, and sent a *farman* to Jai Singh praising his services and informing him that Churaman's overtures had been accepted, and desiring him to return to Delhi. He was also advised to confer a *khilat* upon Churaman who had been told to wait upon him. As Jai Singh was sanguine about the early fall of Thun, and had striven hard for it, he raised the siege most reluctantly, deeply resenting the dubious role of Qutb-ul-Mulk.¹²⁸ His relations with the Saiyids were now worse than ever.

Emperor receives Churaman ungraciously. On March 31, Khan-i-Jahan, accompanied by Churaman and his nephew, Rupa, arrived in Delhi. Churaman did not seek the audience directly, but first visited Abdullah Khan, causing great vexation to the Emperor. Nine days later when he was formally produced in Court, the Emperor met him coolly and refused to see him a second time.¹²⁹ On April 20, it was settled through Qutb-ul-Mulk that Churaman would pay, in suitable instalments, fifty lakhs of Rupees in cash and goods.

Jai Singh honoured; his relations with the Emperor not impaired. Jai Singh reached Delhi on May 16 and was graciously received by the Emperor. On May 21, *Mahi Maratib* (the Fish Standard) was conferred upon him. On June 23, he had a private meeting with the Emperor. The same day Saiyid Abdullah Khan came to see him and presented him a dagger.¹³⁰ But such meetings and the

127. Emperor's *farman*, March 1718, *J.S.A.*

128. Emperor's *farman*, *Kapatdwara*, No. 185; Shivdas, f. 15a; Irvine, I, 326.

129. Irvine, I, 327.

130. *D.K.*, Vol. 18; Maharana to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 11, S. 1774 (June 27, 1718). The Maharana also sent to Jai Singh a copy of the letter he had

formalities accompanying them did not in any way bridge the gulf between the two, nor did the attempts of the Emperor and of the Saiyids to secure a position of advantage over the other slowed down in any way.

Sarbuland Khan and the Nizam disappoint the Emperor; Abdullah Khan obliges Sarbuland Khan, Nizam and Muhammad Amin Khan. In early July 1718, when Sarbuland Khan arrived in the Court, he was asked by the Emperor to take lead in the attempts to overthrow the Saiyids. But he slackened his efforts when he learnt that the office of *Wazir*, after Abdullah Khan's fall, would go to Muhammad Murad, the Emperor's favourite. He was also cowed down by Abdullah Khan's assertion that he and his brother meant the contest to be one for life and death.¹³¹ The Emperor then called the Nizam, who had a general dislike for the Saiyids, and bore a fresh grievance against them for depriving him of the Government of the Deccan *subah*. The Nizam came from Muradabad in the middle of September 1718, but soon realized that there was little chance of removing the Saiyids on account of the Emperor's indecisiveness and pusillanimity. He, therefore, did not put his heart in the matter. As days passed, the Emperor became tired of the Nizam's procrastinatory talks, and, in anger, deprived him of the charge of Muradabad, which was enlarged into a *subah* and was conferred upon the Emperor's favourite, Muhammad Murad. Abdullah Khan won over Sarbuland Khan as well as the Nizam by promising to secure for them the provinces of Kabul and Malwa, respectively.¹³² A little later Qutb-ul Mulk won over to his side Muhammad Amin Khan also, whom the Emperor had dismissed in January 1719 for his refusal to return to Malwa, by having him restored. A few weeks later when the crisis reached its climax, Muhammad Amin Khan, who subsequently took a prominent part in Hussain Aji's assassination, strongly advocated Farrukh-siyar's deposition.¹³³ Like most other nobles, Amin Khan also played safe and false.

Jiziya reimposed; Emperor's explanation to Mewar. In April 1717, Farrukh-siyar reimposed the *jiziya* which he had abolished

received from Ajit Singh, and informed that the Maharaja would be reaching Delhi soon.

131. Irvine, I, 345-47.

132. Irvine, I, 351-52; *Parties*, 134-37.

133. Irvine, I, 366-67, 387.

in January 1713. This retrogressive step was taken at the instance of Inayatullah Khan who had returned from Macca in January, and was appointed the *Diwan* of the *Khalisa* and *Tan*. He had brought a letter from the Sharif of Macca stating that the levying of the *jizya* was obligatory for a Muslim ruler. Farrukh-siyar accepted the plea and reimposed the tax. He was however conscious of the political advantages and also the perils of his action, which, on the one hand, was likely to muster orthodox Muslim opinion in his favour and expose more prominently the soft approach of the Saiyids towards the Hindus, and on the other hand, could deprive him of the affections of the Hindu nobles. He, therefore, took pains to convince the Maharana, Jai Singh, and other influential Hindu nobles that he was reintroducing the tax under the compelling demands of the *Shara*, and that it should in no way affect their present good relations. He explained to the Maharana that he had earlier abolished the *jizya* without any reservation "for the betterment of the subjects", but now he was reversing the decision to fulfil a religious formality.¹³⁴ Apparently, it was no secret that political considerations were the prime cause of the measure, which was never seriously implemented by the Emperor, for we hear no murmur condemning the reimposition of this vexatious tax, nor were the Emperor's cordial ties with Mewar and Amber strained or impaired as a result of this step.

Ajit Singh removed from the Government of Gujarat; Emperor's letter to Jai Singh. In May-June 1717, the Emperor removed Maharaja Ajit Singh from the Government of Gujarat and appointed in his place Khan-i-Dauran. Though Ajit Singh's oppressive rule in the province was given out as the cause of his removal,¹³⁵ probably another reason was the need to seal off Hussain Ali's path to Hindustan. As noted earlier, it was one of the reasons for appointing Muhammad Amin Khan to Malwa in November 1717. By this time it was abundantly clear as to where Ajit Singh's sympathies lay, and it was inadvisable to allow the rich and strategically important Gujarat to remain in his hands.

Ajit Singh at Court. But in August 1718, when Ajit Singh arrived in Delhi, the Emperor did try, as was only natural, to win

134. See Irvine, I, 259, 333-34. Farrukh-siyar's *farman* to Maharana (*Vir Vinod*, II, pp. 954-55).

135. Emperor to Jai Singh, May 5, 1717, *J.S.A.*

him over to his side. He sent Itiqad Khan to induce Ajit Singh to seek the audience directly, but the latter made no secret of his close ties with the Qutb-ul-Mulk and the trust he reposed in him.¹³⁶ Yet, when he came to the Court on August 21, Farrukh-siyar received him graciously, and conferred upon him the Fish Standard, the title of Raj Rajeshwar, the privilege to sit in the Privy Chamber, and the Government of Gujarat.¹³⁷ But neither the graciousness of the Emperor, nor his favours, could wean Ajit Singh away from the side of the Saiyids. It was only after he had been tested and found to be irrevocably attached to the Saiyids that Nizam-ul-Mulk was summoned; but, as already noted, he did not think it prudent or advantageous to his interests to support the weak plans of the Emperor for displacing the Saiyids.

Abdullah Khan calls his brother from the Deccan. Meanwhile, in contravention of his understanding with the Saiyids, the Emperor had recalled Mir Jumla from Lahor. Abdullah Khan strongly remonstrated with him for this breach of promise, upon which fresh orders were sent to Mir Jumla forbidding his visit to the Court. But Mir Jumla, ignoring these instructions, arrived in Delhi on 5 Zul Qada (19th September). The same day Qutb-ul-Mulk sent a letter to Hussain Ali asking him to return from the Deccan without delay in view of the Emperor's persistent efforts directed against them. In the letter he also recounted Jai Singh's campaign against Churaman, the quarrel arising from its termination, his fear of assassination, and the measures taken by him to raise more troops.¹³⁸

Hussain Ali sets out with the Maratha allies; reasons given by

136. See Irvine, I, 348-49.

137. Maharana to Ajit Singh, Margashirsha Sudi 10, S. 1775 (November 21, 1718), *Jodhpur S.A.*; Ishwar Singh, Tej Singh (from Jaisalmer) to Ajit Singh, Chaitra Vadi 5, S. 1775 (February 27, 1719), *Jodhpur S.A.*; Irvine's statement (I, 351) that the Emperor conferred upon Ajit Singh the State of Bikaner also, does not seem to be correct. It is neither mentioned in the Maharana's letter, nor in that of Ishwar Singh's. The letters from Jaisalmer addressed to Ajit Singh and Abhai Singh indicate that Jaisalmer was not entirely ignorant of or disinterested in what was happening at Delhi. In a letter of Asoj Vadi 14, S. 1775, Maharawal Budh Singh asks Ajit to send news about his meeting with the Emperor. In a letter of Chaitra Vadi 5, S. 1775, Sardar Singh of Jaisalmer requests Ajit Singh to take care of Rawalji's interests at the Court (Letters in *Jodhpur S.A.*).

138. See Irvine, I, 352-53.

him; the terms of treaty with the Marathas. In response to his brother's call, Hussain Ali started from Aurangabad in early October 1718. Besides 8000-9000 of his own troops, Balaji Vishwanath, the Peshwa, at the head of 11,000-12,000 Maratha horse, was also accompanying Hussain Ali to secure the ratification of the treaty which the latter had recently concluded with the Marathas, but which the Emperor had declined to ratify.¹³⁹ The treaty gave the Marathas the right to collect the *chauth* or one-fourth share in the revenue of the Deccan, *sardeshmukhi* or ten per cent of the collections, and provided for the confirmation of the hereditary Maratha territory or *Swarajya*, as well as the recent Maratha acquisitions in Khandesh, Berar, Gondwana, Haidarabad and Karnatak. In return, a contingent of 15,000 Maratha troops was to remain at the Viceroy's disposal, and in lieu of *sardeshmukhi* the Marathas bound themselves to preserve peace and order in the province. Also, Raja Shahu agreed to pay ten lakhs of Rupees as annual tribute, and promised not to act against Shambhaji of Kolhapur. It was also agreed that Shahu's mother, wife and brother, who were in the Mughal custody since 1689, would be released.¹⁴⁰ Another reason given out by Hussain Ali for undertaking this unauthorised journey was that he was escorting late Prince Akbar's son to the Court, and he could trust none with the custody of the Prince.¹⁴¹

Ignores Emperor's orders to return. Farrukh-siyar was much alarmed at the prospects of Hussain Ali's arrival in Delhi, accompanied by nearly 35,000 troops and artillery, evidently to cow him down and to put an end to all opposition to the Saiyids once and for all. He, therefore, sent a *farman* with Ikhlas Khan, advising the Amir-ul-Umara to return to the Deccan, as the conditions prevailing there did not permit his absence from his charge, and assuring to grant Raja Shahu's requests in whatever manner the Amir-ul-Umara chose to place them before the throne. Hussain Ali ignored these instructions and continued his march

139. Irvine, pp. 357-59; Duff, I, 369-69.

140. Irvine, I, 357-60; Dr. A. G. Pawar, 'Some Documents Bearing on Imperial Mughal Grants to Raja Shahu (1717-24)', *PIHRC, Vol. XVII* (1941) 205-208; Duff, I, 368-69; K.K., 784-85; Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 41. For a severe criticism of the treaty, see *M.U.* (trans.), I, 633.

141. Irvine, I, 361.

towards the capital.¹⁴²

Emperor tries to propitiate Abdullah Khan; Abdullah Khan visits Jai Singh. Meanwhile, in Delhi, the Emperor tried to propitiate Abdullah Khan by paying him a visit (December 1718), and by acquiescing in certain appointments desired by him.¹⁴³ The Emperor also tried to reconcile Jai Singh and Abdullah Khan, and persuaded the former to visit Qutb-ul-Mulk. On December 30, Jai Singh visited Abdullah Khan, who received him with all due courtesy and offered him suitable presents.¹⁴⁴ On January 4, Abdullah Khan returned the visit. Accompanied by Raja Ratan Chand, his *diwan*, he again came to Jai Singh's camp on the 11th January.¹⁴⁵ A few days before, on the 6th, Jai Singh had held a colourful reception in the Emperor's honour, when a reservoir was filled with rose water and saffron, and trees were adorned with imported fruits. To his already rich titles were now added 'Rajadhiraj' and 'Rajendra'.¹⁴⁶ But all the efforts of the Emperor to harmonize Jai Singh's relations with the Saiyids could merely paper the cracks. The position of the Saiyids by this time had become so strong that they were not inclined to temporize with their enemies, and desired to settle scores with them finally.

Hussain Ali arrives; the Saiyids manipulate Jai Singh's departure. On February 6, 1719, Saiyid Hussain Ali arrived in the vicinity of Delhi. While passing through the territory under Sawai Jai Singh, his troops plundered the villages, sparing neither the standing crop, nor even women and children.¹⁴⁷ Shortly after Hussain Ali's arrival, Abdullah Khan told the Emperor that his brother objected to Jai Singh's presence in the capital as he feared that his soldiers and the Marathas might clash with Jai Singh's troops, 20,000 in number, and requested the Emperor to order the Rajadhiraj to return to his country forthwith.¹⁴⁸ Through Balaji,

142. Irvine, I, 360-61.

143. *Ibid.*, 362-64.

144. *Ibid.*, I, 365.

145. *D.K.*, Vol. 18, p. 427. Ratan Chand, Abdullah Khan's *diwan*, was also given a number of presents including a crest (Rs. 1339, 1 *taka*), a dagger (worth Rs. 1764 and 2 *takas*), and two horses.

146. Irvine, I, 365.

147. *Ibid.*, 373, 369; *Seir*, I, 126-27.

148. Shivdas, f. 23. According to *Seir* (I, 138), the message reads: "Should Your Majesty vouchsafe to dismiss Jai Singh, that known enemy of our family...."

Hussain Ali conveyed his advice to Jai Singh to leave Delhi and return to his State. Jai Singh gave Balaji some assurances of a friendly nature, and informed the Emperor about Hussain Ali's message.¹⁴⁹ He was unwilling to leave the scene, now set for some decisive developments, but the Emperor was anxious to avoid a crisis. He was facing the dismal spectre of confronting 35,000 troops under Hussain Ali just outside Delhi, and nearly 20,000 troops under Qutb-ul-Mulk inside the capital, with most of the nobles like Muhammad Amin Khan, the Nizam, even Mir Jumla, not to talk of Ajit Singh, Bhim Singh, Churaman and many others, either openly on the side of the Saiyids, or ready to join them on the slightest setback to the Emperor's position. He, therefore, sent a personal note to Jai Singh, bidding him to depart early next morning for Amber, without waiting for a formal leave taking.¹⁵⁰ It proved a fatal decision.

Jai Singh keen to stay with the Emperor; his sound advice goes unheeded. On receiving the note, Jai Singh tried to avert its execution. He conveyed to the Emperor that the Saiyids had no desire to settle the issue peacefully. "They want that I should be separated from Your Majesty. Your Majesty's interest and welfare lie in coming out of the fort and pitching the Royal tents outside. I am with your Majesty and assure you that none can dare touch your august person". He was sanguine about the performance of his own 20,000 tried and trusted troops, and promised to fight to the last.¹⁵¹ He urged the Emperor to place himself at the head of his household troops and to fall upon the Saiyid brothers. "The moment Your Majesty's troops and friends perceive that you are acting openly and with vigour, they would flock to you from all parts, and will put it in your power to punish your enemies. I am even inclined to believe that at such a sight, numbers that seem to follow the standard of the two brothers will quit it and return to their lawful master, and will be assisting in crushing them to atom,

149. Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi (Phalguna Sudi 9-10, February 17-18) S. 1775 (1719 A.D.) in Tod, I, 323 n. 1; G. Duff, I, 398, also says that Jai Singh met Balaji Vishwanath. The date of the letter cannot be Phalguna Sudi 19, 1775 given by Tod (I, 323 n. 1). Jai Singh mentions in his letter that the Emperor had made over bath and wardrobe to the Saiyids. This took place on February 17. Jai Singh wrote the letter soon after this.

150. Shivdas, f. 23b.

151. Shivdas, f. 23b; *Seir*, p. 128; K.K., II, 805.

so that these falling at once from the height of their hopes shall be obliged to submit".¹⁵² But the Emperor shrank back from this course which alone could have saved him from the doom he met a few days later, and the orders for Jai Singh's departure were not withdrawn.

Jai Singh moves out to Sarai Sahil; Budh Singh escapes and joins him. On February 13, Jai Singh moved out of the capital, but instead of retiring to Amber, he pitched his tents in a nearby *sarai* to watch the developments from close quarters. Before leaving Delhi, he advised Rao Raja Budh Singh of Bundi to accompany him, but, as Jai Singh wrote in a letter to Mewar, "It did not reach his (Budh Singh's) mind, and he joined Qutb-ul-Mulk, who gave him some horse and made him encamp with Ajit Singh". Shortly afterwards, the troops of Maharao Bhim Singh suddenly attacked him and Jai Singh had to send some of his own troops to his rescue. Budh Singh and part of his troops managed to come out and join Jai Singh at Sarai Allahwardi Khan, about sixteen miles southwest of Delhi.¹⁵³

Hussain Ali meets the Emperor; demands of the Saiyids accepted. The next day (4th Rabi II) Hussain Ali had his first meeting with the Emperor. Early in the morning, Qutb-ul-Mulk and Ajit Singh removed the Imperial guards from the palace, replacing them by their own men. Starting at three hours after sunrise, with the Maratha forces marching in front, "their lances and spears reminding the spectator of a waving reed-bed or cane-brake", Hussain Ali reached the palace at about three O'clock. At the time of meeting, the Emperor was alone, the few remaining servants having been turned out. The Emperor disowned the authorship of the *farnian* to Daud Khan, which Hussain Ali had found among the confiscated goods of that noble after his death, and which he now showed to the Emperor. Hussain Ali next demanded that Itiqad Khan and several others should be excluded from the Court, and all offices round the Emperor's person should be made over permanently to the Saiyids and their nominees. The Emperor

152. *Scir*, I, 128.

153. Sawai Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi, Phalgun Sudi 9-10, February 17-18, S. 1775 quoted by Tod (I, 323). For the attack by Kotah troops see also *Vamsha*, IV, 3065-67; according to K.K., p. 806, the attack was made on 3 Rabi II (February 12).

accepted all these demands.¹⁵¹ When the meeting ended at about 10 p.m., it appeared that the storm had blown over.

Saiyids occupy Court buildings; Qutb-ul-Mulk's stormy meeting with the Emperor. On the 8th Rabi II, Qutb-ul-Mulk sought another interview with the Emperor to enable his brother to deliver the captive prince, son of late Prince Akbar. Early in the morning Qutb-ul-Mulk, Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, Maharaja Ajit Singh, Maharao Bhim Singh, Raja Gaj Singh and others entered the palace and occupied the *Diwan-i-Anam* and the rooms of *Khan-i-Saman's* department, and sent for the keys of the *Diwan-i-Khass*, the sleeping chamber, the Hall of Justice, etc. They also posted their own men at the gates of the palace and the fort. At about midday, Hussain Ali entered the city at the head of 30,000 or 40,000 horsemen and artillery, with the supposed Prince seated on an elephant, and the heralds running before him proclaiming his titles. The Maratha horsemen drew up at the gate of the palace and in the adjoining lanes. Inside the palace, shortly after midday, Qutb-ul-Mulk had a stormy meeting with the Emperor. He rejected the Emperor's proposal that Itiqad Khan and other men of the Emperor would act as their deputies or of their nominees, and charged the Emperor with ingratitude, and with secretly plotting against their lives. During the course of arguments, both used harsh and abusive language. The disgraceful scene ended with the Qutb-ul-Mulk walking out of the *Diwan-i-Khass*, venting his wrath upon the Emperor in the most profane terms.¹⁵⁵

The point of no return reached. The Emperor now poured his anger on Itiqad Khan, blaming him for precipitating the crisis, and ordered him to be turned out of the Court. After he was gone, his limbs trembling from fright, an official of the Court announced that all the demands of the Saiyids had been accepted, including demotion of Itiqad Khan to the rank he had held during Alamgir's reign. The news spread consternation in the city. Soon after Abdullah Khan's departure, the Emperor withdrew to the inner apartments.¹⁵⁶

Farrukh-siyar's last bid for life. During the night, destined to be the last of his reign, Farrukh-siyar is said to have sent a note

154. See Irvine, I, 376-77.

155. Irvine, I, 378-81.

156. *Ibid.*, 381-82.

under his own signature to Ajit Singh, who was occupying the *Diwan-i-Amm* with 4,000 Rajputs, urging him to put some of his men on the eastern wing of the fort touching the Yamuna, so that he might make off in boats from that side. But Ajit Singh expressed his inability to help him. He is also believed to have sent the note to the Saiyids, who posted Churaman on that side.¹⁵⁷

Farrukh-siyar deposed. On the morning of 9 Rabi' II (February 18, 1719), a serious disturbance suddenly broke out outside the fort, resulting in the loss of 1000-1500 Maratha lives. Alarmed at the popular outburst of indignation against their allies, and pressed by Muhammad Amin Khan, Maharaja Ajit Singh, and Saiyid Hussain Ali, Qutb-ul-Mulk agreed to depose the Emperor forthwith. He sent for Rafi-ud-darjat, son of late Prince Rafi-ush-shan, from the prison, and at a bizarre ceremony, placed him on the throne.¹⁵⁸ Thereafter, the deposed Emperor was dragged out from the female apartments with every mark of abuse and insult, and was dropped down upon the floor of the *Diwan-i-Khass*, to be blinded at Abdullah Khan's command.¹⁵⁹ He passed the remaining days of his blighted life in a tiny cell over the Triple Gate within the fort, and was strangled to death on April 17-18.¹⁶⁰

Unpopularity of the Saiyids; Jai Singh's honourable conduct. Whatever were the sins of the Emperor, the heartless treatment that was meted out to him after his deposition deeply outraged the feelings of his subjects, and excited in their breasts unbounded sympathy for him, while provoking feelings of contempt for his tormentors. The conduct of the Saiyids and Maharaja Ajit Singh, no doubt, brought them infamy, and lowered them in the estimation of the people.¹⁶¹ Most of the other nobles at the Court, such as Muhammad Amin Khan, the Nizam, and others also emerged out of this affair with tarnished image. Their behaviour, tainted by dissimulation or cowardice, stood in sharp contrast to that of Jai Singh, whose conduct throughout the struggle had been correct

157. Shivdas, f. 25.

158. Shivdas, f. 26a; *Seir*, 134-35; Irvine, I, 383-84, 387-90.

159. *Seir*, 135; Yahya, f. 125b; K.K., 814-16; Irvine, I, 389-90.

160. Ajit Singh to Dayaldas, *parwanah*, May 4, 1719, in Reu, *Glories of Marwar*, 116; Irvine, I, 392.

161. Thus Yahya says (f. 126b) that everybody called the Saiyids 'faithless'. See also K.K., 820, *Pamsha*, 3064-65, 3082 and Irvine, I, 394-95 for the unpopularity of the Saiyids.

and dignified. For this reason, his prestige now stood higher than ever before. The esteem in which he was held by Emperor Muhammad Shah, and the trust which that Emperor reposed in him were, to some extent, due to his honourable role at this time.

Jai Singh prepares for a show-down with the Saiyids. For the present, however, he was facing the most powerful and acquisitive group of nobles in the Empire, which had given convincing display of its ruthlessness during the past few days. He expected no quarter from these people, and his only hope lay in organising, with Mewar's assistance, the scattered resistance against them, and defy them with tact and firmness.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONFLICT WITH THE SAIYIDS

Saiyids abolish Jiziya, Ajit Singh claims credit. One of the early measures taken by the Saiyids, following Emperor Farrukh-siyar's deposition, was to abolish the *jiziya*, which had been reimposed in April 1717 at Inayatullah Khan's instance. They also secured abrogation of the restrictions on the holy places of the Hindus.¹ These steps, besides being in consonance with the earlier policy of the Saiyids, were expected to highlight the retrogressive outlook and policies of the former Emperor, and provide a justification, at least in the eyes of the Hindu populace and Hindu nobility, for his removal, which was highly unpopular alike among the people and the nobility. It seems Maharaja Ajit Singh took a prominent part in securing the abolition of these disabilities. At any rate he claimed it as his personal achievement. "These twelve successes (abolition of the *jiziya*, the deposition of Farrukh-siyar and other successes) have never been achieved by any Hindu till now", he proudly wrote in one of his letters.² He also sent an account of his achievements to the Maharana. "Farrukh-siyar had called me, holding out many expectations," he wrote, "but the Saiyids and I had other ideas. We, therefore, called Amir-ul-Umara from the Deccan, installed Rafi-ud-darjat on the throne, removed the *jiziya* from the entire Hindustan, and got the restrictions on the *tirthas* removed."³ The Maharana, while praising Ajit Singh for "restoring the honour of the Hindus",⁴ remained fully on Jai Singh's side.

On May 3, Ajit Singh obtained formal permission from the new

1. K.K., p. 816; Maharana Sangram Singh to Maharaja Ajit Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 11, S. 1775 (April 4, 1719), *Jodhpur S.A.*

2. Maharaja Ajit Singh (Camp Delhi) to Dayaldas, *parwanah*, Jyestha Vadi 11, S. 1775 (May 4, 1719), in Reu, *Glories*, p. 114. See also Irvine, I, 404.

3. Maharana to Ajit Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 11, S. 1775 (April 4, 1719), *Jodhpur S.A.* In his reply to Ajit Singh, the Maharana repeats the contents of Ajit's letter.

4. *Ibid.*

Emperor to leave for Jodhpur,⁵ but he had to postpone his departure in view of serious developments at Agra, Amber, and Allahabad challenging the supremacy of the Saiyids.

Jai Singh plans concerted action against the Saiyids; Neku-siyar crowned at Agra. After Farrukh-siyar's deposition and imprisonment, Sawai Jai Singh returned to Amber to prepare for the impending clash with his enemies. To him the bloody change at Delhi recently brought about by the Saiyids and absolute concentration of power in their hands seemed ominous for the crown, the empire, and the larger interests of the nobility. Apparently, his fears were widely shared not only in Rajputana but by a large section of the nobles in other parts of the empire also, whom he now contacted to discuss the measures they might jointly take against the Saiyids. He sent urgent letters to Chhabela Ram Nagar, the governor of Allahabad, Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela, the Maharana, Maharao Budh Singh, the Nizam, and Chhatrapati Shahu, seeking their assistance against the Saiyids.⁶ He also lent his full support to Mitrasen's move to place Neku-siyar, the eldest surviving son of Prince Akbar, and a state prisoner in Agra fort since 1681, on the throne. Mitrasen is believed to have had a secret meeting with Jai Singh, who gave him a letter for Chhabela Ram, and finalized the details of the plan. Mitrasen carried out his role efficiently by crowning Neku-siyar in the Agra fort on May 8, 1719.⁷

The Saiyids take counter measures. No sooner had the news of Neku-siyar's enthronement reached Delhi than the Saiyids despatched a large force under Haider Quli Khan, Maharao Bhim Singh, Churaman Jat, and other officers to deal with the situation at Agra. Hussain Ali did not agree with his brother's suggestion to invite Neku-siyar and proclaim him as the Emperor, lest it should

5. Ajit Singh to Dayaldas, May 4, 1719 (Reu, *Glories*, 114).

6. This we learn from Jai Singh's long letter of June 5, 1719 to Ajit Singh. See p. 142 of this chapter. For correspondence with the Marathas and the Nizam, see Maharana's letter to Chhabela Ram, in *Ajaib-ul Afaq* (Br. M. Or. 1776) No. 131, trans. by Satish Chandra in *PIHC*, XXIII, 1961, pp. 226-30. In *D.K.*, Vol. X., p. 945 (*J.S.A.*), it is mentioned that on June 1, 1719, Jai Singh sent a number of presents to Shahu. This shows that they were in touch at this time.

7. Irvine, I, 410-12; Ghairat Khan to Saiyid Abdullah Khan, *B.N.*, Addendum, No. 1. Ghairat Khan was appointed the governor of Agra in March 1719,

be construed as a sign of their weakness. On June 14, he himself set out at the head of 25,000 troops for Agra. By this time, Jai Singh, after covering one stage, was waiting for news from Chhabela Ram. It was reported that the Nizam was also moving towards Agra.⁸

Though threatened from many sides, the Saiyids kept their heads cool. Using bluff and diplomacy, they tried to prevent the planned union of their enemies at Mathura, from where they (Jai Singh and Chhabela Ram) could not only pose a serious threat to Delhi, but could also shield Agra, now in their hands and flying Neku-siyar's flag. The Saiyids, therefore, took prompt measures to prevent the dangerous junction of their enemies at Mathura.

To check Jai Singh's advance, they sent urgent instructions to Nusrat-yar Khan, *faujdar* of Mewat, to take up position at Kala Dhar (Kaladera, about twenty-two miles north-west of Jaipur) with a suitable force, and to plunder the territory of those *zamindars* who might show defiance. Orders were also sent to Qayam Khan, the *zamindar* of Fatehpur and Jhunjhunu, to win over, with the co-operation of Maharaja Ajit Singh's army which was coming from Marot side, "the Rajput *zamindars* of the *mahals* of the territory of the rebel (Jai Singh)".⁹ A few days later, Bakshi Dilawar Ali Khan and Zafar Khan were also posted at Fatehpur.¹⁰ Tactically, the disposition of these troops was sound as their presence in the north and north-west of Amber created a positive threat to Amber, making it difficult for Jai Singh to move towards Agra without exposing his own State to a grave risk.

Saiyids' offer to Jai Singh. While taking all possible measures to meet Jai Singh's threat, the Saiyids were keen to avoid, as far as possible, hostilities with him. This was necessary not only in view of their preoccupation with the siege of the Agra fort, and continued threat from Chhabela Ram and the Nizam, but also because hostilities with Jai Singh could develop into a large scale

8. Qasim, 85a-87a; K.K., II, 832; Irvine, I, 413-16; Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi, Bhadrpada (n.p.) 4, S. 1776 (July 24 or August 8, 1719) in Tod, I, 324, n. 1.

9. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Qayam Khan (circa 10 July, 1719), *B.N.*, No. 24, p. 90. Fatehpur is about 91 miles north-west of Jaipur, and Jhunjhunu is 89 miles north of Jaipur.

10. Qasim, f. 88a-b.

war in Rajputana, Mewar being fully on Jai Singh's side. Hence, soon after Farrukh-siyar's deposition, the Saiyids informed Jai Singh that his State and *mansab* would not be touched, and that he was being posted at Bidar.¹¹ Jai Singh did not swallow the offer, and spun on the negotiations which the Saiyids were conducting through Ajit Singh.

Jai Singh prolongs the negotiations to gain time; his defiant reply. Till May 19, the negotiations mainly centred round the issue of posting, as Jai Singh was unwilling to go to Bidar.¹² But three days later, when the news of Neku-siyar's enthronement at Agra was confirmed, and Chhabela Ram was reported to be moving towards Mathura, Jai Singh assumed a mocking tone, and rejected the charges levelled against him by the Saiyids. Justifying his own conduct he wrote to Ajit Singh on June 5,¹³ that there was nothing wrong in his calling Maharao Budh Singh, or in his being in touch with Raja Chhatrasal Bundela and Mehta Chhabela Ram, as, in the past also, he had close ties with them. Since he was intending to visit the Court to wait upon the new Emperor, he wrote, he thought that the Maharao might also accompany him. Earlier too, when he had gone to see Emperor Farrukh-siyar, the Maharao had accompanied him to Delhi. As for collecting a large army, he had done so only to remove Abdullah Khan's displeasure. It would be in the fitness of things, Jai Singh continued, if he came with an army of a respectable size on his first visit to meet the new Emperor. As regards the assurance given to him about Nusrat-yar Khan, who, with 10,000 horse, was keeping an eye on him from Amarsar, he would personally explain his stand to the Maharaja; but so long as Nusrat-yar Khan, Qasim Khan, *faujdar* of Narnol, and others, did not withdraw their armies, he could not disband his own either. Also, it was highly improper on the part of Abdullah Khan to blame him for any trouble that might flare up anywhere.

11. Ajit Singh to Dayaldas, *parwanah*, May 4, 1719 (Reu, *Glories*, 115). That Jai Singh had not received the *sanads* regarding the *bahali* of his *jagir* till Septemner 1719 is clear from a letter of Shankarji, advising Jai Singh to proceed to Muhammadabad (Bidar) after the Dashera, and promising to send the *sanads* at an early date (Letter in *J.S.A.*).

12. Jai Singh to Ajit Singh, Jyestha Vadi 14, S. 1776 (May 7), and of Jyestha Sudi 7 (May 15, 1719), *J.S.A.*

13. Jai Singh to Ajit Singh, Ashadha Vadi 14, S. 1776 (June 5, 1719), *Jodhpur S.A.*

This showed, he wrote, that the Khan distrusted him. His (Jai Singh's) apprehensions were justified in view of Nusrat-yar Khan's presence at Amarsar, and the hostile preparations which were being made elsewhere against him. In the end he asked Ajit Singh to be fair to him, and to tell the Saiyids exactly the same thing that he was telling him. If the Maharaja had any doubts, he should have them cleared. As for going to Bidar, he wrote, he would go there, but would like to meet the Maharaja before leaving for that distant charge.¹⁴

Jai Singh comes out in the open; Chhabela Ram and the Nizam fail to join him. It appears that it is with this letter that the negotiations terminated. Jai Singh now moved further on to Toda, about sixty-two miles east of Jaipur, his troops wearing saffron robes and *maur* (coronet) to demonstrate their resolve to fight to the last. But in the absence of any news from Chhabela Ram and the Nizam, he was forced to halt there.¹⁵ The Nizam, as was revealed later on, preferred to play safe and did not join the struggle, and Chhabela Ram was held up in his province on account of the revolt of Jasan Singh of Kalpi, inspired at the Saiyids' instance by Muhammad Khan Bangash.¹⁶

Saiyids try to wean away Chhabela Ram. Knowing well the danger Chhabela Ram's union with Jai Singh could pose for them, the Saiyids did their best to wean him away from Jai Singh. Urging Chhabela Ram not to entertain any suspicions in his mind, Abdullah Khan wrote, "I regard you from the bottom of my heart as the strength of my arms and helper and assistant in all matters". He said that the Emperor was fully aware of his excellent administration in *subah* Allahabad, and, after the fall of the Agra fort, which would take about a week or ten days, he would make an appropriate increase in his (Chhabela Ram's) *zat* rank. He asked Chhabela Ram either to come personally to the Court or to send Raja Girdhar Bahadur, his nephew, to see how great was his (Abdullah Khan's) love and regard for him. Abdullah Khan also informed him that an increase of 500 *zat* was being made in Girdhar Bahadur's rank.¹⁷

14. Jai Singh to Ajit Singh, Ashadha Vadi 14, S. 1176 (June 5, 1719), Jodhpur S.A.

15. Kamraj f. 70a; Qasim, f. 91a, b; Irvine, II, 3.

16. Irvine, II, 6-7.

17. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Chhabela Ram, ca. early August 1719,

The Maharana exhorts Chhabela Ram to support Jai Singh. Meanwhile, Maharana Sangram Singh was trying his utmost to secure help for Jai Singh from all possible quarters. He wrote to Chhabela Ram that several letters sent by the hand of trusted messengers to convey "certain matters" must have reached him apprising him of the true state of affairs. Many persons belonging to the other side (Saiyid group), being unhappy and dispirited, had sent letters to Raja Jai Singh, professing loyalty, and one of them would also join him soon. The cherished goal would be achieved if all three co-operate, wrote the Maharana. He advised Chhabela Ram to start with all possible speed, as time was fast running out, and no delay could be allowed in the matter. In spite of the rains he himself was going to despatch a large army and artillery under Biharidas to 'that side' through Malwa, and to advance further on¹⁸ in consultation with the Nizam, who too was coming with a well equipped army. The Maharana further informed that the Maratha armies had been called and would be joining them soon.

When no reply came from Chhabela Ram, nor was any news of his approach received, the Maharana again exhorted him "to set out boldly for his destination (Mathura) without any further delay."¹⁹ But as we will see, Chhabela Ram could not play the assigned role. This proved fatal to the entire plan of Jai Singh, and he was forced to fall back on the defensive.

Another setback, though of lesser importance, as it was not entirely unexpected, was the Nizam's failure to discharge his role. There is reason to believe that the Nizam was committed to join Jai Singh. This is proved not only by the Maharana's letter to Chhabela Ram noted above, but also from Jai Singh's letter of July 24 or August 8, 1719 (according as it was the dark half or the bright half of the moon) to Biharidas, in which he says that the Nizam-ul-Mulk was marching rapidly from Ujjain, and Chhabela Ram, according to the reports reaching him, had crossed the Yamuna at Kalpi.²⁰

B.N., No. 3.

18. Probably the army was to pass via Sheopur, after skirting Tonk and Kofah, and was to move up towards Agra from the south.

19. *Ajaib-ul-Afaq* (B.M. Or. 1776), Letters Nos. 131 and 132, trans. Satish Chandra, *PIHC*, XXIII (1961), pp. 226-28.

20. Jai Singh to Biharidas Pancholi, Bhadrpada (n.p.) 4, S. 1776 in Tod, I, p. 324, n. 1. Looking to Jai Singh's relations with the Maharana and

Saiyids peace offer; veiled warning to Mewar. The Saiyids were not unaware of the Maharana's dangerous moves, and tried to tackle him by offering to make terms with Jai Singh, and thus avert a conflict. In his letter to the Maharana, Abdullah Khan complained that certain undesirable events had occurred "at the instigation of the leading *zamindars* of Malwa and with the assistance of Rajadhiraj (Jai Singh) who, having moved away from the path of obedience, has evil ideas in his head, and has done other improper acts," and desired the Maharana to keep himself away from these in view of his (Maharana's) "proved, stable, and long standing" friendship with him. He assured the Maharana that he was anxious to make utmost concessions to Jai Singh, and had made efforts to fulfil to the best of his ability Jai Singh's demands and objectives, but as that "ill-advised person" had marched from Amber with the intention of opposing the Royal army, it had become imperative to uproot him and devastate his territory. He informed that the advance tents of the Royal army were pitched outside the capital on June 29, and that a start would be made after five or six days. "Therefore, in view of your deep friendship and affection for the said Raja, and because consideration of your interests is more important to us than anything else, and also because the good of the people is dear to us, we on this side, do not want, on account of the friendship of a friend, that this ancient family should be destroyed due to his misdeeds. It has, therefore, occurred to us that if even now you wish to save him, you should, as soon as you receive this letter, desist him from his erroneous claims, call him to your side, and not permit him to advance any further. Any enquiry about his demands may be made, and if they are then sent (to us) in writing, efforts will be made for their acceptance. You have been informed in time so that there may be no room for complaint on your part hereafter."²¹ But as the matters had advanced too far and the die had been cast, the Maharana ignored Abdullah Khan's letter, and continued to support Jai Singh as wholeheartedly as before.

Abdullah Khan delays campaign against Jai Singh ; fall of

Biharidas, there is no reason to doubt that he was intentionally sending wrong information to Mewar. Cf. Irvine, II, 2.

21. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Maharana (circa 10 July 1719), *B.N.*, No. 1, pp. 17-18.

Agra fort. Meanwhile, Saiyid Abdullah Khan, accompanied by Emperor Rafi-ud-daulah, had started from Delhi on July 5 (28th Shaban), to meet Jai Singh's threat. But when the army reached Kosi, about thirty miles north west of Mathura, it was decided not to march straight to Amber but to keep to the left and reach Fatehpur Sikri.²² In the meantime, Saiyid Hussain Ali, who had not been consulted about this campaign, remonstrated with his brother for setting out on it, and urged him not to advance any further, as he had already posted his *Bakshi*, Saiyid Dilawar Ali Khan, and the *Mir Mushrif*, at Fatehpur.²³ Though, subsequently, Ajit Singh claimed that he had averted the campaign on Jai Singh's request,²⁴ it was Hussain Ali's protest, and Abdullah Khan's own desire to be near Agra at the time of its capitulation so that his brother might not appropriate the entire wealth preserved in the fort, which induced him to turn towards Kuraoli, about fifteen or sixteen miles west of Agra. There, on August 2, he learnt of the fall of Agra fort, and on August 25, met his brother near Sikri.²⁵ The capitulation of the Agra fort was yet another setback to Jai Singh, as it freed a major part of the Saiyids' troops which could now be deployed against him. The loss was all the more severe as the fort had considerable tactical importance, and with Neku-siyar's flag flying over it, served as a rallying point for the anti-Saiyid forces.

Muhammad Shah installed as the new Emperor. The projected campaign against Jai Singh was delayed by a few days owing to Emperor Rafi-ud-daulah's death on September 18, and the installation of Prince Roshan Akhtar as Emperor Muhammad Shah on September 18, 1719.²⁶ The year 1719 thus saw four Emperors on the Mughl throne, made or unmade by the Saiyid brothers. After Muhammad Shah's enthronement it was announced that the new Emperor would visit Ajmer to pay his respects at the shrine of Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti. The real

22. Qasim, f. 88a, b; Kamraj, f. 70a; K.K., 833; Irvine, I, 428.

23. Qasim, f. 88a.

24. Reu, *Marwar*, I, p. 316, n. 7.

25. Irvine, I, pp. 429-30; Qasim, f. 91a.

26. Qasim, f. 92a-b; Irvine, I, p. 431 and II, p. 1. Rafi-ud-darjat, who was raised to the throne after Farrukh-siyar's deposition, retired on May 25, 1719, for health reasons, and died a week later. He was succeeded by his brother Rafi-ud-daulah.

motive, however, was to give Jai Singh a chance to make his submission; in case he was found stubborn or defiant, the army was to proceed against him.²⁷

Jai Singh conciliated,; Saiyids anxious for peace. But shortly afterwards, the expedition was called off. When the army was at Fatehpur Sikri, Maharaja Ajit Singh offered to visit Jai Singh on his way to Jodhpur.²⁸ We have already noted that the Saiyids were not keen on a trial of strength with Jai Singh.²⁹ The Maharana was still whole-heartedly on his side; the uprising at Allahabad was still continuing; and the loyalty of many who professed to be friendly towards the Saiyids, was not above doubt. It was, therefore, in the interest of the Saiyids themselves not to push the matter too far and to arrive at an agreement with Jai Singh. This suited Jai Singh also, as, after the fall of Agra fort, and the failure of Chhabela Ram and the Nizam to play their assigned roles, there was no point in continuing the struggle further if an honourable agreement could be arrived at with the Saiyids. As peace, or even a stalemate, suited both the sides, Ajit Singh's task was greatly facilitated.

The terms. Ajit Singh first went to Manoharpur to marry the daughter of the Gaur chieftain of that place, and from there informed Abdullah Khan that he would be meeting Jai Singh on November 5, at Kala Dhar (Kaladera, twenty-two miles north-west of Jaipur). Abdullah Khan, then impatiently waiting for the news, expressed the hope that the meeting would take place as per schedule, and that after the talks Jai Singh would accompany the Maharaja to Ajmer.³⁰ When Ajit Singh met Jai Singh, it was settled that the latter's state, rank, and *jagirs* would remain unaffected, that he would accept the government of *sarkar* Sorath, and the Muslim nobles who had taken shelter with him would be

27. Shivdas, f. 31b. Cf. Abdullah Khan to Maharana Sangram Singh, circa 10 July, 1719, *B.N.*, No. 1, pp. 17-18. Abdullah Khan wrote that the advance tents of the army were pitched outside the captial on 22 Shaban and that the army would move in the direction of Ajmer after five or six days. (*B.N.*, No. 1, p. 18).

28. Shivdas, f. 32a; Kamraj, f. 70a.

29. This is not only clear from Abdullah Khan's letter to the Maharana (*B.N.*, No. 1), but also from the readiness with which the Saiyids welcomed the conclusion of peace through Ajit Singh's efforts.

30. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Ajit Singh (c. 16 November, 1719), *B.N.*, No. 5, p. 35. For a bardic account of these developments, see, Tod, II, p. 68.

pardoned and allowed to stay on at Amber.³¹ It was also settled that Jai Singh would visit Jodhpur and marry Ajit Singh's daughter, to whom he was betrothed long back on July 26, 1708. Saiyid Abdullah Khan approved of this agreement, and expressed the hope that the wedding would take place on "the auspicious and fortunate date."³²

Muhammad Qasim mentions another term of the agreement, which, for obvious reasons, was kept a secret. He says that Jai Singh was given twenty lakhs of Rupees for "purchasing back" Amber from the Brahmans, upon whom he had bestowed it when setting out for Toda. To the public it was announced as a gift on the occasion of his marriage with Maharaja Ajit Singh's daughter.³³

On the whole it was a satisfactory conclusion of the affair, and the best possible under the circumstances. Only the term stipulating his posting as *faujdar* of Sorath must have irked Jai Singh. Though only nobles of very high rank were appointed as *faujdar*s of Sorath,³⁴ Jai Singh aspired for an independent charge of a province. *Sarkar* Sorath was in *subah* Ahmadabad, which had recently been granted to Ajit Singh for a second time along with the Government of *subah* Ajmer.³⁵

Jai Singh marries Ajit Singh's daughter at Jodhpur. Maharana Ajit Singh reached Jodhpur on December 10, 1719. In May 1720, Sawai Jai Singh, accompanied by Rao Raja Budh Singh and the chief of Shivpuri, came to Jodhpur to marry Surya Kumari, the Rathor princess. On May 19, 1720, on the occasion of the unveiling of the bride's face at Amber, dresses, and ornaments were presented to her.³⁶

The account, as will be seen, contains much truth.

31. Irvine, II, p. 4. The nobles included Ruhella Khan II, *faujdar* designate, Ahmadabad, Tahavvar Khan, and Saiyid Salabat Khan, commander of artillery.

32. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Maharaja Ajit Singh (c. 12 May, 1720), *B.N.*, No. 34, pp. 110-111. The marriage was fixed for the 2nd Rajab.

33. Qasim, f. 93a. Cf. *Parties*, 148.

34. See Athar Ali, p. 147.

35. Ajit Singh was appointed governor of Ajmer on 19 Zul Hijja (October 1719) vide the *farman* quoted by Reu in *Marwar*, Vol. I, p. 318.

36. See *Vamsha*, IV, pp. 3075-3076; Tod, II, p. 69; *D.K.*, Vol. XXIV, p. 573. The presents (price given in brackets) included a pair of *pohcha* (Rs. 600/-), a gold chain (Rs. 23-15 As.), two dresses (Rs. 324-14 As.), a *sari zari* (Rs. 84-14 As.), *kancha buta zari* (Rs. 13-8 As.), *ghazra taj zari* (Rs. 58-8 As.). The entries recording presents made to her from time to time go up to 1729 A.D.

Budh Singh deprived of Bundi. Though the Saiyids were very cautious in dealing with Jai Singh, they had no need to be equally careful or considerate with Maharao Budh Singh. Shortly after Budh Singh's flight from Delhi (February 1719), they had given permission to Maharao Bhim Singh to annex Bundi. The Maharao was also promised the title of Maharaja, the *mansab* of 7000, 7000, and the *Mahi Maratib* or the fish standard after successful conclusion of the impending campaign against the Nizam in which the Maharao and his brave Hada troops were likely to play an important role. In February 1720, Bhim Singh, assisted by an army of 15,000 horse under Saiyid Dilawar Ali, the *bakshi* of Hussain Ali Khan, and Raja Gaj Singh of Narwar, defeated Budh Singh's uncle, who was slain along with six thousand of his troops, and took possession of Bundi. The news of this success reached the Court on February 2, 1720 (3 Rabi II).³⁷

Budh Singh assists Girdhar Bahadur, but the latter conciliated by the Saiyids. After losing Bundi, Budh Singh, no doubt on Jai Singh's advice, decided to join Raja Girdhar Bahadur, who was keeping aloft the flag of resistance against the Saiyids following the death of his uncle, Chhabela Ram. After the arrival of the Hada and the Bundela forces, the strength of Girdhar Bahadur's troops rose to 20,000.³⁸ Budh Singh again sent reinforcements under Salim Singh Hada, who, along with his troops, succeeded in entering the fort. But Budh Singh had to call off his efforts in support of the rising at Allahabad when the Saiyids conciliated Girdhar Bahadur by an offer of the Government of Awadh, and the *faujdaris* dependent thereon, besides two or three other important *faujdaris*, and a gift of thirty lakhs of Rupees.³⁹

The successive reverses of the Saiyids and their rapid downfall; Nizam's rebellion begins. Just at the time when all opposition to the Saiyids seemed to have died down, and their position seemed stronger than ever, a cataract of disasters descended upon them,

(D.K., XXIV).

37. Irvine, II, pp. 5-6; *Kotah*, I, p. 289. The victor carried away from Bundi the *chhatra*, *nakkaras*, and even the portals of Chhatramahal (*Kotah*, I, p. 299).

38. Irvine, II, pp. 8-12.

39. Shivdas, f. 35a; *Seir*, I, p. 150; K.K., II, p. 846. The keenness of the Saiyids to placate Girdhar Bahadur is amply reflected in Abdullah Khan's letter to Haider Quli Khan (letter No. 9) and to Shah Ali Khan (No. 11), in B.N.

burying their ascendancy. The details of their clash with the Nizam, which resulted in the first serious setback to their position, are not called for here; for these one can turn to Mr. William Irvine's graphic account. In brief, contrary to their promise, the Saiyids asked the Nizam to give up Malwa, which they had granted him in March 1719, on the plea that "it was necessary for the protection of the Deccan that Hussain Ali should take charge of that province personally." The Nizam was offered the choice of any one of the four provinces — Agra, Allahabad, Multan and Burhanpur. He, however, felt that the Saiyids were determined to ruin him. During the past few months, he had been repeatedly warned by Muhammad Amin Khan and Dianat Khan that the Saiyids were intending to move against him. Emperor Muhammad Shah and his mother had also appealed to him to liberate them from the clutches of the Saiyids. The Nizam therefore ignored the Saiyids' offer, and, after crossing the Narmada, gained possession of Asirgarh. His rebellion had now begun.⁴⁰

Abdullah Khan tries to put the Nizam off his guard. Abdullah Khan's letter to Balaji Vishwanath; seeks Maratha support. While Dilawat Ali Khan and his army, on receiving a signal from Delhi, were crossing the Chambal, Saiyid Abdullah Khan sent a letter to the Nizam denying all hostile intentions towards him. Seeking Nizam's cooperation, he wrote that the mighty task of administering Hindustan was not one that could be accomplished single handed.⁴¹ But, at the same time, he sent urgent letters to Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath and Chhatrapati Shahu, soliciting their fullest support for Alam Ali, Hussain Ali's deputy in the Deccan, against the Nizam.⁴² The Marathas were naturally concerned at the arrival of the Nizam, now a rebel, in the Deccan, at the head of a large force. As at this time they had the best of relations with the

40. For details see *Parties*, pp. 154ff; Irvine, II, pp. 17-23. The Saiyids suspected the Nizam of having instigated Neku-siyar's rising, and his having eyes on the Deccan. They were also aware of his efforts to increase his military strength, his contacts with Jai Singh to concert measures directed against them, and resented his defiance of their authority. For Dianat's career and his relations with the Saiyids see *M.U.*, trans. B. & B., I, 475-82.

41. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Nizam-ul-mulk (April-May, 1720), *B.N.*, No. 2, p. 23.

42. Abdullah Khan's letters to Shahu (*B.N.*, No. 15) and to Balaji Vishwanath (*B.N.*, No. 16).

Saiyids, through whose efforts they had secured only recently formal grants to collect *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the Deccan, they were keen to render all possible help to Alam Ali. Even before Abdullah Khan's letter (ca. 25th May, 1720) reached Shahu, the latter had conveyed through his *wakil* at Delhi the measures he had taken to deal with the Nizam. He wrote that he had postponed the Maratha expedition to Karnatak, had despatched an army towards Burhanpur, and had moved from his camp near Parnala, which the Marathas were besieging, to *qasba* Masur (30 miles east of Satara) to wait for Alam Ali. Shahu assured Abdullah Khan that the Marathas would exert their utmost in Alam Ali's favour. A few days later, on May 15, 1720, Abdullah Khan wrote to Balaji Vishwanath,⁴³ the Peshwa, urging him to take command of the army that would be appointed to join Alam Ali, and to block the path of the Nizam without the least delay. Reminding Balaji about the recent agreement and covenants "between our worthy brother (S. Hussain Ali Khan) and the Raja (Shahu)", he urged the Peshwa to demonstrate his friendship and sincerity towards them (Saiyids), by dealing effectively with the Nizam, so that it might serve as a lesson to other refractory elements of the Deccan hostile to the Marathas. Apparently, Abdullah Khan did not know that Balaji Vishwanath was already dead (April 2).

Dilawar Ali, Bhim Singh Hada killed. Shortly afterwards, on June 9, 1720, Dilawar Ali Khan and his splendid army were annihilated by the Nizam at Pandhar, sixteen to seventeen *kos* from Burhanpur, the Nizam's guns, camouflaged in a ravine, doing short work of the enemy. Among the casualties were Maharao Bhim Singh of Kotah, and also Gaj Singh of Narwar.⁴⁴

43. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Balaji Vishwanath, May 16, 1720, *B.N.*, No. 16. Shahu sent a force of about 15,000 horse which joined Alam Ali on May 28. Baji Rao also joined a little after.

44. *Alwal*, ff. 162a-164a; *K.K.*, II, pp. 875ff; *Seir*, pp. 162-63; Irvine, II, pp. 28-34; Tod, II, p. 412; *Vamsha*, IV, pp. 3078-79. Maharao Bhim Singh came into prominence for taking an active part in deposing Farrukh-siyar. Under him Kotah's boundaries expanded rapidly, the additions being Rajgarh, Narsingharh, Khilchipur, Gagron, Khandela, Bhanpur, Sheopur, Barod, Manoharthana, Umatwada, Shahabad, etc. (Sharma, *Kotah*, I, 299-301). The Hada chronicler says that his person was covered with scars, and lest he should be thought of being vain, he never undressed even in the presence of his attendants. When he received his death wound, narrates Tod (II, 413-14), and on one of his confidential servants expressing surprise at the numerous

Hussain Ali writes to the Nizam. Nizam explains his conduct to the Emperor; Alam Ali killed. The reverse came as a severe blow to the Saiyids who bore it with courage and fortitude, and rightly sent instructions to Alam Ali Khan to delay the decisive action against the Nizam till Hussain Ali's arrival.⁴⁵ Hussain Ali wrote to the Nizam that he had sent Dilawar Ali merely to escort his family from Aurangabad. As he showed "the impudence of barring your path, and proclaimed something else (about my orders)", wrote Hussain Ali, he had only received what he deserved. He also informed the Nizam that the Emperor was bestowing upon him (the Nizam) the Government of all the *subahs* of the Deccan, and requested him to see that his family, which was returning from Aurangabad with Alam Ali, his (adopted) son, was not molested on the way.⁴⁶ But the Nizam was not deceived by Hussain Ali's letter, and not to be outdone in dissimulation, he explained to the Emperor that he had crossed the Narmada (April 28) as a large Maratha concentration was reported near Aurangabad with the intention of invading Burhanpur and Malwa. For this reason the administration in Malwa was disturbed. He was also concerned about the safety of Bakshi-ul-mulk Hussain Ali Khan's family in *subah* Aurangabad. There was no time for obtaining a formal permission for leaving Malwa, but short-sighted people misunderstood his departure, and made wrong representations about him. But how could those "who have not forgotten respect for the Emperor's status" and were "ancient devotees of the throne, who have eaten your salt" act contumaciously. Also, there

sears, he gave this characteristic reply: "He who is born to govern the Hadas, and desires to preserve his land, must expect to get these: the proper place for a Rajput prince is ever at the head of the vassals." He was brave, and like almost all the celebrated Rajputs, extremely devout. When, after the deposition of Farrukh-siyar, he was returning to Kotah, and halted at 'Mathuraji', as the Rajputs reverently called that place, for a holy dip in the Yamuna, he was so much overwhelmed by the spirit of renunciation that he took the garb of a *sanyasi* and adopted the name of Krishnadas by which name he was henceforth called in his State, and had not Salim Singh of Karwar roused his old spirit again by attacking Kotah, he might have continued to lead the life of a recluse. (*Vamsha*, IV, pp. 3071-72; *Kotah Papers of Basta* No. 32 of S. 1774 refer to the Maharao as "Shri Krishnadasji").

45. See Irvine, II, pp. 34-37.

46. Saiyid Hussain Ali to Nizam-ul-mulk, *B.N.*, Addendum, V, p. 117; Irvine, II, p. 36.

was virtually no administration in the Deccan and anything could have happened. After thus alluding to the Saiyids' misconduct and the damage it had done to the prestige of the crown, he, in the end, thanked the Emperor for conferring upon him full administrative charge of all the Deccan *subahs*.⁴⁷ A few days later (July 31), contrary to the Maratha advice to return to Aurangabad and to wait for Hussain Ali's arrival, Alam Ali led his army against the Nizam and suffered defeat and death at the latter's hands.¹⁸

Hussain Ali and the Emperor leave for the Deccan. These withering blows to their power and prestige shattered the confidence of the Saiyids, and buoyed up the hopes of their enemies. After much discussion, marked by considerable nervousness, it was decided that Hussain Ali, accompanied by the Emperor, should proceed against the Nizam, leaving Abdullah Khan behind in the capital. Hussain Ali chose the longer route via Ajmer, instead of going via Gwalior and Narwar, in the hope of reinforcing his army with the help of the Rajputs, especially the Rathors.⁴⁹

Ajit Singh fails his allies. But Ajit Singh had no intention to stand by his friends in their hour of distress, or to accompany them to the Deccan. He, therefore, advised Abdullah Khan that the army should proceed by the straight road to reach the Narmada at the earliest. In his reply, Abdullah Khan pointed out what was obvious — that the Chambal was in flood and it would be difficult to cross

47. *B.N.*, Addendum VI, Nizam-ul-mulk sent this *arzdasht* soon after receiving the Emperor's *farman* conferring upon him the administration of all the *subahs* of the Deccan.

48. Yahya, f. 126a-b; Irvine, II, pp. 47-50. The Saiyids were optimistic about the outcome of the clash with the Nizam. Unaware of the fate of Alam Ali, Abdullah Khan, in a letter to Murshid Quli Khan, wrote that the Nizam was being pursued by Alam Ali. "The affairs of the Nizam are such", he wrote, "that he will be lucky if he escapes alive, and (in future) the idea of creating disturbances will not even enter his head". (*B.N.*, No. 13). See also Abdullah Khan's letter to Balaji Vishwanath, *B.N.*, No. 16, p. 68. Abdullah Khan asked Murshid Quli Khan (*B.N.*, p. 61) to establish *thanas* on the boundary to prevent Nizam-ul-mulk's escape into Orissa and Bengal.

49. See Irvine, II, pp. 51-52. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Maharaja Ajit Singh, 4 August, 1720; *B.N.*, No. 12, pp. 54-55. Ajit Singh had suggested that Abdullah Khan and the Emperor should stay in the capital and Hussain Ali should march straight from Hindaun to reach the Deccan at the earliest (p. 54). Abdullah Khan's letter to Ajit Singh shows that the Saiyids, in their tone and address, showed uncommon respect for Ajit Singh, and attached considerable importance to his views and advice regarding different matters.

the river with the baggage and artillery. "Apart from this, it is necessary for my brother to meet a trustworthy friend like you, in order to consult regarding certain matters". He asked Ajit Singh to reach Ajmer so that Hussain Ali might not have to wait for him even for a day.⁵⁰

Saiyids try to woo Jai Singh. At this critical juncture, Abdullah Khan wanted to be sure of Jai Singh's attitude also. He asked Ajit Singh to strive more than ever for conciliating Jai Singh, whom he now described as "the refuge of the affairs of the state and of the government", and to bring him to Ajmer. Then he added the following lines, probably for Jai Singh's eye: "The suspicion and doubts that you formerly entertained about him were misplaced. Particularly, now that he has become your son-in-law, what further cause is there for concern? Because he is very much afflicted in his mind, you should not show any hesitation in reassuring him".⁵¹ But, as we will see, Jai Singh steadfastly continued his policy of supporting the crown.⁵²

Hussain Ali assassinated at Toda. On September 2, Saiyid Hussain Ali, accompanied by Emperor Muhammad Shah and a number of important nobles, set out from Delhi, and arrived in the vicinity of Toda Bhim, about 61 miles east of Jaipur, on September 8. That very day he was assassinated with the full knowledge of the Emperor, the leading conspirators being Muhammad Amin Khan, his son, Qamr-ud-din Khan, Haidar Quli Khan, who too was a Turani, Saadat Khan, Khan-i-Dauran, and a few others.⁵³

Jai Singh ignores Abdullah Khan's offer; tries to secure maximum Rajput support for the Emperor. Jai Singh at this time was at Surapura, Jodhpur, where, on October 6, he received the news of

50. Saiyid Abdullah Khan to Maharaja Ajit Singh, *B.N.*, No. 12, dated August 4, 1720.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Jai Singh's attitude towards the Saiyids at this time becomes clear from his *parwanah* dated July 3, 1720 to Kushal Singh Rajawat, who had received orders from Hussain Ali to reach the Court, and to bring along with him Salim Singh Hada of Bundi. Jai Singh wrote, "The Saiyid had sent to you the *parwanah* before the defeat of his armies at the Nizam's hands, and, therefore, Salim Singh need not join him, unless he (Hussain Ali) passes through Bundi." (*J.S.A.*).

53. Qasim, ff. 106a-107b; *Seir*, 174-176; Shivdas, f. 49a; K.K., 904; Irvine, II, 52ff.

Hussain Ali's assassination. On October 9, at midnight, he received the *farman* sent by Abdullah Khan through Maharaja Ajit Singh, granting him the governorship of Malwa.⁵⁴ He, however, ignored it, and on receiving Emperor Muhammad Shah's call, immediately set out to join him.⁵⁵ When the news of Hussain Ali's assassination reached the Maharana, he urgently sought Jai Singh's advice. Jai Singh had already sent him a letter saying that he was going to the Emperor, and advised the Maharana to do the same.⁵⁶ He also sent to the Maharana the copies of the Emperor's *farman*, and of the letters which he had received from Muhammad Amin Khan, Khan-i-Dauran, and Raja Girdhar Bahadur. He regretted that he was not in a position to meet the Maharana personally as he was being pressed to join the Emperor early. He did not even enter Amber, and after a brief halt outside his capital, set out to join the Emperor by rapid marches.⁵⁷ Jai Singh also sent letters to Maharao Arjun Singh of Kotah, and to the rulers of Bikaner and other Rajput states, asking them to join the Emperor with their forces, and in case someone was unable to come personally, to send his troops under a senior noble.⁵⁸ But the Rajput rulers were in general reluctant to participate in the unpredictable contest. The recent events had laid bare the mercurial loyalty of the Mughal nobility, especially of a man like Muhammad Amin Khan, who, at this time, was playing a leading role in the struggle against the Qutb-ul-mulk. The Rajput rulers were also unacquainted with the character and capacity of the new Emperor. These considerations weighed with Jai Singh too. Hence, while sending a large force to the Emperor's aid, he did not take part in the battle personally. The Maharana kept his word, but the forces which he sent could not reach in time. In his letter dated October 28 to Jai Singh

54. *Sihā Daftar Waqiya*, the entry of Kartik Vadi 4, S. 1777 (October 9, 1720).

55. See Maharao Arjun Singh's letter to Jai Singh, Kartik Sudi 14, S. 1777 (November 2, 1720), *J.S.A.* Arjun Singh had succeeded his father, Maharao Bhim Singh, to the *gaddi* of Kotah, and soon established cordial ties with Jai Singh. He died in 1723.

56. Maharana to Jai Singh, letters dated October 24 and 28, 1720, *J.S.A.*

57. Maharana to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Vadi 3, S. 1777 (November 7, 1720), *J.S.A.* The Maharana in his reply repeats the substance of Jai Singh's letter to him.

58. The drafts of Jai Singh's *kharitas* to Bikaner, Kotah, to Rao Indra Singh, etc., *J.S.A.*

he expressed his regret for the delay in sending the troops. "But here, in my house", he explained, "things had taken such a turn that it is difficult to put it in writing. Now, through the efforts of Rai Chand Pancholi, things have improved." It was only on November 1 that he could despatch an army under Sangram Singh. By the time it reached Shahpura, Jai Singh's letter arrived informing that the task had been accomplished and the troops might be recalled.⁵⁹ No help could reach the Emperor from Bikaner also.⁶⁰ Later, Maharaja Sujan Singh explained that he could not join the Emperor on account of his illness, and the threatening movement of the Jodhpur troops.⁶¹ The reason given by Raja Indra Singh for his failure to join the Emperor was that the Marathas had again intruded into Malwa and he had to be on duty against them.⁶² Any help to the Emperor from Jodhpur was out of question. Maharao Arjun Singh of Kotah, who had received a letter from Muhammad Amin Khan also, did not join the Emperor on some facile reasons.⁶³

Emperor's return march; anxiously awaits Jai Singh's arrival; Jai Singh's troops join the Emperor. After waiting in vain for the arrival of the Nizam and the Rajputs, the Emperor commenced his return march from Toda to fight out the final round of contest with Saiyid Abdullah Khan. He moved slowly, halting for a day or two at every stage, and was still undecided whether to move towards Agra or Delhi. Churaman, who had come over to the Emperor's side, and was anxious to save his villages from any harm that might result from the march of the Imperial army, conducted it through the territory under Sawai Jai Singh, though water was very scarce on that route and a number of people died of thirst during the march. To keep up the morale of his men, the Emperor would quietly send out two hundred to three hundred horsemen with orders to return after

59. Maharana to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Vadi 3, S. 1777 (November 7, 1720), and Margashirsha Sudi 10, S. 1777 (November 28, 1720), *J.S.A.*

60. Maharaja Sujan Singh to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Vadi 3 (November 7, 1720), and Margashirsha Sudi 10, S. 1777 (November 28, 1720), *J.S.A.*

61. Maharaja Sujan Singh to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Vadi 3 (November 7, 1720), *J.S.A.*

62. Raja Indra Singh to Jai Singh, S. 1777, *J.S.A.*

63. See Maharao Arjun Singh to Jai Singh, Kartik Sudi 14, S. 1777 (1720 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

making a detour, so as to give the impression that reinforcements were coming in. Once, when a Rajput contingent, which had been assigned this duty, returned at dusk, it was given out that Jai Singh's forces had arrived, and that he too would be joining the army presently.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, in his *farman* of 4th Muharram to Jai Singh, the Emperor expressed his surprise that he (Jai Singh) had not joined him, though the enemy had arrived at Sikri. He asked Jai Singh to come without the least delay, in any case before October 27, and added that he had ordered for a halt and was waiting for his arrival.⁶⁵ Shortly afterwards, Jai Singh's minister, Rao Jagram, arrived with a large force — three or four thousand strong according to Khafi Khan, and fifty thousand horse and a large number of foot according to Shivdas.⁶⁶ Though Khafi Khan's figures seem to be too low, those given by Shivdas seem too high. In the battle, as we will see, Jagram himself was commanding ten thousand troops. Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor that he was busy in collecting more troops and would be joining him soon, and that Jagram and the troops sent with him would fulfil any task assigned to them.⁶⁷ As we have already noted, Jai Singh, while he was most anxious to strengthen the Emperor's hands, was reluctant to take part in the battle personally. He had learnt a bitter lesson in 1707, and in the present case the two sides were evenly matched. Moreover, it was hazardous to trust Muhammad Amin Khan, Saadat Khan, etc., who were men of doubtful loyalties and who, at this time, were at the helm of the Emperor's affairs.

Emperor's victory at Bilochpur; Jai Singh's help assessed. By November 2, 1720, the Emperor arrived near Hasanpur, about forty-seven miles south of Delhi, on the right bank of the Yamuna. Saiyid Abdullah Khan, at the head of 60,000 troops, was reported to be at Bilochpur, six miles north of Hasanpur. Prince Ibrahim, whom he had installed at Delhi, was also with him.⁶⁸ After midnight the Emperor arranged his troops in the battle order. The new *Wazir*, Muhammad Amin Khan, and his son, Qamr-uddin Khan, Sher Afghan Khan and some others took up positions

64. See Qasim, f. 115a; Shivdas, ff. 50b-51a; Irvine, II, pp. 68-69.

65. *Farman*, 4th Muharram (October 25), *J.S.A.*

66. *K.K.*, II, p. 920; Shivdas, f. 51b.

67. Shivdas, f. 51b.

68. Shivdas, f. 58a; Qasim, ff. 113b-115b; *K.K.*, II, p. 920; Irvine, II, p. 82.

in the centre with the Emperor. Haidar Quli Khan, the *Mir-atish*, with a strong artillery force, was posted ahead of the centre. Khan-i-Dauran and Sabit Khan, commanding the left wing, were to support Haidar Quli also. Muhammad Khan Bangash and Saadat Khan commanded the right wing. We are told that Mir Jumla, Raja Gopal Singh of Bhadawar, and a few other officers were ordered to cover the flanks, and Asad-ullah Khan, Rajadhiraj Jai Singh's troops, Saif Khan, and others were so placed as to serve *corps de reserve*, and to keep a watch over the main camp, about two miles in the rear.⁶⁹ When the battle commenced, part of the troops in reserve were called up to join the fighting. The total strength of the army, as we may compute from the figures given by Shivdas, was upwards of one lakh ten thousand men, whereas the army, when it left Delhi in September 1720, had about fifty thousand troops.⁷⁰ As many soldiers had deserted after Hussain Ali's murder, and during the course of the Emperor's return march from Toda, as also on the night preceding the battle, it would be right to presume that Jai Singh had sent a large body of troops to the Emperor's help.

The long battle. (3-4 November), in which artillery played a decisive role, ended in the defeat and capture of Abdullah Khan.⁷¹ As to the role played by the Amber troops, an entry dated November 10, 1720 in the *Waqia* papers deserves notice. It reads: "Foj Singh Kalyanot and other Rajputs of the army, who were sent to (assist) Patshah Muhammad Shahji, fought against the Saiyids, distinguished themselves. captured Abdullah Khan, achieved victory, and won the Emperor's praise. As a mark of high favour the Emperor gave them awards with his own hands, and showed great kindness to them".⁷² The entry indicates that the Amber troops had rendered useful service to the Emperor in the battle of Hasanpur. The warm and honourable welcome accorded to Jai Singh after the battle also shows that his timely help was much valued by the Emperor.

Emperor invites Jai Singh to the Court. The news of Abdullah

69. Shivdas, ff. 58a-59a; Irvine, II, p. 85.

70. Shivdas, ff. 58b, 59a; Irvine, II, p. 53.

71. See, Irvine, II, p. 85ff.

72. *Waqiya* paper, Margashirsha Vadi 6, S. 1777 (November 10, 1720), J.S.A.

Khan's defeat reached Jai Singh the same day.⁷³ Four days later, on Muhammad Amin Khan's complaint, the Emperor mildly reproached Jai Singh for his failure to join him before the commencement of the battle, but asked him to reach the Court without delay, as his advice was required on many problems of the State.⁷⁴

Jai Singh graciously received; secures abolition of the jiziya. On November 11, when Jai Singh arrived in the vicinity of Delhi, the Emperor told Muhammad Amin Khan and his son, Qamrud-din Khan, to proceed to Jai Singh's camp at Khedrabad to welcome him. Jai Singh received the *Wazir* and his son at the threshold of his tent, and conducted them inside. In the afternoon, Jai Singh, accompanied by the *Wazir*, visited the Court. He presented 1000 gold and 1000 silver coins to the Emperor, who, in turn, bestowed upon him an elephant, a studded crest, a pearl necklace, a *jamdhar*, costly vestments, etc. The Emperor also rewarded him with an *izafa* of 4000 *sawars*, and offered two crore *dams* as *inam* which he politely declined to accept.⁷⁵ At his and Raja Girdhar Bahadur's request, the *jiziya*, which had been revived at Muhammad Amin Khan's instance, was also abolished.⁷⁶ Jai Singh sent to the Maharana an account of his reception at the Court and of the abolition of the obnoxious tax at his request. The Maharana was highly pleased to receive the news, and complimented Jai Singh on his luck having at last turned the corner; this he attributed to the latter's *dharmia* and *karma*.⁷⁷

During the period of the conflict with the Saiyids, Jai Singh had sent away his family, and his brother, Bijai Singh, to Udaipur.

73. *Siala Daftar Waqiya*, Margashirsha Vadi 1 (November 5, 1720), *J.S.A.*

74. *Farman*, 10th Muharram (November 9, 1720), *J.S.A.*

75. *Siala Hazur, Daftar Waqiya*, Margashirsha Vadi 7, S. 1777 (November 11); *D.K.*, Vol. XXIV, entry dated Margashirsha Vadi 11, S. 1777 (November 15, 1720) concerning Sawai Jai Singh. See also *D.K.*, Vol. XVIII, 865.

76. See *K.K.*, 936; Irvine, II, 103; Satish Chandra, "Jiziya in the post Aurangzeb period" *PIHC*, Patna, 1946, pp. 324-25. In 1723, the Nizam made an abortive attempt to revive the *jiziya*, but except that it was nominally reinstated during March-April, 1725, the decree was never carried out. (Irvine, II, 103). Nonetheless, "even the nominal restitution of this tax shows the inability of the Emperor to resist the orthodox Muslim opinion."

77. Maharana Sangram Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Pausha Sudi 9, S. 1777 (December 27, 1720), *J.S.A.*

A few weeks after the battle of Hasanpur, Jai Singh wrote to the Maharana to arrange for their return to Amber. On January 12, 1721, the family set out from Udaipur.⁷⁸

The end of an era. The battle of Hasanpur finally rung the curtain over the Saiyid era. During the early part of this period, the country witnessed initiation of new policies, which were in consonance with the changed political situation, and were free from Alamgir's fatal approach which had proved ruinous for the empire. But the good effects of the prudent change were soon negated by the tussle between the Emperor and the Saiyids, which vitiated the entire atmosphere, and paralysed the administration. The struggle ended with the crown suffering a grievous blow at the hands of the Saiyids. The period also witnessed considerable changes in the power groups at the Court, the more important of these being the exit of the Irani group from the scene, and the emergence of the Rajputs and the Marathas as important factors in the politics of the time. The era ended with the lesson, sternly brought out by the fate of the Saiyids, that the historic position of the Emperor could not be brushed aside unceremoniously, and that anyone attempting it would be inviting unlimited trouble for himself.

Jai Singh's rapid ascendancy begins. Sawai Jai Singh's rapid ascendancy synchronized with the fall of the Saiyids. Within a few years of their exit, he became one of the most influential figures on the political stage of the country, his views carrying weight not only at Delhi, but also at Haiderabad, Poona, and Satara. In Rajputana, nothing happened without his knowledge, or succeeded without his goodwill; outside, he became the acknowledged spokesman of the Rajput interests. The princes of Rajputana, Malwa, and Bundelkhand kept him informed about their troubles, frequently sought his advice and assistance in resolving their problems, or requested him to use his undoubted influence at the Court to protect or promote their interests. When the Maratha power acquired dangerous proportions, and the lengthening shadows of their approach began to fall on these states, their rulers looked to him for help and guidance. In course of time he came to command deep respect even among the Marathas. This was especially so after 1735.

78. Maharana to Jai Singh, January 12, 1721, *J.S.A.*

CHAPTER VIII

THE EVENTFUL DECADE (1720-30)

Ajit Singh's revolt. One of the early occurrences, which in some respects seemed an echo of the recent events leading to the overthrow of the Saiyids, was Maharaja Ajit Singh's revolt at the very beginning of Muhammad Shah's reign. When he heard that he had been removed (21 Zul Hijja) from the governorship of Ajmer and Gujarat, apparently on account of his close ties with the Saiyids and his hostile role during the past few months, he took up position at Ajmer with 30,000 troops to challenge Muzaffar Khan, the younger brother of Khan-i-Dauran, who was coming to take charge of the province.¹ There was considerable hesitation among the Imperial commanders, none of whom was inclined to undertake a campaign against him. Mohkam Singh, son of Churaman, had also joined Ajit Singh by this time. Shortly afterwards, Ajit Singh's son Abhai Singh carried out a lightning raid, arriving with 12,000 camel riders at Sarai Allahwardi, about sixteen miles from Delhi. On the way he plundered Narnaul, Alwar, Tijara, and some other towns.²

Ajit Singh submits. But the news of the Nizam's appointment as *Wazir* following Muhammad Amin Khan's death, and his arrival near Delhi (end of January 1722), seems to have induced Ajit Singh to submit. He retired from Ajmer, and sent a polite letter to the Emperor, professing loyalty and pleading innocence. He wrote that when Haidar Quli was appointed to the Government of Gujarat, he had readily handed over the charge of the

1. Shivdas, ff. 76b-77a; K.K., 937; Irvine, II, 108; Commissariat, II, 399, 403. *Ajitodaya* says that Ajit assumed independence, and a Rathor army under Bhandari Raghunath and Abhai Singh captured Sambhar, Didwana, Toda, Jharod, and Amarsar (Cantos, 29, 30). See also Tod, II, 69, who cites from *Surya Prakash*: "Ajmal at Ajmer was equal to Aspati in Delhi. The intelligence spread over the land; it reached even Mecca and Iran that Ajit had exalted his own faith while the rites of Islam were prohibited throughout the land of Maroo".

2. Shivdas, f. 78; Tod, II, 70; Tijara is about 51 miles south-west of Delhi.

province to him, and had instructed his officials at Ajmer to entrust likewise the charge of Ajmer *subah* to Muzaffar Khan. But as that noble did not turn up, the matter remained at a standstill. For the raid on Narnaul and other towns, he laid the blame on the Mewatis. He also requested to be excused from personal attendance at Court so that he might stay on in his State and "pray for the prosperity of the Emperor's government."³ As it was advisable to avoid a campaign in the deserts of Marwar at the very beginning of the Emperor's reign as far as possible, and as Khan-i-Dauran also favoured acceptance of the terms in view of the paucity of funds to conduct a war, Ajit Singh's explanation, despite its hypocritical tenor, was accepted. He was even allowed to continue as the governor of Ajmer *subah*; but to keep an eye on him, Nahar Khan, *faujdar* of Sambhar, was appointed as the *divan* in the province, and his brother Ruhellah Khan was made the *faujdar* of Garh Vitli, the fort which commands the town of Ajmer.⁴ Ajit Singh resented both these appointments as they were likely to restrain his freedom.

During all these months Sawai Jai Singh remained discreetly aloof from the preparations which were made at this time in Delhi in connection with the proposed campaign against Ajit Singh.

Jai Singh appointed governor of Agra province; his second Jat campaign; reasons. A few months later, Sawai Jai Singh was asked to proceed against Churaman Jat, who too had been a staunch partisan of the Saiyids, and who had betrayed only recently Emperor Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasanpur. He had further provoked the Mughal government by assisting Ajit Singh in his rebellion and also the Bundelas against the deputy governor of Allahabad. Lately, his son had killed Nilkantha Nagar, the deputy to Saadat Khan, the governor of Agra, when Nilkantha was returning after conducting a raid on a Jat village. At first Saadat Khan was sent against Churaman, but when he failed to accomplish anything, Sawai Jai Singh was asked to proceed against the Jats.⁵

The Army. Jai Singh set out on his second and last Jat

3. Shivdas, ff. 83a-84b; *Seiv*, I, 231.

4. Irvine, II, 111-12.

5. Irvine, II, 121.

campaign after the formal announcement (September 1722) of his appointment as the governor of Agra *subah*.⁶ His army, whose strength later on swelled to 50,000, included among others Raja Girdhar Bahadur, Maharao Arjun Singh of Kotah, Uddot Singh of Orcha and a number of other officers. He also received a sufficient quantity of artillery, siege materials, and munitions, and was also granted two lakhs of Rupees from the Imperial treasury.⁷

Churaman dies; Badan Singh joins Jai Singh. Jai Singh's task was greatly facilitated as, before his arrival at Thun, Churaman, in a disturbed state of mind on account of the growing dissensions in his family, had committed suicide.⁸ Sometime back Churaman had imprisoned his nephew, Badan Singh, but had released him on the intervention of other Jat leaders. Soon after his release, Badan Singh escaped to Agra and met Saadat Khan.⁹ On September 21, he came to see Jai Singh, who was then proceeding to Thun. The meeting scene is thus recorded in the contemporary papers: "Asoj Vadi 11, S. 1799, Badan Singh of Deeg ki Garhi came. He was received at the threshold by Raja Ayamal (Jai Singh's *diwan*), Thakur Deep Singh, Thakur Budh Singh and Thakur Mohan Singh Nāthawat, who conducted him to the inner *Diwan Khana*. When the Maharaja came out (from the inner apartment) Badan Singh kissed his feet and offered *saj* of a horse. . . The Maharaja exclaimed, 'No, no, I will myself confer gifts upon thee'. Badan Singh replied, 'If *Shriji* (Jai Singh) wants to see me happy, he should accept my offering'. The Maharaja then ordered the things to be retained, and conferred upon him a sword and a shield."¹⁰

The fall of Thun. On arriving near Thun, Jai Singh ordered that the dense jungle skirting the fort be cleared and the guns be moved forward. While this was being done, the Jats made a few bold sallies, but each time they were driven back. Obviously, Churaman's death and the division among their ranks had dampened the spirit of the Jats, and they were not fighting with their usual

6. *Farman, Kapatdwara Records*, 36/A, regarding the grant of *subahdari* of Agra and *faujdari* of Mathura, *J.S.A.*

7. K.K., 945; Irvine, II, 123; Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, 59.

8. Shivdas, 78a; Irvine, II, 122.

9. Irvine, II, 121.

10. *D.K.*, VIII, 435. In the Jaipur records, this is the first mention of their meeting.

vigour with the result that, within the course of a month and a half, two of their fortresses in the vicinity of Thun were brought under close investment.¹¹ In the beginning of November, a Rathor force was reported to be coming to the succour of the Jats, and it actually reached Jobner (about 28 miles west of Jaipur), but for some unknown reasons, it returned.¹² When Mohkam Singh, son of Churaman, realized that the fall of the fort could no longer be averted, he escaped to Jodhpur after blowing up the powder magazine.¹³

The settlement; its nature, and beneficial results. Inside the fort, cash, jewels, weapons, etc., which were found in substantial quantity, were duly forwarded to Court.¹⁴ But far more significant than the successful termination of the campaign was the settlement effected by Jai Singh which transformed the predatory Jat power into a lawful one, subservient to Amber, yet autonomous in its own region. On November 23, Badan Singh formally recognised Jai Singh as his overlord. At a brief ceremony held to mark the occasion, Jai Singh tied a turban round Badan Singh's head and gave him presents.¹⁵ Later, Badan Singh received from his patron a *nishan*, a kettledrum, the five coloured flag of the Kachhwahas, and the title of Brijraj. On June 19, he signed a formal agreement with Jai Singh which reads: "As the Maharaja has bestowed upon me the territory, villages, and the land of Churaman Jat, I will remain in the service of the *Durbar* and will remit every year Rs. 83,000 as *peshkash*"¹⁶. He did not assume the title of Raja

11. K.K., 945; *Seir*, I, 259.

12. Pancholi Rai Chand to Jai Singh, Kartik Vadi 15, S. 1779 (October 28, 1722), *J.S.A.* The Rathor army was led by Vijai Raj Bhandari. The Jats had agreed to pay Maharaja Ajit Singh three lakhs of Rupees in advance and to bear all subsequent expenses.

13. K.K., 945.

14. Irvine, II, 124. Chhatrasal Bundela in his letter dated November 20, 1722 (from Jorpahar) congratulated Jai Singh on his success in capturing Thun (*J.S.A.*).

15. *D.K.*, VII, 436.

16. *Kapatdwara Record*, No. 73, Copy of the agreement in *J.S.A.* See also Sharma, *Jaipur*, 144. The fact that Badan Singh did not enter into direct relationship with the Mughal government gives an idea of Jai Singh's influence at the Mughal Court. It seems the Emperor approved this arrangement in view of the past experience of the Government in dealing with the Jats, and its failure to keep them under effective control.

but preferred the modest appellation of Thakur. In the following years, Badan Singh often visited the Court of Sawai Jai Singh, and attended his Dashera durbars. Like other nobles of Amber, he even built a mansion in Jai Singh's new capital.¹⁷

Peaceful times commence in the region. Under Badan Singh's wise leadership the Jats experienced, after decades of unrest and insecurity, the benefits of peace and tranquillity. The peasants of the region now tilled their fields sure of receiving the rewards of their labour if the elements were kind to them, and the merchants of different provinces now travelled unmolested on the section of the highway between Agra and Delhi. In brief, the Jats were now recipient of all those blessings which a well-ordered society and a lawfully recognised government can confer upon its people. The end of the war in the region, and the agreement mentioned above, paved the way for the birth of the future Jat State of Bharatpur.

Badan Singh maintains close ties with Jai Singh. In the coming years Badan Singh maintained close ties with Jai Singh, and treated him with utmost respect, as a contemporary record of their meeting in 1732 shows. On April 6, 1732, Jai Singh was encamped at Thun. "Four *ghari* after daybreak *Shriji* (Jai Singh) rode out to Badan Singh's camp at Deeg. Badan Singh touched *Shriji*'s feet and offered him Rs. 9,000, an elephant, a horse, a *tora* ... and said: 'Your Highness, I offer you all that I have. For me a few *bighas* of land and a mare are enough'. 'Let me see what you are offering', the Maharaja observed as he picked up a *mulhr* and kept it with him. He also took up one of the *chiras* and tied it round Badan Singh's head, but returned the rest of the *nazr*. After staying for a *ghari* he returned to his camp."¹⁸ In 1738, Badan Singh sent some troops under his son Surajmal, who, along with Ishwari Singh, Jaipur's crown prince, took part in the Nizam's campaign which terminated at Bhopal.¹⁹ In 1739, Jai Singh conferred on the Jat

17. *Siaha Waqia Papers; D.K., X*, p. 1220. Other entries recording Badan Singh's meeting with Jai Singh, and the occasions when he received gifts and awards are dated November 10, 23, 1722 (at Thun); September 2, 1725 (at Sikar), July 3, 1727 (at Toda); September 24, 1727 (at Amber); February 6, October 24, 1729, March 1731 (at 'Mathuraji'), April 6, 1732 (at Thun); October 12, 1734 and September 24, 1735; November 12, 1737; March 16, 1739 and February 5, 1741 (at Deeg). (*D.K., Vol. X*).

18. *D.K., VII*, 441.

19. See Chap. IX.

leader a dress of honour for restoring order in Khori *pargana* where the Meos had been creating trouble.²⁰ In the contemporary papers, the last mention of Badan Singh's meeting with Jai Singh is of February 5, 1741. Jai Singh was encamped at Deeg from where he went to the camp of 'Rao Badan Singh Jat'. This is the first time when the title of Rao is used for him in the Jaipur Records.²¹ It may be recalled that Churaman had also received this title from Emperor Farrukh-siyar in 1713.

Badan Singh died on June 7, 1756. At that time he was leading a retired life after entrusting the cares of the government to his son, Surajmal. Badan Singh's refined taste is amply reflected in the remains of the numerous buildings and garden palaces which he had built at Deeg, Wair, Sahar, etc.²²

Maharaja Ajit Singh revolts again. The settlement of March 1722 had left Ajit Singh in a fretful mood which he betrayed when he tried to help the Jats, then being besieged in Thun, and again when he gave shelter to Mohkam Singh. These acts were overlooked by the Imperial government. But when he got Nahar Khan, the *dewan* of the province, his brother Ruhullah Khan, the *faujdar* of Garh Vitli, and twenty-six of their men murdered at Ajmer on January 6, 1723, the Imperial authorities were thrown in a fit of rage. The Emperor appointed Iradatmand Khan to lead a campaign against Ajit Singh, and placed at his disposal 50,000 troops. Sawai Jai Singh was also asked to join the campaign, and to reach Narnaul at the earliest, either alone, or with Muhammad Khan Bangash Raja Girdhar Bahadur, Raja Gopal Singh, Bayazid Khan Mewati, Shahbaz Khan, etc., who were still encamped in the Jat country to assist Badan Singh.²³ The Emperor also advised Jai Singh to postpone the marriage of his son Shiv Singh, and to join the campaign immediately.²⁴

Iradatmand Khan set out for Ajmer in the last week of February 1723. As Raja Girdhar Bahadur and Muhammad Khan Bangash had not by that time reported for duty, urgent orders were sent to them to join the expedition.²⁵ Jai Singh was reluctant to

20. *D.K.*, VII, 441.

21. *Ibid.*, 444.

22. Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, pp. 63-64.

23. Irvine, II, 112-13.

24. *Farman*, 15 Jamadi I (February 10, 1723), *J.S.A.*

25. Irvine, II, 113.

participate in a campaign against a brother prince, and it was only on the Emperor's repeated orders²⁶ that he set off for Ajmer reaching there in early June.²⁷

By the end of May, the Imperial army had arrived near Sambhar. On its approach, Ajit Singh retired from that town. He also withdrew from Ajmer after leaving a strong garrison in the Vitli fort. At the end of May, the Imperial army entered Ajmer unopposed, and a week later commenced the investment of the fort. The siege continued for a month and a half, during which period Jai Singh was repeatedly advised to do away with Ajit Singh by any means. The Emperor even chided him for being lukewarm in this matter.²⁸

Jai Singh mediates. But Jai Singh had other plans. While the siege was in progress, he tried to persuade Ajit Singh to make peace and to withdraw his garrison from Ajmer. He also sent Raja Ayamal, his *diwan*, along with some other nobles of Amber, to discuss with Thakur Amar Singh Udawat, the commander of the Rathor garrison in Taragarh, the terms for an honourable evacuation of the fort.²⁹ As a result of these talks it was agreed that the Rathor troops would march out of the fort with their colours flying and drums beating. After the garrison had departed in the agreed manner, Haidar Quli Khan sent the keys of the fort to Delhi (July 26).³⁰ The Maharana in his letter of August 13 praised

26. Thus see *Farman* (copy), received on May 18, 1723, in which the Emperor again exhorts Jai Singh to go against Ajit Singh 'the *jali bachcha*' with a large army, and to bring him to the Court. (*J.S.A.*).

27. On June 15, 1723, Jai Singh visited the *Dargah* of Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer and offered two *muhrs* and five hundred Rupees. (*D.K.*, XVIII).

28. Irvine, II, pp. 113-14; *Farman*, July 20, 1723, *J.S.A.* Towards the end of May, Nagor was granted to Indra Singh as "a further expedient for the injury of Ajit Singh" (Irvine, II, 113). Indra Singh being in the Deccan with the Nizam, his grandson, Man Singh, carried out homage on the occasion. Indra Singh in his letter dated June 9, 1723 (*Asadha Vadi 2*, S. 1780) requested Jai Singh to employ his troops in securing control over Nagor. (Letter in *J.S.A.*).

29. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, *Bhadava Vadi 9*, S. 1780 (August 13, 1723), *J.S.A. Khyat Maharaja Ajit Singhji, Ajitodaya* (copy, Rajasthan University History Department Library), pp. 555-56, says that Jai Singh had written directly to Ajit Singh for arranging peaceful evacuation of the fort, and Amar Singh obeyed the orders when his master asked him twice to do so. He came out beating drums of victory.

30. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, *Bhadava Vadi 9*, S. 1780 (1723 A.D.), *J.S.A.*; Irvine, II, 114.

Jai Singh for his peace efforts, and expressed the hope that the expedition against Ajit Singh would be called off soon.

Peace made through Jai Singh's efforts. Meanwhile, Ajit Singh had moved further west of Merta, and some of his troops had also plundered Didwana, a town under the direct control of the Mughal government. But on finding the Imperial army advancing towards Merta, and there being no likelihood of receiving help from any quarter, he decided to submit.³¹ He sent his son Abhai Singh to meet Sawai Jai Singh, and through him to settle peace terms with Iradatmand Khan and Haidar Quli Khan.

On December 4, Abhai Singh arrived at Reyan village, about 30 miles south-west of Merta, where the Imperial army was encamped. He first visited Jai Singh, who took him to Haidar Quli Khan, Iradatmand Khan, and Muhammad Khan Bangash. After the talks, Abhai Singh returned to Jai Singh's camp.³² While submitting unconditionally, Ajit Singh had requested for exemption from personal attendance at the Court for a period of one year. This and other terms were forwarded to the Emperor, and on receiving his approval, the Imperial army commenced its return march, reaching Sambhar on April 8, 1724. There Iradatmand Khan took leave of Jai Singh, who wanted to visit Amber, and with Abhai Singh he proceeded to Delhi. The Emperor received Abhai Singh kindly but detained him at the Court.³³

An unnecessary rebellion. This uncalled for rebellion — his second during the past three years — cost Ajit Singh the governorship of Ajmer, and discredited him in the eyes of the Imperial authorities. The acute distrust which his conduct had created in the mind of the Emperor was soon to cost him his life. Had Ajit Singh shown more constancy and wisdom in dealing with the Mughal government after the fall of the Saiyids, he could have maintained his position with Jai Singh's support. But he chose the path of bluff, which he had to call off, lacking as he was in the qualities required for making organized and concerted efforts. His second rebellion during Muhammad Shah's reign, and the third since the uprising of 1708, marked his last appearance on the political stage of the country. A few months later he met a

31. Irvine, II, 114.

32. D.K., XVIII, 590.

33. Irvine, II, 114; D.K., XXVII, 29-30.

violent death at the hands of his own sons.

Jai Singh's relations with Bundi and Kotah; common misconceptions about Jai Singh's policy. We have noted that after Farrukh-siyar's deposition the Saiyids had granted Bundi to Maharao Bhim Singh, but soon after the fall of the Saiyids, that is by November 1720, Jai Singh had Bundi restored to Maharao Budh Singh. After 1720, Jai Singh's role in the affairs of Kotah and Bundi requires careful study in view of the general belief that he desired to reduce these States to the level of his vassals, and some other charges made against him in connection with Budh Singh's deposition.³⁴ His dealings with these States will be discussed from time to time in the following pages. Here we will only take up his relations with Kotah soon after Maharao Bhim Singh's death in June 1720.

A number of letters of Maharao Arjun Singh,³⁵ who had succeeded his father Bhim Singh, show that he had cordial relations with Sawai Jai Singh. After Arjun Singh's premature death in October 1723, there was a dispute between his two brothers — Shyam Singh and his younger brother Durjansal, for the *gaddi* of Kotah. It is generally believed that Jai Singh's relations with Maharao Durjansal remained very strained, and that the latter even fought Jai Singh a number of times to force him to restore Bundi to Budh Singh.³⁶ The contemporary papers, however, do not support this version.

According to Salim Singh's letter dated December 8, 1723, Durjansal was at Siswali when Shyam Singh arrived with his

34. Thus see, Tod, II, 414; *Mahwa*, p. 179.

35. Arjun Singh was the eldest of the four sons of Maharao Bhim Singh. His mother was Rana Amar Singh's daughter. For his cordial ties with Jai Singh, see his letters to Jai Singh, dated Bhadrapada Vadi 12, S. 1778 (August 8, 1721), Phalgun Vadi 11, S. 1780 and Asoj Sudi 11, S. 1779 (October 1722) in *J.S.A.* In the last mentioned letter he writes that he had made preparations to start after the Dashera to join Jai Singh, who was then proceeding against the Jats, but meanwhile the Nizam's letter arrived. The Nizam wanted to take the Maharao to Gujarat, for which the latter was reluctant. The Maharao requested Jai Singh to write to Rao Jagram (Jai Singh's *wakil* at the Court) to get the posting under the Nizam cancelled.

36. Thus see Sharma, *Kotah*, I, pp. 338-39. *Vir Vinod* even says (p. 1416) that after Shyam Singh's defeat, Jai Singh gave him shelter, and in 1728 A.D., after giving him some troops, sent him against Durjansal. This is wholly contrary to facts.

troops at Palkaran on December 7. About 1000-1200 Rohelas had come from Malwa, and each side was anxious to hire them against the other. Besides these mercenaries, there was also Dalel Khan who was willing to lend his men for money. Bundi's army under Salim Singh Hada was on the border of the two States. Salim Singh requested Jai Singh to write to Dalel Khan not to interfere in the dispute.³⁷ It seems that the Rohelas and the Pathans kept themselves away from the conflict on Jai Singh's intervention. On December 12, the two sides fought out the issue which went in Durjansal's favour. Shyam Singh was killed in the encounter. As Jai Singh's relations with Durjansal became increasingly close during the following years, he does not seem to have supported Shyam Singh. This inference is further supported by the fact that later in 1726-27, when an impostor impersonating Shyam Singh created trouble in Kotah, Durjansal received all help from Amber.³⁸ As we will see, Jai Singh maintained to the very end friendly ties with Kotah, and the differences arising out of Budh Singh's deposition were not allowed to prevent the two from acting unitedly in all matters concerning Rajputana, the Marathas, and the Imperial government.

Jai Singh and the Bundela States; his close ties with Chhatrasal. Jai Singh's relations with the rulers of Bundelkhand and Narwar further reveal that he was playing the useful role of a trusted friend and adviser in respect of these states. This is evident from a large number of letters addressed to him by Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela, Raja Uddot Singh of Orcha, Rao Ram Chandra of Datia, Hirde Sah (son of Chhatrasal) and others. Jai Singh and Chhatrasal had cordial relations from the very beginning. We have already given the text of Jai Singh's letter dated October 16, 1708.³⁹ in which he had explained the circumstances which had forced the Rajputs to defy the Imperial government, and had asked Chhatrasal to oppose the Mughal authority in his own region. We have also noted that Munim Khan, who knew about Chhatrasal's close ties with the Maharana and Jai Singh, had especially sought Chhatrasal's assistance in persuading the Rajputs to meet Emperor

37. Salim Singh Hada to Jai Singh, *ar-zdasht*, Paushā Vadi 7, S. 1780 (December 8, 1723), *J.S.A.*

38. See this Chapter below.

39. See Ch. V, p. 64. ;

Bahadur Shah and end the hostilities. Jai Singh and Chhatrasal came in close contact during 1714-16 when the former was the governor of Malwa, and together they had campaigned against Diler Khan and the Marathas. Jai Singh gave the Bundela hero all due respect on account of his age and legendary career. During 1719-20, when Jai Singh was busy fighting a life and death struggle against the Saiyids, he kept Chhatrasal fully informed about the developments on his side.¹⁰ On Jai Singh's request, the Bundelas even supported Raja Girdhar Bahadur, then holding out at Allahabad, against the Saiyids. Jai Singh's relations with Chhatrasal, despite occasional strain, retained great warmth and cordiality to the very last.

From 1720 till almost the end of his life (December 4, 1731), Chhatrasal had to contend with Muhammad Khan Bangash, who had been appointed the governor of Allahabad *subah* soon after Emperor Muhammad Shah's victory over Saiyid Abdullah Khan. As most of the eastern Bundelkhand was in *subah* Allahabad, Chhatrasal's clash with Bangash was inevitable.¹¹ On May 10, 1721, Chhatrasal, then at Sohrapur, wrote to Jai Singh that he had put to flight Diler Khan, Bangash's lieutenant in Erach, Kalpi and Bhandar. "Many crossed the Jamuna and escaped, but those who have gone towards Pailani will be despatched", he wrote.¹² Shortly afterwards, on May 15, the Bundelas defeated and killed Diler Khan, after which Chhatrasal wrote to Jai Singh that everything had been done as desired by him (Jai Singh), and should any complication arise, the latter should manage it.¹³ In July 1722, Chhatrasal, then at Mahoba, sought Jai Singh's advice on how to deal with Bangash, and sent his *diwan*, Rasik Rai, to Amber for this purpose.¹⁴ About the middle of April 1725, Saadat Khan, while pursuing the Chandelas, crossed the Yamuna and entered Chhatrasal's territory. Chhatrasal then sent between thirteen to fourteen thousand horse under his sons Hirde Sah and Jagat Raj. In his letter of April 12, 1725, Chhatrasal wrote that on the approach of his troops Saadat Khan recrossed the Yamuna. "The Kunwars did not engage him as that might have brought a bad name.

40. See Ch. VII, p. 142.

41. See Bhagwandas, 77 and n. 6.

42. Chhatrasal to Jai Singh, May 10, 1721, *J.S.A.*

43. Bhagwandas, 77.

44. Chhatrasal to Jai Singh, Shravana Vadi 2, S. 1779 (1722 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

Saadat Khan is very restive" he informed.⁴⁵ During 1724-25, the threat of Bangash's invasion continued, but on account of the presence of a large Bundela army, estimated at twenty thousand horse and one lakh foot, in Baghelkhand, he did not provoke hostilities. He wrote to Qamar-ud-din Khan, the *Wazir*, to ask the various rulers, and the *zamindars* of Bundelkhand, and also the neighbouring *jagirdars*, to co-operate with him against the Bundelas.⁴⁶

In 1727, when Chhatrasal's son, Hirde Sah, occupied almost the whole of Baghelkhand,⁴⁷ Bangash was asked to proceed against him. He crossed the Yamuna in January 1727. But the Imperial authorities, being anxious to avoid hostilities in view of the difficult terrain, requested Jai Singh to intercede with Chhatrasal without delay.⁴⁸ Shortly afterwards, on Chhatrasal's orders, Hirde Sah restored Rewa to the Baghelas. In this affair, some misunderstanding developed between Chhatrasal and Jai Singh. Chhatrasal came to know that Jai Singh was critical of the attempt to annex Baghelkhand, and had even supported the suggestion that Bangash should be sent against him. When Chhatrasal remonstrated with Jai Singh on his sullenness, the latter reminded him (letter, 13th March 1727) that their relations were not of recent origin but went back to the time of Mirza Raja Jai Singh. When the issue concerning the Baghelas came up, he (Chhatrasal) should have written to him. He should not have entertained any such feeling that they were drifting apart, nor was it desirable that doubts about him should have arisen in Chhatrasal's mind.⁴⁹

There are letters which show that the great Bundela leader also took keen interest in the affairs of the Rajput States. In an undated letter, which from its contents seems to be of 1720 or of 1723, he advises Jai Singh to bring about reconciliation between Ajit Singh

45. Chhatrasal to Jai Singh, Vaishakha Sudi 11, S. 1781 (April 12, 1725), *J.S.A.*

46. Bhagwandas, 82.

47. Chhatrasal was opposed to Hirde Sah's attempt to annex Rewa. Hirde Sah was desirous of creating a separate principality for himself. See Bhagwandas, p. 82.

48. A letter in Persian to Jai Singh (January-February 1727), *J.S.A.*

49. Jai Singh to Chhatrasal, draft letter, Chaitra Sudi 2, S. 1784 (March 13, 1727), *J.S.A.*

and the Emperor.⁵⁰ In 1726, when a person impersonating Shyam Singh created disturbance in Kotah, Chhatrasal enquired from Maharao Durjansal the details about the trouble-maker. As Jai Singh was already helping Kotah, he advised the Maharao not to bother Chhatrasal, who was himself busy against Bangash.⁵¹

Jai Singh's cordial ties with other Bundela chiefs. Jai Singh's relations with Hirde Sah, son of Chhatrasal, Raja Uddot Singh of Orcha, Rao Ram Chandra of Datia, and Prithvi Singh of Sathaddi were also quite cordial. Jai Singh was encouraging the Bundela rulers to co-operate with Chhatrasal in thwarting Bangash's efforts to acquire a foothold in the eastern Bundelkhand.⁵² These princes held Jai Singh in very high esteem.⁵³ and often sought his help and support in their difficulties. There are a number of letters breathing warmth and cordiality in which the topics range from political developments in Bundelkhand to personal and informal requests, such as the one in which Jai Singh asks one of them to send seeds of blue lotus, or Chhatrasal desires Jai Singh to arrange for the speedy transit of the horses which were being brought for him by some traders. All these letters testify to the existence of close ties between the Bundela states and Jaipur. Jai Singh's relations with these states after 1726 will be discussed at the appropriate place in the next chapter.

Jai Singh saves Narwar. Another State, which from time to time sought and received Sawai Jai Singh's assistance, was Narwar. Disregarding the fact that Raja Gaj Singh was a staunch friend of the Saiyids, Jai Singh always supported his young son, Chhatra Singh. Raja Chhatra Singh had received Shahabad *pargana*,

50. Chhatrasal to Jai Singh (n.d.), *J.S.A.*

51. Jai Singh to Maharao Durjansal, draft letter, February 15, 1727, *J.S.A.*

52. Bhagwandas, 77, n. 6. In a letter dated Shravana, S. 1779 (1722 A.D.) Chhatrasal requests Jai Singh to advise Prithvi Singh to maintain harmonious relations with Ram Chandra. (Letter in *J.S.A.*). There are a number of letters sent by Uddot Singh, Ram Chandra, Prithvi Singh and other Bundela chiefs to Sawai Jai Singh. The letters are preserved in the Jaipur Archives. The drafts of some of Jai Singh's letters to these princes are also available. *The Eastern States Gazetteer*, Vol. VI-A, Lucknow, 1907, gives brief biographical sketches of these chiefs.

53. Thus Raja Prithvi Singh in his letter dated May 9, 1723 wrote to Jai Singh, "Your Highness is the *Sardar* of the Rajas of Hindustan. All are devoted to you." Similar sentiments are expressed in some other letters sent by the Bundela rulers. (Prithvi Singh's letter is in *J.S.A.*).

consisting of seven *mahals*, as part of his estate. Towards the end of 1723, Chhatra Singh clashed with Devi Singh Dhandhera, who had some lands in these *mahals* and enjoyed the support of Dhiraj Singh Khichi of Bajranggarh. Chhatra Singh requested Jai Singh to ask Dhiraj Singh not to assist the Dhandheras.⁵⁴ In late December 1723, Pir Khan, *amin* of Muhammad Khan Bangash in Alapur *pargana*, clashed with Khande Rai, the *diwan* of Narwar. Despite the fact that Pir Khan had with him 7000 Pathans, he was repulsed. On January 6, 1724, Chhatra Singh sent to Jai Singh the details of the incident, and requested him to write to Muhammad Khan Bangash that Pir Khan was at fault. A week later, Khande Rai also requested Jai Singh to write to Bangash about the incident.⁵⁵ What seem to us minor incidents were matters of considerable consequence to these States, and a word from Jai Singh in their favour meant much to them.

A few years later, Jai Singh extricated Narwar from a critical situation. Towards the close of 1727, Saiyid Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, who had lately been granted the *faujdar*i of Gwalior, Ranod, and Shahabad and who had strained relations with Chhatra Singh, began to resettle in Narwar State those *zamindars* who had been displaced from there by the Narwar ruler. This led to hostilities between the two sides. In October 1727, Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, accompanied by Nijabat Ali Khan, Shah Ali Khan, Raja Prithvi Singh Bundela, and Dalel Khan Pathan drew upon Narwar and commenced the siege of the fort. After a fortnight or so, the position of Narwar became so critical that Khande Rai had to seek (November 11) urgent help from Jai Singh. He reminded Jai Singh of the help the latter had given in saving the honour of the house when, after Raja Gaj Singh's death in the battle against the Nizam (in June 1720), Muhammad Amin Khan had wanted to harm Narwar.⁵⁶ By the end of November, the position of Narwar had deteriorated considerably. On November 28, Khande Rai informed Jai Singh that if relief did not reach Narwar immediately, the ladies in the fort might be forced to perform *jauhar*. He

54. Raja Chhatra Singh to Jai Singh, January 6, 1724, *J.S.A.* For Devi Singh's attempt to take Shahabad in 1700 A.D., see Bhagwandas, 62.

55. Raja Chhatra Singh to Jai Singh, January 1, 1724; Khande Rai to Jai Singh, *arzdashit*, January 13, 1724, *J.S.A.*

56. Khande Rai to Jai Singh, *arzdashit*, Agahan Sudi 9, S. 1784 (November 11, 1727) and Pausha Vadi 12, S. 1784 (November 28, 1727), *J.S.A.*

requested Jai Singh to send some troops without a moment's delay, and to ask Khan-i-Dauran to issue a rescript ordering Najm-uddin Khan to withdraw from Narwar.⁵⁷ In response to this appeal, Jai Singh despatched a force, on whose approach, as Raja Chhatra Singh later wrote in his letter, "the enemy hurriedly withdrew without even beating the drums."⁵⁸

Becomes accredited spokesman of their interests. It was by rendering such help and assistance to other States, and by using his influence at the Court in their favour, that Jai Singh gradually became the accredited spokesman of their interests in their dealings with the Mughal government, and a welcome arbiter in their mutual quarrels, till there was hardly any Hindu state, large or small, which did not seek his assistance or goodwill in the fulfilment of its wishes, or for mitigating its hardship which misfortune or default might have warranted.

Maharaja Ajit Singh murdered; Abhai Singh acts under Court's pressure. We have noted that after Ajit Singh had made his submission, his son Abhai Singh accompanied Iradatmand Khan to the Court, where he was detained by the Emperor. Shortly afterwards, on June 23, 1724, Ajit Singh was murdered in sleep by his second son, Bakht Singh, on orders from his elder brother, Abhai Singh.⁵⁹ No sooner had the news of Ajit Singh's murder reached Delhi than the Emperor recognised Abhai Singh as the new ruler of Jodhpur, granted him the *mansab* of 7000/7000, and the title of Raj Rajeshwar. A number of *parganas* — Nagor, Kekri, Parbatsar, Phulja—which had been resumed in 1723, were now restored to him.⁶⁰ Jai Singh was then at Agra. On July 5, he sent some presents on the occasion of Abhai Singh's '*Rajtilak*'. During the next few days Abhai Singh must have come to know of the developments in Marwar and, needing all possible support, went to Mathura and married Jai Singh's daughter (August 1).⁶¹

57. Khande Rai to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, Pausha Vadi 12, S. 1784 (November 28, 1727), *J.S.A.*

58. Khande Rai to Jai Singh, Magha Vadi 6, S. 1784 (December 22, 1727), and Raja Chhatra Singh to Jai Singh, Phalguna Vadi 9, S. 1784 (January 24, 1728), *J.S.A.*

59. *V.V.*, II, 842; Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 600.

60. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 605; Irvine, II, 115.

61. According to the *Jodhpur Khyat* (II, 121-24) when Abhai Singh was at Delhi, he received the marriage proposal from Amber. When he consulted the

It is said, and with much weight and credibility, that Abhai Singh had acted under persistent pressure from the Court. Among others who instigated him to do away with his father, the names of Jai Singh and Bhandari Raghunath are also mentioned. Abhai Singh was told that Marwar's interest made Ajit Singh's removal imperative. The Emperor, he was told, was thinking of resuming Jodhpur, in which case, as the Rathors were sure to resist the move, many lives were likely to be lost. Would it not be advisable to sacrifice one life in the interest of many? When Abhai Singh hesitated, he was pointedly asked which he loved more, his father or his fatherland? To a Rajput, nothing can be more sacred than *desh* or *bhumi*, and Abhai Singh's reply can be easily inferred. The reward for accomplishing the crime was his immediate installation as the ruler of Jodhpur. The offer was likely to brush aside any traces of hesitation in Abhai Singh's mind.⁶²

The reasons of the crime. The reasons, which induced the Imperial authorities to adopt this dastardly course, were chiefly Ajit Singh's role during 1717-20 as an important member of the Saiyid group, and his persistent and unconcealed hostility towards the new government. The reasons which led to Ajit Singh's murder were not personal, viz., Ajit Singh's incestuous relations with his son's wife, as alleged by Kamwar Khan. This is proved not only by the developments in Marwar following the murder, but also by the fact that instead of receiving for his deed severest punishment from his brother, now the ruler of Jodhpur, Bakht Singh was rewarded by the grant of Nagor, and cordial ties continued to exist between the two for many years to come, showing thereby that they had acted in concert and that Bakht Singh had not acted to avenge the wrong "on being touched in the tenderest point of his honour," as Irvine writes. William Irvine, accepting

sardars and Bhandari Raghunath about it, they advised him to visit Jodhpur first and thereafter to marry the Amber princess. But, disregarding their advice, Abhai Singh went to Mathura and espoused Sawai Jai Singh's daughter. A number of Rathor *sardars* then broke off from him and came away to Marwar and joined Anand Singh and Rai Singh (Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 606).

62. *Jodhpur Khvat*, II, 115; Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 600 and n.1; *Vamsha*, IV, 3082-3084; Tod, I, 583. He says in his account, which otherwise is correct, that it were the Saiyids who told Abhai Singh to do away with Ajit Singh. At another place he rightly notes that the Saiyids had died in Ajit Singh's lifetime (II, 69).

Kamwar Khan's version, cites "the Muhammadan view of the Raja's character",⁶³ which, as we know, was extremely hostile on account of the proud assertiveness of Ajit Singh and that of his father Maharaja Jaswant Singh in their dealings with the Mughal government since Alamgir's days, and their refusal to show undue deference to the orthodox Muslim opinion.

Insufficient evidence against Jai Singh. As, after 1720, Jai Singh's relations with Maharaja Ajit Singh had improved considerably, which is evident from the fact that it was through his good offices that Ajit Singh had concluded peace with the Mughal government in 1723, and as Jai Singh had never evinced any enthusiasm for underhand methods even when goaded by the Court,⁶⁴ and in the absence of adequate proof in support of the charge, it is difficult to say anything conclusively about Jai Singh's complicity in the plot. Also, if Jai Singh was privy to the scheme, then so must be Maharana Sangram Singh, for, after Ajit Singh's murder, the two acted in close concert in restoring order in Marwar. But the high character and policies of Sangram Singh throughout his reign of four-and twenty years rule out the possibility of his being involved in such a crime. In the private correspondence between the two also, there is not the slightest indication that they were being guided by any motive other than to restore order in Mewar, to prevent a civil war there, and avert Mughal or Maratha intervention in the internal affairs of the State.⁶⁵

Developments in Marwar after Ajit Singh's murder; wide support for Anand Singh and Rai Singh. Amber and Mewar troops reach Marwar. Maharaja Ajit Singh's murder was deeply resented by the people of Marwar, and also by the Rathor nobles nearly all of whom decided to oppose the parricides. They came out in open support of Ajit Singh's younger sons, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, and placed under arrest the Bhandari

63. See Irvine, II, 117.

64. See Chapter VI, p. 126.

65. In the Jaipur Archives there are a number of letters sent by the Maharana to Jai Singh and drafts of Jai Singh's letters dealing with the developments in Marwar following Ajit Singh's murder. Some of these letters and drafts have been used here. Cf. Reu's version (*Marwar ka Itihas I*, 327) which implicates Jai Singh and Bhandari Raghunath in the Emperor's plot to have Ajit Singh murdered by his sons.

officers, who, they believed, were in league with the offenders.⁶⁶ In fact, save three or four nobles, and even their loyalty towards Abhai Singh was not above suspicion, the rest of them refused to recognise him as their king, even though the Emperor had already declared him as the ruler of Jodhpur. Bakht Singh, to save his own skin, had shown to the nobles, who had come to arrest him after the crime, Abhai Singh's letter, in which the latter had asked him to kill their father. But this did not save him from being placed under confinement. At Sojat Dhanrup Bhandari, and at Merta Khivsi Bhandari would have met a similar fate had not Thakur Shiv Singh and Thakur Santokh Singh, who were supporting Abhai Singh, interceded in their favour. But the situation began to change in Abhai Singh's favour when a large force under Kesri Singh Naruka, despatched by Jai Singh, reached Merta on October 28, 1724. Khivsi Bhandari confided in Naruka that in case Anand Singh and Rai Singh decided to take Jodhpur, there was nothing to impede their march. In his letter dated October 31, Naruka asked his master to send more troops, preferably under Rai Shivdas.⁶⁷ On November 11, Jai Singh sent to the Maharana a detailed account of the situation in Marwar and informed him that Rai Shivdas and Bhandari Raghunath would be reaching Merta soon. He also requested the Maharana to order the Mewar army under Kanha Pancholi, then on way to Marwar, to reach Merta by forced marches.⁶⁸

Maratha intervention in Marwar feared. The Emperor sends Jai Singh to Marwar. About this time the Emperor came to know that some of the Rathor nobles, who were supporting Anand Singh and Rai Singh, took them to Jalor for talks with the Marathas, who

66. Bakht Singh had a number of Bhandari officers imprisoned for some time, to appease the Rathors. At Mathura, Raghunath Bhandari was also put under confinement for some time, and Pancholi Ram Baksha Balkishan was appointed as *diwan* (Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 607-08).

67. Rai Shivdas was brother of Raja Ayamal Khatri, Jai Singh's famous *diwan*. The first mention about Shivdas, in the *D.K.* Volumes, is of 1717. He rendered good service in Jai Singh's Jat campaign of 1723. In 1725 he was awarded the title of Rai. See *D.K.*, Vol. III, pp. 691ff.

68. Kesri Singh Naruka to Jai Singh, report, Margashirsha Vadi 11, S. 1781 (October 31, 1724), *J.S.A.* Copy of Jai Singh's letter to the Maharana, Margashirsha (Sudi) 6, S. 1781 (November 11, 1724), and his letter of the same date to Nangji, the foster brother of the Maharana, *J.S.A.* See also *Vir Vinod*, II, 843.

were then active near Ahmadabad.⁶⁹ Though the Marathas did not actually intervene in Marwar, and soon withdrew to take advantage of the political situation created by the impending struggle between Hamid Khan, the Nizam's uncle, who was soliciting their help, and Shujaat Khan, the nominee of Sarbuland Khan,⁷⁰ mere spectre of their intervention in Marwar alarmed the Emperor so much that he asked Sawai Jai Singh to proceed to Jodhpur forthwith after leaving his eldest son Shiv Singh as *faujdar* of Mathura and to take all such measures as were required by the situation.⁷¹ Abhai Singh had already left for his State on a month's leave.⁷² When Jai Singh reached Reyan village (about 30 miles south-west of Merta), Abhai Singh came there from Merta, and on November 18-19, discussed with him 'the situation in Marwar. After the meeting, Jai Singh returned to Delhi.⁷³ His army however remained at Abhai Singh's disposal; a few months later (June 1725), it rendered good service by expelling Indra Singh from Nagor. Among those whom Abhai Singh especially commended in his letter (dated Ashadha Sudi 2, S. 1781) was Raja Ayamal, *diwan* of Amber.⁷⁴ The other force under Naruka

69. *Farman* to Jai Singh (ca. October-November 1724), *J.S.A.*

70. On the political situation created by Hamid Khan's conflict with Shujaat Khan, see Dighe, *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, Bombay, 1944, pp. 26-28.

71. *Farman* to Jai Singh (ca. October-November 1724), *J.S.A.*

72. Jai Singh to Maharana, draft *kharita*, Margashirsha Sudi 8, S. 1781 (November 13, 1724), *J.S.A.*

73. *D.K.*, Vol. XXVII, 22.

74. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 2, S. 1781 (1724 A.D.), *J.S.A.* The first entry in *D.K.* volumes about Ayamal Khatri is of 26th February 1718. In October 1718, Jai Singh appointed him *naib faujdar* of Narnol. He appears to have rendered exceptional services to his master during the crucial months following Farrukh-siyar's deposition, as is evident from the long list of rewards given to him on September 3, 1719. In March 1721, he took part in subjugating Khandela, which was made a tributary to Amber. In July 1721 he went to Delhi to obtain the Emperor's sanction of the arrangement made by Jai Singh in respect of Khandela. Ayamal appears to have succeeded in his mission, for, on his return, he was loaded with rewards. The first mention of Raja for him is in the entry dated April 29, 1722. In June 1728 he was sent to Bundelkhand. He took an important part in the Mughal negotiations with the Marathas after 1730, especially in the negotiations which Jai Singh held with Baji Rao in 1736 (see Chap. X, below). He survived his great master by about three years, dying in May 1747. He was a well known figure in the diplomatic world of his time. For his early career see *D.K.*, III, pp. 473-502, 514.

was already operating in consultation with Abhai Singh. This very month (June 1725), the Maharana had to recall his army under Kanha Pancholi, then at Sojat, where it had gone to assist Abhai Singh, as his own State was threatened by the dreaded Maratha incursion.⁷⁵

A new threat to Rajputana; Rajputs concerned about Maratha advance towards Malwa and Gujarat. The Rajput rulers, though fully appreciative of the valiant struggle waged by the Marathas against the Mughal government,⁷⁶ had always viewed with concern their increasing incursions into Malwa and Gujarat. As early as June 1711, we find Jai Singh expressing concern at the Maratha incursion into Malwa, and blackmailing of Mandsaur and some other towns. In his letter dated June 7, 1711, to Biharidas, he described their advance as dangerous, and wrote that "efforts must be made to keep the Marathas on the other side of the Narmada."⁷⁷ The Marathas had rightly chosen the north-western part of Malwa, containing Mandsaur and Rampura, which like a wedge goes deep into southern Rajputana, separating Mewar and her vassal state of Pratapgarh from Haroti. Within a radius of hundred miles from Rampura are Udaipur, Pratapgarh, Banswara, Kotah, Bundi and parts of what later on was known as Ajmer-Merwara. The Rajput rulers were aware of the need to fill this artificial gap created by Akbar when he separated Rampura from Mewar and made it an independent principality. In 1713, when Sawai Jai Singh took charge of Malwa, he introduced vigorous measures to check the Maratha inroads into the province⁷⁸ But the Marathas were determined to establish their hegemony over Malwa and Gujarat, which were high up in their minds as alluring prizes, rich and contiguous to their own country, and providing ample scope for the ambitions of the newly risen Maratha commanders to whom the Deccan offered little, being the special preserve of others. In 1718, when Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath accompanied Saiyid Hussain Ali to Delhi, he is said to have received instructions⁷⁹ to secure

75. Kanha Pancholi to Jai Singh, *ar-dashu*, Vaishakha Vadi 9, Raj. S. 1781 (March 28, 1725), *J.S.A.*

76. See Chap. V., pp. 58-59.

77. Draft of Jai Singh's letter to Biharidas, Ashadha Sudi 2, S. 1768 (June 7, 1711). *J.S.A.*

78. See chap. VI, p. 115.

79. See Duff, I, 370; *Parties*, 196.

from the Emperor the right to collect *chauth* from these provinces also.

The first Maratha incursion in Mewar. After 1722, the Marathas increased their pressure upon Malwa and Gujarat.⁸⁰ In early 1724, they created disturbances in Rampura, and also on the borders of Kotah and Bundi. The following year, their first incursion in Mewar announced their dreaded entry into Rajputana. From Sojat, Kanha Pancholi informed (June 26, 1725) Jai Singh, then at Mathura, that he had been urgently recalled in view of the Maratha incursion into Mewar.⁸¹ That year the Marathas created disturbances in Kotah also.⁸² In early 1726, they again entered Mewar and caused widespread disturbances there. Deeply upset at the Maratha incursions, the Maharana sent Rai Maya Ram, Mewar's *wakil* at Delhi, to discuss with Sawai Jai Singh the steps the Rajput states should take to meet the new threat. "The disturbing capacity of the Marathas is so great," wrote the Maharana to Jai Singh, "that if they are not checked in the next six months or a year, anarchy and ruin would sweep the entire land."⁸³

Jai Singh and the Maharana support the Nizam's move. At this time, the Nizam was scheming to subvert Shahu's government by supporting Shambhaji of Kolhapur. His object apparently was to weaken the Maratha power at its very root to secure his own position in the Deccan. Jai Singh and the Maharana were in full agreement with his plan, which was likely to weaken the Maratha thrust into Malwa as well as Rajputana. Expressing his deep concern at the disturbances created by the Marathas in Rampura, Bundi, and Kotah, and at their attempt to ruin Malwa and Gujarat, the Nizam struck an optimistic note in his letter to Jai Singh. He wrote that earlier, *farmans* were sent to Shahu, asking him to

80. The situation created by the Nizam's sudden withdrawal from Court (December 1723) and his uncle Hamid Khan's offer of *chauth* of Gujarat to the Marathas in lieu of their help against Shujaat Khan, the new Governor's nominee, facilitated the growth of Maratha influence in Gujarat. See Dighe, 26-28; Irvine, II, 170-71.

81. Kanha Pancholi to Jai Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 9, Raj. S. 1781 (March 28, 1725), *J.S.A.*

82. Jai Singh Rathor (of Kotah) to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 8, S. 1782 (6th July 1725), *J.S.A.*

83. Maharana to Jai Singh, Chaitra Vadi 7, S. 1782 (14th March, 1726), *J.S.A.*

forbid his armies from crossing the Narmada, but his troops not being under his control, they did not refrain from creating disturbances in Malwa and Gujarat. "As asked by you, and out of regard for the Maharana," continued the Nizam, "I induced Shambhaji to join me, and made him agree to punish and exterminate Shahu. Sultanji Nimbalkar, the *Sar-i-lashkar* of the enemy, came and saw me, and has since been appointed to command Shambhaji's army. By the grace of God, other partisans of Shahu would also desert him and the desired object would be gained."⁸⁴ The letter shows that Sawai Jai Singh and the Maharana had full knowledge of the Nizam's intrigues against the Maratha government whose aggressive policies and encroachments upon the Rajput states had caused their rulers deep concern and mortification. They, therefore, felt it right to take all such measures as might avert or diminish the Maratha threat to their lands.

Jai Singh's efforts to offer united opposition to the Marathas welcomed by the Rajput states. But Jai Singh did not rely solely on the Nizam's efforts, and tried to prepare the Rajput states to face the common threat by mutual co-operation among them. He sent urgent letters to the rulers of Kotah, Bundi, Jodhpur and other states, asking them to keep themselves ready to ward off any fresh Maratha incursion in southern Rajputana.⁸⁵ His appeal received a ready response from these states. In his letter dated November 25, 1726, Durjansal of Kotah assured Jai Singh that he would promptly reach Mewar in case of a fresh Maratha incursion in that state. "The safety and honour of Hindustan," he wrote, "depend on your Highness's care and efforts."⁸⁶ Jai Singh received similar assurances from the rulers of other states also.

Chhatra Singh of Narwar and the Bundela chiefs, who too were concerned over the increasing Maratha danger to their states, did their bit in keeping Jai Singh informed about the movements of the Maratha armies. Thus, in his letter dated November 13, 1726, the ruler of Narwar reported to Jai Singh, "Here we have the

84. Nizam's letter (in *J.S.A.*) to Jai Singh. The letter is of late 1724 or early 1725 as the Nizam mentions in it his departure for Haidarabad after his victory over Mubariz Khan (October 1, 1724).

85. Jai Singh to Bhandari Raghunath, *parwanah*, Bhadrpada Vadi 7, S. 1783 (August 9, 1726), *Jodhpur, S.A.*

86. Durjansal to Jai Singh, Kartik Sudi 11, S. 1783 (November 25, 1726), *J.S.A.*

following news about the Deccanis: after crossing the Narmada, Pila's army has reached Nayapura near Surat; Baji Bhil has returned after collecting *chauth* from Ranaji's territory, and from Jhabua, Badnagar, and Bisalnagar, and has posted Udaji Pawar at Jhabua; Kanthaji has crossed the Narmada with 4,000-5,000 horse and has moved towards northern Malwa. About eight or nine months before, Tara Bai and Shahu had fallen out, but were reconciled later. Now it is said, differences have again cropped up between them. For this reason the Deccanis did not come in large numbers this time." Chhatra Singh promised to send more news about the Marathas on receiving the same.⁸⁷ These letters clearly reveal the concern felt in Rajputana and Malwa at the northward march of the Marathas.

Jai Singh explores the possibility of a settlement; sends Shambhu Ram and Navnit Sai to Ratara. A significant letter to Jai Singh. While preparing the Rajput states to face the Maratha threat, Jai Singh also initiated talks with Shahu. In early July 1726, he sent Joshi Shambhu Ram to Satara to convey to Shahu his desire that the Marathas should break off negotiations with Rai Singh and Anand Singh.⁸⁸ He also initiated negotiations for a settlement of the Maratha claims in Malwa and Gujarat. We get a fair idea of the trend and the scope of these negotiations from a letter dated July 28, 1726, sent by a Mewar official posted at Satara. Acknowledging the two letters and the message sent by Jai Singh through Navnit Rai, he informed that the Maratha armies would assemble after the Dasherā. He advised Jai Singh to come to southern Malwa for talks with Shahu.⁸⁹ After his arrival they would make their offer which, he hoped, Shahu would accept. He cautioned against betraying any eagerness to come to terms with the Marathas, lest they might think they were weak. "We should promise to secure for them *jagirs* worth ten lakhs of Rupees in each of the two *subahs* (Malwa and Gujarat).

87. Raja Chhatra Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Agahan Sudi 9, S. 1783 (November 13, 1726), *J.S.A.*

88. Jai Singh to Bhandari Raghunath, *parwanah*, Bhadrāpada Vadi 7, S. 1783 (August 9, 1726), *Jodhpur, S.A.*

89. It may be noted that till 1730, the Mughal authorities conducted diplomatic negotiations with Chhatrapati Shahu directly, without even bringing Baji Rao in the picture. But after that year it is Baji Rao with whom they have to deal with and whose voice is final and decisive.

But as Your Highness knows, their demand is for *chauth*, which for both the *subahs* comes to fifty lakhs of Rupees. The problem of reconciling their demand with our offer, and other related matters, can be settled on your arrival here." He then wrote that the Maratha problem could still be tackled, and that what Jai Singh had thought in this connection was right. Earlier, he wrote, when Mirza Raja Jai Singh had gone against Shivaji, the latter had surrendered to him the keys of eighty-four of his forts. The Maratha house, he wrote, was divided, and by making a supreme effort, their power could still be checked, and their teeth broken while yet raw. The Nizam was also with them.⁹⁰ The writer's assessment of the Maratha strength was obviously erroneous and it is doubtful if Jai Singh agreed with it.

Jai Singh advocates his plan to the Emperor. Shortly before this (June 1726), Jai Singh had written to the Emperor that, though he was ever ready to accompany Khan-i-Dauran and Khidmatgar Khan to Malwa to grapple with the Maratha menace, for practical reasons it was advisable to grant Shahu *jagirs* worth ten lakhs of Rupees in Malwa and of like value in Gujarat, and to enrol some of his chief officers in the Imperial service on suitable *mansabs*, on the condition that the Maratha encroachments in the province would cease forthwith. On Jai Singh's advice, Maharana Sangram Singh made this offer to Jadu Rai Prabhu, the Maratha *wakil* at Udaipur, and also sounded Shahu about it. The Maharana favoured acceptance of this proposal, which, he felt, was in the Emperor's own interest.⁹¹

Sarbuland Khan concedes chauth and sardeshmukhi to the Marathas. But before the negotiations could make any headway, Sarbuland Khan, the governor of Gujarat, conceded to the Marathas what Jai Singh and the Maharana had been trying all along to avoid. When Pilaji Gaikwad and Kanthaji Kadam from Ahmadabad-Petlad side, and Peshwa's army under Udaji Pawar, Ambaji Purandare, Baji Bhivrao, etc., from Vadnagar side, began to harry Gujarat, he asked the Marathas to send a

90. The Report dated Shravana Sudi 11, S. 1783 (July 28, 1726), which seems to have been sent by Joshi Shambhu Ram, or Rai Maya Ram, *wakil*, has at the top *Shri Ramo Jayati*, and on the right side *Shri Ekalingaji (J.S.A.)*.

91. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 14, S. 1782 (July 2, 1726), *J.S.A.*

responsible man to negotiate terms with him. He sent back Shyam Rao, whom Ambaji had sent to him, saying that the issue was too weighty to be discussed with him, and wrote to the Maharana to send Jadu Rai, the brother of Shankarji Malhar, who had been sent to Udaipur some time before. The Maharana, however, declined to give leave to Jadu Rai, whom he had found a good and honest man, without Raja Shahu's prior consent. Sarbuland Khan then wrote to Shahu directly for sending Jadu Rai to him. On Shahu's orders, the envoy, accompanied by Munshi Shobha Ram of Mewar, met Sarbuland Khan in May-June 1726.⁹² After brief negotiations, Sarbuland Khan agreed to grant the Marathas *chauth* for that year. As in the winter of that year Pilaji and Kanthaji, who resented Peshwa's intrusion into Gujarat, created much trouble in the province, Sarbuland Khan concluded with the Peshwa (February 20, 1727) an agreement granting Raja Shahu the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Gujarat, on the condition that other trouble makers (viz. Kanthaji, Pilaji, etc.) would be expelled from the province. But two months later, when Kanthaji and Pilaji captured Baroda and Dabhoi, Sarbuland Khan agreed to confirm the grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in their favour. Their right to Gujarat as their special sphere of activity was now confirmed by Shahu (August 1727). With the Maratha forces fighting among themselves and harrying the province alternately, and the Maratha officials collecting their various claims everywhere in the province, peace and prosperity vanished from Gujarat, and utter lawlessness and disorder became the order of the day. In March 1730, Sarbuland Khan came to an agreement with Chimnaji Appa, renewing the treaty of February 1727. By this agreement, he conceded to the Peshwa the right to collect *sardeshmukhi* (both on land and customs, excepting the port of Surat and the district around it), *chauth* (on land and customs, excepting Surat), and five percent of the revenues of Ahmadabad city.⁹³ The cession of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Gujarat was highly resented at the Imperial court, and Sarbuland Khan was soon replaced by Maharaja Abhai Singh.

92. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 14, S. 1782 (July 2, 1726), *J.S.A.*

93. See *S.P.D.*, XV, 86; *Shahu Roznishi*, No. 105; Duff, I, 416-17, 422-23; Dighe, 30-33.

Jai Singh keen to save Malwa from Gujarat's fate. Though Sarbuland Khan had succumbed to the Maratha pressure, Jai Singh was keen to save Malwa from meeting a similar fate. He was entirely against conceding to the Marathas the right to collect *chauth* from northern provinces, though, as already noted, he favoured granting them some concessions within the framework of the empire. This, from financial point of view, was likely to be advantageous to both the sides, as it would have spared each from undertaking costly campaigns round the year.⁹¹ Meanwhile, Jai Singh tried to secure for himself the Government of Malwa, and when it was declined, he requested the Emperor to post him at Mandsaur, so that he might check Maratha threat to the Rajput states from that side. But the Emperor did not accept his proposal.⁹⁵

Jai Singh's attempt to deal with the Maratha problem, and his unceasing efforts from 1727 onwards to check the fury of the Maratha flood, have been recounted in the next chapter.

Jai Singh reproves Abhai Singh for disobeying the Imperial orders; Abhai Singh appointed under Sarbuland Khan in Gujarat; Abhai Singh's reasons for not going to Gujarat; also declines to go to Malwa. It has been noted that in November 1724, Maharaja Abhai Singh was granted a month's leave to enable him to go to his state, where disorder had broken loose following Maharaja Ajit Singh's assassination. Since then he had stayed on there. In September 1725, he received orders to join duty under Sarbuland Khan, the new governor of Gujarat. During the next two months, he was repeatedly asked to carry out the posting orders. Sawai Jai Singh also sent him a number of letters urging him to join Sarbuland Khan, but he did not stir out of Jodhpur;⁹⁶ his patent reply was that threat from his brothers, who were trying to secure Maratha help, still persisted, and the Emperor being reluctant to pay him expenses, he was unable to move from Jodhpur. Jai Singh, in his letter dated November 26, 1725, advised him to set out from Jodhpur, and, after covering five or six stages, to request the Court to send the expenses. He

94. This has been discussed further in Ch. IX, p. 205.

95. For his request to be posted at Mandsaur, see the draft of Jai Singh's letter to the Maharana, Kartik Vadi 4, S. 1783 (October 4, 1726), *J.S.A.*

96. In the Jaipur Archives there are a number of drafts of Jai Singh's letters and Abhai's replies in connection with his posting under Sarbuland Khan; only the more important of these letters have been used here.

assured that the Emperor would give all due consideration to the existence of the Deccani threat to his State, but would listen nothing till he (Abhai Singh) has started for Gujarat.⁹⁷ As at this time Sarbuland Khan was facing stiff resistance from the Marathas in Gujarat, the Emperor and Sawai Jai Singh both wanted Abhai Singh to reach Ahmadabad early. It was in December that Abhai Singh at last set out from Jodhpur, but he did not proceed beyond Varna.⁹⁸ Knowing well that Abhai's disobedient conduct at the very beginning of his career in the Imperial service, after becoming the ruler of Jodhpur, would create a most unfavourable impression upon the Emperor, Jai Singh wrote to Raghunath Bhandari to persuade his young master not to delay in carrying out the posting. Jai Singh felt satisfied when Abhai Singh, in his letter dated 25th March 1726, informed him that soon he would be leaving for Ahmadabad after entrusting the administration of his state to Bakhta Singh and Raghunath Bhandari.⁹⁹ But he changed his mind. He wrote to Jai Singh on March 31, 1726, that he had postponed his departure in view of continued Maratha threat to his state.¹⁰⁰ In May 1726, orders were sent to him to join Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, then posted in Malwa. On May 13, Abhai Singh wrote to Jai Singh that he was not in a position to leave Jodhpur. "You know the condition of my *desh*. For the sake of its security, I did not go to Gujarat. Had the Emperor given me sufficient expenses, I would have reached there after recruiting temporary levies, leaving the army of *desh* here." He was also doubtful if he would be able to pull on with a man like Sarbuland Khan. He was unwilling to go to Malwa either, for, he wrote, he would not be able to protect the province from the Marathas, and by associating with Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, would unnecessarily provoke the Deccanis. He would however go to Malwa in case Jai Singh was posted there. He requested Jai Singh to secure for him the governorship of Gujarat or to have him recalled to

97. Jai Singh to Abhai Singh, draft letter, November 26, 1725, *J.S.A.*

98. Jai Singh to Abhai Singh, draft letter, Pausha Vadi 12, S. 1782 (December 20, 1725), *J.S.A.*

99. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Chaitra Sudi, 3, Raj. S. 1782 (March 25, 1726), *J.S.A.*

100. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Chaitra Sudi 10, S. 1782 (March 31, 1726), *J.S.A.*

Court.¹⁰¹ This was in fact the reason why he was not going to Gujarat or to Malwa. He wanted independent charge of a province, or a posting at Court. But this was asking too much at the very beginning of his career in the Imperial service and without rendering any service anywhere in the empire. In August, on Jai Singh's request, the Emperor agreed to postpone Abhai Singh's appointment under Sarbuland Khan. Jai Singh also advised the Emperor not to grant Nagor to Indra Singh.¹⁰² It seems that after a month or so Abhai Singh was again asked to proceed to Gujarat, and again he made excuses. By this time, he had been in Jodhpur for nearly two years, whereas he had been allowed to go to his state in November 1724 for a month only.

Jai Singh's sharply worded letter to Abhai Singh; Abhai Singh leaves for Court. Abhai Singh's procrastination made Jai Singh write to him a sharply worded letter. He wrote on November 6, 1726, "You give two reasons for not going to Gujarat: the disturbances created by Rai Singh and Anand Singh, and the Emperor's failure to grant you *jagirs* and expenses. It would have been proper had you accompanied Sarbuland Khan to Gujarat, and from there should have sent your application with Sarbuland Khan's recommendation, on which the expenses and the *matalibs* would have been granted to you. Sarbuland Khan and the mace-bearers have sent adverse reports about you. When you were at Delhi you had assured the Emperor to serve, wherever required, with 20,000-30,000 horse. And now you are not even going to Gujarat! The Emperor is extremely unhappy with you on this account, and I cannot express in words the way he taunts me and Khan-i-Dauran. Your request for the expenses was conveyed to the Emperor by Khan-i-Dauran, but he pays no heed to it, and is very critical of your conduct. He is even discussing the question of Nagor with Indra Singh. He also intends to summon Anand Singh to Court. Indeed, he may even cancel the grant of Jodhpur that he has bestowed upon you."¹⁰³

101. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Jyeshtha Vadi 8, S. 1782 (May 13, 1726), *J.S.A.*

102. Jai Singh to Raghunath Bhandari, *parwanah*, Bhadava Sudi 11, S. 1783 (August 27, 1726), *Jodhpur, S.A.*

103. Jai Singh to Abhai Singh, draft letter, November 6, 1726, *J.S.A.* These letters show that the Emperor had not become a nonentity, as is sometimes supposed.

But it was not before June-July 1727, by which time Rai Singh and Anand Singh had been conciliated through Jai Singh's efforts, that Abhai Singh set out for the Court.¹⁰⁴ Abhai Singh's adamant conduct caused considerable annoyance to Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran. Later on, as we will see, he could not come close to the Emperor, Sawai Jai Singh, the Maharana, or any other Rajput prince, and, like his father, pursued policies which did not find favour with his brother princes.

Civil war brings misery to Marwar; Jai Singh tries for a compromise; Abhai Singh's obstinacy. Though more than two years had elapsed since Ajit Singh's murder, the situation in Marwar had not returned to normal. Jai Singh and the Maharana were very anxious on this account, especially as continuance of a civil war in Marwar served as a standing invitation to the Marathas to intervene in the dispute. Also, the country was suffering badly on account of continued hostilities. The trade in the region had come to a standstill as Rai Singh and Anand Singh, penniless as they were, plundered the caravans and extracted money from the traders, to keep up their struggle against their brothers, who were being backed by the Imperial Court and the states of Amber and Mewar. It was also feared that in view of the extremely disturbed situation in Marwar, the Emperor might take some drastic step which might complicate the matters further. For these reasons, when Jai Singh came to know in August 1726 that Anand Singh and Rai Singh were inclined to submit provided suitable *jagirs* were granted to them, and that the nobles supporting them were also willing to recognize Abhai Singh as their ruler provided they were restored their *jagirs*, he sounded Bhandari Raghunath about granting some villages to Anand Singh and Rai Singh.¹⁰⁵ But Abhai Singh declined to accommodate his brothers even to the smallest extent.

Jai Singh secures Idar for the Maharana. Jai Singh now advised Abhai Singh to transfer Idar, over which Anand Singh and Rai Singh had established their hold, to the Maharana, who was anxious to acquire it to secure his State on the southern side, on the condition that the Maharana would undertake to destroy the

104. On June 26, 1727, Abhai Singh was at Barahpula (his letter of this date to Jai Singh is in *J.S.A.*).

105. Jai Singh to Bhandari Raghunath, *parwanah*, Bhadava Vadi 7, S. 1783 (August 9, 1726), *J.S.A.* The letter shows that Bhandari Raghunath had regained his old position after suffering a temporary eclipse.

two brothers.¹⁰⁶ In his letter dated May 31, 1727, Jai Singh requested the Maharana to conduct personally the operation against Rai Singh and Anand Singh, or to send Nagraj, his foster brother, against them, and to take all precautions to prevent their escape.¹⁰⁷ But, before the Mewar troops reached Idar, the rebels had escaped. Nagraj and the Maharana, both then tried to mollify Jai Singh, and assured him that the two brothers had only a small following and soon they would either be killed or captured.¹⁰⁸

Anand Singh and Rai Singh at Sirohi. Jai Singh asks Jaisalmer not to shelter them. After fleeing from Idar, Rai Singh and Anand Singh entered Sirohi, 56 miles north-west of Udaipur, and from there commenced harrying raids into Marwar. In his letter of June 26, 1727 to Jai Singh, Abhai Singh regretted that he was unable to take reprisals against them as they were operating from inside the Mewar territory.¹⁰⁹ On Abhai Singh's request, Jai Singh wrote to the Maharana to send a force to Sirohi to drive out the two brothers. Towards the end of 1727, Anand Singh and Rai Singh had to leave Sirohi and also Jetaran. At Jetaran they tried to plunder the carts of the Marwar traders who were on their way to Gujarat; but nothing fell into their hands as the carts were carrying only indigo. Thereafter they fled to Hasror. But soon Bakht Singh arrived there, and they were forced to flee. They took shelter in Rupnagar, but there too Bakht Singh arrived in their pursuit.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, Jai Singh had sent Joshi Shambhu Ram to Jaisalmer to request the Maharawal not to give shelter to Rai Singh and

106. Dhabhai Nagraj to Sawai Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 15, S. 1783 (June 22, 1727), *J.S.A.* In his letter of 1727 A.D. (month not mentioned), the Maharana thanked Jai Singh for persuading Abhai Singh to transfer Idar to Mewar, and for sending the document recording the transfer. He wrote, "This you alone could have done. The work of entire Hindustan is done through you. This was after all work of your own house."

107. Jai Singh to Maharana, Ashadha Vadi 7, S. 1783 (May 31, 1727) in *V.V.*, II, 968. Sometime back the Maharana had remarked: "Mewar is the house and Idar is its courtyard". Ever since then, wrote Jai Singh, he was keen to get Idar for Mewar (*Ibid.*). See also Abhai Singh's letter to the Maharana in *V.V.*, II, 969, conveying his consent to the transfer of Idar to Mewar.

108. Dhabhai Nagraj to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 15, S. 1783 (June 22, 1727); and Maharana to Jai Singh (n.d.), 1727 A.D., *J.S.A.*

109. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Shravana Vadi 4 (June 26, 1727), *J.S.A.*

110. Bhandari Raghunath to Jai Singh, Magha Sudi 14, S. 1784 (January 14, 1728), *J.S.A.*

Anand Singh. He also sent a force to assist Bakht Singh who was then operating against his brothers.

Jai Singh brings about the settlement of the dispute. Reduced to great hardships, and, with no hope or resources left to continue the struggle, Anand Singh and Rai Singh submitted on the condition that they would stay at Udaipur, that except the villages adjoining Mewar, the rest of the Idar *pargana*, including Idar town, would be assigned to them for their expenses. They also pledged not to move out of Udaipur.¹¹¹ Maharaja Ajit Singh's fourth son, Kishore Singh, who had taken shelter with his maternal grandfather, the Maharawal of Jaisalmer, came away to Amber. Jai Singh secured from Abhai Singh a promise to pay his brother forty Rupees per day for his maintenance. He asked Bhandari Raghunath to send the amount for the Prince at an early date; till then, Jai Singh wrote, he would arrange payment to the Prince through some banker, and would settle the account on receiving money from Jodhpur.¹¹²

In this manner, through Jai Singh's patient efforts, peace was restored in Marwar, and the dispute, which at one time had threatened to bring about Maratha intervention, was settled to the benefit of all concerned. The Rathor nobles, who had been supporting Anand Singh and Rai Singh, were also restored in their *jagirs*.

Kotah seeks Jai Singh's help against a pretender. About this time, Sawai Jai Singh's help was urgently sought by Kotah in dealing with the trouble created by an impostor. We have already noted that Shyam Singh, son of Maharao Bhim Singh, had died in the battle of Udaipuriya (December 1723) while fighting against Durjansal, his younger brother, for the *gaddi* of Kotah. In early 1726, a pretender personating as Shyam Singh, and accompanied by Dalel Khan Pathan and the Rohelas, reached Sheopur and started creating trouble. Maharao Durjansal then moved to Ramgarh, about 49 miles north-east of Kotah. Jai Singh also sent a token force, signifying his support for Maharao Durjansal.

111. Copy of Abhai Singh's letter to the Maharana, Bhadrpada Vadi 2, S. 1785 (August 10, 1728); Kishore Singh to Abhai Singh, undated, in *J.S.A.* Also see Jai Singh to Maharana, Bhadava Vadi 13, S. 1785 (August 21, 1728) in *Vir Vinod*, II, 971.

112. Jai Singh to Bhandari Raghunath, Asoj Vadi 2, S. 1785 (September 9, 1728), and of Kartik Sudi 4, S. 1785 (October 25, 1728), *Jodhpur S.A.* See also Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 611.

On March 17, 1726, the Amber official commanding this force reported that the pretender had with him between 1500-2000 troops, and that Salim Singh Hada's sincerity towards Durjansal was doubtful. "Although he has sworn in the name of Rao Rajaji and his own *karmas*, the contingent which he had promised to send has not yet arrived, nor do we hope that it would come. Gulmir Khan Rohela, Chitar Singh of Hada Ghati, and some relations were with Salim Singh. They claim that the *Fitur* is really Shyam Singh. I then told them, 'If he is Shyam Singh, then he should wait upon the Emperor or Shriji (Jai Singh). If he is Shyam Singh then why is he getting his land ravaged by the Turks? If it is proved that he is really Shyam Singh, then we shall secure a *jagir* for him'," he wrote.¹¹³

When Durjansal was at Ramgarh, Khande Rai, *diwan* of Narwar, also arrived there. Accompanied by two Kotah officials, he went to Sheopur to ascertain the identity of the *Fitur*. On his return he reported that the person in question was a pretender. As Maharao Durjansal did not trust Khande Rai, he requested Jai Singh to ask Khande Rai to do his best in suppressing the pretender. He complained against Khande Rai for delaying action against the Pathans, and requested Jai Singh to write to the Shivpuri ruler to prevent the *Fitur's* escape from that side and, in case he was captured, to send him to Amber so that his identity might be ascertained.¹¹⁴ In October 1726, Maharao Durjansal informed Jai Singh that the miscreant was still at Sheopur and that Khande Rai had given him shelter¹¹⁵

The trouble created by the *Fitur* continued till the early months of 1727.¹¹⁶ It attracted wide notice. We have already mentioned that Chhatrasal Bundela enquired about the affair from the Kotah ruler. The *Fitur's* case, though not important in itself, shows the existence of close ties between Maharao Durjansal and Jai Singh, and reveals the growing tendency among the disgruntled elements in the Rajput states to hire the Pathans,

113. Report of an Amber official, Chaitra Vadi 10, S. 1782 (March 17, 1726), *J.S.A.*

114. Durjansal to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 11, S. 1782 (June 28, 1726), *J.S.A.*

115. Durjansal to Jai Singh Kartik Sudi [n.d.], S. 1783 (October 15-29, 1726), *J.S.A.*

116. Durjansal to Jai Singh, February 15, 1727, *J.S.A.*

the Rohelas and other disturbing elements for achieving their objective.

Durjansal raids Rampura; Jai Singh mediates. In November 1727, some miscreants—Chitar Singh Hadā and his followers according to Surajmal¹¹⁷—plundered some villages of the Kotah State, and then escaped to Rampura. When Thakur Sangram Singh Chandrawat, grandson of Rao Gopal Singh of Rampura, did not pay heed to Durjansal's warning against sheltering the miscreants, he crossed into Rampura, which had again been under Mewar since August 1717. The Kotah troops captured Rampura, forcing Sangram Singh and Chitar Singh to fly for their lives, and plundered the town. After handing over the place to the Mewari *thanahdar* of Kukresar, Durjansal returned to his State, and sent a detailed account of the incident to Sawai Jai Singh.¹¹⁸ Sangram Singh, who had fled to Bijolia, also complained to Jai Singh against Durjansal, whom he charged with violating Mewar's territory. He requested Jai Singh to send a large force which should, in co-operation with the Maharana's troops, avenge the insult.¹¹⁹ Jai Singh ignored Sangram Singh's suggestion. He, however, recommended to the Maharana not to dismiss the Thakur who was a hereditary servant of Mewar. Some time later, Sangram Singh went to Delhi, and managed to secure the grant of Rampura in his name by bribing the Imperial officers. But, while on his way back to Rampura, he was murdered, according to Surajmal, by Jai Singh's men.¹²⁰

The Marathas again figure in Rajputana; force Dungarpur and Banswara to pay annual tribute. We have already noted the strong resentment that was felt in Rajputana at the Maratha inroads in Mewar during 1724-26, and the military and diplomatic measures taken by Jai Singh and the Maharana to prevent their recurrence.¹²¹ In 1728, the Marathas succeeded in securing from Dungarpur and Banswara, which were vassal states of Mewar, promise to pay them tribute. In the agreement it was stipulated that Dungarpur would

117. *Vamsha*, IV, 3117. For details see 3116-3121.

118. Durjansal to Jai Singh, Pausha Vadi 10, S. 1784 (November 26, 1727), and Magha Vadi 4, S. 1784 (December 21, 1727), *J.S.A.*

119. Maharaj Shri Rao Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, Pausha Sudi 5, S. 1785 (December 24, 1727), *J.S.A.*

120. *Vamsha*, IV, 3121.

121. See Ch. VIII, pp. 181-82.

pay the amount through Udaji Pawar, and Banswara would remit half of the amount to Udaji Pawar and remaining half to Holkar, and later only to the Dhar chief. But in the following year (October-November 1729), Kadam Rao Raghoji and Kat Singh Kadam Rao, who had strained relations with the Peshwa, fell upon Dungarpur and Banswara and carried away one lakh thirteen thousand and fifty thousand Rupees from the two states, respectively. When the Chhatrapati came to know of it, he demanded explanation from the two commanders and ordered them to send the amount to Poona.¹²²

Mewar's anger and concern at the Maratha raids. These developments caused deepest concern to Mewar. In his letter of December 10, S. 1728, the Maharana sought Jai Singh's views on the steps they should take to deal with the Marathas. "This time they have struck their blow. If necessary measures are not taken in time, there would be no limit to their disturbances," the Maharana wrote. Earlier (December 1726), when the Maharana had written to Jai Singh about repeated intrusions of the Deccanis into the southern Mewar, Jai Singh had called them thieves.¹²³ His unsavoury remark expresses the bitter feelings of the Rajputs at the Maratha intrusions in their states. But, despite provocations from the Marathas, Jai Singh kept the door open for negotiations with them, and in 1730 sent Mansa Ram Purohit to Satara.¹²⁴ Thereafter, Jai Singh's diplomatic negotiations with Satara and Poona proceeded at a hectic pace which never languished till his death in 1743. The course and tenor of these negotiations constitute the main theme of the next chapter.

Jai Singh builds Jainagar. In the midst of all this activity, Sawai Jai Singh could find time to lay the foundation of a new capital, which, after its completion, was acclaimed by all as one of the most graceful and well planned cities of India. Amber, the old

122. *S.P.D.*, XIII, 42; Lele, pp. 30ff; *Treaties, Engagements & Sanads*, III, 444; Vad, *Shahu Roznishi*, I, No. 214; Ojha, *Dungarpur*, 125. That Mewar resented these developments is evident from the agreement which Rawal Shiv Singh of Dungarpur had to sign in April 1729, promising to serve Mewar like his ancestors. Dhabhai also made him pay four lakhs of Rupees (see text of the agreement, dated Vaishakha Sudi 6, S. 1786 in *V.V.*, II, 1011).

123. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, -Pausha Vadi 5, S. 1785 (December 10, 1728), *J.S.A.*

124. *S.P.D.*, XXX, No. 78.

Kachhwaha capital, was too small to meet the growing requirements of the rapidly expanding State of Jai Singh. There were no large markets, nor good roads, nor enough room to meet the needs of the growing population. The palaces were excellent, but the town itself was too old fashioned and circumscribed by nature to permit such improvements as could have satisfied Jai Singh, whose resources, fortunately, now matched his high talents and imaginative dreams. On Pausha Vadi 8, S. 1784 (25th November, 1727) he laid the foundation of Jainagar, a town after his name.¹²⁵ During the next few years, Jai Singh frequently visited Jainagar to satisfy himself about the progress of the construction of the town. A full account of the town, which was ready by 1733, is given at a subsequent place.

Birth of Madho Singh; Jai Singh faces the succession problem. The year 1728 ended leaving a delicate problem for Sawai Jai Singh. On December 17, 1728,¹²⁶ his Sisodini queen, whom he had married long back in May 1708 at Udaipur, gave birth to a male child. The birth of Madho Singh, as the child was named, shattered Jai Singh's hopes of a peaceful succession of Ishwari Singh, his only surviving son who was born of his Khichi queen in February 1722.¹²⁷ Shiv Singh, the eldest son of Jai Singh from Maharani Gendi, had died earlier in 1725 or in 1726. The earliest entry in the contemporary papers about Shiv Singh is of 1717 A.D. On the 1st October, 1721, he waited upon the Emperor and received a *mansab* of 5,000, and in the Mughal official records his name was entered as Shiv Singh. The Emperor took his hand, led him inside the palace, and bestowed upon him many gifts, including a male elephant and a horse. In 1724, the Emperor told Jai Singh, who had been asked to proceed to Jodhpur, to leave Shiv Singh as *faujdar* of Mathura. Jai Singh was then the governor of Agra province. After this, we hear no more of Shiv Singh; it seems he died shortly afterwards.¹²⁸

125. Ojha, *Nibandha Sangraha*, III, 104.

126. *V.V.*, II, 973. Surajmal gives (*Vamsha*, IV, 3121). Pausha Vadi 15, S. 1785 as Madho Singh's date of birth.

127. The news of the child's birth reached Jaisinghpura, Delhi, on February 12, 1722. The same day Jai Singh presented 500 *muhrs* to the Emperor while conveying the happy news.

128. For Shiv Singh see, *D.K.*, XXIV, 408. Surajmal says (*Vamsha*, IV, 3036) that Shiv Singh was of a very violent temperament, and that his father put

Mewar's matrimonial offer to Ishwari Singh. Jai Singh seeks Mewar's favor; the Maharana obliges. In January 1728, Maharana Sangram Singh sent the coconut proposing his granddaughter's hand to Jai Singh's only son and heir, Ishwari Singh. Jai Singh was then encamped at Pavta, 67 miles east of Jaipur. He accepted the *tika* brought by the uncle of the Maharana, Kishore Singh, Thakur of Salumber, and the Purohit.¹²⁹ Apparently, the Maharana did not expect his sister, who was married to Jai Singh about twenty years before, to bear a child now, otherwise he would not have made this proposal. But shortly after Mewar's proposal had been accepted, it became known that the Sisodini Rani was with child. The birth of a son to the lady was bound to rake up the almost forgotten issue of succession of her son irrespective of his age, in accordance with the agreement of 1708. Hence, in September 1728, about three months before the expected birth of the child, Jai Singh journeyed down to Udaipur, obviously to discuss with the Maharana the steps he might take in case a son was born to the Sisodini queen. He reached Udaipur on September 21, and stayed there till October 8.¹³⁰ It seems, he returned satisfied after receiving the Maharana's promise to help him out of the difficulty in case a male child was born to his wife.

After Madho Singh's birth, Jai Singh decided to bestow upon him an unusually large appanage which included Tonk, Phagi and Malpura, constituting almost a petty sovereignty, and the Maharana

him to death.

129. *D.K.*, Vol. XXIV, 40. Though the entry only says that the *narial* sent by Maharanaji was accepted, Surajmal says (*Vamsha*, IV, 3096) that the Mewar princess was the daughter of Kamwar Nath Singh, the second son of Rana Sangram Singh. For complications arising out of the acceptance of the offer by Jai Singh for Bhawani Singh, his sister's son, see chapter IX, p. 213

130. *Siala Hazur Papers*, Asoj Vadi 2 — Kartik Vadi 1, S. 1785 (1728 A.D.). On September 13, Jai Singh was at Deosuri pass where Bakht Singh of Nagor received him. On Sunday, September 15, he reached Jilwada, where he was welcomed by the Maharana's eldest son, Jagat Singh. On September 21, he arrived in Udaipur in a *palki*, halted for some time in a garden, changed his dress, put on jewels, etc., and then mounted a horse. The approach of the Maharana was announced. The Maharana was also mounted on a horse. They both alighted and mounted an elephant, first the Maharana, followed by Jai Singh, and came to the palaces. Jai Singh stayed at Udaipur till October 8. Besides Bakht Singh, Raja Gopal Singh of Karauli and Rao Indra Singh were also present. They all spent their free hours boating, playing *chaughan*, and witnessing elephant fights.

also assigned to his nephew the rich fief of Rampura.¹³¹ When the issue of Rampura's grant to Madho Singh arose, Jai Singh had to employ all his persuasion before Mewar's faithful minister, Biharidas, agreed to its transfer from a Sisodia to a Kachhwaha.¹³² On March 26, 1729, Rana Sangram Singh issued a grant conferring Rampura on his nephew on the condition that the latter would serve Mewar for six months in a year with 1000 horse and 1000 matchlockmen. Jai Singh signed the agreement on behalf of his son, promising fulfilment of the terms of the agreement.¹³³

The eventful ten years. These ten years (1720-30) witnessed the exit of Churaman Jat and of Maharaja Ajit Singh from the political scene, the reduction of the Jat power as a tributary to Amber, and the Nizam's departure to the Deccan, where he lived in virtual independence, and from where he continued to cast his baleful influence upon Delhi. During this period, the Marathas commenced their desolating raids in Rajputana, and scorched Malwa and Gujarat by their fury, which did not abate till they had established their hegemony over both these provinces. These ten years also witnessed the rapid growth of Jai Singh's influence at Delhi and in Rājputana, and blossoming of his exceptional talents as a diplomat, negotiator, and as a man of wide culture. By 1730, two or three of his five observatories were complete and the rest were nearing completion; his work on reformed astronomical tables had made considerable progress; and his newly founded city was coming up fast. The decade thus marked the completion of the first phase of Jai Singh's rise to eminence and power.

131. See Tod, II, 298.

132. See *V.V.*, II, 974.

133. Text of the agreement dated Chaitra Sudi 7, S. 1785 (March 26, 1729) in *V.V.*, II, 975-76. See also the agreement in Madho Singh's name, and Jai Singh's agreement of Chaitra Sudi 9 in *V.V.*, II, 976-77.

JAI SINGH AND THE MARATHAS

After 1728, the problem created by the rapid Maratha advance towards northern India was uppermost in the minds of all those who were likely to be affected by the Maratha success.

Jai Singh's policy towards the Marathas; common misunderstanding about his policy. So far as Jai Singh was concerned, he had never any illusions regarding the seriousness of the Maratha threat to Rajputana and other parts of northern India if Malwa and Gujarat passed into their hands. We have already noted his vigorous measures to check the Maratha entry into Malwa during 1714-16 when he was the governor of the province, and his attempt to organize Rajput resistance to meet their incursions in Mewar during 1725-26.¹

While favouring military preparedness, Jai Singh, as we have seen, did not share the view held blindly by Muhammad Khan Bangash, Saadat Khan, Qamar-ud-din Khan, and many others that a military confrontation was the only way out to deal with the Maratha problem. This policy had been tried in the past for too long and with most disappointing results. Now, with diminished financial and military resources and a crumbling Imperial authority, it had even lesser chances of success. By this time the Punjab, Bengal and the Deccan had passed beyond the effective control of Delhi, and Saadat Khan in Awadh, Bangash in Allahabad, and the successive governors of Gujarat were busy in emulating the pernicious example set by the Nizam and were trying to become virtually independent of Delhi. The Imperial government was seriously weakened by these inroads on its authority. Moreover, the Maratha armies under Baji Rao's able and inspiring leadership had by 1728 acquired the reputation of being an all conquering force — disciplined, confident and charged with utmost alacrity and high hopes. In these circumstances, Jai Singh gradually veered to the viewpoint that an agreement between the Marathas and the

1. See chapt. VIII, p. 182.

Mughal government might result in a lasting solution of the vexed problem. This could be achieved by granting the Marathas suitable concessions within the framework of the empire. With this purpose in mind, he entered into negotiations with the Marathas in 1728. After 1730, these negotiations ran a busy course, and, in the end, held out the possibility of restoring peace and stability in the country, with the active support of Marathas, under the nominal leadership of the Emperor.

In this attempt Jai Singh had to encounter heavy opposition all along from the Nizam, Qamar-ud-din Khan and other influential nobles, who did their best to wreck the negotiations which he was conducting with Satara and Poona with the full approval of the Emperor. There is no doubt that Jai Singh was sincere in his desire to restrain the Maratha advance into the northern provinces, and facts do not bear out the view² that he called them into Malwa "in order to weaken the detested Mughal power", as a part of his "scheme of Hindu revival," or that he favoured them in any way. On the other hand, he strove hard to contain the Maratha imperialism so that the existing political set up might not blow up all too suddenly.

A brief account of the growth of Maratha influence in Malwa during 1720-27. We have noted that Muhammad Amin Khan, who had replaced Jai Singh as the governor of Malwa in November 1717, was dismissed a few months later. The next governor of Malwa was the Nizam, who had accepted the appointment on the express assurance of the Saiyids that he would not be removed from the province in the near future. In March 1719, he left Delhi to take charge of Malwa, but shortly afterwards came into open clash with the Saiyids. At this time, the Marathas were busy in enforcing their newly acquired rights to collect *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the Deccan *subahs*. This and Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath's death in April 1720, prevented the Marathas from invading Malwa during 1719-20.

Malwa again under the Nizam; his ominous meeting with Baji Rao. After the fall of the Saiyids, the Government of Malwa was again given to the Nizam who already held the Government of the

2. This view is held by J.N. Sarkar (see *Later Mughals*, II, 244); Sardesai, *Main Currents*. 95-6; Sinha, *Rise of the Peshwas* (2nd Ed., Allahabad, 1954), 135; see also Yusuf Hussain, 167-68, and Jonathan Scott, II, 190 who writes that Raja Jai Singh Sawai supported Baji Rao "from a similarity of religion."

Deccan *subahs*. As noted, the Nizam had taken over as *wazir* in January 1722, following Muhammad Amin Khan's death. In August, *subah* Malwa was granted to Raja Girdhar Bahadur whose appointment coincided with renewed Maratha aggression in the province in accordance with Baji Rao's forward policy, which he had been able to push through the Maratha council.³ In the beginning of 1723, he entered Malwa, and on February 13 had a meeting with the Nizam at Bolasa in the former Jhabua state.⁴ The meeting was ominous for the province as the Nizam, to secure his own position in the Deccan, was willing to offer the Marathas a free entry into the northern provinces, provided they would leave him unmolested in the Deccan.⁵ Baji Rao too gave priority to Malwa instead of first dealing with the Nizam. He had already granted to Udaji Pawar half of the *mokasa* in Gujarat and Malwa (December 3, 1722).⁶ The Nizam's offer facilitated his task. In March-April 1723, the Peshwa visited Handia district, and a section of his troops joined the Nizam in reducing Dost Mohammad Khan Rohilla of Bhopal.⁷

Nizam meets Baji Rao; barter away the empire's interests. In May 1723, Girdhar Bahadur's first tenure as the governor of Malwa came to an end when the Nizam took over the charge of the province from him. But on finding his position at the Court increasingly difficult, the Nizam decided to step down as *wazir* and to make himself virtually independent in the Deccan. In December 1723, he left Delhi and reached Ujjain by rapid marches. Here he came to know that he had been superseded in the Deccan by Mubariz Khan, his deputy, whom he had left there when leaving for Delhi in October 1721. He also learnt that Sawai Jai Singh had been asked to enlist Maratha support for Mubariz Khan against him.⁸ As the Nizam was in desperate need of Maratha support, or at least of their neutrality, in the impending conflict with Mubariz Khan, he met Baji Rao at Nalchha on May 18, and agreed not to oppose

3. Chitnis, *Shahu Charitra*, 60-61.

4. For this see *Malwa*, 142, 144-46; Dighe, 96.

5. This conclusion is supported by the Nizam's policy towards the Marathas and his dealings with the Peshwa during the coming years. Cf. Yusuf Hussain, 165.

6. *Malwa*, 144.

7. Dighe, 96.

8. See *Parties*, 177.

the collection of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the six Deccan *subahs*, and reissued the grants under his signature.⁹ There is ground for believing that he may have agreed to support their claims in Malwa and Gujarat.¹⁰

Raja Girdhar Bahadur foils Maratha attempts to levy blackmail. Battle of Amjhera. Bhawani Ram appointed governor. After the Nizam's victory over Mubariz Khan in October 1724, Malwa was taken away from him and was granted to Raja Girdhar Bahadur. The Raja and his cousin Daya Bahadur had to face an uphill task in the province. The Peshwa had, on his own authority, assigned to a number of Maratha *sardars* the right to collect dues from different areas of Malwa. After the Dashera of 1725, three Maratha armies entered Malwa, but Daya Bahadur foiled their attempts to collect blackmail from the province. During 1726-27 also, the Marathas had to return empty-handed from the *subah*.¹¹ But Baji Rao's great victory over the Nizam in February 1728 at Palkhed imparted a new buoyancy to the Maratha drive towards the northern provinces. The Peshwa even issued instructions to the rulers of various principalities of Malwa and to the Mughal officers of the *parganas*, to pay dues to the Maratha officials appointed by him.¹² Shortly afterwards, the Mughal position in the province received a serious blow when a large Maratha army under Chimnaji Appa, brother of the Peshwa, secured near Amjhera a decisive victory (November 29, 1728) over the imperial troops led by Raja Girdhar Bahadur, who was slain along with several leading officers.¹³ The blow was so sudden and severe that, for quite

9. See *S.P.D.*, X, No. 1; XXX, pp. 269, 271; Vad, II, 224-25; *Malwa*, 151-52; Dr. A.G. Pawar's paper in *PIHRC*, Vol. XVII (1941), pp. 213-14. Shahu, before he decided to support the Nizam, had sent to Delhi a long list of terms on which he would assist the Emperor. He asked for confirmatory *farmans* for *chauth*, *sardeshmukhi*, and *swarajya*, exemption from payment of *peshkash*, appointment of a person of their choice as the governor of the Deccan, etc. The Emperor, it appears, did not accept these terms whereupon the Marathas decided to support the Nizam. (A.G. Pawar, *loc. cit.*, 213).

10. Dighe, 97.

11. See *Malwa*, 153ff. In a letter, which seems to have been sent some time between March and June 1726, Girdhar Bahadur describes the activities of Ambaji Pant and Kanhoji, and narrates how his own troops drove the Marathas beyond the Narmada after a month long fighting. (*J.S.A.*)

12. *Dharcha Itihas*, 17-18, 27-29; *Malwa*, 161; Dighe, 96-99.

13. *S.P.D.*, XIII, Nos. 15, 23, 26, 27; *Ajaib*, f. 74b. In Jai Singh's correspondence (e.g., in his condolence message to Bhawani Ram) there is no mention

some time after this debacle, no effective resistance was offered to the Marathas in Malwa. To fill the gap for the time being, the Emperor appointed Bhawani Ram, son of Chhabela Ram, as the new governor of Malwa. He was given the title of Raja, and was advised to run the affairs of the province in co-operation with Raja Girdhar Bahadur's sons. Also, orders were sent to Sawai Jai Singh, Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, Maharana Sangram Singh of Mewar, the Maharao of Kotah, Muhammad Umar Khan, and some other nobles asking them to assist Bhawani Ram in all possible ways.¹⁴

Jai Singh informed about Bhawani Ram's position. Jai Singh sent a condolence message to Bhawani Ram on Girdhar Bahadur's death and a *parwanah* to Kesho Ram, Amber's official agent at Ujjain. In his report of December 21, Kesho Ram informed Jai Singh that Bhawani Ram's *wakil* at the Court had requested the Emperor to continue to treat Raja Girdhar Bahadur's sons and nephews just as he had been treating Raja Bahadur. He wrote that the army of the '*ghanims*' (Marathas) was spoiling for trouble since the 19th Jamadi and that they had made furious attacks on all the fronts. He, however, was hopeful that they would be beaten back. He also informed that the Emperor had asked Bhawani Ram to engage the Marathas resolutely, that the Imperial force at Sironj was determined to defend the city and, lastly, that though

of Daya Bahadur anywhere. In *D.K.* Volumes, Daya Bahadur is mentioned only once when he came to meet Jai Singh on December 3, 1720, at Jaisinghpura, Delhi (*D.K.* Vol. XIX, 527). The Peshwa also refers to Girdhar Bahadur only (*S.P.D.*, XIII, Nos. 23, 29), and omits the name of Daya Bahadur. *Ajaib* letters refer only to Girdhar Bahadur's death. The confusion has been created by the Maratha officials and *sardars*, who, without mentioning Girdhar Bahadur, refer only to Chimnaji's victory over Daya Bahadur (*S.P.D.*, XIII, Nos. 17, 26, 27), and in one letter (XIII, No. 25) even describe him as the governor of Ujjain. Later, this gave rise to the impression that Girdhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur were killed in two separate battles. The point has been examined in detail by Dr. Raghbir Singh (*Malwa*, 199-207). He is of the view that Girdhar Bahadur and his cousin, Daya Bahadur, who, he says, "was much better known than Girdhar Bahadur" to the public at large and the Maratha generals, on account of his great activity against them during the winter of 1725-26, were killed on the same day in the battle of Amjhera.

14. *Ajaib*, 74b, 75b, 83b; *S.P.D.*, XXII, 51; Irvine, II, 245. Md. Said Khan, the *diwan* of Malwa, requested Jai Singh to reach Ujjain "for the protection of this *subah*, and especially the city of Ujjain". Raghbir Singh, "Fresh Light on the battle of Amjhera," November 29, 1728, *PIHC*, tenth session, 1947, 379.

Chhabela Ram's son, Chimnaji or Bhawani Ram, and Girdhar Bahadur's sons, Kunwars Vijai Ram and Shambhu Ram, were acting in close concert, the differences among them were bound to come into open after some time.¹⁵

Marathas spread in Malwa to levy blackmail. On January 13, 1729, the Marathas raised the siege of Ujjain which by this time had lasted a month, and dispersed to collect blackmail from a number of important towns of Malwa, especially Kayath, Shajapur, Sarangpur, Nolai and Dhar. From Sarangpur, Chimnaji moved towards Kotah-Bundi side (February), and collected money from Rajgarh, Bhanpura, Rampura and Jawad. He then moved into Gujarat, and from there returned to Poona, reaching there on May 4, 1729.¹⁶ A part of the Maratha army, however, stayed on in southern Malwa, and even passed the rainy season there.

Bhawani Ram's difficulties; removed from Malwa but reinstated for the time being. All this time and during the coming few months also, Bhawani Ram strove hard to eject the Marathas from the province, but lack of finances, the failure of the imperial authorities to send him reinforcements, and the opposition of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, who had given out that he had superseded Bhawani Ram, made the latter's task increasingly difficult.

In September, Baji Rao issued grants to Holkar and Udaji Pawar confirming the districts in Malwa which he had assigned to them earlier.¹⁷ As the state of the province was going from bad to worse, Bhawani Ram was removed from his charge, and his *jagirs* were also confiscated, but he was reinstated on Jai Singh's

15. Kesho Ram to Sawai Jai Singh, P.A., December 21, 1728, J.S.A. It seems Bhawani Ram's appointment to the Government of the *subah* was resented by Raja Girdhar Bahadur's sons. In the Jaipur records, Bhawani Ram is described as Chhabela Ram's son and not of Girdhar Bahadur. Thus entry in D.K. Vol. XIX, 319 of Vaishakha Sudi 8, S. 1786 (April 14, 1730) reads: "Shriji (Jai Singh) held the *darbar*. When Veni Bahadur, son of Girdhar Bahadur, and Raja Chimnaji, son of Chhabela Ram Mehta, arrived, Shriji moved up to the *chandani* to receive them. Both of them performed *mujra*; Shriji embraced them, applied scent, offered *pan*, and bade them leave". Another entry dated Phalguna Vadi 12 (February 3, 1730) mentions the arrival of "Ujjain's *subedar* Raja Chimnaji, brother of Raja Girdhar, son of Raja Chhabela Ram" to meet Jai Singh (D.K. Vol. XIX), or the entry mentioning the condolence visit paid by Jai Singh on February 2, 1730, to "Chimna Raja, son of Chhabela Ram Mehta, *subedar*, Ujjain" (*Ibid.*).

16. S.P.D., XIII, No. 30; S.P.D., XXX, pp. 284-87; Dighe, 101.

17. S.P.D., XXX, pp. 293-94.

recommendation, probably temporarily, till the latter reached Ujjain after the rains. Jai Singh was urged to reach Malwa at an early date, and the districts of Mandsaur and Toda were granted to him for recruiting additional troops.¹⁸

After the rains, Kanthaji Kadam, Holkar and Pawar recommenced their operations in Malwa. They devastated Dharampuri district and marched up to Mandu. In view of these developments, Bhawani Ram was asked to send provisions to Dhar, so that it might hold on till Jai Singh's arrival in Malwa, and on the latter's arrival to make arrangements in consultation with him. Bhawani Ram failed to overcome his financial difficulties, and soon both "his money and credit were exhausted". Meanwhile, only seven hundred Jaipur troops had reached the province to assist him. He resented Jai Singh's appointment in Malwa, and complained to the Emperor that the Maharaja would not stay in the province throughout the year, and a number of disloyal Rajas would roam about in the *subah*. He pointed out that he was handicapped by the lack of finances, and if he was given even half of what Jai Singh would receive, he could keep the Marathas out of the province. But the need to appoint an experienced noble to deal with the situation in Malwa was so apparent that Bhawani Ram's request was overlooked, and he was informed formally (October 1729) about his replacement by Sawai Jai Singh.¹⁹

JAI SINGH'S SECOND GOVERNORSHIP OF MALWA

Mandu restored to Jai Singh. On October 23, Sawai Jai Singh started from Jaipur for Ujjain to take charge of the *subah*. The Marathas were already there, and towards the end of November they captured Mandu also. Jai Singh, therefore, did not stop at Ujjain but marched directly to Mandu. He had a brush with the Maratha troops, but shortly afterwards, the talks which he had already initiated with Shahu bore fruits, and the Marathas returned to the south of the Narmada after restoring Mandu.²⁰

Baji Rao's scheme for joint Mughal-Maratha control of Malwa

18. Vad, *Shahu Roznishi*, I, No. 198; *Malwa*, 173-74.

19. *Malwa*, 174-76.

20. See *Shahu Roznishi*, 1, 198; *Malwa*, 178 and 179n.

makes no headway. At this time, Peshwa Baji Rao broached a scheme which provided for joint Mughal-Maratha control over Malwa. He had already written to Jai Singh about it in October 1729.²¹ But the proposal could not make any headway probably because the Mughal government considered the scheme fraught with risks. Looking to Jai Singh's policy towards the Marathas during the coming years, it is doubtful if he favoured Baji Rao's plan which was likely to pave the way for the Maratha domination over the province.

Jai Singh signs an agreement with Shahu. As at this time Jai Singh was not in favour of giving the Marathas so large a concession in Malwa, he put forth his own scheme to secure the immunity of that province from the Maratha encroachments. His proposal was to grant *tankwah jagirs* worth ten lakhs of Rupees to Kushal Singh, adopted son of Raja Shahu, "on the condition that the Maratha inroads in Malwa would cease forthwith."²² Though this proposal was basically different from that of Baji Rao, it was accepted by Shahu.²³ On February 26, 1730, Jadu Rai, *wakil* of Shahu, signed an agreement on these lines. Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor that as a result of this agreement, the government would be spared heavy expenditure it had been incurring year after year on the maintenance of a large army in Malwa to check the Deccanis, and the province would also receive much needed respite.²⁴ In conformity with the spirit of the agreement, Raja Shahu instructed (March 1730) Chimnaji Appa, Udaji Pawar, and Holkar to treat Jai Singh with respect "in view of the old, hereditary, friendship between the two Royal Houses", and to restore Mandu to him, which the Marathas had already done.²⁵

Jai Singh returns. Jai Singh stayed on in Malwa till the beginning of May 1730, and then set out for Jaipur. On the way, he halted

21. *Malwa*, 180.

22. Copy of the agreement signed by Jadu Rai, *wakil* of Raja Shahu, February 26, 1730 (*Kapatdwara document* No. 96, Jaipur).

23. There are letters in Forrest's *Selections* (Vol. I, Part I, pp. 72, 74) which show that the Peshwa resented that other powers should approach Raja Shahu without prior consultations with him. The Peshwa, it seems, resented this agreement and saw to it that it was nullified soon.

24. See the text of the letter in *Parties*, Appendix 'C', b, 273. But Jai Singh's proposal did not mean conceding to the Marathas the *chauth* of Malwa and Gujarat. Cf. *Parties*, 204.

25. *Malwa*, 180.

at Bundi to crown Dalel Singh as the new ruler of that state in place of Maharao Budh Singh. The unfortunate developments which led to this grave step will be discussed at a subsequent place.

Agreement not in Baji Rao's interests. It seems the recent agreement between Shahu and the Emperor was soon in trouble. The agreement came in the way of Baji Rao's policy of northward expansion; it implied abandonment of the Maratha claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Malwa and other provinces; at home it did not provide for any division of revenue between the Chhatrapati and the Maratha *sardars*. It also blighted the prospects of Sindhia. Holkar, Pawar, and others who were keen on securing large gains in the Mughal provinces. Moreover, by committing the Peshwa to a policy of inactivity, Shahu's agreement was likely to nullify the vital gains secured by the Marathas in Malwa during the past ten years at a considerable cost and sacrifice. It also made it impossible for the Peshwa to resolve his financial problems. Finally, the agreement did not cover Gujarat.

As the recent agreement seemed to be in trouble, Jai Singh thought it proper to send another mission to Satara to seek a clarification from Shahu and to gauge the real intentions of the Maratha government.

Deep Singh's mission. In April 1730, while encamped at Indore,²⁶ Jai Singh sent Deep Singh Kumbhani, a senior official of his state, along with Mansa Ram Purohit, to Satara. Vyaghraji of Mewar also accompanied them. We gather from Deep Singh's letter that the Emperor had laid down the broad guidelines along which the negotiations were to be conducted with the Marathas. Though Deep Singh reached Satara on May 22, 1730, he had to wait for an audience with Shahu as Baji Rao was indisposed. On June 16; he wrote that the Peshwa would attend the court after two or three days and that after "settling the issues as per instructions of the Emperor and after talks with Raja Shahuji," he would start on

26. D.K., Vol. I, 199. Deep Singh carried with him presents for Chhatrapati Shahu, and a studded crest (costing Rs. 970/-) and some other articles for Baji Rao on the occasion of the marriage of the Peshwa's daughter. (D.K., X). Deep Singh Kumbhani of Banskooch (about 22 miles south-east of Jaipur) was the son of Akhai Singh. He was appointed *faujdar* of Amber *pargana* in 1717; in April 1737, he was rewarded for keeping Agra fort ready to face any emergency. There are no entries about him after April 1737 (D.K., I, 196-200, J.S.A.).

his return journey.²⁷ According to the Maratha accounts, Deep Singh conveyed an offer to pay the Marathas eleven lakhs and fifteen lakhs of Rupees annually, to square their claims of *chauth* from Malwa and Gujarat respectively.²⁸ It will be noted that this time the Marathas had succeeded in securing from the Emperor a concrete offer about Gujarat also. On his return journey, Deep Singh met the Nizam, it being advisable to know his mind before concluding any settlement with the Marathas. At this time the Nizam's intrigues with Dabhade against Baji Rao were thickening fast. Deep Singh found the Nizam sceptical about the possibility of a lasting agreement between the Mughal government and the Marathas, and though the Nizam spoke highly of Baji Rao's ability and character, he said he would not trust him for a *courie*.²⁹ Deep Singh crossed the Chambal on December 18 and reached Amber on December 27.

Bangash secures appointment in Malwa. By this time orders had been issued (September 1730) replacing Sawai Jai Singh by Muhammad Khan Bangash as the new governor of Malwa. Bangash had returned from Bundelkhand after beating a hasty retreat on the arrival of Baji Rao, and when he failed to retain *subah* Allahabad, he managed to secure Malwa by bribing Zafar Khan Roghan-ud-Daulah Panipati, aided by the reigning favourite Koki Ju.³⁰ The reasons for this imprudent change are not clear, though it seems that besides the Emperor's practice of changing horses in mid-stream, Qamar-ud-din Khan, Saadat Khan, and Muhammad Khan Bangash, who were opposed to Jai Singh's negotiations with the Marathas, had facilitated the task of Zafar Khan and Madam Foster-sister. Anyway, it meant the

27. Deep Singh to Bakshi Hem Raj, Ashadha Sudi 12, S. 1787 (June 16, 1730) *J.S.A.* Hem Raj Kayastha, son of Prithvi Singh, and third *Bakshi* in Amber state in 1718, was in high favour of Jai Singh and received from him rewards more frequently than any other Kayastha official. In October 1731, he received a horse and seventeen other articles, for killing the Chandrawat of Rampura (*D.K.*, Vol. I, 847-51).

28. *S.P.D.*, X, No. 66.

29. See *S.P.D.*, X, No. 66; Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 112-14. On his return, Deep Singh was given a Turkish horse and twenty-two other articles as *inam* (*D.K.*, X, 949). Vyaghraji died while on his way back to Rajputana. Mansa Ram Purohit returned to Satara and lived there for the rest of his life. (Sardesai, II, 112).

30. Irvine, II, 249.

termination of the negotiations which Jai Singh had initiated with Shahu.

BANGASH'S GOVERNORSHIP OF MALWA

Bangash's letter to Jai Singh. Bangash was unduly optimistic about the Mughal capability to check the Maratha tide provided a concerted and well planned attempt was made in that direction. Now, when proceeding to Malwa as the new governor of the province to initiate a policy of bold offensive against the Marathas, he could afford to talk to Jai Singh in a patronizing tone. In his letter he advised Jai Singh not to flirt with the Marathas as they were deceitful, and might overthrow him and the Bundelas after establishing themselves in their regions. The only way for Jai Singh, who had lakhs of men and *jagirs* worth crores of Rupees, he pointed out, was to join hands with the other nobles against the enemy. He also warned Jai Singh against a Maratha-Bundela combine, and suggested that the Emperor should come down to Agra, as it was imperative to keep the Marathas away from that province at all costs. If this could be done, a handful of Marathas could be checked and driven across the Narmada, he concluded.³¹ In a few months he was proved wrong and his hopes were belied.

Bangash set out from Delhi on November 6, 1730. The chiefs of Orcha, Datia, Shivpuri, Kolaras and Ratlam had received orders to join him. Sawai Jai Singh and the Maharana had also been asked to assist Bangash in all possible ways. Accordingly, the Maharana sent his foster-brother with some troops and artillery towards Mandeshwar. When Bangash reached Gwalior, he got the report that Maratha troops were massed on the Narmada.³²

Bangash baffled; his meeting with the Nizam. In October 1730, Baji Rao had appointed Holkar to the supreme command in Malwa, and, after a few months, Ranoji Sindhia was also associated with him.³³ During the coming years, the Maratha armies operated in Malwa under the able guidance of these two generals. Bangash was completely baffled by their swift moves and, despite his

31. *Khujastah Kalam* (Letters of Muhammad Khan Bangash, ed. by Sahib Rai, I.O.L., Sitamau transcript), 281, 288, 208, cited in *Parties*; 209.

32. W. Irvine, *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad — A Chronicle (1713-1857)*, *J.A.S.B.* IV, 1878, 308-09.

33. *S.P.D.*, XXX, pp. 300, 304-06.

best efforts, could not prevent them from ravaging the villages and the towns of the province. In desperation, he turned to the Nizam for support, and met him in March 1731, "to concert measures against the opponents of Islam." Bangash suspected that the Hindus were instigating the Marathas to ravage Malwa. He remained closeted with the Nizam for nearly a fortnight, and agreed to join him in supporting Senapati Dabhade, Gaiḱwad, and Udaji Pawar, who all were hostile to the Peshwa.³⁴ But Dabhade's defeat and death in the battle of Dabhai (April 1731) put an end to their plan.

In March-April 1731, Holkar plundered the country near Mandsaur and Rampura, and Antaji Manakeshwar ravaged areas round Kayath and Shajapur. Bangash reached Ujjain on May 9, and after a few skirmishes with the enemy, halted at Sironj to let the rainy season pass. From here, he sent urgent appeals to the Emperor to send more money and reinforcements, and complained that the rulers of Kotah, Narwar and other principalities were not co-operating with him whole-heartedly.³⁵

Bangash hemmed by the Marathas; replaced by Jai Singh. After the Dasherā of 1731, the Marathas showed unprecedented activity in the province. Their total strength in Malwa at this time was reckoned at one lakh troops. Bangash, who had not received any help from Delhi, found himself hemmed by the enemy and unable to stir from Sironj without exposing the town to a grave risk. His failure against the Marathas, and his attempt to capture Shahabad from Chhatra Singh of Narwar, were censured at the Court, and Khan-i-Dauran even accused him of complicity with the enemy. Shortly afterwards, he was informed of his replacement by Sawai Jai Singh. He handed over the charge of the province to Jai Singh's officers and started for Delhi, reaching there on December 6, 1732.³⁶

Bangash's failure in Malwa was, in fact, the failure of his stand and that of Qamar-ud-din Khan, Saadat Khan, and many others. The failure, however, was not unexpected in view of the fact that during the past few years, the Marathas had improved their position everywhere. In Gujarat and Bundelkhand, their arms had

34. W. Irvine, *loc. cit.*, 309; *Malwa*, 215.

35. *Malwa*, 217-18; W. Irvine, *loc. cit.*, 315-17.

36. W. Irvine, *loc. cit.*, 321-24; *Malwa*, 219-21.

achieved significant success, and the long shadows of their approach, which had been falling upon Rajputana for a decade, had become shorter and shorter during the past few years. On the other hand, the state of the Mughal government and the empire had not improved in any way. Hence, Sawai Jai Singh, who had been given too brief a trial in 1729, was now again appointed to tackle the vexed problem.

SAWAI JAI SINGH'S THIRD AND THE LAST GOVERNORSHIP OF MALWA

The scheme of joint administration of Malwa by Mewar and Jaipur. Leaving Jaipur on October 20, 1732, Jai Singh reached Ujjain in December. He had received thirteen lakhs of Rupees as grant, and a loan of seven lakhs of Rupees for raising additional troops.³⁷ For some time past, he had been thinking of trying a new scheme in Malwa which envisaged joint efforts by Jaipur and Mewar for preserving the integrity of the province. It seems he had discussed the scheme with the Emperor and had found him favourably inclined towards it; had it not been so, he would not have sent Raja Ayamal Khatri, his *diwan*, to Udaipur, to finalize the terms of the agreement by which Jaipur and Mewar were to share the onerous responsibility as also the rewards. The terms which were agreed upon between the two States are learnt from Ayamal's report dated Asoj Vadi 13, S. 1789, which he had sent to his master.³⁸ He wrote that out of 24,000 horse and an equal number of foot, which were to constitute the strength of the combined army, 7000 horse and 9000 foot would be Mewar's contribution. The remaining 15,000 horse and 15,000 foot would be from Amber. As for the division of revenue from the *Subah*, one part of the income from the land and *peshkash* would go to Mewar and two parts to Jaipur. Besides the *Subah*, they would take the *parganas* of the *mansabdars* on *ijara*, and after paying the *ijara* amount, would distribute the saving in the ratio of 1:2. Dhabhai Rao Nag Raj (foster-brother of the Maharana) would remain with the Maharana throughout the year 1732, and, subsequently, for only six months in a year. The *Bakshis* of both Mewar and Jaipur would work

37. *Malwa*, 222.

38. Raja Ayamal to Sawai Jai Singh, Asoj Vadi 13, S. 1789 (1732 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

jointly, and so also the *naibs* and the *muttsaddis* of both the *Darbars*. The agricultural produce collected by the officials of both Mewar and Jaipur would be shared according to the agreed ratio (*viz.*, two parts to Jaipur and one part to Mewar). It was agreed that in case the Marathas accepted the Maharaja's proposal for a compromise, Jaipur and Mewar would share the burden of land and cash which the Emperor would grant them. In case more troops were needed for opposing the Marathas, then both the States would furnish additional quotas in proportion to their respective shares. Lastly, any *peshkash* that would be levied in the *Subah*, or in the *taluqa* of the *Diwan* (Maharana), or of the Maharaja, would be shared proportionately. On behalf of the Maharana, Dhabhai Nagraj signed the agreement.

Marathas enter Malwa; Holkar's letter to Zorawar Singh. The scheme had hardly been launched when the Marathas reappeared in the province. In early December 1732, Sindhia and Holkar, after informing Bakshi Zorawar Singh of Jaipur, then posted at Rampura, of their "peaceful entry into Malwa as directed by Shahu Maharaj", asked him to arrange for the payment of dues from Rampura, and to arrange Shankarji's meeting with Maharao Durjansal in order to settle the matter concerning Kotah.³⁹ They also despatched a small force to Dungarpur and Banswara, but it returned empty handed and reported that a large force was needed to accomplish the task.⁴⁰

Jai Singh surrounded near Mandsaur; the fight. Marathas accept the earlier offer; Jai Singh's grief. Jai Singh at this time was moving rapidly towards Bundelkhand to check Chimnaji Appa, then reported to be active there. On coming to know of Jai Singh's movements, Holkar and Sindhia, after leaving their heavy baggage, rode with utmost speed, overtook him at Mandsaur, and completely surrounded his force. It seems Jai Singh was taken by surprise at an awkward moment, and was obliged to fall on the defensive. At first he opened secret negotiations with Krishnaji and Udaji Pawar, who were hovering in the neighbourhood and were known to be aggrieved with the Peshwa on the question of their share in Malwa, but the talks were detected, and Holkar

39. Malhar Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia to Bakshi Zorawar Singh, Pausha Sudi 5, S. 1789 (December 11, 1732), *J.S.A.*

40. *S.P.D.*, XIV, No. 3.

plundered a part of Udaji's baggage and restrained him from joining Jai Singh. As no help was likely to arrive from Delhi in the next few days, Jai Singh opened negotiations with Holkar, and offered to pay him six lakhs of Rupees in cash, and the collection from twenty-eight *parganas*, which the Marathas had already made.⁴¹ But Holkar demanded more. Shortly afterwards, on learning that reinforcements were coming from Delhi, Jai Singh broke off negotiations and launched a furious attack upon the enemy forcing them to fall back about thirty-two miles. In the encounter, the Marathas lost 10 to 20 officers and 100 to 200 horsemen. Thereafter, Jai Singh advanced about sixteen miles towards the enemy positions, but Holkar doubled back and surrounded him again. As the expected help did not come, Jai Singh was obliged to initiate talks once again. He repeated his earlier offer, and this time the Marathas accepted it.⁴² A Maratha force reached Rampura also and extracted seventy-five thousand Rupees from the Jaipur officials posted there. Deeply upset at these developments, Jai Singh retired to Ramgarh. He had developed high temperature, and so profound was his grief that he wished the illness might aggravate and relieve him of the burden of life.⁴³

Mewar told to withdraw troops from Malwa. On November 19, 1732 (Margashirsha Sudi 13, S. 1789), 8000 mounted troops from Mewar reached Ujjain in accordance with the scheme of joint administration of Malwa by Jaipur and Mewar.⁴⁴ But for some reasons, which are not clear, the Maharana was asked (October 1733) to withdraw all his troops from Malwa,⁴⁵ thus preventing the plan from receiving a fair trial.

41. *S.P.D.*, XIV, Nos. 1, 2. (The correct dates of the two letters, according to Dighe, 115 n. 19, 20, are February 21, 1733 and March 5, 1733).

42. *Ibid.*, XV, No. 6.

43. Gulab Rai to Hem Raj, Chaitra Sudi 6, S. 1789, *J.S.A.* It is incorrect to say (e.g. see Dighe, 115) that on returning to Amber after this reverse, Jai Singh "gave himself up to pleasure" considering it vain to check the Maratha invasion, or that he became "quite unmindful of the affairs of Malwa" (*Fall*, I, 138; *Malwa*, 225). In fact, as will become clear from the following account, it was after 1733 that Jai Singh played his best role in solving the Maratha problem.

44. Jodhraj to Vijai Ram, letter, Margashirsha Sudi 15, S. 1789 (November 21, 1732), *J.S.A.*

45. Rao Jag Ram (Jai Singh's *wakil* at Delhi) to Zorawar Singh, letter, Kartik Sudi 11, S. 1790 (November 6, 1733), *J.S.A.*

Here we will pause to discuss the circumstances which forced Jai Singh to depose Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi. As we shall presently see, the unfortunate step had serious repercussions in Rajputana.

JAI SINGH REMOVES BUDH SINGH FROM THE BUNDI THRONE

We have seen that more than once Maharao Budh Singh was restored to his throne through Jai Singh's efforts. The two remained on cordial terms till the early months of 1728; after that their relations rapidly worsened, and finally broke down. The circumstances which led to this unfortunate development are briefly given below.

Budh Singh disowns his son. In April 1728, when Jai Singh was encamped at Pavta (66 miles east of Jaipur), Thakur Kesari Singh of Salumbar, Kishore Singh, uncle of the Maharana, and the Purohit arrived from Udaipur with the coconut for Prince Ishwari Singh, the eldest surviving son of Jai Singh. The same day Bundi's Purohit, Surajmal, and Thakur Achal Singh also arrived; they were escorting Vichitra Kunwar, daughter of Jai Singh, who had been married to Maharaja Abhai Singh.⁴⁶ Jai Singh's sister Amar Kunwar, who was full sister of Bijai Singh and wife of Maharao Budh Singh, was already there with her eight year old son, Bhawani Singh, born on July 30, 1719.⁴⁷ On his sister's request Jai Singh advised the Salumbar Chief to offer the coconut for Bhawani Singh. Salumbar consented, and Jai Singh accepted the proposal on behalf of his young nephew. When Maharao Budh Singh, who in his heart of heart disliked Amar Kunwar, came to know of it, he told Salumbar not to settle the marriage without his permission. On being asked the reason, the Maharao acquainted Jai Singh with the equivocal conduct of the latter's sister, saying that the child was not his lawful offspring. Jai Singh then angrily demanded that if Bhawani Singh was not his (Budh Singh's) lawful son, why did the Maharao wait for eight long years, and why did he not kill the child soon after

46. *D.K.*, XXIV, *Rajlok Sagai* (Maharaj Kunwar).

47. The last entry in *D.K.*, XXV, about Bhawani Singh's meeting with Jai Singh is dated October 10, 1727. The last entry about Amar Kunwar receiving Rs. 520/- on *Bhaidoj* from his brother is dated Phalguna Sudi 1, S. 1791 (February 1735), (*D.K.*, XXV, 49)

his birth? When Budh Singh vowed in support of his charge, Jai Singh told him that the Maharao being a *Vam-margi*, he had no faith in his oaths. When Budh Singh re-affirmed the charge, Jai Singh asked him to give in writing that Bhawani Singh was not his son upon which he (Jai Singh) would have the child done away with, that the Maharao's favourite wife Chundawat's son would not succeed on the throne of Bundi, that the Maharao would hand over to him the sons born to his Chundawat and Rathori queens, and finally, that he would adopt the child nominated by Jai Singh.⁴⁸

Jai Singh narrates the case to the Maharana. A few months later when Jai Singh went to Udaipur, he acquainted the Maharana with these developments, and showed him Budh Singh's agreement. Jai Singh said that ever since his sister gave birth to the child in 1719 A.D., Maharao Budh Singh, without any rhyme or reason, was angry with her, and now was asking him to kill her son alleging that the child was illegitimate. "I asked him. 'Why did you not kill the child soon after his birth? Now you are conspiring to take his life and commit a sin.' He (Budh Singh) swore by Jagadamba and said: 'I cannot do it. You kill the enemy of your *vansha*. Your sister is ill-tempered and she will create trouble. Hence you finish the very root of this trouble. I will do whatever you will desire.'" Budh Singh asserted that the Kachhwahi *rani* never shared his bed. "But then," Jai Singh continued, "how were two children born to her? Moreover, he (Budh Singh) is a follower of *Kaul-mata* and she is a Vaishnavite and does not indulge in the evil practices of her husband's faith. For this reason he is angry with her. During the past eight years he did not utter this lie. In fact, he loves Chundawat (queen) more. I had sent to him Deep Singh Kumbhani, to whom he gave seventy thousand Rupees (as bribe). I then turned out Deep Singh, and I felt that Bhawani Singh is legitimate. After thinking over (the whole issue) I told

48. *Vansha*, IV, 3096-3100. The insult to the Kachhwahi princess was balanced later when Madho Singh, son of Jai Singh, then ruling at Jaipur, returned the coconut sent by Ummad Singh (son of Budh Singh) in the name of his sister. "What fame said of the daughter of Budh Singh," asked Madho Singh, in full Assembly, of Deo Singh of Indragarh. The reply was "an insulting innuendo leading to doubts as to the purity of her blood." The coconut was returned to Bundi. That the imputation was unfounded was confirmed when Bijai Singh of Marwar sought her hand. (Tod, II, 400).

Budh Singh that I will accept the Kunwar to be an impostor if he (Budh Singh) would give in writing that he would hand over to me the sons born to his Sisodini and the Rathori queens, and would adopt the child nominated by me. I thought that he would never consent to sign such an agreement, and I would be spared of a *hatya*, but that king of fools accepted even these unacceptable terms, and gave me his consent in writing, attested by all the Hadas." Jai Singh requested the Maharana to be a witness to the agreement. The Maharana put his signature on the document signed by Budh Singh in which the latter had declared Bhawani Singh to be an illegitimate child, and got it attested by his sixteen Umraos⁴⁹.

Bhawani Singh put to death. Soon after Jai Singh's departure for Udaipur, Budh Singh, in anger, left Amber for Bundi. When Jai Singh returned from Udaipur, his sister asked him about the developments concerning Bhawani Singh's proposed betrothal to the Udaipur princess. Jai Singh angrily retorted that her husband regarded the child to be an impostor, and hence he would not do anything in the matter. Exasperated "either at the suspicion of her honour or the discovery of her fraud," she tried to snatch the dagger from her brother, calling him an impostor. He gave a jerk, came out of the room and bolted the door. The Kachhwahi queen left the palace from the back door, summoned her charioteer, and with her son left in anger to rejoin her husband. Jai Singh then wrote to Budh Singh that the Kachhwahi queen and Bhawani Singh were now with the Maharao. If he wished him (Jai Singh) to commit the sin of killing the child, he would do so as agreed upon in writing, but the Maharao himself might do it on reaching his State. When Budh Singh desired Jai Singh to fulfil his part of the agreement, while promising to carry out his own, the latter sent Raja Ayamal, who met the lady and told her that the dispute had been amicably settled, and that her brother Jai Singh was backing her strongly. He also assured her that now Maharao Budh Singh had no grouse against her, and Bhawani Singh would be betrothed to whichever princess she wished, and that her husband had given an assurance in this regard in writing. The queen sent word to the Maharao

49. *Vamsha*, IV, 3111-13. Deep Singh, in case he fell out of favour, must have been restored, as we know he was sent in April 1730 for negotiations with Shahu and the Peshwa.

that her brother wished Bhawani Singh to be sent to Amber, and if there was no dispute between them, she might send him with Ayamal. In reply, Budh Singh said that he had written what Jai Singh had desired, from which his wife gained the impression that the two had been reconciled. On his arrival at Amber, Bhawani Singh was put to death.⁵⁰

Documents support this account. Surajmal's version given above is corroborated in its essential points by a few documents. These documents show that Budh Singh had agreed that he would not adopt a child of his own free-will.⁵¹ Surajmal admits that he could not vouchsafe the legitimacy or otherwise of the child. Looking to the tortuous nature of the Kachhwahi, he says, the boy might have been an impostor; he might also have been a lawful child if we keep margin for the fact that Budh Singh had lost his mental balance.⁵²

Budh Singh withdraws the charge. When the Kachhwahi queen came to know of the fate of Bhawani Singh, she charged her husband with causing the death of her son, and gave up meals altogether. Budh Singh tried to pacify her and promised to do whatever she might ask for. After a number of days, during which period she ate nothing, the Kachhwahi agreed to forgive her husband if he would put down in writing that Bhawani Singh was his lawful son. To this Budh Singh agreed.⁵³

Budh Singh breaks the agreement; declines Jai Singh's offer. Jai Singh installs Dael Singh, secures recognition from the Emperor. Soon it became known that Budh Singh's Chundawat queen was with child. In June 1729 (Asadha Vadi 14, S. 1786) a son was born to her. Budh Singh was advised to conceal the birth of the child, but it was feared that later on it might give rise to doubts in his genuineness. So the news was announced. Budh Singh

50. *Vamsha*, IV, 3122-23.

51. There are two documents (Nos. 1426/R and 855/R), and a letter in Hindi (No. 1493) dated Ashadha Vadi 2, S 1787 (*Kapatdwara Records*), which show that Budh Singh had agreed not to adopt a child of his own free-will. The first two papers record that it was rumoured that Rani Chundawatji of Rao Budh Singh had adopted a son, but it was known through Rao Budh Singh that the news was wrong. A few months later, Jai Singh sent the *Mahzarnamah* to Rana Sangram Singh.

52. *Vamsha*, IV, 3095, 3123. He says that his account is based on an old *Khyat*.

53. *Ibid.*, IV, 3124.

assured Jai Singh that as per his agreement he would hand over the child to him, and adopt one from among his (Budh Singh's) kith and kin. He however expressed his desire to keep the child with him till the *Jatkarma* ceremony. Jai Singh readily agreed to this request. The child was named Ummed Singh. Later, when Jai Singh sent for the child, Budh Singh haughtily declined, flinging taunts and abuses at Jai Singh.⁵⁴ This infuriated the latter and he decided to teach a lesson to Budh Singh by removing him from the throne of Bundi. But before doing so, he gave his brother-in-law the last chance to retain his State. He asked him to adopt Dalel Singh, son of Salim Singh Hada of Karwar, a Bundi vassal, and to hand over Chundawat's son to him (Jai Singh), in which case, he promised, he would leave him undisturbed, Budh Singh declined. Thereupon Jai Singh sent for Dalel Singh, seated him on the cushion by his side, and declared that the latter would rule Bundi, and that his (Jai Singh's) daughter would be married to him. He also said that the Maharana and others would support his move. He called Salim Singh and asked him to take Bundi in his possession. As for the *Rajyabhisheka*, he said, it would be performed in due course of time.⁵⁵

Jai Singh now wrote to the Emperor that Maharao Budh Singh had no longer any desire to remain in the Mughal service, and, being without an heir, wished to make over his State to Dalel Singh, who was a wise and brave Hada, and that the Maharana, Maharaja Abhai Singh, and he himself favoured this decision. He requested that a formal order recognising Dalel Singh as the new ruler of Bundi might be sent to him. A *farman* to this effect was received soon afterwards.⁵⁶

Jai Singh now asked Salim Singh to install Dalel Singh on the throne of Bundi. As none of the major Rajput States, nor the rulers of Kotah, Shivpuri, Raghogarh, Bajranggarh, Narwar and other principalities gave any indication that they were opposed to Jai Singh's move, the installation was carried out smoothly.

Bijai Singh put to death. Jai Singh, along with Dalel Singh, now left for Malwa. Shortly afterwards, Budh Singh worked on a plot to secure Bijai Singh's release and to install him at Jaipur.

54. *Vamsha*, IV, 3125-3130.

55. *Ibid.*, 3130-32.

56. *Ibid.*, IV, 3133.

When Jai Singh came to know of it, Bijai Singh, who had been in confinement since 1713, was put to death.⁵⁷

An unfortunate development. Subsequently, these developments caused much misunderstanding and ill-will among the Rajput rulers at a time when they should have stood united to face the growing Maratha pressure upon their states. After Maharao Budh Singh's deposition, Jai Singh could never again enjoy the same trust and confidence of the brother princes as he had enjoyed till then. They accepted his action in regard to Bundi with considerable displeasure, which they did not express openly, but after his death in 1743, they supported Maharao Budh Singh's son, Ummed Singh, who recovered his patrimony within five years of Jai Singh's death.

The battle of Pancholas. Soon after his arrival in Malwa, Jai Singh learnt that Maharao Budh Singh was preparing to recover Bundi by force. Jai Singh immediately despatched 3000 troops under five premier nobles of Amber, viz., of Isarda, Sarsop, Suhadpur, Nantori and Paondhera, to join Salim Singh. The Narwar ruler also sent a force under Khande Rai, the *diwan*. The two armies clashed on April 6, 1730. In the ensuing action, which was as fierce as it was deadly, all the important Jaipur nobles lost their lives. Another conspicuous casualty was Khande Rai. There was also the rumour that Salim Singh Hada had been killed, but the report was later found to be incorrect. Though Jaipur forces had suffered heavy losses, in the end Maharao Budh Singh had to retreat.⁵⁸ He retired to Kotah, and thence to Udaipur, where the Maharana received him with all due courtesy.⁵⁹

57. *Vamsha*, IV, 3134-37; see also Ch. V, p. 87

58. *Vamsha*, IV, 3142-3189. A paper dated Bhadava Vadi 3, S. 1787 (July 21, 1730) in *J.S.A.* recording the death of Thakur Koju Singh Kachhwaha of Isarda, Fateh Singh of Sarsop, Ghasi Ram, Bahadur Singh of Paondhera, Achal Singh Rajawat of Nantori at Panchola village, mentions that Rs. 5000/- were sanctioned for the construction of *chhatris* in their memory. Later, in October, Jai Singh ordered that a garden be laid and *dehra chhatris* be built at the place where the Amber *thakurs* had fallen. (*Dol Siaha Hazur*, Asoj Sudi 11, S. 1787, October 11, 1730, *J.S.A.*).

59. *Vamsha.*, IV, 3190. As per reports sent by Bakshi Zorawar Singh and Gulab Rai to Hem Raj (Jyestha Vadi 11, S. 1787, May 1, 1730, and of Ashadha Vadi 3, S. 1787, May 23, 1730, *J.S.A.*), Budh Singh, after his defeat, had with him 15,000 horse, which included 4000 Rohelas, while another force of 15,000,

Meanwhile, Jai Singh had started from Malwa for Pancholas, where the battle had been fought. He halted at the border of Kotah, where Maharao Durjansal was present to receive him (May 11, 1730). Jai Singh, accompanied by Salim Singh, paid a visit to Durjansal and brought about reconciliation between the two. The next day, Jai Singh again took Dalel Singh to meet the Kotah ruler. The meeting lasted till late in the night.⁶⁰ Jai Singh placed before Durjansal the document containing the terms of the agreement made by Budh Singh and testified by the Maharana, and asked the Maharao to put his seal also on the document, which the Kotah ruler did. Thereafter, on Jyestha Sudi 13, S. 1787 (May 19, 1730), on the bank of the Kusak, Jai Singh crowned Dalel Singh, the Kotah ruler first applying the *tika* on Dalel Singh's brow, followed by Jai Singh, who, waving *chamwar* over the head of the young Hada, proclaimed him as the new Rao Raja of Bundi. Jai Singh also sent the coconut offering his daughter's hand to Dalel Singh. Thereafter he visited the battlefield, granted a few Bundi villages to the descendants of the Amber nobles who had lost their lives in the recent battle, and then returned to Amber.⁶¹

The battle rules out conciliation. The battle ended all chances of a reconciliation between Sawai Jai Singh and Budh Singh. The heavy losses suffered by the Jaipur forces at the Pancholas hardened Jai Singh's attitude towards Budh Singh, and excited his determination to uphold his action in respect of Budh Singh. At the same time, Budh Singh's defeat completely dampened Kotah's desire to help him against Jaipur.

But the Maharana had still some hope that Jai Singh might relent and agree to restore Budh Singh to his throne. He invited Maharao Durjansal to Udaipur to discuss this possibility, but, as Durjansal's attitude towards Budh Singh had been far from satisfactory, his visit served no useful purpose. Shortly afterwards, Budh Singh decided to go to his father-in-law, Devi Singh,

which included a number of Pathans, was at Gagon (44 miles south-east of Kotah). The latter force was facing acute shortage of money and provisions. Budh Singh was to meet Maharao Durjansal at Sheopur Mukunddarra, but they postponed the meeting when they came to know that the Jaipur army would be passing through the pass on its way to Rampura.

60. D.K., XXXII, 424-25.

61. *Vamsha*, IV, 3192-3193.

the Thahkur of Begun (about 90 miles east by north-east of Udai-pur). On the way he plundered some villages of Mewar, an act which greatly offended the Maharana.⁶²

That Sawai Jai Singh had no mind to retrace his steps became clear when two years later (1732) he married his daughter, Krishna Kunwari, to Dalel Singh. On November 1, 1732, the bridegroom and his father, Salim Hada, signed an agreement which provided for the succession of Krishna Kunwari's son irrespective of his age, and the status of chief queen, and the usual privileges of the *Patrani* for her. One of the clauses, meant to ensure the safety of her son, provided for adequate safeguards against any attempt to bypass his right to succeed Dalel Singh. It was also agreed that the Rao Raja would not perform any fresh marriage, though the marriages prior to the agreement would stand.⁶³

The real nature of the dispute. It is very clear from the above account that Jai Singh's action in removing Budh Singh from the throne of Bundi was not, what Tod says, a part of a "deeply cherished scheme" for "the maintenance of his supremacy over the minor Rajas,"⁶⁴ but it arose out of Budh Singh's base plot, inspired by his Chudawat queen, to prevent Bhawani Singh's succession to the throne of Bundi. The method adopted by him for fulfilling his object was exceedingly provocative, and the penalty which he had to pay for sullyng the character of his wife, and for having an innocent child murdered by the hand which sought to protect it, was not disproportionate to what justice demanded.

62. See *Vamsha*, IV, 3202-3204.

63. *Vaddashta*, bearing Salim Singh's signature, dated Margashirsha Vadi 10, S. 1789 (November 1, 1732), *J.S.A.* Among the privileges mentioned in it is the following: "Bai would reside in the upper storey of the palace: the other queens would occupy the lower ones. If Rao Rajaji desires, he might visit them once a month. During travel, Bai would accompany Rao Rajaji. When she is at her parents' place, the other queens would attend on Rao Rajaji. In the palace, her carriage would move in front (followed by those of the other queens); she would occupy a seat higher than the other queens, and that she would enjoy greater respect and regard than all the other queens of the Rao Rajaji." Karwar was a small *thikana* of a small state and Jai Singh's sensitiveness about the superior status his daughter should enjoy at Bundi is understandable.

64. Tod, II, 393. See also Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 139. But it is nowhere recorded that Jai Singh installed Dalel Singh "on condition of his acknowledging the house of Jaipur as his over-lord," as Sarkar writes.

MARATHA ACTIVITY DURING NOVEMBER 1733—APRIL 1734

Marathas intervene in the Bundi affair. In the winter of 1733, a Maratha army under Holkar, Sindhia, and Pilaji again entered Malwa. They had come at the invitation of Budh Singh's Kachhwahi queen to restore Bundi to her husband on payment of six lakhs of Rupees as their expenses. The invitation was conveyed by Pratap Singh Hada, the elder brother of Dalel Singh.⁶⁵

In the third week of April 1734, the Marathas arrived near Bundi, and encamped at a distance of six miles from the town. On April 18, they entered the town, and, four days later, captured the fort. In the fighting, Salim Singh Hada, father of the new Rao Raja, was severely wounded, and was carried away as captive by the Marathas.⁶⁶ The victors thereafter proclaimed Budh Singh as the ruler of Bundi. For his prompt and successful help, Jai Singh's sister tied a *rakhi* on Malhar's wrist, calling him her brother.⁶⁷

But no sooner had the Marathas turned their backs than a large Jaipur army of 20,000 arrived and restored Dalel Singh. Pratap Singh Hada, who was running the administration in Budh Singh's absence, escaped from the town, and informed Malhar, then encamped at Nennagar, about the reverse;⁶⁸ but the Marathas were not inclined to reassert their stand. The Peshwa, it seems, now realized that Sawai Jai Singh had put the highest stakes in the matter, and it would not be in the Maratha interest to interfere in Budh Singh's favour for the sake of a few lakhs of Rupees.

As we shall presently see, after 1735 the Marathas had begun to attach increasingly high importance to the maintenance of cordial ties with Jai Singh, whose help and goodwill they needed in their negotiations with the Mughal government. Hence, so long as Jai Singh lived, they did not disturb Dalel Singh. In November 1737,

65. *Vamsha*, IV, 3216.

66. Shri Chand to Zorawar Singh, Vaishakha Sudi 2, S. 1791 (1734 A.D.), and of Vaishakha Sudi 6, S. 1791, *J.S.A. Vamsha*, IV, 3216ff. The date of the commencement of the siege (Vaishakha Vadi 15) given by him (p. 3216) does not tally with the date given in the above letter. Later, Salim Singh was released on payment of two lakhs of Rupees. (*Vamsha*, IV, 3225).

67. *Vamsha*, IV, 3220-21.

68. *Ibid.*, IV, 3221-22.

a son was born to Sawai Jai Singh's daughter.⁶⁹ In 1742, Jai Singh secured for his grand-nephew the title of Kunwar, kettledrum, and the *mansab* of 4000/2000.⁷⁰ Maharao Budh Singh was already dead (1739 A.D.), and his sons — Ummed Singh and Deep Singh — were too young to attempt to recover the State. Dalel Singh's position, therefore, seemed secure in Bundi.

Muzaffar Khan's campaign. Meanwhile, when in the winter of 1733, the news of Maratha entry into Malwa and of their advance in the direction of Gwalior and Narwar reached Delhi, Muzaffar Khan, the younger brother of Khan-i-Dauran, was asked to proceed against them. But he conducted the campaign in the usual indolent fashion which had become characteristic of the Mughal nobles. He made a start towards the end of March 1734, but by the time he reached Sironj (June), the Marathas had returned after a successful campaign covering Bhopal, Bundelkhand, Narwar, Gwalior, and Bundi. Muzaffar Khan then returned to Court.⁷¹

HURDA CONFERENCE

Mewar's impracticable object. The dismal failure of the Imperial authorities to check the advance of the Marathas in Malwa, Gujarat, and Bundelkhand, and the recent Maratha intervention in the Bundi affair, brought home to the minds of the Rajput rulers the urgent need to call a conference of the Rajput princes to concert measures to save Rajputana from meeting Malwa's fate. That the Maratha advance towards the north constituted a threat to each and every Rajput state was known to them as early as 1711.⁷² This became all the more clear in 1725, and by 1734 even the most sceptical of the Rajput rulers could not have doubted it. The prime

69. *D.K.*, XXIV, 36.

70. Rao Raja Dalel Singh to Jai Singh, Bhadrpada Vadi 5, S. 1799 (1742 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

71. Rustam Ali, f. 265b; *Seir*, IV, Section XVII, 19; Irvine, II, 279. Abhai Singh in his letter dated March 3, 1734, mentions that, as per the reports received by him, the Marathas had entered the districts of Amber-Jaipur, whereupon Jai Singh urgently sought his assistance. (B.N. Reu, "Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur and Maharaja Sujan Singh of Bikaner", *PIHRC*, Vol. XVII (1941), pp. 202-204.) But Abhai Singh's version is not corroborated by any other source.

72. See Ch. VIII p. 180

object of the proposed conference was to decide the course of action which might lead to the expulsion of the Marathas from Malwa and diminution of their influence in the province, so as to ensure the security of Rajputana. Another object was to consider the feasibility of demarcating their spheres of influence in Malwa. The latter idea was mainly Mewar's, and it is doubtful if Jai Singh ever took it seriously as he had a correct idea of the magnitude of Maratha power at this time. In a letter, which seems to have been written a few months before the conference was held at Hurda, the chief Mewar nobles had even suggested to the Maharana the manner in which the province could be shared among the allies. According to the proposal, two parts were to go to Mewar, one part to Jodhpur, one to Jaipur, half of the remaining part to Bundi and Kotah, and the remaining half to the other Hindu powers.⁷³ These facts make the secretness of the terms of the agreement at Hurda intelligible.

The terms. It seems Jai Singh and Maharana Sangram Singh II, whose unfortunate and untimely death in January 1734 was, as time showed, a severe jolt to the former and a grievous set-back to the interests and future of Rajputana, had been thinking of summoning a conference of the Rajput rulers to evolve an agreed programme of offensive or defensive action against the Marathas, relying solely on their own native resources. Despite Sangram Singh's death, the meeting was held as per schedule on July 16, 1734 at Hurda (Hurra) village, about 36 miles south-by-south-east of Ajmer. Jagat Singh, the new Maharana, presided over the conference. Besides Sawai Jai Singh, who had reached the place five days earlier, Maharaja Abhai Singh, Maharao Durjansal of Kotah, Rajadhiraj Bakht Singh, and their nobles and officials were also present. The meeting was held under a large red tent erected by Abhai Singh.⁷⁴ The agreement, which was signed the next day (July 17) reads: "1. All are united in good and evil (times) and none will withdraw therefrom on which oaths have been taken and faith pledged, which will be lost by whoever acts contrary thereto. The honour and shame of one is that of all, and in this everything is included.

73. See *Vir Vinod*, II, 1225.

74. See *Jodhpur Kharita Bahi*, No. 2, S. 1789-92, which has some significant entries about the arrival and meeting of the chief personalities at the conference.

2. No one shall countenance the traitor of another.

3. The affair will commence after the rains when all the chiefs will assemble at Rampura with their armies, and if any chief is indisposed and cannot come, he will send either his Kunwar (heir) or his brother.

4. Should such Princes commit some error, their respective chiefs shall intervene to correct the same.

5. In any new enterprise all shall unite to effect it."⁷⁵

Agreement still-born. The agreement, however, proved still-born as the decisions taken were never implemented. Looking to Jai Singh's attitude and policy towards the Mughal government and the Marathas during the coming years, it seems unlikely that he at any time shared Maharana Jagat Singh's hopes of driving out the Marathas from Malwa or his ambition to partition the province. The latter objective, being utterly impracticable, vitiated the entire scheme. In view of the crumbling state of the Empire, there was nothing wrong in Mewar's thinking on these lines, but Malwa was not Bengal or Awadh, and by this time was already in the firm grip of the Marathas. Nor was the objective attainable with differences between Jai Singh and the new Maharana on the one hand, and between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh on the other, seeping through the outwardly united and formidable union which the participants in the conference at Hurda had tried to forge. Jai Singh was no less aware of Jodhpur's hostility towards him than of the Maharana's suspicious attitude towards him.⁷⁶ It was, therefore, unsafe to embark upon the proposed adventure which was bound to encounter heavy opposition as much from the Marathas as from the Court, and was likely to fail in its purpose in the absence of perfect understanding and ample goodwill among the signatories to the agreement which alone could have brought it success. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Rajput rulers did not assemble at Rampura after the rains of 1734, and preferred to join the imperial offensive against the Marathas, instead of

75. Copy of the agreement, Shravana Vadi 13, S. 1791 (July 17, 1734) in *Kapatdwara Papers*. There is no expression like "the Rana alone shall correct it" in the third clause of the agreement. Cf. Tod, I, 329, n. 1; Ojha, *Udaipur*, II, 629.

76. See Rawat Kuber Singh Salumbar to Maharana Jagat Singh, Phalguna Vadi 14, in *V.V.*, II, 1235, for Maharana's adverse remark about the Kachhwahas.

mounting one of their own.

THE MUGHAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MARATHAS, NOVEMBER 1734—MAY 1735:

In the winter of 1734, the Mughal government decided to send two large armies to drive out the Marathas from Malwa, Bundelkhand, and southern Rajputana. It was intended to be a mighty effort on the part of the Mughal government to deal with the ever increasing Maratha pressure. Of the two armies, the one under Qamar-ud-din Khan, the *Wazir*, totally failed against Pilaji Jadhav, then active in northern Malwa and Bundelkhand, and returned to Delhi in May 1735, baffled and exhausted.⁷⁷ We are more concerned with Khan-i-Dauran's campaign undertaken about the same time when the *Wazir* was toiling against Pilaji ineffectually.

Khan-i-Dauran set out from Delhi in November 1734 with an army whose strength swelled to nearly one lakh after Jai Singh, Abhai Singh, Durjansal, and other Rajput rulers had joined it with their troops.⁷⁸ The Imperial army crossed the Mukand-darra in the beginning of February 1735, and reached Rampura, where Holkar and Sindhia had been sighted. The Maratha generals urgently recalled their scattered troops, busy in plundering the neighbouring villages, and on their arrival, encircled the Imperial army and cut off its supplies. With this the initiative passed into the Maratha hands which they retained till the end of the fight. The Maratha ring, flexible but supported by a series of mobile bases, was extremely galling to the Imperialists. During the next few days, the enemy continued to skirmish round the Mughal camp from morning till night-fall, keeping the Imperial commanders guessing as to when or where they would break off, or would direct their main thrust. The Imperial army was unable to move in any particular direction to break the cordon without exposing its flanks and the rear to severe Maratha mauling, while the Maratha commanders could always enlarge the segment of the cordon under attack to make a bulge or to make a gap, only to seal it off at the

77. For details see Dighe, 118-19; Irvine, II, 279-80.

78. According to *S.P.D.*, XIV, 23 (dated March 14, 1735), the strength of the army rose to two lakh horse, besides artillery. Rustam Ali, f. 266a, places it at 90,000, which seems to be correct.

appropriate moment to separate the Mughal cavalry from the protecting umbrella of their excellent artillery. With supplies entirely cut off, the vast Mughal army, laden with impedimenta, spoilt by lax military discipline, and lacking offensive eagerness, and its commanders constantly distracted by hostile activity of their rivals at the Court and concerned about maintaining their own position and interests there, did not attempt a break-through. On the 9th day, following a heavy engagement, the Marathas abruptly broke off, crossed into Kotah-Bundi territory, and from there 40,000 mounted troops made a dash into Sawai Jai Singh's state, then lying defenceless. Three days later (February 28), they fell upon Sambhar and plundered the town. Holkar's tactical move forced Jai Singh to leave the main army and to rush to save his own state. Khan-i-Dauran made use of the opportunity to retrace his steps and retired to Bundi, where he hoped to get supplies. On March 14, as Naro Shankar informed the Peshwa, the position was that Jai Singh was near Jaipur, Holkar was about twenty miles ahead of him, and Khan-i-Dauran was at Bundi. Thus by their speed and audacious tactics, the Marathas had succeeded in dividing the strength of the numerically superior Mughal army, which now lay dazed and inert at two or three places, its commanders guessing the next move of the enemy. The only answer to the Maratha strategy which Baji Rao had developed to perfection was a sufficient number of mobile troops, inspired by offensive eagerness, equipped with long range and quick firing muskets, and maintained by an efficient supply corps, but the Mughal army was deficient in all these requirements.

Jai Singh favours negotiations; his proposal. By this time it was clear that the initiative had passed into the hands of the Marathas, and there was not even a remote chance of a Mughal victory over them. In fact, there was every possibility that the Imperial troops, scattered as they were, and their morale at a very low ebb, might suffer heavy losses, in case a fresh attempt was made to engage the enemy. This was Jai Singh's view, though some junior commanders favoured a counter attack upon the enemy. Jai Singh, however, doubted the wisdom of adopting the latter course, and urged Khan-i-Dauran to open negotiations with the Marathas. Jai Singh suggested that they should offer to secure for the leading Maratha commanders *mansabs* of 4000 to 5000, a few lakhs of Rupees, and also the territory under the control of

Dost Muhammad Khan Rohela. Khan-i-Dauran was in agreement with Jai Singh.⁷⁹

The course of negotiations. The negotiations commenced with the arrival of Pandit Ram Chandra, who met Khan-i-Dauran and Sawai Jai Singh. Khan-i-Dauran, however, insisted that he would not conclude any agreement till Holkar and Sindhia would come personally and agree to serve the Emperor. As Hemraj, a senior Jaipur official who was present with his master, informed Bakshi Zorawar Singh of Jaipur, the "*ghanims* (Marathas) were not prepared to accept it and for this reason there was little possibility of an agreement with them." Ram Chandra had a separate meeting with Jai Singh whom he assured that as the Marathas had come to an agreement with him (Jai Singh), they would not disturb his country. But as their desire to come to an agreement with the Imperial government had not been realised, they would not abstain from harming the Imperial territories.⁸⁰ What understanding had been reached between Jai Singh and the Marathas, in consideration wherefor they had promised to keep their hands off Jaipur state? We know, and this will become clear from the subsequent account, that Jai Singh had not agreed to pay any fixed sum to the Marathas. The agreement, it seems, stipulated Jai Singh's help in the Peshwa's negotiations with the Imperial government.

Holkar and Sindhia meet Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran; the terms. On Chaitra Sudi 8 (March 20, 1735), Ram Chandra met Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran again, and it was settled that Holkar and Anand Rao would come to see the Imperial commanders on March 31. It was also settled that the Maratha *sardars* joining the Imperial service would receive during the first three months Rs. 4000/- per day. Towards the end of March it appeared that an agreement on these lines would be concluded, and, to avoid delay, Jai Singh himself would leave for Delhi to secure the Emperor's approval.⁸¹ On March 17 and 20, Jai Singh visited Khan-i-Dauran in his camp at Avaval village in Bundi. On March 31 (Vaishakha Vadi 4),

79. For the above account, see *S.P.D.*, XIV, 21, 23; Yahya, ff. 137a-138b; Rustam Ali, f. 266; Dighe, 119-20.

80. Hem Raj to Bakshi Zorawar Singh, Chaitra Sudi 14, S. 1792 (March 12, 1735), *J.S.A.* Advising Zorawar Singh to remain alert, he wrote: "But they (Marathas) cannot be trusted. You keep the city very carefully guarded. . . ."

81. Dan Singh (from Camp) to Zorawar Singh, Vaishakha Vadi 4, S. 1792 (March 31, 1735), *J.S.A.*

Sindhia, Holkar and other Maratha *sardars*, accompanied by Raja Ayamal Khatri, Jaipur's *diwan*, came to meet Jai Singh, who took them to Khan-i-Dauran's camp.⁸² During the talks, it seems, the Maratha commanders insisted that the question of joining the Imperial service could be discussed only at the Peshwa's level, and pressed for the *chauth* of Malwa. After prolonged discussions, Khan-i-Dauran accepted, on behalf of the Emperor, the Maratha demand of twenty-two lakhs of Rupees as the *chauth* of Malwa.⁸³ Regarding the actual mode of collection of *chauth* and other related matters, a letter sent by a Jaipur official in August 1735, furnishes us with some information. Thus it was agreed that "in each of the *parganas* under the direct control of the government, (i.e., excluding the lands held by the *jagirdars*) a Maratha official will be appointed." The Marathas were to receive half of the income of the *tehsils*, and were to have the right to put their seal on the *parwanahs* issued by the Jaipur officials. They were also to collect *hasil* at the custom *chowkis*. The Jaipur officials were anxious that in no case the Marathas should be allowed to exercise any control in Ujjain, the provincial capital.⁸⁴ It will however be a mistake to surmise that the above terms were anything more than tentative proposals. These terms were never ratified by the Emperor, nor were these ever implemented; nevertheless, their mere acceptance was a significant success of the Marathas, and seem to have proved useful to the Peshwa in his negotiations with Jai Singh a few months later.

Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran assailed by critics; they defend their policy. There could be no two opinions regarding the failure of the campaign undertaken by Khan-i-Dauran and Jai Singh. This made Saadat Khan and other critics of Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran very vocal. Saadat Khan charged Jai Singh for having ruined the country by supporting the Marathas. If he was granted the Government of Malwa and Agra provinces held by Jai Singh, he said, he would be able to keep the Marathas to the south of the Narmada with the help of his friend, the Nizam. But Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran maintained that the policy of

82. *D.K.*, XIX, 32-5; *S.P.D.*, XIV, 24, 26, 27.

83. *Irvine*, II, 280.

84. Hem Raj to Zorawar Singh, Bhadrpada Vadi 11, S. 1792 (August 3, 1735), *J.S.A.*

confrontation with the Marathas would not serve any purpose; on the other hand, by showing consideration to the Peshwa and his brother, they would be able to arrange their meeting with the Emperor when the terms of a lasting agreement between the two sides could be settled. As a proof of the Peshwa's desire to come to terms with the Mughal Government, they cited Radha Bai's proposed visit to the holy places in northern India. On the other hand, if Saadat Khan were to unite with the Nizam, the two would set up a new Emperor. Khan-i-Dauran confidently said that if the Maratha demands were fulfilled, and the Maratha *sardars* were granted *jagirs*, they would not create disturbances in the Imperial territories. In the course of recent negotiations, he said, he himself had promised to give to the Marathas that portion of Malwa which was under the refractory Rohelas, on the condition that the Marathas would not disturb the Mughal provinces.⁸⁵

The Emperor's wavering attitude; Jai Singh decides to make a grand effort to solve the problem. When Jai Singh found the Emperor wavering, and unable to choose between these two sharply antagonistic views, he decided to make a grand effort, at the highest diplomatic level, to reconcile the conflicting interests of the Empire and of the Maratha imperialism. The basic differences in the approach of the two groups at the Court on the Maratha question had by now reached a point when the Emperor's decision regarding the policy to be pursued in future could seriously affect the position of either group at the Court.

Jai Singh invites the Peshwa for talks. Jai Singh had so far sent missions to Satara and Poona, and had received various Maratha envoys. He had discussed the issues with Jadu Rai, Ram Chandra, and also with Sindhia and Holkar, but had no occasion to have heart to heart talks with the person whose supremely confident and able hands had been guiding the movement of Maratha expansion. Jai Singh sent for the Maratha agent. At the meeting Biharidas Pancholi, the veteran diplomat and *diwan* of Mewar, was also present. According to the Maratha agent, Jai Singh prefaced his proposal by saying that hitherto he had protected the Peshwa's prestige and importance, but in view of the Emperor's wavering attitude after Saadat Khan's

85. S.P.D., XIV, 47 (August 1735), 39 (21st October, 1735).

recent diatribe against him and Khan-i-Dauran, it would be desirable if the Peshwa, accompanied by Holkar, Sindhia; and other officers posted in Malwa, and attended by a small force of 5,000, visited Rajputana for talks with him. He offered to pay the daily expenses of this force, as well as the dues of Malwa, Sironj, Datia, Orcha, and other areas, totalling a sum of twenty lakhs, in cash. After the Peshwa's arrival he would discuss the situation with him, and if reliable assurances of his safe conduct were secured through Khan-i-Dauran, he would accompany him for a meeting with the Emperor: otherwise, he said, the Peshwa might return home. Jai Singh sought a definite reply to this proposal so that he might proceed further in the matter. The Maratha agent informed the Peshwa that Biharidas would be staying at Jaipur for a month, and it would be better if a reply to Jai Singh's proposal was received during his presence.⁸⁶

The Nizam opposed to Jai Singh's move; the Emperor ignores his request. The prospects of Baji Rao's meeting with the Emperor were not to the Nizam's liking.⁸⁷ He frankly conveyed to Anand Rai, the Maratha agent, his disapproval of Baji Rao's proposed visit to the Court, and advised that the Peshwa should not hold negotiations with the Emperor.⁸⁸ This was absolutely contrary to Jai Singh's policy. The Nizam was acting purely from selfish considerations, and, in fact, had reason to fear that a settlement between the Maratha and the Mughal government would seriously jeopardize his position in the Deccan. He

86. *S.P.D.*, XIV, 47 (August 1735).

87. About this time the Nizam wrote to the Emperor that Jai Singh being "devoid of courage and spirit of adventure", and being affluent, was reluctant to undertake operations against the Marathas. "He wants the Marathas to be his allies. In this he has two aims: one, that disturbances should subside, the other that the Marathas be shielded." (Nizam's letter to the Emperor, trans. in *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, p. 141). In his letters he repeatedly presses the Emperor to draw up a plan for an offensive campaign to destroy the Marathas while admitting that the most resolute and planned efforts of Hazrat Khuld-makan (Aurangzeb) had completely failed, though the condition of the Empire was much more sound and prosperous and the Marathas were considerably weaker at that time. The contradiction in his advice and the realities which he admitted in his letters being so obvious, the Emperor supported Jai Singh's move to hold negotiations with the Peshwa. See Nizam's letter in *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, 141-48.

88. *S.P.D.* (New Series), I, No. 26 (December 9, 1735).

therefore sought military and financial assistance from the Emperor to fulfil two objects: the destruction of the Maratha homeland, and the revocation of their right to collect *chauth* from the Deccan, after bringing about a rupture with them. But the Emperor ignored his request for the time being.⁸⁹

Jai Singh extends traditional hospitality to the Peshwa's mother. When in June 1735, Radha Bai, mother of Baji Rao, arrived in Jaipur, Jai Singh got an opportunity to show his earnest desire to establish harmonious relations with the Marathas. Radha Bai had passed through Udaipur where the Maharana had accorded her a warm and honourable welcome.⁹⁰ On June 1 (Ashadha Vadi 7), when she arrived near Jaipur, Sawai Jai Singh came out of his capital to receive her. She stayed in the Royal palace, and from the day of her arrival, Rs. 125/- were sent to her daily for her expenses. Three days later, Jai Singh presented her one thousand gold coins. During her seven weeks stay at Jaipur, Sawai Jai Singh came to see her several times and on each occasion offered her suitable presents. On August 8 (Bhadrapada Sudi 1, 1792), when she left Jaipur, Jai Singh went up to the mansion of Badan Singh Jat to see her off. He presented her an elephant, dresses, and Rs. 25,000/- as expenses for visiting Gaya. Radha Bai too gave presents — five articles for Ishwari Singh, five for Madho Singh and thirty for Jai Singh's queens. From this time, Jai Singh started sending Rs. 25,000/- annually to Radha Bai as *barkhasan* expenses. The amount continued to be sent to her till 1744.⁹¹ It is said that when Radha Bai was staying at Jaipur, Jai Singh secured her blessings for his daughter, Krishna Kunwari, who had been married to Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi,⁹² and this seems to have been one of the reasons why the Marathas did not disturb Dalel Singh till 1748. By that time, the Maratha

89. Nizam's letter to the Emperor in Musawi Khan's collection, trans. in *Eighteenth Century Deccan*, 140. The Nizam even complained (p. 145) that his letters had no effect upon the Emperor. "On the other hand, the replies to my letters were sent after great delay. These replies were vague and had no relation to the questions which I had raised. They added to my sense of disappointment."

90. *Vamsha*, IV, 3223-24; *S.P.D.*, IX, 12.

91. *D.K.*, X, 1219-1239. The details of the presents given to Radha Bai are given in these pages.

92. *Vamsha*, IV, 3224.

sardars were going their own way, disregarding the weak central control.

A few days before Radha Bai's departure from Jaipur, Jai Singh had sent Raja Ayamal to Delhi to see personally that necessary instructions were issued to all officials concerned to provide full facilities to the Peshwa's mother during the course of her pilgrimage.⁹³ Jai Singh also appointed Naraindas, Ayamal's brother and deputy governor of Agra, to accompany Radha Bai to Poona. Up to Agra, an escort of 1000 horse and 3000 archers provided by Jai Singh accompanied her.⁹⁴ When Naraindas met Muhammad Khan Bangash, the latter observed that as the Peshwa, having trusted him, had sent Radha Bai, he would treat her as his own mother, and sent orders to the *faujdar*s and other officials to extend all courtesy to the honoured pilgrim.⁹⁵

The warm and respectful welcome accorded to Radha Bai in Rajputana was highly appreciated by the Marathas⁹⁶ and created friendly atmosphere on the eve of Baji Rao's visit to Rajputana for negotiations with Jai Singh.

Baji Rao's visit; journey to Rajputana; preparations for the meeting. Leaving Poona in October 1735, Baji Rao arrived on the southern border of Mewar in the third week of January 1736. Among the important commanders accompanying him were Holkar, Sindhia, Anand Rao Pawar, and Tukoji Pawar.⁹⁷ On the way, he received the news that Maharaja Abhai Singh and Qamar-ud-din Khan, the *Wazir*, were reconciled again, and that there was a proposal to transfer the *subahs* of Agra, Malwa, and Gujarat to the *Wazir's* charge. He also learnt that the Emperor was intending to send two large armies against the Marathas.⁹⁸

When the Peshwa arrived near Dungarpur, he sent for Mahadeo

93. *S.P.D.*, XXX, No. 131.

94. Hem Raj to Zorawar Singh, Bhadrapada Vadi 3, S. 1792 (July 26, 1735), *J.S.A.*

95. *S.P.D.*, XXX, No. 134.

96. Thus see *S.P.D.*, XXX, No. 131. Hingne, No. 19 says that Radha Bai treated Jai Singh as her son, and, because of that, brotherly ties grew up between Jai Singh and Baji Rao. Jai Singh used his influence with Baji Rao in gently bringing him round to his point of view that the Marathas should sustain the empire by playing a positive role in the political situation as it existed at that time.

97. *S.P.D.*, XXII, pp. 168-69, XIV, 50; Dighe, 123.

98. *S.P.D.*, XIV, 39 (October 21, 1735).

Bhatt Hingne, the Maratha *wakil* at Delhi, and Raja Ayamal, to discuss the preliminaries, and to decide upon a suitable place for quartering his army during the period of negotiations with Jai Singh.⁹⁹ The Peshwa had not entered Rajputana from the Mandsaur-Rampura side, and, quite significantly, had taken this route which had not been adequately covered by the Maratha activity earlier. From this side, he could easily send his troops via Sirohi, and along the Mewar border, into Marwar. In this way he could hope to avoid his troops' presence near him at the time of his negotiations with the Maharana and Jai Singh, and maintain them at the expense of a hostile state and also subject it to pressure. Besides, if he sent his troops via this route, at no time they were likely to be away from him for more than a day's march. The Peshwa also instructed Hingne to see that Jai Singh encamped in the open, i.e., away from any town.¹⁰⁰ Also, before the commencement of the formal talks, Ranoji Sindhia, Ram Chandra Baba, and Ayamal had secured Court's approval of the basis on which the negotiations were to proceed. It was settled that after the Peshwa's meeting with the Emperor, he would be given twenty lakhs of Rupees in cash, a *jagir* worth forty lakhs of Rupees in Malwa, and *tankwah* on the territory of Dost Muhammad Rohela.¹⁰¹

Mewar grudgingly concedes Peshwa's demand. At Udaipur, the Peshwa could extract from the Maharana a promise to pay Rs. 1,50,000 annually, for which revenue of Banera *pargana* was assigned to the Marathas. The *sanad* showing the revenues of the *pargana* for V.S. 1792-99 is preserved in *Vir Vinod*. The treaty remained in force for ten years "when grasping at the whole they despised a part and the treaty became a nullity."¹⁰² The Maharana agreed to the above terms most grudgingly, and, as his letter to Biharidas shows, he had no intention to part with any portion of his territory. The Peshwa, he wrote, would "derive satisfaction from having compelled a contribution from me, besides

99. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 3 (December 21, 1735).

100. *Ibid.*

101. *S.P.D.*, XIV, No. 50.

102. *Vamsha*, IV, 3236-37; *Tod*, I, 337; *V.V.*, II, 1228-1229; *Ojha*, *Udaipur*, II, 631; *B.I.S.M.*, July-October, 1952, pp. 80, 84.

his demand of land...but if God hears me, he will not get my land."¹⁰³

Leaving Udaipur on February 8, 1736, Baji Rao passed through Nathdwara, where he made offerings to the deity, and then turned north-east, arriving at Jahazpur.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, Jai Singh had reached Jhadli village in *pargana* Malpura. There he waited for the Peshwa's arrival. The contemporary records have preserved the protocol observed on the occasion, so as to serve as a precedent for the future. As it makes interesting reading we give it in detail.

Jai Singh receives Baji Rao. On February 25, 1736 (Chaitra Vadi 10), Jai Singh advanced about a mile from his camp at Jhadli in *pargana* Malpura to receive the Peshwa. As they came nearer, both of them dismounted from their horses. Baji Rao performed *mujra*; Jai Singh touched his forehead with his hand, and then they embraced each other. The Peshwa was attended by Ram Chandra and six other officers. After exchanging a few formal words, Jai Singh and the Peshwa retired to their respective camps.¹⁰⁵

Nine week long meeting and negotiations. The next day, Baji Rao, attended by Raja Ayamal and Ram Chandra, visited Jai Singh's camp. Jai Singh received the Peshwa at the threshold of his tent. They embraced, saluted (each touching his own forehead), and then sat down on a *masnad*. After a while, they retired to the inner council chamber and remained closeted for about three hours. When Baji Rao took leave, Jai Singh came up to the outer *Diwan-khana* to see him off. As the news of the death of one of Sawai Jai Singh's queens had been received, no betel leaves or scent was offered to the guests.

On Tuesday, March 2, Jai Singh held court in the evening. Presently Baji Rao arrived. Jai Singh took him to his private

103. Maharana to Biharidas, Thursday, S. 1792 (1735 A.D.) in Tod, I, 336, Letter No. 2. Dr. Dighe's comment (p. 125) that "the Hindu chiefs and Hindu populace looked upon him (Baji Rao) as a deliverer, for whom they were long waiting" is not borne out by facts.

104. Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 146; Sardesai, *New History*, II, 151.

105. *D.K.*, X, 1158. The entries about the visit are in great detail. There is no mention of Bhambholao, where, according to Surajmal (*Vamsha*, IV, 3238-39), the Peshwa met Jai Singh. Also the contemporary records do not mention Holkar among those present at the time of meeting. Cf. *Vamsha*, IV, 3238-3240; Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 164.

chamber. offered him betel leaves, scent, and a large number of presents. After staying for more than three hours, the Peshwa departed for his camp. The presents offered to the Peshwa that evening included crests, pearls, pearl necklaces, costly cloth of hundreds of variety, and an elephant (Mira Gaj). The next day, wine cups of gold and a gold tray were sent to him; on March 4 (Chaitra Sudi 3), Jai Singh visited Baji Rao's camp and returned after nightfall. Three days later, when Baji Rao came to Jai Singh's camp, two sedan chairs, one of which was especially equipped for ladies. were sent to his camp.¹⁰⁶ On March 14, we find Jai Singh encamped at Morla village (about 35 miles south-east of Ajmer) from where he went to meet Baji Rao.¹⁰⁷ On March 16, Baji Rao again paid a visit to Jai Singh who presented him an ivory chess set and a few decorative articles of sandal-wood. On April 30 (Jyestha Sudi 1) we find Jai Singh encamped at Gehalpur, from where he went to see the Peshwa, who had just returned after taking a holy dip in the sacred Pushkar lake near Ajmer. The next day, the Peshwa came to Gehalpur to pay the return visit. After the meeting the Peshwa left for Sitagarh.¹⁰⁸ Two months later, on Peshwa's request, Jai Singh sent him a costly tent-house with all its paraphernalia.¹⁰⁹

Between February 25 and April 30, Jai Singh and Baji Rao met a number of times, and had prolonged discussions to bring about a lasting settlement between the Marathas and the Mughal government. Jai Singh kept the Emperor in touch with the progress of his talks with the Peshwa. In March, Yadgar Kashmiri,

106. *D.K.*, X, 1158-1181,

107. *Ibid.*, 1184.

108. *Ibid.*, 1187-89.

109. *Ibid.*, 1205-1207. Surajmal's version (3238-39), that during the meeting Baji Rao puffed his pipe blowing the smoke into the face of his host, accepted by Sarkar (*Fall*, I, 164), who also says that Baji Rao had the manners of a "mosstrooper", is hardly credible, nor is it correct to say that Holkar was present but "he sulked in his tent as Baji Rao did not now ask Jai Singh to restore Bundi to Budh Singh." There is ample proof of Baji Rao's polite manners and cultured tastes. The restrained tone in his letters in which he refers to the Emperor and the Imperial officers, many of whom were his sworn enemies, is a model of courtesy. Moreover, after Radha Bai's visit to Jaipur, warm and brotherly feelings had developed between Jai Singh and the Peshwa (See *Hingne Daftar*, I, Nos. 17, 19),

Kripa Ram and Nijabat Ali Khan had come from Delhi. They carried back with them the memorandum of the terms demanded by the Peshwa.¹¹⁰ As the negotiations were in progress, the Peshwa scrupulously refrained from giving any provocation to the Imperial authorities. He kept Holkar and Sindhia away in Marwar, where they besieged Merta for some time, and rejoined the Peshwa only at the end of the negotiations, in the last week of April. On their way, they halted at Ajmer and made offerings at the shrine of Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti. Baji Rao also ordered his troops operating in Bundelkhand not to enter Allahabad *subah*.¹¹¹

The negotiations; Baji Rao's terms in consonance with Jai Singh's plan; accepted by the Emperor. At the commencement of the negotiations, the Peshwa had asked through his envoy, Dhondo Mahadeo, for (1) a hereditary estate under the crown, (2) *mansabs* and *jagirs* for himself and his lieutenants, (3) cessation of offensive against him, (4) the office of *Sardeshpande* of the Deccan (which entitled him to receive five per cent of the revenue of the Deccan) for which he offered to pay six lakhs of Rupees to the Emperor, (5) the grant of the *subahdari* of Malwa, and control over its entire territory, excluding the Imperial forts and lands of the *jagir* holders, old feudatories, grantees of rent free land, and *rozinadars*, (6) thirteen lakhs of Rupees for his expenses, to be paid in three instalments at stated periods.¹¹² These terms were in consonance with Jai Singh's plan to bring the Marathas within the copious folds of the Mughal government, thereby sustaining the Empire with their support. The Emperor accepted terms 1, 5 and 6, which also implied acceptance of terms 2 and 3. The Emperor also agreed to give two lakhs of Rupees to Chimnaji Appa, as he was (now) 'loyal to the Emperor', and also consented to grant *Sardeshpandeship* of the Deccan to the Peshwa on the condition of paying six lakhs of Rupees. It may be noted that there was no mention of *chauth* in these terms.¹¹³

Other terms broached by the Peshwa. The Peshwa, on finding the Imperial government inclined to yield to his demands, and

110. See Rustam Ali, ff. 267b-268a; Irvine, II, 284.

111. Rustam Ali, f. 267b; *S.P.D.*, XIV, 56.

112. *S.P.D.*, XV, 92-94.

113. *Ibid.*, 93, 96; Duff, I, 439.

desiring to secure greater financial control over the Deccan, broached new demands at different stages during the course of negotiations; but as we shall presently see, he did not make their acceptance a pre-condition to a settlement with the imperial government. He asked for: (1) expenses from the chiefs of Orcha, Bhadawar, Chanderi, Narwar, Shivpuri, Rampur, Amjhera, Kotah, Datia, Khichiwada, Seondha, and Bundi. (2) all the arrangements in the Deccan to be made through him, (3) the Shahzada to be appointed as the governor of the Deccan. (4) *jagir* of fifty lakhs in the Deccan for himself, (5) hereditary (*watni*) *Sardeshpandegiri* of the Deccan, (6) Mandu and Raisin forts for the safe-keeping of his family, (7) territory up to Chambal in *jagir*, (8) a sum of Rupees fifty lakhs to be paid to him (Peshwa) from the revenues of Bengal. (9) Allahabad, Banaras, Gaya and Mathura to be given to him in *jagir*, (10) a meeting with the Emperor during a ride, in the presence of Amir Khan and Jai Singh, soon after which he would be free to return home. It would, however, be wrong to think that the Peshwa put forth all these demands at the same time, or with equal force and earnestness. Much of the confusion regarding these demands is removed when we study them in the light of the letters written by the Peshwa shortly after his meeting with Jai Singh in which he had charged the Imperial government with going back on its word.¹¹⁴

Jai Singh and Baji Rao not responsible for the failure of the talks. In his letter dated May 31, 1736 to Hingne, the Maratha envoy at Delhi, Baji Rao candidly says that he had received an assurance about the fulfilment of the terms relating to the grant of a *jagir*, five lakhs of Rupees in cash as expenses, possession over the country held by the Rohelas, and grant of *subah* Malwa, before the commencement of the rains. He waited in Malwa till May (1736), expecting ratification of these terms, but when no reply came, he remonstrated with Khan-i-Dauran, who had promised to get the terms ratified within two or three days. He wrote that he had to maintain 50,000-60,000 horse all these months, and as the question of his joining the Imperial service had cropped up, he had abstained from plundering the Imperial territory. But how long could he feed the army like that? The decision on the proposed terms, he wrote, should be taken promptly, to enable

114. See *S.P.D.*, XV, 94-96.

him to implement the same without delay. Meanwhile, he added, he was leaving behind Holkar with ten thousand troops in Malwa.¹¹⁵

In his letter dated July 11 to Mahadeo Bhatt, the Peshwa wrote that though he was keen to fulfil the promise he had made, and was serious about it, the Mughal government had gone back on its word and had kept him waiting for seven weeks without giving any definite reply. Hence, he was leaving Holkar and Sindhia in Malwa with 12,000-15,000 troops. Had he received a favourable response from Delhi, he would have kept quiet, he wrote. The Peshwa also disapproved of the Mughal proposal to pay him five lakhs of Rupees in five instalments of one lakh each, for two reasons. First, it would be a bad precedent, and secondly, a lakh of Rupees would not meet the requirements of an army of fifteen to twenty thousand even for a week.¹¹⁶

When at last, after a good deal of injudicious and avoidable delay on the part of the Imperial government, a *farman* was issued on September 29, bestowing on Baji Rao a *jagir*, *mansab* of 7000, and *mahals* of his *watan*, it contained no mention of the grant of the Government of Malwa to the Peshwa. The offer was, therefore, unacceptable to the Peshwa.¹¹⁷ As it was clear that the assurances given to him by the Emperor a few months ago were not likely to be fulfilled, chiefly due to the opposition of Qamar-ud-din Khan, the Nizam, and others, the Peshwa felt that he must cow down this clique by demonstrating his might. If the talks, so patiently conducted by Jai Singh, had failed, neither he nor the Peshwa were to be blamed for it.¹¹⁸

Baji Rao's spectacular raid for discrediting the Turani clique. The details of Baji Rao's brilliantly conducted raid on Delhi are not called for here. The news of his arrival within 70 miles of Agra spread consternation at the Court, and *Wazir* Qamar-ud-din Khan and Khan-i-Dauran hastily left the capital with large armies to

115. *Hingne Daftar*, No. 6; Peshwa's letter to Khan-i-Dauran, May 31, 1730 (*Hingne Daftar*, No. 4). See also Rajwade, VI, 95-97.

116. *Hingne Daftar*, No. 6.

117. See *S.P.D.*, XV, 86.

118. For a different view see Duff, I, 438-39; Kincaid and Parasnis, 246; Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 154; Dighe, 129; *Parties*, 228-29; they consider Baji Rao's exorbitant demands as the chief cause of the failure of the talks.

intercept him. Jai Singh, in response to the Imperial orders, started from his capital with fifteen thousand troops and artillery. Maharaja Abhai Singh was then encamped at Mauzabad with ten thousand to fifteen thousand men. From Awadh, Saadat Khan swiftly moved towards Agra to meet the threat. To divert Saadat Khan, Baji Rao despatched ten thousand horse under Holkar to threaten Doab. This force, however, was surprised at Jalesar on March 12, and had to retreat with heavy losses. Saadat Khan now crossed the Yamuna near Agra and wrote to Khan-i-Dauran to dismiss Dhondo Pant, the Peshwa's envoy, as he had dispersed Baji Rao's army.¹¹⁹

In this situation, it was hazardous for Baji Rao to advance any further towards Delhi, as three large armies were barring his path and were ready to pounce upon him or encircle him. The enemy was wide awake and in high spirits. At the same time, a retreat would have impaired the Peshwa's military prestige built up through a space of seventeen years by a series of brilliant victories, and the Mughal faction would have also gained ascendancy at the Court, making Peshwa's recent negotiations with Jai Singh entirely futile. He, therefore, did not change his destination but only altered his course. Retreating some distance, he made an out-flanking movement to the left, and moving swiftly through the Jat country, and avoiding contact with the enemy, or detection by them, suddenly arrived on the outskirts of Delhi. He stayed there for twenty hours, during which time, had he so wished, he could have plundered or burnt down a part of the Mughal capital. Though there was a large garrison in the capital, a number of boats were hurriedly collected below the palace window as a precautionary measure to enable the Emperor's wives to escape. After the first short encounter between the Marathas and a part of the garrison, in which the latter became a laughing stock of the Deccanis, "the citizens prepared for flight and the contagion of terror spread to the fort and the palace."¹²⁰ But Baji Rao had no intention to sack Delhi; from military point of view it was risky; politically, it was unnecessary. He had achieved his aim of discrediting the Mughal faction. As Baji Rao wrote, he knew that the Emperor and Khan-i-Dauran were inclined to

119. Dighe, 130-33.

120. *Br. Ch.*, No. 27; *S.P.D.*, XV, 37, 47. See Iso Irvine, II, 288-94.

accept his demands, but the Mughal faction was opposed to this policy. "I did not wish to drive our friends to an extremity by committing sacrilege on the capital. I, therefore, sent letters assuring the Emperor."¹²¹ Obviously, the Peshwa was keen for a settlement, and wished to avoid everything which might imperil prospects of an agreement with the Mughal government.

Baji Rao's object partly fulfilled; Nizam called. This brilliantly conducted raid demonstrated Baji Rao's capacity to reach anywhere at any time and provided a proof, if any was needed, of his great superiority over the Imperial commanders. He was right in thinking that his Delhi raid would discredit the Turani group,¹²² but wrong in expecting that the Emperor would concede his demands immediately as a result of the raid. In fact the raid alarmed the Emperor so much that he broke off the talks initiated by the *Wazir* soon after this spectacular raid, and revoked the proposal to grant Baji Rao the Government of Malwa, besides fifteen lakhs of Rupees!¹²³ Instead, he accepted the Nizam's offer to oppose the Marathas, using all the Imperial resources, and sent *farmans* summoning him to Delhi.¹²⁴ The Nizam, as has been pointed out earlier, was anxious to prevent the negotiations from succeeding.¹⁻⁵ The Peshwa's demand for the *Sardeshpandeship* and the deputy governorship of the Deccan impinged severely upon his interests. He also knew that any agreement between the Emperor and the Peshwa would seriously jeopardize his own position in the Deccan, and would render his virtually independent position there untenable. The Nizam took full advantage of the Emperor's desperation, and procured honours and rewards which, in view of his disservice to the empire since 1723, were absolutely uncalled for. But when he reached Delhi

121. *Br. Ch.*, No. 27. Though on Khan-i-Dauran's request Jai Singh advanced to Baswa with fifteen to sixteen thousand troops and artillery, he did not try to bar the Peshwa's path as the latter's raid was intended mainly to discredit the Turani clique which was thwarting all attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement with the Marathas. Jai Singh wrote to the Peshwa not to cause any disturbance in his territory. To this the Peshwa willingly agreed. (See *Br. Ch.*, 27).

122. The Emperor refused to see Saadat Khan, or to appoint him to the Government of Malwa or of Gujarat.

123. Ashub, f. 125a; *Parties*, 232, n. 49.

124. See *S.P.D.*, XV, 26, 33; X, 27.

125. See above, pp. 230-31.

on July 2, 1737 (15th Rabi I, 1150 H.), he was hailed as if the saviour had arrived. Besides the title of Asaf Jah, the highest that a subject could bear, he was promised the Government of five *subahs* and one crore of Rupees for keeping the Marathas to the south of the Narmada. On August 3, Ghazi-ud-din Khan, eldest son of the Nizam, was appointed governor of Agra and Malwa vice Sawai Jai Singh. The Nizam was also given sixty lakhs of Rupees to equip his army and a number of prominent officers were detailed under him.¹²⁶ He could neither have asked nor wished for more.

Jai Singh sends a token force under Ishwari Singh and Pratap Singh Jat; Nizam humiliated but saves his skin. Sawai Jai Singh sent a suitable force under his eldest son, Ishwari Singh, and Raja Ayamal, to join the Nizam. Badan Singh Jat also sent a contingent under his son Pratap Singh.¹²⁷ Avoiding Ujjain, where the Maratha position was considered strong, the Nizam took the southern route, arriving near Bhopal about the middle of December. By that time his army had swelled to about 50,000, including the troops sent by Saadat Khan and the rulers of Orcha, Datia, etc. The Nizam had excellent artillery at his disposal. Despite all these advantages, his much younger rival completely outshone and outwitted him as a commander and tactician, and forced him to sign (January 6, 1738, 26 Ramzan) the humiliating convention of Duraha Sarai, 64 miles from Sironj.¹²⁸ The Nizam promised to secure for the Peshwa a *sanad* conferring:

- (1) the grant of the *subahdari* of Malwa; and
- (2) complete sovereignty over the territory between the Narmada and the Chambal.

The Nizam also promised to secure fifty lakhs of Rupees as expenses from the Emperor.¹²⁹

Nizam's failure vindicates Jai Singh's agreement with the Peshwa. In these terms, it will be noted, there was no mention of the demands relating to the Deccan made by Baji Rao a few months earlier.

126. *S.P.D.*, XV, 53; Irvine, II, 299-302; Dighe, 145.

127. *D.K.*, XXIV, 39.

128. *Br. Ch.*, Appendix 33, 34; Peshwa places the strength of the Nizam's army at 35,000 (*Br. Ch.*, 134). Obviously, the Nizam was expecting heavy reinforcement from Aurangabad but the Marathas succeeded in checking them. See also *S.P.D.*, X, 27; XV, 53, 56, 58, 82; XXX, 207.

129. See *S.P.D.*, XV, 66; *Br.Ch.*, Appendix Nos. 35, 36, 116.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the Nizam had once again bartered away the interests of the Imperial provinces to secure his own position in the Deccan. He had even conceded to the Peshwa those demands which directly impinged upon the sovereignty of the Emperor.

But it is likely that by forcing the Nizam to accept these impossible terms, Baji Rao wished to discredit the Mughal faction altogether. He knew that his purpose would be achieved through Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran, and that Qamar-ud-din Khan and the Nizam were deadly against all negotiations which might lead to an agreement between the Emperor and the Marathas. It is therefore doubtful if Baji Rao put any hope in the fulfilment of the agreement concluded at Duraha Sarai. The Nizam's disgraceful failure, however, strengthened Jai Singh's position¹³⁰, as the terms which he had concluded with the Peshwa were far better than those conceded by the Nizam, and had the additional merit of containing the stipulation that the Peshwa and a number of Maratha *sardars* would serve the Emperor.

Ishwari Singh meets the Peshwa; Marathas retire. In the negotiations leading to this agreement, which presented the Nizam in a very poor light, Raja Ayamal, Jai Singh's *diwan*, had played a key rôle. By doing so, he had rendered yet another good service to his master. After the signing of the agreement, the Nizam sent the Rajas and the important nobles to meet Baji Rao. Prince Ishwari Singh met the Peshwa on January 23 (Magha Vadi 14, S. 1794), and offered presents, including a studded crest. He also gave suitable presents to Holkar, Pilaji, Ranoji Sindhia, Jaswant Rao, Ram Chandra Pandit, and also to Shyam Rai and Ghane Rai, *mumshis* of Sindhia.¹³¹ From Duraha Sarai, the Nizam returned to Delhi, reaching there in April 1738. The Peshwa stayed on at Bhopal for a fortnight, and then came to Kotah to punish Maharao Durjansal for his attempt to send reinforcements to the Nizam during the recent hostilities. After extracting from the Maharao a promise to pay ten lakhs of Rupees, the Peshwa retired towards the Deccan, reaching Poona

130. This is evident from the fact that Jai Singh was again entrusted with the task of effecting a settlement with the Marathas, and from his high position at the Court during 1740-43. See below, p. 253.

131. D.K., XXIV.

on July 15.¹³² Soon he was engrossed in the Salsette campaign, which his brother was conducting for the past one year without any appreciable success. He remained engaged in this costly but necessary campaign (which cost 22,000 Maratha lives) till May 12, 1739, and could not resume negotiations with the Imperial government.¹³³

Nadir Shah appears on the scene. Meanwhile, the Persian Emperor Nadir Shah, after capturing Kabul in June 1738, had reached Peshawar (November). On December 2, the Emperor formally gave leave to Qamar-ud-din Khan, the Nizam, who was at this time holding the post of *wakil*, and Khan-i-Dauran to check the invader's advance. In the beginning of January the enemy entered Lahor. It was then that the Imperial authorities fully awoke to the seriousness of the threat. Urgent letters were immediately despatched to the provincial governors, the Rajput chiefs, Peshwa Bajī Rao, and others calling upon them to come to the Emperor's assistance.¹³⁴ It was widely believed that the invader had received invitation from the Nizam and Saadat Khan, who wanted to establish a new empire by calling the Persian Emperor, and thereby stem the Maratha tide.¹³⁵ There was no doubt about the Nizam's

132. *S.P.D.*, XV, 68; Dighe, 149-50.

133. *Dighe*, 184ff.

134. See Irvine, II, 331-36.

135. See Dhondo Govind to Bajī Rao, *Ait Charcha*, 4, cited in Sardesai, *op. cit.*, 167. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, 559.

Shakir Khan asserts that "Zakariya Khan, at the instigation of the Nizam and Saadat Khan, who wanted to overthrow Khan-i-Dauran, disloyally admitted Nadir into Lahor." See Irvine, II, 325n; Fraesar, 129-31; *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, ff. 100a, 103a which says that Saadat Khan had been persuading Nadir Shah for some time, to invade India, and had informed him about the disorders in the country, and differences and ill-will among the ministers. He had instigated some other nobles to join in the plot. Khan-i-Dauran, for this reason, advised the Emperor not to call Saadat Khan from Awadh. But the Emperor, being unaware of his dark designs, repeatedly sent him orders to arrive. Surajmal says (p. 3254) that the Nizam and Qamar-ud-din Khan, who wanted to destroy Khan-i-Dauran, had won over Saadat Khan by promising him the post of *Mir Bakshi*. He also says (pp. 3272-73) that when Nadir Shah saw Delhi army well prepared to face him, he wrote a sharply worded letter to the Nizam charging him with treachery and threatening him with serious consequences. The Nizam then assured that most of the nobles were loyal to him, and requested him not to accept the indemnity but to commence action so that he might get rid of Khan-i-Dauran. It is a fact that after Bajī Rao's Delhi raid and his triumph at Bhopal, the position of

dark record of disloyal service to the Emperor, and it was natural that his loyalty to the latter was suspected by many.

Why Jai Singh and Baji Rao were keen to help the Emperor but not in concert with the Turani clique? For this reason it was difficult for Jai Singh and the Peshwa to join Nizam-ul-Mulk in opposing Nadir Shah. They could not also trust Saadat Khan and Qamar-uddin Khan who had always been hostile towards them. Also, sharp differences and feelings of acute rivalry existed among the chief nobles of the empire, especially between Khan-i-Dauran and Nizam-ul-Mulk, and the possibility of their sabotaging the entire resistance against Nadir Shah could not be ruled out. In such a situation it was not possible or advisable for Jai Singh or the Peshwa to rush to the Emperor's aid and, without their lead, no help was likely to

Qamar-uddin Khan, Saadat Khan, and the Nizam had been severely compromised, and there was danger that the terms, which the Emperor had agreed to concede to the Peshwa in 1736 on the recommendation of Jai Singh and Khan-i-Dauran, and which were bound to affect seriously the interests of the Turani clique, might be revived again. To Nizam, Saadat Khan, and Qamar-uddin Khan it must have seemed essential to resort to some severe, even destardly remedy, like inviting Nadir Shah. It is significant that the conduct of all these three greatly facilitated the enemy's task, and they became the prime reason of the sad events at Karnal and the dark deeds of Nadir at Delhi. The charge against the Nizam and Saadat Khan has been examined in great detail by Zahiruddin Malik (see *Medieval India, A Miscellany*, Bombay, 1964, I, 210-23). He exonerates the Nizam as well as Saadat Khan (213, 223). About the Nizam he concludes his detailed enquiry in these words: "Except his withdrawal from hostilities provoked by Saadat Khan at the battle-field of Karnal, no other act of treason stands out against Nizam-ul-Mulk. Actuated by motives to save the Empire from the approaching doom, Nizam-ul-Mulk accepted the invitation of Muhammad Shah to come to Delhi and take charge of conducting the state affairs. In the month of October (1737) he marched from Delhi to recapture Malwa; on January 7, 1738 he concluded peace with Baji Rao and returned to Delhi in April 1738. Against this background of his seemingly good relations with the Emperor, the high esteem in which he was held and the position of prestige and authority he enjoyed, it is improbable that he should have written letters to Nadir Shah..."(223). But as we have seen, the Emperor did not at all trust the Nizam, whose prestige, after his humiliating Bhopal campaign, had gone down lower than ever before, that more than once he had bargained with the Marathas at the cost of the Empire, that he had no good relations with the Emperor, nor was he held in high esteem at the Court. Indeed the theatrical manner in which Saadat Khan provoked the engagement on a mere loss of 500 camels, his leaving behind a large part of his contingent, his survival in the encounter, probably much to the Nizam's dismay, the manner in which the Nizam and Qamar-uddin Khan manipulated Khan-i-Dauran's departure and

reach the Emperor from Rajputana or Maharashtra.¹³⁶ The Marathi letters show that though the Peshwa was keen to help the Emperor and engage Nadir Shah, as any violent change in the political set up was bound to affect his hard won gains adversely, he had no intention of doing so in cooperation with the Nizam, Qamar-ud-din Khan, and Saadat Khan. He wanted to drive off Nadir with the help of the Rajput chiefs¹³⁷ who, despite their preoccupation at this time in the situation arising out of Jodhpur's attack upon Bikaner, were as keen as the Peshwa to prevent any political upheaval in consequence of the Persian invasion.

Nadir's victory at Karnal; treacherous conduct of Niza-mul-Mulk and Saadat Khan. On February 13, Nadir Shah won the battle of Karnal after a successful engagement with only a part of the Emperor's troops. In all 5000 troops under Saadat Khan, who set out against the enemy without permission and against the wishes of all, and 8000 horse under Khan-i-Dauran engaged the enemy; the rest of the army remained inert during the battle. The Nizam remained "absolutely inert throughout the day and gave no help to Khan-i-Dauran or Saadat Khan, probably because he hoped to take the place of these rivals at the Court if they perished." When as a result of Khan-i-Dauran's death, the post of *Mir*

their refusal to support him, thus contributing to his death, and their vital interest in the removal of Khan-i-Dauran from the scene so as to weaken the efforts of Jai Singh and Baji Rao to arrive at an agreement with the Emperor, suggest that the conduct of the Nizam, Qamar-ud-din Khan and Saadat Khan, on the eve of and during the battle of Karnal, was pre-meditated. It is significant that Nizam had brought with him only 5000-6000 horse, a small part of his artillery, and 2000-3000 foot-soldiers. James Fraser, an impartial observer and a contemporary of Nadir Shah, is quite categorical about the pressing invitation sent to the Shah by the Nizam and Saadat Khan who also wrote letters to Nasir Khan and Zakaria Khan, the governors of Kabul and Punjab, advising them to "behave discreetly" in view of unlikelihood of any help reaching them from Delhi in case of Nadir's invasion who, they wrote, being aware of the fact that the Emperor and his favourites were immersed in debauchery, had "come to a resolution to strike a blow at this empire." These letters "cooled them pretty much..." (pp. 130-31).

136. As in 1720, Jai Singh did not go personally to the Emperor's assistance but sent a force, this time under Rao Kirpa Ram, his representative at the Mughal Court, who along with the Jats was posted to the rear of Khan-i-Dauran at Karnal. (*The Journal of Nadir Shah's Transactions in India*, tr. by Fraser in *The History of Nadir Shah*, 1742, p. 153)

137. Letter. *Ait Charcha*, 4.

Bakshi fell vacant, Nizam-ul-Mulk tried to secure it for his son. This was opposed by Azim-ullah Khan, the son of the *Wazir's* brother, who in protest set out to join Nadir Shah. The Nizam then secured the post for himself. When Saadat Khan, who was a prisoner in Nadir's camp, came to know of the Nizam's appointment as *Mir Bakshi*, the post which he coveted, he sought to wreck vengeance on the Nizam and the Emperor and induced Nadir Shah to visit Delhi.¹³⁸ These foreigners—Saadat Khan, Qamar-uddin Khan, the Nizam—who had no roots in the country,¹³⁹ thus became the cause of unspeakable misery which the people of Delhi and other places had to suffer at the hands of the invader and his vile hordes.

In the beginning of March 1739, Nadir entered Delhi and stayed there 'ill the end of April. During his fifty seven day long bloody and disgusting stay, coins were issued and public prayers were read in his name as the sovereign of India.

Baji Rao's concern at Nadir's success; his plan to fight in concert with Hindu powers; reasons. Baji Rao was in constant touch with the developments in the north, and as the details of the Emperor's defeat at Karnal reached him, he became increasingly alarmed at the sudden change in the political situation in the country.¹⁴⁰ In his letter dated February 9 to his brother, he expressed the view that the Mughal government might fall. This was likely to complicate the entire situation, and upset all his plans. In case Nadir decided to stay on in India, he was likely to march to the Deccan. In that case, wrote Baji Rao, he would engage him on the left side of the Chambal in cooperation with the army of 'Hindustan'. He asked Chimnaji to finish the Bassein campaign, and send him reinforcements post-haste. He also advised him to win over Raghuji Bhosle to their side, as his cooperation would be valuable in the coming conflict with Nadir.¹⁴¹

138. See Irvine, II, 341-49, 352-56; *Tazkira* as cited in E&D, VIII, 82.

139. This point has already been made by Sarkar (see *Later Mughals*, II, 313). He says that these persons had "no share in its (country's) past history, traditions, and culture, no hereditary loyalty to its throne. The Mughal Emperor was merely their pay-master . . . It was only in the succeeding generations that their families became rooted in the Indian soil." On the other hand, Khan-i-Dauran's ancestors had been living in India for generations.

140. Thus see Baji Rao's letters to Chimnaji Appa, dated February 9 and March 31, 1739 in *S.P.D.*, XV, 71, 72.

141. *Ait Charcha*, 4, in Sardesai, II, 167; *S.P.D.*, XV, 72, 75, 77.

It was imperative to make the best possible preparations, irrespective of whether a clash with the invader took place or not. Dhondo Pant had informed the Peshwa that Nadir himself would like to avoid hostilities with him if the Marathas would make an impressive show of their strength. He was confident that the united strength of the Peshwa, Jai Singh, and the Bundela chiefs would be sufficient to overcome Nadir, and reported that Jai Singh was waiting for the Peshwa to take the lead. He wrote: "Nizam-ul-Mulk is playing a mischievous game. Some of his spies who were found roaming about, prying into Jai Singh's secret counsels, were captured by him. They confessed they were deputed by Nizam-ul-Mulk. They were discharged with their noses and ears cut off."¹⁴² The Peshwa's concern at these developments arising out of Nadir's invasion was primarily for political reasons, but in his letter to Mewar, he also spoke of offering resistance to the Persian "for the safety of our *dharma*" and to save "Hindu bravery and religion" from dishonour. "You try to assemble Sawai Jai Singh and others, and all the Hindu armies should gather at one place. This army would be about one lakh twenty-five thousand strong; we with our entire army would also join it. Thus with an army of about two lakhs we should try to defeat the enemy."¹⁴³ While deciding to gather such a large army against Nadir, the Peshwa might have taken into account the possibility of the Nizam and others joining the invader against them.

- We have already noted that a large part of the Peshwa's army could not join him till the fall of Bassein on May 12, 1739. On May 5, Nadir left Delhi on his return journey. A few days before his departure, he sent letters to Raja Shahu, Baji Rao, Jai Singh, the Maharana, and other *rajās* of Hindustan and the chiefs of the Deccan notifying them the peace between him and Muhammad Shah and bidding them to serve the Emperor loyally.¹⁴⁴

142. *Ait Charcha*, 4.

143. Baji Rao to Dhabhai, March 23, 1739, *JBISM*, July-October, 1952, Letter No. 6, p. 85.

144. See Scott's *History of the Dekkan*, II, 213; *S.P.D.*, XV, 83; Irvine, II, 375; Tod, I, 333, n.: Kincaid and Parasnis, who give ((Appendix, pp. 453-54) the translation of Nadir's letter (dt. 27th Muharram, 1152 H.) to the Peshwa. It reads: "... Baji Rao, possessing a charming face and being a man of good luck, is informed that... to Emperor Muhammad Shah, whose greatness is like that of the heavens... the kingdom and crown of India is entrusted, treating him as brother"

On receiving the news of Nadir's departure, Baji Rao broke up his camp at Burhanpur and returned to Poona, reaching there on July 27.¹⁴⁵ He asked Mahadeo Bhatt Hingne to discuss with Sawai Jai Singh the changed situation in the country.¹⁴⁶ Nadir's visitation had not only dealt a shattering blow to the Emperor's prestige and that of the Mughal government, it had also altered the position of different factions at the Court which had till now influenced in varying degrees the Emperor's policies. To Jai Singh the death of Khan-i-Dauran was an irreparable loss. The two were close friends, tied together by warmest ties, sharing same tastes, and having the same outlook on various political issues.¹⁴⁷ The Nizam's attempts, after the death of Khan-i-Dauran and Saadat Khan, to extract maximum gains from the weak hands of the Emperor were as much Jai Singh's concern as of the Peshwa. The Emperor was fed up with the Turani clique and wanted to replace Qamar-uddin-Khan, the *Wazir*, by Amir Khan. He even sought Maratha support for Amir Khan through Sawai Jai Singh, who was asked to take solemn assurance from the Peshwa that he would not take

145. Dighe, 153.

146. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 15.

147. Khan-i-Dauran had many qualities of head and heart. He was courteous, of easy manners, generous, a liberal patron of poets, witty and wise, regular in performing prayers, brave and chivalrous, and like his friend, Jai Singh, owned a large library. There was nothing low or mean about him. "He had pleasant manners and was affable and was fond of the society of the learned. In his company subjects of learning were always discussed. He was courteous to strangers but reserved with his rivals. Whatever he got from his chiefs he spent upon his soldiers who were all in good condition and there was no self-seeking in his management of state affairs." (*M.U.*, trans. R.&B., I, 776). For his personality and character, see also *Medieval India, A Miscellany*, I, 231.

After Khan-i-Dauran's death, Jai Singh, and later his sons, treated the late Nawab's family with respect and kindness. Soon after Khan-i-Dauran's death, one of his Begams was granted a village in Jaipur state for her maintenance. In September 1739, Rs. 10,000 were sent to two sons of Khan-i-Dauran — Ashraf and Ahtasham Khan. One of his Begams continued to receive till her death Rs. 1000 yearly. In 1751, Rs. 3000 were sent to her. When in November 1760, Begam Iztulnisa came from Delhi, Madho Singh, the then ruler of Jaipur, paid her a visit. In 1763 we again find him visiting Khan-i-Dauran's Begam. She lived in Jaipur till her death on June 22, 1769. She resided in the *haveli* of Vrija Nathji. The frequent visits of Khan-i-Dauran's sons, *wakils*, *mutsaddis*, *hakims*, etc., to Jaipur, recorded in *Dastur Komwar* papers, indicate the close ties which existed between the two families. (See *D.K.*, XIX, 1-39).

Nizam-ul-Mulk's side and would support the Emperor.¹⁴⁸ As the political situation was very fluid and the Empire seemed on the brink of dissolution, Baji Rao felt that he should try to stabilize the position in consultation with Jai Singh, and as per the Emperor's wishes. By doing so, he hoped to win the Emperor's gratitude, and ensure safety of his gains achieved during the past two decades. He, therefore, asked Hingne to meet Jai Singh and discuss high policy matters with him.¹⁴⁹ He also set out towards Malwa, after forcing Nasir Jang, son of the Nizam, to surrender the Narmar district. But the end of his remarkable career was at hand. On reaching the Narmada he was taken ill and breathed his last there on April 28, 1740.¹⁵⁰ He was then thirty-nine years of age.

Jai Singh grieved at the Peshwa's death; his concern for the future; his assessment of the situation right. Jai Singh was extremely grieved to hear of Baji Rao's death.¹⁵¹ The two had developed, during the course of years, feelings of deep regard and affection for each other. Also, Baji Rao's demise, besides greatly weakening Jai Singh's "side" at the Court, could jeopardize the very basis on which he had been working hard all these years in order to bring about a suitable agreement between the Marathas and the Mughal government. It was possible that the new Peshwa, Balaji Bajirao, might well take a different line in regard to a settlement with the Mughal government, and the Maratha policies might take a different course, and might be run in a different manner. But soon Jai Singh received Chimnaji Appa's assurance,¹⁵² conveyed through Mahadeo Bhatt, that the Marathas would stick to their promises, and would act as desired by the Emperor. To boost the Maratha morale, Chimnaji Appa tried to emphasize that his brother's death had made no difference whatsoever. The veteran commanders, the army, the

148. *Hingne Daftar*, Letter No. 13 (dated April 28, 1740) and No. 15 (dated June 2, 1740). See also *Seir*, (tr.), I, 318-20. It says (318) that after Nadir's departure, the Emperor tried to dismiss the Turanis from administration. "He had long since harboured suspicions against the zeal and fidelity, not only of Qamar-ud-din Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk, but against all the Turanis in general, nor had these suspicions received any alteration by their conduct all along the troubles of Nadir Shah's invasion. He resolved, therefore, to weaken their confederacy."

149. See *Hingne Daftar*, I, Nos. 15 (June 2, 1740), 17 (June 16, 1740).

150. *S.P.D.*, XXI, 89. See also Dighe, 201-03 and Duff, I, 461-63.

151. See *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 17 (June 16, 1740).

152. Thus see *Hingne Daftar*, Nos. 15, 17. See also No. 19.

trained officials and diplomats, all were there to carry on Baji Rao's unfinished task. "This Sawai Jai Singh and other wise and far-sighted people knew well," he wrote.¹⁵³ Jai Singh knew it too well and the history of the rise of the Maratha power supported the belief.

The Marathas bank on Jai Singh who advises them to counter the Nizam's move. In the altered political circumstances following Nadir's departure, when Baji Rao's steady hand was no more to guide the destiny of the Maratha nation, Balaji Baji Rao and Chimnaji Appa attached greatest importance to Jai Singh's goodwill and support in their negotiations with the Emperor. It is remarkable that, though Jai Singh had not rendered any service to the Emperor at the time of Nadir's invasion, he continued to enjoy the trust of the Emperor as before. The Marathas were convinced that it was in their own interest to support the Emperor and to negotiate with him through Jai Singh, rather than through the Nizam or any other noble, even though their offers might be more glittering. Jai Singh also needed their support in strengthening the Emperor's position. Hence he did not relax his efforts to bring about a settlement between the Marathas and the Mughal government.¹⁵⁴ In sharp contrast to Jai Singh's approach and his assessment of the situation following Baji Rao's death, the Nizam and a few other nobles, who rejoiced at the Peshwa's death, regarded it as an opportunity to roll back the Maratha tide. At the Nizam's suggestion, his cousin, Azim-ullah, was appointed to the Government of Malwa.¹⁵⁵ It was clear that the Nizam was trying to block any further negotiations between the Marathas and the Emperor. To counter the Nizam's move, Jai Singh advised Chimnaji Appa to post a strong force in Malwa. Chimnaji had already sent there Vithoji Bule and now despatched Holkar and Sindhia also with ten to fifteen thousand troops into Malwa.¹⁵⁶ It was also decided that the new Peshwa should proceed to northern India and, in consultation with Sawai Jai Singh, should try to fulfil his father's aims. As Chimnaji noted in a letter, the Marathas highly valued the good relations with Jai Singh, and wanted to promote them further. The Marathas also took note of the fact that Jai Singh was helping

153. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 17.

154. *Ibid.*, Nos. 15, 17, 19.

155. *Ibid.*, No. 17; Duff, II, 6; *Malwa*, 266.

156. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 17.

Bikaner against Jodhpur, and that it was necessary for him to do so. They had no intention to interfere in the matter.¹⁵⁷

At this time, the Nizam, either to repair his damaged image at the Court, or to give a twist to the negotiations which Jai Singh was carrying on with the Marathas on behalf of the Emperor, or because he was in dire need of the Peshwa's support against his rebellious son Nasir Jang, offered the Peshwa his good offices in the latter's negotiations with the Imperial government. He tried to impress upon the Peshwa that the Emperor was highly displeased with Jai Singh and other Rajput rulers for their failure to turn up to his assistance at the time of Nadir's invasion, and also for grabbing the Imperial territories. He offered to arrange the Peshwa's meeting with the Emperor. "If you and I combine, who is greater than us," he said, and offered to secure for the Peshwa twenty lakhs of Rupees instead of fifteen lakhs promised by the Emperor earlier, grant of the whole of Malwa, and of the country to the east of the Chambal which was under the jurisdiction of Agra, abolition of the tax charged at Prayag, and grant of Varanasi in *jagir*, besides two to four areas yielding good income, and also enough money to clear the Peshwa's debts.¹⁵⁸ But the Marathas preferred to rely on Jai Singh, who had been mediating in their dealings with the Imperial government from the beginning, as Mahadeo Bhatt Hingne wrote, and with whom the late Peshwa had developed brotherly relations. Balaji asked Hingne to apprise Jai Singh of the Maratha desire for the grant of expenses and forts, grant of *Diwani* rights (in Malwa), and also money to clear the debts.¹⁵⁹ The Peshwa, saying that he considered Jai Singh like his father, asked for a loan of twenty lakhs of Rupees to relieve him from acute financial difficulties. This amount, he said, might be adjusted when the Emperor would pay him money. As the Nizam was away from the Court, wrote the Peshwa, it would not be difficult for Sawai Jai Singh to obtain the amount from the Emperor.¹⁶⁰

The Peshwa was keen to avoid everything which might offend Jai Singh. It was the view at Poona that in any settlement of Malwa, Sawai Jai Singh's small interests there should not be ignored.

157. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 17. Chimnaji Appa died a few months later, on December 17. His premature death was a profound loss to the Maratha State,

158. *Ibid.*, No. 19 and No. 23 (dated February 26, 1741).

159. *Ibid.*, No. 23.

160. *Ibid.*, Nos. 19, 23.

When Azim-ullah Khan, the Nizam's cousin and newly appointed governor of Malwa, removed Himmat Singh from Ater, whom Jai Singh had installed there some time back, he (Jai Singh) decided to reinstate Himmat Singh, if required with the Maratha support.¹⁶¹ The Peshwa took note of Jai Singh's keen desire to support Himmat Singh. On another occasion, the Peshwa severely rebuked Holkar for creating disturbances in Rampura and Bundi for recovering dues which had fallen into arrears since 1740. On February 26, he wrote to Holkar that his action had been deeply resented at Jaipur. Did he not know that he (Peshwa) had cordial ties with Jai Singh, and was it not necessary to maintain good relations with him as he was mediating between the Emperor and the Marathas? In case he was displeased, some of the matters might not be settled in accordance with their wishes. He strictly forbade Holkar to do anything in Rampura which might antagonize the Raj Rajendra.¹⁶² The Peshwa was then about to march into northern India. Meanwhile, Sindhia and Holkar had captured Dhar (January 5, 1741) and had created widespread disturbances in northern Malwa. This caused grave provocation to the Emperor, as at this very time the Peshwa was coming for a meeting with Jai Singh.

But in view of the Emperor's military measures following Holkar's activity in Malwa, the Peshwa was constrained to take counter measures. On the Emperor's orders, Sawai Jai Singh had reached Agra with a large army to engage the Marathas. It is possible that the Emperor feared another raid on Delhi; the Maratha professions and their implementation during the past few months had certainly been contradictory, and the Emperor was justified in taking necessary precautions. The Emperor also ordered Amir Khan, the governor of Allahabad, and Mansur Ali Khan (Safdar Jang), the governor of Awadh, to join Jai Singh with their armies. In this situation, the Peshwa asked Holkar and Sindhia to prevent Amir Khan and Mansur Ali from joining Jai Singh, and despatched a light force to threaten Doab up to Allahabad. This prevented the two governors from uniting with Sawai Jai Singh, who now arranged a meeting with the Peshwa.¹⁶³

161. *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 21.

162. *Ibid.*, No. 24 (February 26, 1741).

163. *Purandare Daftar*, I, No. 149. See *Iso Malwa*, 267; Sardesai, *op.cit.*, II, 201.

Jai Singh meets Balaji Baji Rao. Jai Singh met the Peshwa on May 13 at Fatehabad, Dholpur. The Peshwa was accompanied by Sindhia and Holkar. After exchanging courtesies, they sat down on a carpet under a mango tree, and remained together for some time. The same day Balaji, accompanied by Sindhia, Holkar, and Man Singh (son of Udaji Pawar), visited Jai Singh's camp. Nawab Azam Khan, Muhammad Said Khan, Raja Dalel Singh and Samsam-ud-daula were also present. The Peshwa remained at Dholpur till May 18. That day he again visited Jai Singh's camp. Besides Azam Khan and Samsam-ud-daulah, those present included Sindhia, Holkar, Pilaji Jadhav, Ram Chandra Pandit, Jaswant Rao Pawar, Tukoji Pawar and a few others. They all were given suitable presents at the time of parting.¹⁶⁴

The terms of the Dholpur Agreement. The terms of the settlement concluded at Dholpur were as under: the Peshwa was to receive the grant of Malwa *subah*, in lieu of which he was to hold himself responsible for any Maratha disturbances in the Mughal provinces; he was to depute a Maratha general with 500 horse to serve in the Mughal Service; he promised to join with a force of 4000 horse any Imperial campaign in future, and in case additional help was sought, to send such help, in which case expenses were to be borne by the Imperial government; he agreed not to make any fresh demands for money, and promised not to ask for any other contributions, except *nazar* and *peshkash*, from the *zamindars* to the east and south of the Chambal. Also, the Peshwa agreed to submit a petition professing loyalty to the Emperor and expressing his desire to serve the Imperial government. Lastly, Sindhia, Holkar and other Maratha commanders agreed to give an undertaking in writing that they would abandon the Peshwa if he turned disloyal to the Emperor.¹⁶⁵

The Peshwa receives naib-subahdari of Malwa. On July 4, 1741, the Emperor sent a *farman* granting naib-subahdari of Malwa to the Peshwa, and two months later (September 7), the whole of the province with criminal jurisdiction was granted to him. In the grant, the Peshwa was asked to devote himself to the maintenance of peace and order in the province, and to see that the people

164. D.K., X, 1107-1112; S.P.D., XXI, 2.

165. S.P.D., XV, pp. 97-98.

were not oppressed.¹⁶⁶

The agreement in consonance with Jai Singh's policy; the reasons of its failure. These were the best possible terms which the Imperial government in her then miserable condition could have hoped to secure from the Marathas. The agreement embodied Jai Singh's idea of the nature of relationship that should subsist between the Marathas and the Mughal government. The terms were based on concessions from each side to the other. It was without doubt in Maratha interest to have observed these terms. This would have enabled them to play the much needed role of a stabilizing force, stalling political disruption in the country. But the agreement made by the Peshwa came in the way of the Maratha *sardars*, especially Raghuji Bhosle, who had his own ambitions in Orissa and Bengal, which he claimed as his exclusive sphere of influence, and who had acquired considerable prominence at the Maratha Court after his brilliant success in Karnatak. The agreement fettered their freedom of action at a time when political upstarts in Awadh, Bengal, the Deccan, and Karnatak were literally grabbing large parts of the sick Empire. It was a time to establish their own independent power over as large areas as possible, and not to be tied down by an agreement which mainly benefitted the Peshwa. The Dholpur agreement foundered amidst the surging tide of ever-increasing ambitions of the Maratha *sardars*, and ever-increasing political disruption, which showed no signs of abatement. Had Baji Rao been alive, he would have succeeded in preventing this catastrophe. But his son, the new Peshwa, was devoid of military capacity, without which it was not possible to hold the powerful Maratha commanders in check, nor was he strictly true to his word.

As per his recent agreement, Balaji was duty bound to check, without any pre-conditions, Maratha incursions into the Mughal provinces, but he asked for the *chauth* of Malwa, Bundelkhand and Allahabad.¹⁶⁷ The Emperor agreed to the Peshwa's request, and asked him to proceed to Alivardi Khan's assistance against Bhosle.

166. *S.P.D.*, XV, p. 86; Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 155. That the Marathas failed to inspire confidence among the people in their government is proved by a few contemporary letters. Thus see Vad, *Selections*, I, No. 6, wherein it is stated that the Maratha army having cantoned in 1742 in Malwa, the cultivation of the land was given up by the people through fear.

167. See Sardesai, *op. cit.*, II, 215.

The Peshwa had a meeting with Alivardi Khan near Plassey (March 31, 1743), and secured from him promise to pay twenty-two lakhs of Rupees as expenses, annual *chauth* of Bengal for Chhatrapati Shahu, as a condition for taking part in a joint action against Raghuji Bhosle. The Emperor was pleased to hear that the Peshwa was going against Raghuji and, as Hingne wrote, appreciated his loyalty.¹⁶⁸ On April 20, the Peshwa had a brush with Raghuji's army near Pachet and plundered part of his baggage. But three months later, he compromised with Bhosle and signed an agreement at Satara, according to which "all the territory from Berar to the east right up to Cutrack, Bengal and Lucknow, was assigned to Raghuji, with which the Peshwa bound himself not to interfere: and the territory west of this line including Ajmer, Agra, Prayag and Malwa were to be the exclusive spheres of the Peshwa."¹⁶⁹ With this, the Peshwa threw to the winds the agreement he had recently concluded with the Mughal government. It should, however, be admitted that, after 1741, the political scene changed so rapidly, and the Mughal Empire dismembered at such a dizzy pace, that the Marathas had to reassess their stand and readjust their sights, to take advantage of the changing scene. For this reason, the agreement which Jai Singh had concluded with the Peshwa, and which fettered the Maratha policy and action, was torn asunder as much under the pressure of the new circumstances as on account of the failure of the Peshwa and Shahu to play their roles as responsible representatives of a great power. In 1742, when Jai Singh sent Ayamal to the Peshwa to protest against Sindhia's demand of two lakh forty thousand Rupees as *khandani* from Kotah, instead of one lakh twenty-two thousand Rupees as settled earlier, the Peshwa replied that Kotah was in the *taluga* of Ranoji and Mahadji and so it was their concern.¹⁷⁰ Such a laconic reply was out of question during Baji Rao's days. But after him, the Maratha policy lacked consistency as well as direction, which explains its erratic course, and its tragic consequences ultimately.

168. Sardesai, *op. cit.*, II, 216-18; Sarkar, *Fall*, I, 56.

169. Sardesai, *op. cit.*, II, 219.

170. Maharao Durjansal to Jai Singh, Agahan Sudi 8, S. 1799 (November 24, 1742). *J.S.A.*

CHAPTER X

THE LAST PHASE

After 1737 A.D. Jai Singh mostly resides at Jaipur. In August 1737, after he was relieved of the governorship of Malwa and Agra, Sawai Jai Singh returned to his new capital, which was now complete in all respects. As the Nizam was at the helm of affairs at this time, Jai Singh preferred to stay mostly at Jaipur. He, however, sent a token force with Ishwari Singh and Ayamal to participate in the Nizam's campaign against Baji Rao (1737 A.D.). The important role played by Ayamal in bringing about the agreement of Duraha Sarai has been noted earlier.¹

His influence with the Emperor remains unimpaired. Though Jai Singh had not rendered any assistance to the Emperor at the time of Nadir Shah's invasion, he retained his high position at the Court and continued to influence the government's attitude towards various political problems, especially the problem of the Marathas.² But from August 1737 to April 1740, he mostly resided at Jaipur. In October 1740, he went to Agra, and went there again in March or April 1741, to look after the affairs of the province which had again been put under his charge after the Nizam's departure in August 1740.³ In April 1741, he visited Delhi in connection with his coming talks with the Peshwa. But his visits to the Court were now less frequent. His hands were full with the problems concerning Rajputana. He was also busy in performing the *Asvamedha* and other ancient sacrifices, and in his astronomical studies.⁴ The

1. See Chap. IX, 241-42.

2. This is evident from his crucial talks with Balaji Baji Rao leading to the agreement of May 1741, the attempt made by the Emperor to reduce Turani influence with Jai Singh's support after Nadir's departure, and from the Emperor's acquiescence in Jai Singh's stand in respect of Jodhpur and in other matters.

3. *Parwanah* (no. 699) from the Mughal Court to the *Mutsaddis Chaudharis, Qanungos of pargana Lahar, subah Akbarabad*, 5 Jamadi II (August 7, 1741), *Kapatdwara Record*, Jaipur.

4. These have been discussed in detail in Chapter XII. J.N. Sarkar's statement (*Fall*, I, 135), based chiefly on *Vamsha Bhaskar*, that "after failing to keep

five observatories which he had built at Delhi, Benaras, Ujjain, Mathura, and Jaipur between 1724 and 1737 were pouring out copious data which were being constantly analysed for astronomical studies. A full account of his services in the field of astronomy is given in a subsequent chapter.

In 1740, Jai Singh's intellectual pursuits were rudely disturbed when he came to know that Nadir Shah might visit Khwaja Muin-ud-din's shrine at Ajmer. In that case he was likely to pass through Jaipur. As it was not possible for Jai Singh to oppose the Persian, he advised the inhabitants of the city to retire to places of safety.⁵ Fortunately, the invader returned from Delhi and Jaipur escaped his visitation.

Jodhpur's aggression against Bikaner. Jai Singh drawn into the conflict. After 1738, Jai Singh was increasingly drawn into the situation created by Jodhpur's repeated incursions into Bikaner. Maharaja Ajit Singh had all along been anxious to annex Bikaner State, or parts of it.⁶ After his death in 1724, his sons, Maharaja Abhai Singh and Bakht Singh, made vain attempts to capture Bikaner, first in 1733 and again in 1734, shortly before the Hurda Conference.⁷ But in 1736, serious differences developed between the two brothers, and Bakht Singh came away to Nagaur, where he was besieged by the Jodhpur army. Bakht Singh then opened negotiations with Maharaja Zorawar Singh of Bikaner to gain

out the Marathas from Malwa and inducing the Emperor to make a complete surrender to them (1736), Jai Singh returned to his own state and gave himself up to sexual excesses," is not borne out by facts. Even after 1736, as already described in Chap. IX, he continued to play a crucial role in the negotiations with the Marathas. His efforts to effect a lasting settlement between the two sides did not slacken in any way, and he remained as busy as ever with the political developments in Rajputana and in other parts of the country. Also, it was during this period that the literary and astronomical activities at his court and his efforts for the revival of the Vedic rites and learning reached their climax.

5. See Irvine, II, 374.

6. See Ojha, *Bikaner*, I, 294-96, 299.

7. Of the eight Jodhpur invasions, only the second (1542 A.D.) was successful, and that too for a short period only. Jodhpur made her third attempt to annex Bikaner in 1707 (See Powlett's *Gazetteer of the Bikaner State*, (8). See also Ojha, *Bikaner*, I, 302, 304. Cf. B.N. Reu, Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur and Maharaja Sujan Singh of Bikaner, *PIHRC*, Vol. XVII (1941), pp. 202-203. Abhai Singh in his letter dated March 3, 1734, given by Reu, claims that the Bikaner ruler had agreed to pay allegiance to Jodhpur and had promised to serve him with all his troops.

his support and to forge friendly ties with him. In 1739, when Abhai Singh attacked Bikaner again, Bakht Singh, to create a diversion in Bikaner's favour, captured Merta, and threatened Jodhpur, thereby forcing Abhai Singh to retrace his steps. He, however, restored Merta to his brother on receiving three lakhs of Rupees for the repairs of Jalor.⁸ In 1740, when Abhai Singh again besieged Bikaner, Bakht Singh offered his whole-hearted support to Zorawar Singh, and urged him to secure Sawai Jai Singh's help in putting an end to Jodhpur's repeated aggressions, once and for all. He also sent an envoy, along with a Bikaneri noble, to meet Jai Singh and to request him to intervene in the matter.⁹

Jai Singh's growing differences with Abhai Singh after 1728. We have already noted that cordial relations had existed between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh till about the end of 1728. In fact it was Jai Singh's support that had enabled Abhai Singh to tide over the stiff opposition he had to face from his brothers and the Rathor nobles following Maharaja Ajit Singh's violent death.¹⁰ But after 1728, the relations between the two deteriorated rapidly, one of the reasons being Abhai Singh's acquisitive, obstinate, and jealous nature which made it difficult for the other rulers to act in concert with him. We have already noted an instance of his stubbornness when in 1725 he refused to join duty under Sarbuland Khan. Probably the chief cause of friction between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh was in regard to their attitude towards the Marathas. While Jai Singh and Maharana were acting in close concert in dealing with the Maratha problem, as has already been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Abhai Singh ranged himself on the side of Qmar-ud-din Khan, who was advocating a line directly contrary to that of Jai Singh. Moreover, Abhai Singh's unprovoked attacks on Bikaner were fast becoming a problem for the whole of Rajputana. In fact the terms which he had tried to impose on Bikaner in February-March 1734 were too provocative and covetous to be overlooked by Jai Singh.¹¹ Abhai Singh, on the other hand, resented the extension of Jaipur's influence towards

8. Ojha, *Bikaner*, I, 310. See also his *Jodhpur*, II, 648-49.

9. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 650-52, and *Bikaner*, I, 313-14; Tod, II, 84.

10. *Supra*, 177 ff.

11. Ajit Singh to Amar Singh Bhandari, *parwanah*, Phalguna Sudi 10, S. 1790 (March 3, 1734 A.D.), in Rêu, *Glories*, 179.

Fatehpur, Jhunjhunu, and Ajmer, the last of which he himself coveted.¹²

As early as November 1730, we find Abhai Singh instructing Bhandari Raghunath to foil Sawai Jai Singh's efforts to secure Jhunjhunu, Fatehpur, Jharod (Distt. Didwana), and other places in *jagir*. "You should try to get these areas added to ours," he wrote. "In case it is not possible, then try to get these areas leased to us. But in no case these should pass into his (Jai Singh's) hands."¹³ It is not a little curious to find that one of the terms of the agreement concluded between Jai Singh and the Marathas on January 15, 1731, stipulated recalling of the Maratha *Pandit* from Jodhpur in view of strained relations between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh.¹⁴ Also, after 1730, we find Jai Singh favourably inclined towards Rao Indra Singh, whose enmity with Ajit Singh and his sons had never languished, nor had he ever ceased to strive to regain Nagaur. During 1724-30, he did not receive any encouragement from Jai Singh, but the growing estrangement between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh revived his hopes. After 1730, we find him in regular correspondence with Jai Singh.¹⁵

On receiving Bikaner's appeal for help, Jai Singh sought advice from his nobles. After some hesitation, he decided to intervene decisively to silence Jodhpur's pretensions for ever.¹⁶ Tod in his inimitable style describes how the Bikaner envoy could secure through Vidyadhar permission to make a verbal report, despite an

12. Ajit Singh to Amar Singh Bhandari, *parwanah*, Phalgun Sudi 10, S. 1790 (March 3, 1734 A.D.), in Reu, *Glories*, 179.

13. Abhai Singh to Bhandari Amar Singh and Purohit Vardhaman, November 10, 1730, in Reu, *Glories*, 147.

14. *Kapatdwara* document No. 1319, *Qaulnama*, Ashadha Vadi 7, S. 1788 (June 4, 1732).

15. Thus see Indra Singh's letter to Jai Singh, (n.d.) S. 1790, *J.S.A.*, in which he asks for monetary help, and requests Jai Singh to write to Sujan Singh to help him. He was invited on the occasion of the *Asvamedha* (1742 A.D.). A number of letters sent by Indra Singh to Jai Singh are preserved in the Jaipur Archives.

16. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 653-54. Some of the senior nobles, such as the chief of Banskoh, were against intervention. See Tod, II, 85. According to Jhabar Malla Sharma (*Sikar ka Itihas*, p. 71) the only noble to favour intervention was Rao Shiv Singh of Sikar. Cf. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, etc., pp. 56-57, where it is stated that Jai Singh, who was bent upon humiliating Abhai Singh, recognised Abhai's brother, Ratan Singh, as the ruler of Jodhpur, and that it was with this intention that he set out with an army and met Abhai Singh and Bakht Singh at Gangwana. It is, however, well known that Bakht Singh alone had faced Jai Singh at Gangwana.

edict prohibiting all official business when the Maharaja was in cups. " 'Bikaner', he said, 'was in peril, and without his aid must fall, and that his master did not consider the sovereign of Marwar, but of Amber, as his suzerain.' Vanity and wine did the rest. The prince took up the pen and wrote to Abhai Sing, 'that they all formed one great family, to forgive Bikaner and raise his batteries.' As he took another cup and curled his moustache, he gave the letter to be folded. 'Maharaja', said the envoy, 'put in two more words: 'or my name is Jey Sing'. They were added. The overjoyed envoy retired, and in a few minutes the letter was on transit to its destination by the swiftest camel of the desert. . . . The reply, a laconic defiance, was brought back with like celerity; it was opened and read by Jey Sing to his chiefs: 'By what right do you dictate to me, or interfere, between me and my servants? If your name is 'Lion of Victory' (Jey Sing), mine is 'the Lion without Fear' (Abhye Sing)' ".¹⁷

But before actually intervening in the dispute, Bakht Singh was asked to capture Merta, as a proof of his sincerity. This the latter promptly did.¹⁸ Jai Singh now gave up all hesitation and despatched twenty thousand troops under Raja Ayamal to raise the siege of Bikaner, and a few days later himself set out with a large army towards Ajmer.¹⁹ In response to his call, Maharana Jagat Singh also set out with eighty thousand troops to join him near Ajmer; Maharao Durjansal of Kotah and the chiefs of Pratapgarh and Dungarpur were also with the Maharana.²⁰ These unexpected developments forced Abhai Singh to raise the siege. As Jai Singh's advance posed a serious threat to Jodhpur, Abhai Singh, leaving his main army behind and taking with him only a thousand horse, rushed to save his capital.²¹ But, on realizing that he could hardly offer adequate resistance to the formidable combination against him, he sent emissaries to Jai Singh to settle peace terms.²²

17. Tod, II, 84-85.

18. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 652-53.

19. Ojha, *Bikaner*, I, 315; *Vir Vinod*, II, 848.

20. *Vamsha*, IV, 3298-3301. It says that the Maharana returned from Pushkar on hearing that an agreement had been concluded between Jai Singh and Abhai Singh.

21. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 654.

22. See Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 654. The *Jodhpur Khyat* puts the strength of Jai Singh's army at three lakhs, which figure seems to be too much inflated.

Abhai Singh accepts terms; the agreement of July 1740. The terms which Jai Singh offered to his son-in-law were severe, but having no other option, the latter accepted them. The agreement which Abhai Singh signed on July 25, 1740, bound him:

- (1) to pay one lakh Rupees, precious stones worth twenty-five thousand Rupees, and three elephants as *peshkash* to the Emperor;
- (2) to pay Jai Singh twenty lakhs of Rupees as expenses of the expedition;
- (3) to furnish guarantee till the entire amount was paid;
- (4) to restore to Bikaner all her villages recently annexed by Jodhpur;
- (5) To hand over Merta to Bakht Singh;
- (6) to refrain from interfering with the *parganas* of Ajmer received by Jai Singh on *ijara*, or with his *mansab*. These were Bhiwai, Kekri, Rajgarh, Prabatsar, Pisangarh, Saroth, Bamvali, Bherundo, Harsor, Devgaon, Ramsar, Masuda, Toseno, Dhavli, Piplad, Sambhar, and Didwana;
- (7) to appoint his sons, nobles, and officials at the Jaipur court; they were not to serve the Emperor separately, nor the Maharaja, hereafter, was to keep a separate *wakil* at Delhi, nor was he to negotiate directly with the Imperial government or the Marathas; and finally,
- (8) the nobles of Marwar to give an assurance that in case of non-observance of the terms by Abhai Singh, five of them would be required to serve Jaipur State.²³

Extraordinary severity of the terms. Bakht Singh rejoins his brother; his letter to Kotah. The last two terms, which touched to the quick the Rathor pride, were intended to bring Jodhpur's external relations and policies under control. There is no doubt that during the past two decades Jodhpur had been pursuing policies which ran counter to those of the other Rajput states, and some control over her was justified, but, unfortunately, Jai Singh went too far in this direction. Though by nature and long

23. *Kapatdwara* documents, *Yaddashta* No. 46K/1094, dated July 25, 1740. Reu (*Marwar*, 351-52) glosses over Abhai's discomfiture. Also see *Vamśka*, IV, 3299-3301; *Dayaldas Ki Khyat*, Vol. II, ff. 64-7; Powlett, *op. cit.*, 50-51,

training he was extremely careful in dealing with other states, on this occasion his desire to punish Abhai Singh got the better of his wisdom and characteristic caution. The last two terms were a gross insult to Marwar and her people, and for this reason, and probably for not having received any substantial gain out of the recent hostilities, Bakht Singh separated from Jai Singh and rejoined his brother, from whom he sought pardon and also permission to avenge the insult. Both were readily granted. His bitter feelings can be better appreciated from his letter dated April 13, 1741 to the Kotah ruler, informing him that he was reunited with Abhai Singh, and expressing the hope that this development would be looked upon with favour by the Maharao. He wrote that Jai Singh had done gross injustice to the Rathors, making his fight with him imminent. God willing he would overcome Jai Singh. He requested Kotah to be on his side in the impending conflict. In the margin of the letter he wrote in his own hand that their Houses had always been close to each other, and hence the Maharao should do what was consistent with these relations. The world would behold in amazement, he added, what they would do to the Kachhwahas.²⁴ Though Kotah did not join him, Bakht Singh maintained his vaunt, and put up a heroic fight against Jai Singh's army, many times larger than his own.

Bakht Singh resolves to fight Jai Singh alone. At first the combined troops of Abhai Singh and Bakht Singh reached Merta. There, a small incident occurred which provoked Bakht Singh to go alone against Jai Singh. One day when the army was near Ajmer, Maharaja Abhai Singh gave flowers to his Umraos as *bakshish*; but Kushal Singh Champawat of Duvanagar declined to accept them saying why he should accept the flowers when the Rathors had lost their noses as well as their "pags" (turbans) at the hands of the Kachhwahas. Bakht Singh, who was present there, felt the sting of the remark. Saying that it was he who had joined Jai Singh, and thus was the main cause of their disgrace, he declared his intention to fight the Kachhwaha ruler separately with his own devoted troops. It is said that the provocation was intentional as

24. Bakht Singh to Maharao Durjansal, Vaishakha Vadi 13, S. 1797 (April 2, 1741) in *J.S.A.* Obviously, Durjansal had sent this letter to Jai Singh and that is why we find it in the Jaipur State Archives,

Abhai regarded his brother a threat to himself and to his progeny.²⁵

The battle of Gangwana. Jai Singh at this time was at Dholpur where he was conducting crucial talks with the Peshwa (May 12-18). He had received news about the Rathor preparations and knew about the impending showdown with Jodhpur. Hence, after the Peshwa's departure, he hurriedly set out for Ajmer. On the way, Raja Ummed Singh of Shahpura and Raja Gopal Singh of Karauli also joined him.²⁶ On arriving near Gangwana (near Kishangarh) on 11th June, 1741, he was informed about Bakht Singh's approach. For some time he continued to travel in his *palki*, and then mounted his war elephant. Shortly afterwards, Bakht Singh's gallant band of five thousand charged Jai Singh's large army. The Rathors fought with astonishing courage, eliciting praise even from their enemy, but could do no more. At last when only sixty of his heroic band had remained alive, Bakht Singh, who had received two wounds but was keen on continuing the fight, was persuaded with great difficulty to disengage from the inferno. Reluctantly he retired towards Merta-Nagor side, and rejoined Abhai Singh. The elephant carrying the idol of his family deity was captured by the Jaipur army.²⁷

Abhai Singh reconciled only outwardly. Jai Singh halted for a day in his camp at Gangwana, and then proceeded to Ajmer, reaching there on June 13, 1741.²⁸ Three weeks later when Abhai Singh sent Bhandari Raghunath to Jaipur, Jai Singh restored the idol with all due reverence and ceremony.²⁹ In September 1741, the Emperor sent an elephant (Shamsher Jang) to Jai Singh on

25. See *V.V.*, II, 848.

26. Ojha, *Jodhpur*, II, 655ff.

27. *Siaha Waqia* No. 105, *Kapatdwara Record*, Jaipur. On Sawai Jai Singh's side, Raja Ummed Singh of Shahpura, who was in the van and had distinguished himself in the encounter, lost his brother, and 400 of his men. After the battle Jai Singh paid a condolence visit to Ummed Singh, and sent him presents for his role in the battle (Entry dated Ashadha Sudi 11, S. 1797, C. n. p. Ajmer, *Waqia* No. 105). The same record shows that Raja Gopal Singh of Karauli was also with Jai Singh. For the description of the fierce encounter, see Tod, II, 86; *Vamsha*, IV, 3310-11; *Jodhpur Khyat*, II, 153, which gives Ashadha Vadi 9 (May 27) as the date of battle. *Vir Vinod*, 848, also gives the same date.

28. *Siaha Waqia* No. 105, entry dated Shrawana Sudi 6, S. 1797, *J.S.A.*

29. *Kapatdwara* No. 1/6, 105 (entry dated Ashadha Sudi 15, S. 1797).

his victory over Bakht Singh.³⁰ Abhai Singh wished to bury the hatchet, or at least made a show of it. Maharana Jagat Singh who, in his heart of heart, was against Jai Singh, and lacked wisdom and nobility of his father and grandfather, came forward to bring about reconciliation between Abhai Singh and Jai Singh. On June 9, Abhai Singh wrote to Jai Singh that as per orders of Diwanji (Maharana), he was restoring the old friendly ties, and would do nothing on the malicious advice of any Hindu or a Muslim, which might weaken their ties in any way.³¹ But, despite this assurance, the Rathors neither forgave nor forgot the humiliation suffered by them, and pressed the Emperor to intervene. On August 5, 1743, the Emperor conveyed to Jai Singh his concern about the strained relations between Jodhpur and Amber, and asked him to reach the Court without delay to discuss the matter.³² The meeting however never took place as Jai Singh passed away on September 21, 1743.

The Asvamedha. We have already noted that in August 1734, i.e., barely a month after the Hurda Conference, Jai Singh had performed the *Asvamedha* (horse sacrifice), but details about that significant event are lacking. The sacrifice was over on Bhadrapada Sudi 11 (Thursday, August 29). All the people of the State had been informed about the event, and those who wished to come to Jaipur were invited "to earn religious merit by participating in the mass bathing ceremony on the completion of the sacrifice."³³ The *Asvamedha* which was performed in 1741 A.D., seems to have been a more elaborate affair.³⁴ On Ashadha Vadi 2, S. 1799, the invitations were sent to Maharana Jagat Singh, Maharao Durjansal of Kotah, Raja Chhatra Singh of Narwar, Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi, Raja Gopal Singh of Karauli, Raja Indra Singh, Raja Jait Singh, Raja Vikramajit, and a few others.³⁵ On Asadha Sudi 13, S. 1797, Ishwari Singh took the *diksha*. The *yajna* was over on

30. *Kapatdvara*, entry dated Asoj Sudi 9, S. 1798 (1741 A.D.), Camp Sawai Jaipur.

31. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Ashadha Sudi 7, S. 1799 (June 9, 1741) in *Vir Vinod*, II, 1229, and Abhai Singh's letter dated Bhadrapada Vadi 7, S. 1798 (August 21, 1741), *Kapatdvara Documents*, O.H.R., No. 913.

32. *Farman* dated August 5, 1743, *J.S.A.*

33. Copy *Sialha Haqiqat*, pargana Tonk, dated Bhadrapada Sudi 5, S. 1791 (August 22, 1734), *J.S.A.*

34. See Krishna Kavi's *Isvaravilasamahakavyam*, Cantos IV & V.

35. Copies of the invitations in *J.S.A.*

Shravana Sudi 3.³⁶ The significance of the event was not lost upon Jai Singh's contemporaries. At least one letter has survived out of many which Jai Singh must have received from the various rulers and the prominent Pandits of Benaras and other places, congratulating him for reviving this ancient sacrifice after a lapse of several centuries. In his letter of July 10, Raja Indra Singh expressed this sentiment when he wrote: "Maharaja alone can perform this sacred act. Even in this *Kaliyuga*, the Maharaja has established *Satyuga*."³⁷ It was the revival of the ancient *yajna*³⁸ after more than seven centuries which appealed to the imagination of the people. As *Asvamedha* is commonly linked with unchallenged sovereignty and extensive sway,³⁹ the event became more widely known, though

36. Raja Indra Singh to Sawai Jai Singh, Shravana Sudi 4, S. 1799 (1742 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Taittiriya Samhita* V, 4, 12.3, and *Satpatha Brahmana* XIII, 3.3.6, both state that the *Asvamedha* was *utsanna*. When Samudragupta performed the horse sacrifice in the 4th century A.D., he was given credit for reviving the ancient sacrifice. It is however known that this sacrifice had been performed before Samudragupta by Bharsivas and by Pravarsena I of the Vakataka dynasty. In the south, an Andhra king is described as having performed the *Rajsuya* and two *Asvamedhas* and a few other sacrifices. An inscription of 757 A.D. mentions Chalukya emperor Pulakesi having performed an *Asvamedha*. Later, about the 9th century, Prithivyaghra of Nisadha had performed the *Asvamedha*. Despite these and a few other instances, the sacrifice, on the whole, had become very rare. (*Fleet, Corpus*, III, 53. The Poona plates of Samudragupta's granddaughter, Prabhavati Gupta, give him the epithet *anekasvamedhayajin*: *A.S.W.I.*, V, 60-61; *E.C.*, X, *Kolar* No. 63 cited in Kane, II, Part II, 1238; *J.A.*, VIII, 273; *E.I.*, XVI, 25).

39. It is not necessary, that a paramount sovereign (*sarvabhauma*) alone can perform this sacrifice. A crowned king who is not *sarvabhauma* can also undertake it. Nor is it performed only for political reasons. *Asvalayana-Srauta-Sutra*, X, 6.1 states that *Asvamedha* is performed for securing desired object, victories (including over the senses), and for attaining prosperity. In *Satpatha Brahmana* this idea occurs again and again. Where this sacrifice is performed, it is stated, there the rains are plentiful. Its performance assures security of possession. The sacrificer goes to the heavenly world. Verily, *Asvamedha* is the king of sacrifices. He who performs it makes himself complete, and thus atones for everything, even for slaying a Brahman. *Asvamedha* is everything and secures everything. (See *Sat. Br.*, XIII) Sawai Jai Singh, being well versed in *Dharmasastra*, understood all this, and performed the sacrifice to earn religious merit, and also probably to ensure fulfilment of some object. For this reason the timing of both the sacrifices is significant. For a detailed discussion of *Asvamedha*, see P.V. Kane's *History of Dharmasastra*, 1941, II, Pt. II, 1228-39. See also P.K. Gode's article 'The *Asvamedha* performed by

it was only one of the many *srauta yajnas* which he had performed in his lifetime, or which were performed at his desire and with his assistance by others. Among these the more important were *Vratya-stoma*, *Sarvamedha* (*Agnistoma*, *Vajapeya*, *Atiratra*, *Aptoryama*, *Ukathya*, *Sodasin*), *Purusamedha*, *Samrat*, *Paundarika* and a few other *srauta yajanas*. According to Krishna Kavi, who was present on the occasion when Jai Singh performed the *Asvamedha*, he had already acquired the status of *chaturagnichid* and that he had performed hundreds of *Somayajnas*. At the time of his death, Prince Ishwari Singh was performing *Rajsuya yajna*.

After performing the *Asvamedha* Jai Singh again visited Ajmer where he stayed for some time.

Jai Singh finds the situation satisfactory in 1743 A.D. In 1743, the last year of his life, Jai Singh must have found the situation in Rajputana peaceful, and though not entirely to his satisfaction, yet, on the whole, satisfactory. Abhai Singh had been subdued; his own relations with Mewar and Kotah were friendly, and these States did nothing against his advice or desire; Bikaner was extremely grateful to him for his recent help;⁴⁰ his son-in-law, Dalel Singh, was secure on the throne of Bundi; Badan Singh Jat was still as loyal as before; the chiefs of Karauli and Shahpura enjoyed his trust and favour, and the state of Jaipur had never been more extensive and prosperous, and yet not at the cost of any sister state, as had been her tradition. The administration in the State

Sawai Jai Singh of Amber (1699-1744)', *Poona Orientalist*, II, 166 ff. Till 1937, the historicity of the tradition about the sacrifice performed by Jai Singh was doubted, but in that year late Dr. P.K. Gode of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, found references about this event in some of the Sanskrit works of that time, especially *Isvaravilasamahakaryam* by Krishna Kavi, and proved conclusively that the historic sacrifice was indeed performed by Jai Singh. (See his papers on this subject in the *Journal of Indian History*, Madras, XV, 1937, 364-67; *Poona Orientalist*, II, 1937, 166-180; *Mimansa Pakasha*, Poona, 1947, II, 43-46). As for the time of its performance, his best estimate was that it was performed some time between 1713 A.D. (the approximate year of the completion of *Jaysimha-Kalpadruma*, composed by Ratnakar, who does not mention this sacrifice though he mentions others performed by Jai Singh) and 1742 A.D., (the approximate year of the completion of *Acharasmrtichandrika*, which mentions it).

40. In 1740, Jai Singh also helped Bikaner in suppressing her refractory nobles. After making suitable arrangements in his State, Zorawar Singh came to Jaipur, and stayed there as Jai Singh's guest for six months. (*Dayaldas ki Khyat*, Vol. II, f, 68; Powlett, 53).

was also running most smoothly and efficiently.

Outside Rajasthan, his relations with the Emperor still retained the old warmth. Only recently he had successfully conducted important negotiations with the Peshwa on behalf of the Emperor. He had been on the throne of Amber for forty-four years. During this period, he had dealings with five Emperors, excluding the two who flitted across the stage in 1719. He had intimate contacts with three Maharanas, and had come into contact with three famous Peshwas. With the greatest of these, Baji Rao, he had close and intimate relations for a long time. Since 1714, he had played a prominent role in the Imperial politics; after 1728, his role in shaping the imperial policy towards the Marathas was decisive. He had also been able to fulfil most of his dreams such as building a new city—the finest of his time—and a number of observatories, temples, *sarais*, and had the satisfaction of making his capital one of the foremost centres of art and learning in the country.

Ensures Ishwari Singh's succession. Jai Singh's death. As his health began to decline, he gradually transferred the cares of the government to his son, Ishwari Singh.⁴¹ He had already done whatever was possible for him to ensure Ishwari Singh's succession after him. In 1734, at a formal *darbar*, he had had him declared as the Crown Prince, and had obtained the Emperor's approval in this regard⁴². In 1735, Maharana Jagat Singh affianced his daughter to Ishwari Singh. The ruler of Kotah had also betrothed his daughter to the Prince.⁴³ In 1741, Jai Singh secured in writing a solemn assurance from a number of leading *Sardars* of Mewar, including Rawat Budh Singh, Rawat Kuber Singh, Padam Singh, Rawat Jasot Singh, Takht Singh, Nathji, Bharat Singh and Sah Bhima, that they would not seek the Emperor's help or that of the Marathas in Madho Singh's favour against Ishwari Singh; and in case Madho Singh commenced hostilities with the intention to acquire Jaipur, then they would not support him.⁴⁴ In 1741, when the *Asvamedha* was performed, he asked Ishwari Singh to take the *diksha*, as if to make the people familiar with the idea that the Prince was the future king of Jaipur. In 1743, he even permitted his favourite son to

41. *Isvaravilasamahakavyam*, Canto X, vs. 5.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *D.K.*, XXIV, 83.

44. *Kapatdwara Record*.

perform the *Rajsuya yajna*. But before its completion, Jai Singh passed away on September 21, 1743.⁴⁵ He had not yet completed fifty-fifth year of his life.

Place in History. It was a premature end of a brilliant and fruitful career. He was hailed in his own life time and by posterity as one of the most remarkable men of his time, excelling in diverse fields, and richly endowed with many diverse faculties. He had in him the rare combination of a scholar and statesman, administrator and legislator, diplomat and soldier. His versatility was as amazing as his attainments in these fields. He was considered to be one of the wisest men of his time, an oracle of the age. Indeed, had he survived longer, he might have rightly assessed, as he did in regard to the Marathas, the extent of danger from the growing power of the English, and would have taken suitable measures to counter the new threat. For more than thirty years, nothing happened in India with which he was not directly or indirectly concerned, or which escaped his sharp eye and penetrating intellect. His death in 1743 was thus a loss to the entire country. In fact, had the Marathas listened to him and played a positive role in sustaining the Empire with the Emperor as the nominal head—an idea which had appealed to Baji Rao towards the end of his career—the entire history of the country might have run a different course. But in 1740, the Empire as well as the Marathas suffered grievous blows, making Jai Singh's task still more difficult.

Despite heavy odds, Jai Singh continued to strive for peace and stability, and persevered in his efforts to stem anarchy and political disruption, or at least to slow-down their pace. Till the very end of his life, he continued to play the role of a great stabilizing force during the period of transition which witnessed the transfer of power from the Mughals to the Marathas. He was essentially a man of peace, and understood better than most of his contemporaries its value and that of progress in science and learning. Had the times been less chaotic, had the political and administrative matters not consumed so much of his time and energies, he would have contributed much more in these fields. But even what he could accomplish amidst perpetual wars and the falling debris of the Mughal Empire, entitles him to a high rank among the most remarkable men in the long history of this country.

45. *Isvaravilasamahakavyam*, Canto 10, vss. 11-14; *Vamsha*, IV, 3323.

CHAPTER XI

THE STATE OF SAWAI JAI SINGH, ITS ADMINISTRATION AND RESOURCES

Jaipur State during Sawai Jai Singh's time. Before Jai Singh died in 1743, he had made Amber one of the largest tributary states in the country, with an area exceeding 20,000 square miles, which included about 9000 square miles of the parent country, 5200 square miles of Shekhawati, about 3000 square miles of Macheri (later Alwar), about 1800 square miles of Tonk, besides the area covered by Gazi-ka-Thana, Kamau, Khori, and Pahari, which Sindhia rented out to the Jats later and were retained by them, and also Narnaul and Kanorh, subsequently seized by De Boigne and given to Murtaza Khan.¹ Besides these, there were a few *parganas* such as Bhinai, Kekri, Parbatsar, Pisangarh and Piplad,² which Jai Singh had acquired from Jodhpur in 1740 A.D., and were lost subsequently. The population of the State had also increased considerably. Even after Amber had lost Tonk, Macheri, Rampura, and Khori, and other alienations of territory had taken place, the population of the State was about the highest in Rajputana. Col. Tod put it at 18,56,700 in 1832,³ and Malleeson at 19,00,000 in 1875.⁴ At the time of the first census in 1881, the population of Jaipur was 25,28,730 and had increased to 26,31,775 in 1931.⁵ Keeping in view the fact that a number of areas, which in Col. Tod's time stood alienated from Jaipur, were a part of the State

1. For the alienation of the areas, see Tod, II, 349-50. The area figures given here are no more than approximate. It is difficult to determine the exact area of the Jaipur State during Jai Singh's time as the number and size of the *parganas* continued to vary. While we know the year in which the number of the *parganas* was maximum (viz., thirty-six, in 1740 A.D., vide *Yaddashata* of 1740 A.D.), the boundaries of the *parganas* cannot be drawn with absolute precision due to the difficulties in locating all the *mauzas*, especially those newly settled.

2. See Ch. X, p. 261.

3. See Tod, II, 347.

4. Malleeson, 27.

5. *Census Reports*, 1881, 1931.

during Sawai Jai Singh's time, and the fact that during 1832-1931, the increase in population was a little over 7,00,000, we may put the population of Jaipur state during Jai Singh's time at about 16,00,000.

The resources of the State also seem to have been greater than those of other states of this region. Though figures showing the gross annual revenue of Jaipur State prior to 1802 could not be traced, it may be estimated to have been more than a crore of rupees. Col. Tod has noted that the annual revenue of the State, prior to the alienation of the areas mentioned above, stood at one crore of Rupees. The schedule of the revenue of Amber for 1820-03 shows that the total revenue of the State exceeded eighty lakhs of Rupees.⁶

Watan area of Amber. Inappropriateness of the terms zamindar and watan jagir. As Tod,⁷ and later on Wills⁸ pointed out, and as the contemporary records also reveal, the *watan* area of Amber State, even up to the time of Sawai Jai Singh's accession, was small. In fact, it seems to have been not more than 3000 square miles. The State extended up to Chatsu (28 miles south of Amber), and Niwai in the south, to the imperial *thana* of Sambhar in the west, to Chomu and Samod in the north, and to Dausa and Baswa in the east. It comprised a major part of the Amber, Chatsu and Dausa *nizamats* of the erstwhile Jaipur state.⁹ As noted later on, we find Jai Singh claiming during 1707-12, that Dausa, Mauzabad, Chatsu, Niwai, and Naraina *parganas* were *mahals* of his *watan*, and on the south, *pargana* Tonk was adjacent to his *watan*.¹⁰ As the area hereditarily held by the Jaipur rulers included a number of the twelve fiefs—Chomu, Achrol, and others, the figure of 3000 square miles for the area of the State at the time of Jai Singh's

6. Tod, II, 350-51.

7. Tod, II, 294.

8. Wills' Report, Appendix G.

9. In July 1707, at any rate, Jai Singh had *jagirs* worth three crores thirty lakhs *dams* in *pargana* Mominabad (Amber), Dausa and Phagi. These were restored to him for a few days soon after the War of Succession of 1707 (Copy of the *parwanah* of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, 25 Rabi II, R. Yr. 1, 1707 A.D., J.S.A.). That Jai Singh had not the entire *pargana* Dausa and Chatsu is proved by his order to his *wakil*, Pankshit Rai, (June 1706), to try for a *jagir* in Dausa for his brother Bijai Singh, and also from the grant of a *jagir* worth 4,15,530 *dams* in *pargana* Dausa to him in August 1706. (Pankshit Rai's *arzdasht*, 28 Jamadi I, 1184 H., August 27, 1706). The same is true of Chatsu. See Pankshit Rai to Jai Singh, P.A., November 7, 1706, J.S.A.

10. See below, p. 272.

accession to the throne is not on the high side. In the Mughal administrative terminology, this area was called *watan jagir*, and the rulers were called *zamindars*—terms intended to emphasize the paramount position of the Mughal Emperor, and also to make it clear that from the point of view of the Mughal government the chiefs were no more than mere land-owners, even though they might have been accorded some exclusive rights. Though these terms might not have been of “intentional disparagement”, as regarded by Tod and Wills,¹¹ these do not convey correctly the true position and powers of the chiefs under the Mughal government. True, there were a few common features between the semi-autonomous chiefs and the ordinary *zamindars* in the Imperial territories, the differences between them were far too glaring,¹² and the use of these terms even in those times was singularly inappropriate in view of the independence enjoyed by the princes in their internal administration. It may be mentioned that the Rajput rulers in their correspondence with each other invariably refer to their states as *Desh* or *Raj*, and sometimes as *Mulk*, or *Watan*, but never as *Watan Jagir*, nor does the term *zamindar* ever occur in their records in reference to one another.¹³

Small watan area of Amber state; reasons. A number of *parganas* which Sawai Jai Singh had absorbed in his State during 1712-43, and thus extended the boundaries of Amber, had been held by his ancestors almost continuously, though as *jagir* assignments or on lease. Thus Mirza Raja Jai Singh held the *parganas* of Chatsu, Phagi, Mauzabad, Pachwara, Khori, Deoli, Sanchari, and Bawal in *jagir*, and held Lawan, Paparda, and Suneri in mortgage.¹⁴ His son Ram Singh had received Vahatri, Phagi, Hindaun, Baswa, Niwai and a few other *parganas* in *jagir*.¹⁵ In fact during 1707-11,

11. See Tod, I, 288, n. 4; 291; Wills' *Report on Panchapana Singhana*, 8. That the Mughal chancery was “always chary of giving a high, especially royal designation to any ruler in India”, is pointed out by Irfan Habib, 183, n. 5. See also P. Saran, 111-112.

12. See Irfan Habib, 182-84.

13. This fact is significant as it shows that the Rajput princes looked upon their states and their own position differently.

14. C.U. Wills' Report on “The Land Tenures and special powers of certain Thikanedars of the Jaipur State”, p. 20.

15. See S.P. Gupta, “Expansion of the territories of the Kachhwahas in Mughal Time”, *PIHC*, XXVII (1967), p. 178.

we find Jai Singh making specific claims that Lalsot, Jhak, Tarana, and Hasanpur were of old in his *zaminadari*,¹⁶ that the boundaries of his hereditarily held dominion were up to *pargana* Tonk,¹⁷ and that *parganas* Dausa, Mauzabad, Chatsu, Newai, and Naraina were *mahals* of his *watan*.¹⁸ There is no doubt that a number of these areas, especially those in the vicinity of Amber, were under its jurisdiction in 1526, though vicissitudes following that year seem to have affected this position. Moreover, after accepting Mughal suzerainty, Amber could not lay claim to the allegiance of the petty chiefs (Thakurs, Umraos and Rawats, whose territories or *thakurai* ringed its territories) who had been acknowledging Amber as their superior, but taking advantage of its troubles after 1527 had, it seems, asserted their freedom. From the point of view of the Mughal government, the area which could be guaranteed to the Amber chiefs as untransferable and hereditary, or as their *watan* (homeland or ancestral domain), could only be that area which had been continuously under their full and direct control for a long time. Amber's geographical position, the fact that it had to seek Mughal vassalage at a difficult hour in its career and was the first Rajput state to do so, prevented it from successfully laying claim to a larger *watan* area. In comparison, Jodhpur, and later Mewar, could get a much larger area recognized by the Mughals as *watan*.

Expansion of Amber under Sawai Jai Singh; rapid growth of the ijara system after 1707. After 1707, the conditions prevailing in various parts of the Mughal empire began to decline fast, making it increasingly difficult for the government to exercise effective control over the *khalisa* lands, and to discharge her paramount duty of providing protection and proper administration, and enforcing her sovereign rights. The same difficulty, though in a far greater measure, was faced by the Imperial assignment holders, who found it extremely difficult to realize revenues from their *jagirs*. The changed political situation, the increasing weakness of the

16. Jai Singh to Chagtai Khan, *P.L.*, 22 Shawwal, 1119 H. (January 5, 1708); Jai Singh to Mahir Khan, *P.L.*, 5 Jamadi II, 1122 H.; Jai Singh to Bakshi-ul-Mulk Shah Nawaz Khan, *P.L.*, 13 Rajab, 1123 H., *J.S.A.*

17. Jai Singh to Bakshi-ul-Mumalik Mahabat Khan, *P.L.*, 18 Rajab, 1122 H., *J.S.A.*

18. Jai Singh to the *mitsaddis* of the *sarkar* of Badshahzada, 20 Safar, R. Yr. 5; Copy of the *parwanah* to Bhikharidas, *diwan*, 21 Muharram, 1123 H.; Copy of Jai Singh's *parwanah* to Khivsi Bhandari, 27 Shawwal, R. Yr. 5.

central and the provincial governments, the growing power of the Rajputs, Bundelas, Jats, and others, their bold assertiveness as well as their desire to bring the areas contiguous to their states under their direct control, the mounting peasant resistance in many areas, and the uncertainty caused by the contracting shadows of the Maratha approach after 1715, made it almost impossible for the Mughal officers, especially those who held assignments in problem areas, where their interests clashed with those of the Rajput and Bundela rulers, or chiefs like Churaman, to realize income from their *jagirs* through their own agents. This left such officers with no alternative but to grant their assignments on *ijara* to the chiefs who exercised influence in their respective regions. The holders of smaller assignments near the states then readily agreed to give their *jagirs* on *ijara*. It was by taking the *jagirs* contiguous to Jaipur State on lease or on *ijara* that Jai Singh acquired extensive territory, mostly from Muslim assignment holders.¹⁹

Jai Singh secures extensive areas as tankhwah, inam and ijara. As early as 1712, Jagjiwandas, the Amber *wakil*, had secured a number of *jagirs* on *ijara*, and had also secured the necessary *pattas*. These included Shujaat Khan's *jagirs* in Amarsar, Mauzabad, Bhairana and Nagina under *sarkar* of Tijara, and the *patta* of *jagir* (*jama*, seventy lakhs *dams*), belonging to Ghighada Khan, in *pargana* Lalsot, and *patta* of *pargana* of Ghazi-ka-Thana (held in *jagir* by Ikhlas Khan), of Maujpur (held by Ghasi Ram, *Waqia-Nigar Kul*), of Jaitpur (held in *jagir* by Multafit Khan), of Benetta (held in *jagir* by Jamal Muhammad), and *pattas* for the *ijara* of the *jagirs* of Khan-i-Jahan Bahadur and his kinsmen, in Mewat.²⁰

19. As early as 1707, we find Jai Singh instructing his *wakil* to secure Chatsu, Mauzabad, Dausa, and Niwai, which were close to his *watan* and the *zamindari mahals*. "The Rajputs who are to be posted there are already residing there", he wrote. (C.U. Wills' *Report*, Appendix E. Jai Singh's *parwanah* to his *wakil* at the Court, 9 Ramzan, 51st Regnal year, 1707 A.D.). See also, Jagjiwandas' report to Maharaja (1712), trans., in Wills' *Report*, Appendix, for his remarks about the readiness of the small assignment holders to give their assignments on *ijara* when large assignment holders had done so.

-20. See *arzdast* of Pancholi Jagjiwandas to Jai Singh (1712 A.D.). The *jama* figures of the *jagirs* received by Jai Singh on *ijara* were calculated according to the Mughal official rate of 40 *dams* to a Rupee. This rate continued to be used in the first half of the eighteenth century in the accounts of the Imperial government. In the revenue papers of the Jaipur State, however, we find that the traditional scale (50 *dams* = 1 *taka*, 32 *taka* = 1 Rupee) was used.

From Farrukh-siyar's time, the number of *jagirs* which Jai Singh secured from the Mughal government as *tankhwah*, *inam* and on *ijara* increased considerably. In 1714, he obtained *pargana* of Bhangarh. In 1715, a *jagir* with *jama* of 2,59,82,222 *dams* was transferred to him from the *jagir* of Shukr-ullah Khan in Tonk *pargana*,²¹ and a *jagir* having *jama* of 1,97,09,609 *dams* in *pargana* Khori from Muhammad Khan. The same year, a reduction, made earlier in his *jagir* in Deoti Sanchari, was also restored.²² In 1716, *jagirs* in Malarna *pargana* and in 1717 in Amarsar were obtained by him.²³ In 1717, he also obtained grants of *jagirs* valued at 1,33,30,883 *dams* annually in *pargana* of Malpura,²⁴ and of 1,60,00,000 *dams* in *pargana* of Muhammadpur (*subah* Malwa).²⁵ He also got rich *jagirs* transferred to him in *pargana* Malpura, and some villages under *sarkar* Agra, which were held by Churaman Jat and the Narukas.²⁶ In 1718, *jagirs* worth 32,00,000 *dams* annually in *pargana* Amarsar,²⁷ and 2,65,000 *dams* in *pargana* Bhangarh, and *zamindari* of Kiara (Bhangarh), both belonging to Wali Muhammad, were obtained by him.²⁸ Soon after the fall of the Saiyids, he was restored *jagirs* worth 6,61,96,632 *dams*. In 1722, he received rich *jagirs* in *pargana* Bhangarh (*subah* Agra), besides Amarsar, and a *jagir* worth 1,00,00,000 *dams* in *pargana* Khori, formerly with Churaman, and Hindaun and Toda *parganas* which were held by Saadat Khan.²⁹ In October 1722, a *jagir* (*jama*, 1,08,00,000 *dams*) in *pargana* Tonk was transferred to him from Nusrat Yar Khan.³⁰ In 1724, a *jagir* (*jama*, 32 lakh *dams*) in *pargana* Malarna, and another of 66,19,663 *dams* in *pargana* Mominabad were granted to him.³¹ In 1734, he secured *faujdari*

21. *Parwanah*, November 23, 1715, *O.H.R.*, No. 78. The *jama* figure for the *jagir*, however, seem to be inflated.

22. *Parwanah*, November 23, 1715, *O.H.R.*, No. 136.

23. *Parwanahs*, 1716, 1717, *J.S.A.*

24. *Parwanah*, August 31, 1717, *O.H.R.*, No. 129.

25. *Parwanah*, August 31, 1717, *K.D.*, No. 130.

26. *Parwanah*, September 13, 1717, *O.H.R.*, No. 120. *Hasb-ul-hukm*, September 15, 1717, *O.H.R.*, No. 268.

27. *Parwanah*, March 25, 1718, *O.H.R.*, No. 18.

28. *Parwanah*, June 5, 1719, *O.H.R.*, No. 99; *Parwanah*, August 13, 1719, *O.H.R.*, No. 58.

29. *Parwanahs*, *M.K.R.*, 93; *O.H.R.*, No. 131 (April 22, 1722) and No. 266.

30. *Parwanah*, October 4, 1722, *O.H.R.*, No. 17.

31. *Parwanahs*, September 7, 1724, *D.H.*, No. 265, and *D.H.*, Nos. 122 and 60 (May 19).

of Ranthambhor on *ijara* for Rs. 31,300. He retained it during the subsequent years.³² In early 1725, *jagirs* of Ali Amjad Khan Koka in *pargana* Alwar were transferred to him on *ijara*.³³ In April 1726, he was granted a *jagir* (*jama*, 11,49,900 *dams*) in *pargana* Manoharpur.³⁴ In November 1728, Jai Singh obtained lease of Ajmer *subah* (excluding Haveli) for one year on payment of Rs. 1,75,000³⁵ and also of Sambhar and Didwana. In that very month he also received a grant of 15,13,720 *dams* in *pargana* Amarsar.³⁶

Shortly afterwards, he secured through Muzaffar Khan, *faujdar* of Narnaul, five *mahals* viz., Gaonri, Babai, Jhunjhunu, Udaipur and Narhar, on *ijara*.³⁷ In 1732, Jai Singh sent an army under Sardul Singh of Udaipur and Thakur Sheo Singh of Sikar, who expelled Qaimkhanis from southern Fatehpur, comprising of the four *pattis* (Juliasar, Sihot, Patodia and Katrathal), and jointly appointed Sardul Singh and Sheo Singh as *faujdar* to administer the tract. Though *amils* were appointed by the State to collect the revenue, the Fatehpur *pattis* were transferred to Sikar by 1738. In 1736, Sawai Jai Singh took possession of the remaining part of the territory under the Qaimkhani *zamindars*, and, while retaining Fatehpur town, made a fresh arrangement giving Shiv Singh half a share in the *parganas* of this region, and allowing the remaining half to Ram Singh of Kasli.³⁸ In 1733, he took 85,60,339 *dams* of *paibaqi* lands on *ijara* in Uniara, Banetha, Nagar,³⁹ etc. It was in this manner that Jai Singh restored to the scions of Baloji their *desh*, though under the suzerainty of the parent State.

In 1741, Jai Singh secured for Ishwari Singh a large *jagir* in *pargana* Manoharpur, and also captured Deoti and Rajor (which were held by the Badgujars) and added these to the Jaipur State.⁴⁰

32. For details see Wills' *Report on Uniara*, Appendix A, 10.

33. Diwan Naraindas Kriparam to Vidyadhar, Pausha Sudi 1, S. 1783 (1725 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

34. *Parwanah*, October 30, 1726, *D.H.*, No. 132.

35. Abhai Singh to Jai Singh, Margashirsha Vadi 12, S. 1785 (November 17, 1728), *O.H.R.*, No. 118.

36. Wills' *Report, Panchapana Singhana*, 12.

37. *Ibid.*, 12-13.

38. See for details, Wills' *Report on Sikar*, 15-20. *Pargana* Gaonri included Patan also (Wills' *Report on Patan*, 8). See also Jhabar Malla Sharma, *Khetri ka Itihas*, pp. 36-40, and *Sikar ka Itihas*, pp. 61-68.

39. Wills' *Report on Uniara*, 6.

40. *Parwanah*, August 24, 1741, *D.H.*, No. 264; Tod, II, 295-96.

Merger of these areas in Jaipur State beneficial to the people. The above account of the *jagirs* received by Jai Singh as *tankhwah*, *inam*, or on *ijara*, though not complete or perfect,⁴¹ gives us a fair idea of the manner in which Jai Singh extended the boundaries of his State. In some cases, it will be noted, a *pargana* was acquired in stages. This was natural as the *parganas* were often not granted whole (*dar-o-bast*), and the Imperial government retained a few *mauzas* in *khalisa*, or assigned them to some other officers. It were these areas which Jai Singh secured as grant or on *ijara* in his favour and, in course of time, merged them in his State. This was also in the interest of the peasantry of these areas, as the conditions in Jaipur were far better than those prevailing in the Imperial territories, the reason being not so much the low revenue demand here⁴² as the peaceful conditions in the State and the effective functioning of the government. The conditions in the Imperial territory at this time, on the other hand, were deplorable, as the assignment holders, fearing that their assignment might be transferred any time to some one else, cared only for their immediate benefit, and tried to extract utmost from the peasants.⁴³

Appointment of subordinate ijaradars. We find that after 1727, Sawai Jai Singh leased out a number of *parganas*, or parts of *parganas*, to subordinate *ijaradars*, whose rights were limited to the collection of revenue only, the State retaining the administrative control.⁴⁴ In some cases, however, *zamindari* rights were granted subsequently to the *ijara* holder (e.g., *ijara* of Fatehpur *pargana* to Sikar) after fixing the annual assessment. Most of the

41. This requires not only a thorough search for the references in the *Parwanahs*, *Farmans*, and references about grants in the *Wakil Reports* and other documents, but also the *Arshsattas* of all the *parganas* of the entire period of Jai Singh's reign. Such an exhaustive enquiry is beyond the scope of the present work.

42. The revenue demand in the State (see below, p. 292) does not seem to have been lower than in the Imperial territory. At the same time, without knowing the precise rate of the government demand on land and other taxes charged in the Imperial territory contiguous to the Jaipur state, no categorical statement can be made on this point. As for peaceful conditions in the State during Jai Singh's time, the reports of the *Khufianavises* and *Sialha Adalati Papers* provide ample testimony.

43. See Irfan Habib, *op. cit.*, 319ff. See also Moreland, *op. cit.*, 147.

44. This is proved negatively as nowhere in the papers relating to the grant of *ijaras* to sub-*ijaradars* is there any indication that any administrative functions were bestowed on them.

leases were granted for a period of one to three years. We find that a large number of *ijaradars* belonged to the business community of the State, and in some cases (e.g., of Gijgarh, in April 1727) the *ijaradars* were Patels and the Patwaris of the place. In each case the *ijaradar* had to arrange for surety. A few instances are cited here. In November 1727, we find some bankers standing surety for one year's *ijara* (amounting to Rs. 85,837-7) of Bidana, Mojpur and Harseva, and also for the payment of one year *ijara* amount of Rs. 43,385-10 of the villages of *pargana* Wazirpur, on behalf of Naraindas, son of Hira Nand Natani, who had taken it on lease for a period of three years. Another entry of March 1729 informs that one Bijai Ram promised to deposit Rs. 10,00,000 on account of the *ijara* of the following places: Gijgarh, Toda, Thana, Ajabgarh, Pindayan, Ponkhar, Amarsar, Khandela, Manoharpur, Jaitpura, Naraina, Mauzabad and Niwai.⁴⁵ About 1731, a subordinate *ijara* of five *mahals* (Gaonri, Babai, Jhunjhunu, Udaipur and Narhar) was given to Hari Singh Chhabra, Mohan Singh Nathawat and Sardul Singh Shekhawat.⁴⁶ In the *Likhtang* documents we have details of the sub-leases of the different *parganas* for different years, which give us a full idea of the extent to which this practice was current. Jai Singh was securing areas on *ijara* from the Imperial government in so large a number and with such rapidity that to lease out those areas to sub-*ijaradars*, till such time when it might be possible to bring them under the direct administration of the State, seemed the only way out for realizing revenue from those areas. As the political condition in the country continued to be fluid, Jai Singh could merge in his State most of these areas which he had taken on *ijara* from the Imperial government, and could bring them under his direct and full control.

Limited control of the State over the thikanas. As has already been stated, the State retained its administrative control over the areas leased to the subordinate *ijaradars* after these areas had been merged in the State for all practical purposes. The case was entirely different in respect of the *thakurs* of Chomu, Achrol, Isarda, Diggi, Sarsop, Sikar and other *thikanas*, who were ordinarily regarded as

45. The above information is based on the Hindi Bonds preserved in *Diwan-i-Hazuri Daftar*.

46. Wills' Report, *Panchpana-Singhana*, 13. See also Satish Chandra, "A few documents pertaining to Zamindari from Thikana Records in the former Jaipur State." *P.I.H.C.*, XXIX (1968), pp. 261-65.

hereditary owners of their lands, and, subject to a few conditions, were left free to manage their own affairs. The State did not appoint its officials in these *thikanas*,⁴⁷ which otherwise were treated as an integral part of the State, and were fully and exclusively under its authority. The *thikanas* had no separate political jurisdiction, nor any pretensions to semi-sovereignty. This is proved by their obligation to perform *chakri*, to attend the Court whenever summoned, and the obligation of the successor of a *thakur* to secure *tika* from the Maharaja. The ruler could also cancel the *patta* of a *thakur* for any offence of a grave nature, e.g., refusal to comply with the orders of the ruler, or for being in league with the enemy, or for any serious omission in performing service. The *thakurs* of these estates were not entitled to seek redress from the Mughal Emperor against the just demands of the Raja. Their feudal obligations included *chakri* (military service), and acceptance of revenue rates and tariff scales of the State, which remained a sovereign prerogative.⁴⁸ Also, they did not enjoy the right of subinfeudation.

The states and the central authority. We will now briefly discuss the position of the states vis-a-vis the central authority. The relations of different states with the Mughal government show variations in respect of *mansabs* and personal service by their rulers.⁴⁹ It may be mentioned that in actual practice the relationship between the states and the central government had undergone considerable change after 1707, and, by 1730, little had remained of the old terms and conditions which had bound the states in subservient ties to the Mughal government, now exercising only a

47. In the records there is no mention of appointment of any official in any of these *thikanas*. The point is also proved by the *pargana* records of the State.

48. For instance, see Wills' *Report on Sikar*, 26. An agreement written in 1681 by the *Muqaddams* and *Mazaran* of *pargana* Malpura, however, indicates that the *Thikanadars* could charge customary cesses (*dastur*), and *bhaum* and *zamindari* dues on *mal-o-jihat* and *sayar jihat*. See Satish Chandra, *P.I.H.C.*, XXIX (1966), 263. See also Ghanshyam Dutt Sharma, pp. 288-92 and Dilbagh Singh, pp. 292-94 in *P.I.H.C.*, XXXI (1970). A scrutiny of the records of the *thikanas* of Jaipur, which are yet to be explored, should yield plenty of documentary evidence to substantiate these points. See also the tables showing the revenue of the fiefs and personal quotas the chiefs were required to bring, in Tod, II, 352.

49. Thus the Maharana of Mewar was exempted from rendering service personally.

shadowy authority over the provinces.

Like other states, different parts of Amber State were also treated as *mahals* of the Imperial territory and not apart from it, and fell under the jurisdiction of the various Mughal *sarkars*. Taking the Akbari *sarkars* (the precise boundaries of the *sarkars* of Ajmer *subah* in the first half of the eighteenth century being not known to us) we find that different areas of Jai Singh's state came under the jurisdiction of the Mughal *sarkars* in the following manner: Amarsar, Manoharpur, Kasli, and Fatehpur under *sarkar* Nagaur; Khandela, Kot, Babai, Singhana, Jhunjhunu in the north in *sarkar* Narnaul; Baswa, Deoti, Mandawar, etc., on the east in *sarkar* Alwar; Chatsu, Lalsot, Malarna, Niwai in the south and south-west in *sarkar* Ranthambor; and Amber, Jobner, Sambhar, Mozabad, Lamba, etc., in *sarkar* Ajmer.

These non-transferable hereditary states enjoyed full autonomy in their internal administration. Though many features of the Mughal administrative system are noticed in the administrative system of these states, these features were adopted by the rulers of their own free will and not under any directive from the centre. The ruler was the final court of appeal in his state⁵⁰ and there is no case on record when any of his subjects appealed to the Emperor against his decisions in any civil or criminal case. This, however, did not apply to the people residing in the *parganas* received by a ruler as *tankhwah*, *inam*, or on *ijara*. But when the *parganas* were absorbed in a state, as Jai Singh actually did in respect of a number of *parganas*, he exercised full administrative and judicial powers in those *parganas*.⁵¹ It is only very rarely that we find some disgruntled relation or a vassal of a ruler appealing to the Emperor against him, and the Imperial government not being averse to exploit such an opportunity to its own advantage and also to assert its paramount position, issued directives to the ruler.⁵²

50. See *V.V.*, II, 1252.

51. Thus in *Nyaya Sabha* papers preserved in the Jaipur Archives, we have cases brought by the inhabitants of Suner or Saneri (*sarkar*, *subah* Agra) which were decided by the judicial authorities of the State.

52. For instance, the case of Sur Singh (of Bikaner), who had complained to Jahangir against his elder brother Rai Dalpat, the Raja of Bikaner, for resuming most of his (Sur Singh's) *jagir* which had been assigned to him by his father. But even in this case, the reasons of the Imperial interference were Dalpat's defiance of the Emperor's order to go to Thatta, and, probably, Raja

But such cases were very rare and each case had its own peculiar circumstances which facilitated the Imperial intervention. In matters of succession, the right of primogeniture was the established rule in the Rajput states, and the Emperor was not expected to interfere on his own authority and against the wishes of the former ruler, the nobility, and the people of the state. Any violation of this understanding was stoutly resisted, and in the end nullified, as happened in the case of Jodhpur and Amber during the reigns of Aurangzeb and his successor.⁵³ On the death of a ruler, his successor, if present in the state, was installed on the *gaddi* without delay and without waiting for the Emperor's formal approval; the *tika*, which signified recognition by the paramount power, followed as a matter of course.⁵⁴ In fact, sometimes the *tika* was received several months after the enthronement of the ruler. The chiefs of these states, who were entitled to have their separate flags, maintained through their *wakils* direct contacts with the *Mughal Court*, their only dealing with the provincial governor being in regard to *peshkash* — the claim of the Imperial exchequer — which was fixed after a rough assessment of the total revenue of the state from land and other sources, including the amount received from the vassals.⁵⁵ The *peshkash* was deposited in the *subah* treasury. In case of default, however, the *subahdar* on his own initiative was not entitled to take any action against the ruler. In the eighteenth century, the rulers could have intercourse with the foreign and Indian powers,⁵⁶ and had full freedom to exchange

Man Singh's support to Sur Singh's candidature. See Ojha, *Bikaner*, I, 208-09. But such cases in no way contradict the above statement.

53. This point has been discussed in detail in Chapter V, 57ff. The few exceptions to this well established practice do not disprove the fact that the Emperor's right in matters of succession was more of a confirmatory nature than discretionary. There is no doubt that in practice he did not enjoy unlimited discretionary powers in the matter, though his formal approval of a candidate was necessary.

54. For instance, Rana Amar Singh died on December 22, 1710, and his son's *rajyabhisheka* took place the same day (*V.V.*, II, 789, 937). In fact, as Shyamaldas specifically says, on the death of a Rana, his son, real or adopted, was placed on the *gaddi* the same day. The same was the practice in other States also. The formal coronation ceremony took place later on.

55. For the basis of determining the *peshkash*, see Irfan Habib, 184, n.7.

56. Thus see entries in *D.K.*, XVIII, p. 343 for Jai Singh's contacts with the "Patshah of Rum and Siam", and *D.K.*, XIII for his contacts with the Firingis.

presents, gifts, etc. with them. As regards seeking of gift or a privilege by one chief from another, there had never been any restriction of any kind.⁵⁷

The chief features indicative of Mughal supremacy over these principalities may also briefly be mentioned. The very fact that the rulers of the Rajput states, including of Mewar, held *mansabs*, meant that were regarded as being in the Imperial service. They also paid, as already stated, a fixed annual tribute. Moreover, no state could violate the boundary of another, each being under the protection of the Imperial government.⁵⁸ Further, though the Imperial government did not issue directives to any state regarding the revenue system to be adopted in its territory, it could forbid levying of certain cesses within its confines.⁵⁹ The Imperial government also claimed the right of extradition and freedom of transit through these states.⁶⁰ Also, these principalities came within the purview of the religious policy of the government, though, in actual practice,⁶¹ its severity was considerably reduced in these principalities.

We shall now discuss the administration of the Jaipur state as gathered from the contemporary records.

Administration in the State; the Pradhan or the chief Diwan.
The highest office in the State was that of *Pradhan* or the chief

The ambassador from Rum was in Jaipur in May 1740 and again in August 1743. As for the envoys of Shahu and Baji Rao, see Ch. VIII, p. 184 and Ch. IX, p. 230.

57. The position was different during the early British rule. Thus in April 1886, a chief of central India desired to receive a *toda* (a gold chain) from the "famous house of Kolhapur". The request was courteously declined. (Lec-Warner, *The Protected Princes of India*, p. 311).

58. Even in its dying moments, the Mughal government responded to Abhai Singh's appeal against the terms imposed upon him by Sawai Jai Singh in 1740 A.D., and the Emperor called the latter to Court in this connection. See Ch. X, p. 264.

59. A note in *D.A.*, Sanganer, 18, (*J.S.A.*), records that the duty charged from the iron-smiths bringing their wares in the town was stopped in 1681 when the iron-smiths declared their resolve to represent to the Emperor in this regard. The Emperor was going to pass through Sanganer.

60. For this there are numerous references in the *Farman*s and the letters of high Imperial officers addressed to the Rajas.

61. Thus burden of the *ji-ziya* had to be borne by the states, and, occasionally, they had to tolerate damage to the temples within their confines. But in actual practice, the loss thus caused was reduced to a considerable extent partly by bribing, and sometimes by intimidating the officials sent for the purpose.

Diwan,⁶² who exercised general supervision over the entire administration. He received abstracts of income and disbursement from all the departments, revenue records from the *parganas*, certain categories of records from the *Bakshi's* office, abstracts of *Waqia* sent by the *khufianavises*, and reports from the *pargana* officials, such as the *amils*, *faujdar*s and others. He kept the ruler informed of these reports. He also submitted the papers relating to the grant of *jagirs*, and disposed of papers concerning the various departments, giving priority to those of *khizana khalisa* and *jagir*. The claims of the various officials and the *jagir*-holders were settled in his *kachehri*. He got the revenue records sent by the *amils* audited and made enquiries wherever required. He also looked after the political correspondence. The drafts of the *kharitas*, *parwanahs*, *arzdashts*, etc., were submitted to the ruler through him, and the drafts of important letters and orders were preserved for record in his office. The mass and range of the records received by him from the various departments and administrative agencies will give us a clear idea of his wide responsibilities. The following list of documents is fairly representative of the kinds of papers preserved in his office.

Records maintained or received in his office :

1. *Kharitas* and draft *kharitas*
2. *Khatut Maharajgan* (*Khatut-i-Maharajgan*)
3. *Khatut Diwanan* (*Khatut-i-Diwanan*)
4. *Khatut Ahalkaran* (*Khatut-i-Ahalkaran*)
5. *Akhbarat*
6. *Wakil Reports*
7. *Siaha Haqiqat*
8. *Siaha Mharaja*
9. *Siaha Hazur*
10. *Siaha Waqia*
11. *Tojih Dastur*
12. *Chhitiyat Khizana* (*Chhitiyat-i-Khizana*)
13. *Roznama Khizana*
14. *Safayat Khizana*
15. *Khizana Hazur*

62. Jai Singh's chief *Diwan*, Raja Ayamal, was a well known figure in the diplomatic world of this period.

16. *Puja*
17. *Siga Imarat*
18. *Jagir, Muwazana, Awarija, Baqiat Papers*
19. *Kharcha Nyaya Sabha*
20. *Siaha Adalati*
21. *Nuskha Udak, Inam*
22. *Kharda Jama Kharch Khizana*

Of these, nos. 1 to 7 are invaluable for the political history of the times; nos. 8 to 11 for the movements and activities of the ruler and the important persons who came to meet him. These documents, besides having considerable chronological importance, are also helpful in knowing Jai Singh's relations with such important persons as the Peshwas, the various Maratha commanders, the Jat leaders, like Churaman and Badan Singh, and the Imperial officers such as the Saiyids, Khan-i-Dauran, the Nizam and others. Documents mentioned at serial nos. 12-15 and 22 relate to the treasury, while nos. 19 and 20 give us information about the working of the judiciary in the State. Of these nos. 1 to 11 have been widely used in this book.

Records sent to him from the *parganas*:

1. *Nirkha Bazar*
2. *Roznama Potdar*
3. *Dastur-al-amal* (of the season which has passed)
4. *Arhsattas*
5. *Barat*
6. Papers relating to *Maapa, Rahdari, Kotwali Chabutra*, and *Punyartha* (charity).
7. *Yaddashti Baqi Hawalgi* (dealing with arrears).
8. *Mavajana Kalan*
9. *Yaddashti Pardakhti*
10. *Tankhadar Parganavati*
11. *Yaddashti*

Papers sent to him by the Bakshi :

1. *Jama Kharch Dag Ghora Mulazim*
2. *Roznama Daftar Bakshi*
3. *Siaha Daftar Bakshi*
4. *Kilejat (Qilajat)*
5. *Jama-Kharch* of the campaigns

Sialha as well as *awarija* of the various *Karkhanahs*⁶³ were also sent to his office.

The chief *Diwan* was assisted in his multifarious duties by the *Diwan Desh* and *Diwan Hazur*. Though the duties of these *diwans* were partly overlapping,⁶⁴ the former was chiefly concerned with *jagirs* and *pargana* administration. He issued necessary directives to the *pargana* officials concerning their work, e.g., the revenue rates to be applied for the season, the recovery of advances, calling up money from the *pargana* treasuries, investigations regarding matters reported by the *khufianavis* of a *pargana*, prevention of hoarding, or import of certain articles from outside, and such other matters.⁶⁵ He prepared a consolidated statement of the income and disbursement of *Khazana Desh* and the *pargana* treasuries, toured the *parganas*, and kept the ruler and the chief *Diwan* informed about the conditions there. The duties of the *Diwan-i-Hazur* seem to have been mainly confined to matters relating to the hereditarily held fiefs, the royal establishment, and the *jagirs* acquired by the ruler as *tankhwah*, *inam*, or on *ijara*.

The Bakshi. The *Bakshi* was incharge of recruitment, the

63. We find in the Jaipur Archives papers dealing with the following: *Tosha Khanah* (presents, valuable cloth, shawls, and embroidery); *Koshagraha* (treasury); *Kothyar Hazuri* (royal store); *Kirkiri-khanah Hazuri* (jewellery section); *Kagad* (paper); *Pothi-khanah* (books, manuscripts); *Ratangraha* (jewels); *Awadhagraha*; *Agnijantragraha*; *Nagar-khanah* (drums); *Gunijan-khanah* (musicians); *Rath-khanah* (chariots); *Sileh-khanah* (armoury); *Phil-khanah* (elephants); *Shutr-khanah* (camel stables); *Jin-khanah* (*Zin-khanah*) (saddles and bridles); *Palki-khanah* (sedan chairs); *Jargar-khanah* (*Zargar Khanah*) (gold and silver articles); *Shikar-khanah* (menagerie of hunting animals); *Chhapa-khanah* (print); *Mashal-khanah* (torches); *Farrash-khanah* (carpets, tents); *Karkhanah Punya* (charity and religious institutions, temples, etc.); *Surati-khanah* (paintings); *Khyal-khanah* (chess, *chaupar*, etc.); *Khasboi-khanah* (scents); *Ranga-khanah* (colour, paints, etc.); *Tambul-khanah* (betel leaves and vessels for the same); *Modi-khanah* (provided supplies of all kinds to other departments); *Baraf-khanah*; *Rasoi* (kitchen).

64. Thus an order (in *J.S.A.*) dated Pausha Sudi 3, S. 1794 (1737 A.D.) of Naraindas (*Diwan Desh*) and Vidyadhar (*Diwan Hazur*) instructing the *amils* to confiscate *inam* and *punya* lands held by all the grantees other than Brahmans and Thakurs (deities).

65. Hathi Ram Maluk Chand to Raja Ayamal, Bhadrpada Vadi 6, S. 1800, acknowledging the instructions for preventing hoarding. In a significant order dated Shrawan Sudi-3 (n.s.) the *Panch Mahajans* of Amber, Jaipur, Sanganer, etc., were ordered not to import silk from Gujarat and Agra. *O.H.R.*, No. 1002, *J.S.A.*

commissariat, and was also the pay-master of the army. For any default in furnishing the quota of troops, or for abstaining from duty, he took suitable action against the defaulter, including annulling his land assignment.⁶⁶ We find in the papers that the *Bakshi* was assisted in his work by *Bakshi Jagir*, *Bakshi Desh* and *Bakshi Pargana*.⁶⁷ Officials like *Mushrif Zakhira*, *Daroghas of Topkhana Zakhira* and *Topkhana Desh*, *Tehvildar Zakhira*, *Darogha Topkhana* etc., were directly under him.⁶⁸ The *Bakshi* sent to the *Diwan siaha* as well as *awarija* of the expenditure incurred by his department. The total expenditure incurred on any campaign was calculated to the last *dam* and was reported to the *Diwan*.⁶⁹

It seems these *Diwans* and *Bakshis* formed a distinct category of senior officers who worked directly under the eye of the ruler and the chief *Diwan*, and supervised the work of other officials at lower levels.

Pargana administration. For administrative purposes Jaipur State, like other principalities of Rajputana, was divided into a number of *parganas*, each of which comprised a large number of *mauzas* or villages of two types: main (*asli* or the original) and adjoining hamlets (*dakhili* or incorporate). The size of the *pargana*, which depended upon the number of villages, was not constant. In fact, some of the *parganas* show considerable change in size during a period of a decade or two. Thus in *pargana* Amber there were 700 villages in 1715 and 998 in 1737,⁷⁰ the increase being due to the amalgamation of contiguous tracts to the *pargana*.

The available records⁷¹ enable us to form a fair idea of the

66. See *Roznama*, *Daftar Bakshi*, S. 1783. It records resumption of *jagir* on the complaint of the *tawaichi* that the trooper had not presented himself at the time of muster. Similarly, there is the case of a soldier who had gone on leave after leaving a substitute, but did not return. His *jagir* was resumed.

67. *Roznama*, *Daftar Bakshi*, S. 1783.

68. *Qilajat* papers and *Fauj Kharch* papers, S. 1787 (1730 A.D.).

69. Thus see *Jama Kharch Khazana*, Karauli campaign, S. 1786.

70. See S.N. Hasan; Mrs. K.N. Hasan, S.P. Gupta, "The Pattern of Agricultural Production in the territories of Amber." *P.I.H.C.*, (1966), 244.

71. Of all the papers relating to the *parganas*, the *Arhasattas* are by far the most useful and give most comprehensive information, such as the size of the *pargana*, the number of *mauzas* in it held in *khalisa*, *jagir*, *bhom*, the *jama* of each *mauza*, *hasil* or actual realization, details of the cultivated area under each crop, the rate of payment per *bigha*, total revenue realized in *jinsi* form, the cash demand of the areas in *ijara*, etc.

administrative set up in the *parganas* of Jaipur State during Jai Singh's time.

The officials: their functions and duties. In *Tankwahdar Pargana* papers we come across three categories of *pargana* officials: *alufdars*, *mahindars* and *rojindars*. The *amil*s alone came in the first category. Their annual salaries are given in round figures. In the second category were *faujders*, *naib faujders*, *kotwals*, *khufianavises*, *potdars* (*fotahdars*), *tahvildars*, *mushrifis*, *awarijanavis*, *daroghas* of the various *khazanas*, *butayat*, etc. Among the *mahindars* we also find *hazrinavis*, *chobdars*, *nishanbardars*, *daftarband*, and *daftaris*, who were the lower grade officials. their monthly salaries usually being below Rs. 10. In the category of *rozinadars* came servants and labourers who worked on daily wages.

In the contemporary papers⁷² we note that while *amil*, *potdar*, *kotwal* and *khufianavis* were appointed in every *pargana*, there were some other officials. e.g., *faujders*, who were posted in a few *parganas* only. Obviously, different officials were appointed keeping in view the requirements of each *pargana*.

Amil. The powers and the functions of the *pargana* officials are learnt, with sufficient degree of accuracy, from the *pargana* records, general orders issued to them in regard to some measures to be taken by them, and also from stray references about them in papers not strictly concerned with the *pargana* administration. It is interesting to find *amil* as the highest paid official in the *pargana*. In the early part of Jai Singh's reign, the monthly salaries of *potdars* (*fotahdars* or treasurers), *kotwals*, and *khufianavises* in most of the *parganas* ranged from Rs. 12 to Rs. 30, while those of the *amil*s were from Rs. 1200-1500 annually, or Rs. 100-125 per month.⁷³ One of the chief duties of an *amil* in the *pargana* was the assessment and collection of revenue. In this, he was assisted by an *amin*, a *qanungo*, *patels*, *patwaris*, etc. He maintained a variety of records showing total revenue demand at each harvest, area under each crop wherever assessment was by the *zabti* system, the total amount of revenue realized by the State in kind, the cash demand from the areas under *ijara*, *hasil* from taxes, duties, fines,

72. The information about the salaries and postings of the *pargana* officials is chiefly based on *Tankwahdar Parganawati* papers of Newai, Chatsu, Toda Bhim, Toda Raisingh, Narnaul, Khadari, Vahatri, Malarna, and *Ycddashti*, *pargana* Khori, *J.S.A.*

73. *Ibid.*

etc., daily market rates of the various articles—from *muhr*, gold and silver to oil, cereals, *gur*, sugar and other things. The *amil* looked after the general welfare of the peasants, took measures to promote agriculture, granted relief, and distributed *taqavi* to the afflicted.⁷⁴ In his *kachehri* he decided civil and criminal cases, heard complaints of *patels* and *patwaris* in respect of their claims, and also marriage disputes after community *panchayats* had given their opinion on them.⁷⁵ As noted subsequently, the *khufi-navis* of the *pargana* invariably mentioned in his report whether the *amil* held the *kachehri* or not.⁷⁶

Potdar, Faujdar and Kotwal. We may briefly write about other *pargana* officials also. *Potdar (Fotahdar)* was the treasurer of the *pargana* treasury, and maintained *Roznama Khizana* in which he recorded daily income to and disbursement from the *pargana* treasury. The monthly salaries of the *potdars* ranged between Rs. 12 and Rs. 28.⁷⁷ As noted earlier, we find mention of *faujdar*s in a few *parganas* only though we find that *kotwals* were appointed in almost all the *parganas*. At important places under his charge, he established *thanahs* under *naib-faujdar*s and *thanahdar*s, who were in charge of smaller areas. *Faujdar*s were mainly responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the *parganas*, and, whenever required, assisted the *amils* in realizing revenue from unruly elements. The contemporary papers show that the *faujdar*s enjoyed judicial powers in regard to criminal cases such as thefts, obscenity, and offences concerning law and order situation. In fact the powers and functions of *amils* and *faujdar*s in respect of the maintenance of law and order in the *parganas* were not well demarcated and were overlapping.⁷⁸

74. For the powers and the duties of the *amils*, there is copious though scattered information in a variety of papers — revenue, general orders issued by the *Divans*, *Siaha Adalat* papers, *Siaha Khufia* records, *Dastur-al-amals* (which mention the discretionary powers of the *amils* in respect of the State demand for crops not covered in the *Dasturs*), and other records.

75. See *Siaha Adalat* papers, S. 1787, *J.S.A.*

76. See below, p. 308.

77. *Tankhwahdar Parganawati* papers, *J.S.A.*

78. Thus see the letter of *Diwan* Naraindas Kirparam (dated Jyestha Vadi 6, S. 1794) to Vidyadhar, another high official of the State, regarding the instructions to *amils* and *faujdar*s in respect of punishment for thefts, dacoity, etc. There is another order of Naraindas (dated Magashirsha Vadi 6, S. 1784) in which *amils*, *amins* and *faujdar*s are told to force the *bairagis* having wives and

Kotwal was another officer who performed police functions in a *pargana*. But he was essentially an urban officer in the sense that he was more concerned with the *gasbas* or towns. There he posted night patrols, kept an eye on bad characters, detected crimes, appointed *chowkidars* in the villages, and took measures necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the *pargana*. The *khojas* and village officials furnished him with useful information. It was also his duty to check weights and measures, to suppress hoarding of food grains and other commodities, and to regulate the manufacture and sale of intoxicants in accordance with the prescribed rules. Also, on the platform in front of his office, tolls were collected.⁷⁹

Khufianavis. From the records we find that in each and every *pargana*, a *khufianavis* was appointed to report on the events and the conditions in the *pargana*. Their duties and functions have been discussed in detail at a subsequent place.⁸⁰

The other officials mentioned in the *pargana* papers are *awarijanavis*, *hazrinavis*, *roznamanavis*, *nishanbardar*, *muharrir*, *talvildar*, *mushrif*, and *darogha*. Every *pargana* had its own office (*Daftar Pargana*) in which *amil*, *potdar* and other officials transacted business and maintained their records. Among the low paid officials were *daftarband*, *chobdar*, and *chowkidar* (who was generally a Meena). The salaries of the last two ranged from Rs. 2 to Rs. 5 per month.⁸¹

Looking to the needs of the Jaipur State, the administration at the *pargana* level in the State was fairly well organized. The vast mass of papers dealing with *pargana* matters do not leave us in any

children, to lead the life of *grahasthas*. Such general orders indicate the overlapping nature of the duties and functions of *amils*, *faujdar*s and *kotwal*s. Mention of a *faujdar* enforcing penalty for *chamchori* can be seen in *Siaha Khufia*, Shrawana Sudi 9, S. 1771 (1714 A.D.), *pargana* Vahatri, *J.S.A.*

79. In a general order of Vaishakha Sudi 2, S. 1783 (1726 A.D.), the *kotwal*s were asked to prevent hoarding of grain; collection of duties at *Kotwali chabutra* is mentioned in *Bahi Khazana Hazur* S. 1774; for *Khoja* reporting about the theft cases and movement of thieves, Deep Singh's letter of Jyestha Sudi 7, S. 1793 to *Diwan* Naraindas, *J.S.A.* The posts of *kotwal*, *faujdar*, and *amil*, so far as their duties and functions were concerned, were modelled after the Mughal *kotwal*, *faujdar* and *amil*, with such modifications as were deemed necessary in view of limited requirements of the State.

80. See below. p. 307.

81. Papers *Tankwahdar Parganawati*, *J.S.A.*

doubt as regards its efficient and effective working during Jai Singh's time.

Land Revenue. The land revenue (*Mal Jihati* or *Mal-o-Jihat*), as the *jama* from this source recorded in the *Arhsattas* show, was the most important source of income of the State. Though the schedules of revenues of Jai Singh's time have not been found (though undoubtedly they are lying in the Archives and persistent search would no doubt trace them out some day), the schedules of revenue of a later period, viz., after 1800 A.D., support this conclusion. The income of the State from land revenue must have been considerably higher in Sawai Jai Singh's time, as by 1800 A.D. the State had lost a number of areas mentioned already,⁸² and there had been a sharp deterioration in the economic conditions of the region due to recurring Maratha depredations, internal disputes, and maladministration in the State following Sawai Jai Singh's death.

Problems in studying land revenue system in the State. As already noted, a large number of *jagirs*, the addition of which from time to time led to the enlargement of the boundaries of Jaipur State, were first taken on *ijara* by Sawai Jai Singh, and subsequently merged in the State. Some of the *parganas* which Jai Singh took on *ijara* were again given to *sub-ijaradars* for an agreed period, but in respect of a number of these *parganas*, *ijaras* were not renewed, and the areas were brought under the direct control of the revenue department of the State. Such variations in tenures, and the fact that detailed revenue information is available only in respect of *khalisa* lands and *ijaras* held by the State, and not about the lands alienated from time to time in the form of *jagir*, *ijara*, or as grants, make the study of the revenue system in the State difficult. Nevertheless, the organization and working of the revenue system in Jaipur during Jai Singh's time is generally clear. Here we will give only a bare outline of the system, the subject being too technical for a detailed discussion in these pages.

Methods of land revenue assessment and collection. We find in *Dastur-al-amals*, and also in the *Arhsattas*, that in the same *pargana*, *zabti* (measurement, and assessment based upon it), *batai* (division or crop-sharing) and *kankut* (appraisement or conjectural estimate of the quantity of the standing crop on a measured surface by the

82. See above, p. 269.

revenue officials in conjunction with the cultivator) systems continued side by side, the reason being that in respect of most of the crops, save a few purely cash crops such as sugar cane, hemp, cotton, indigo, tobacco, poppy, and a few others, there was no difficulty in allowing the peasant the choice of any of these systems. Hence it was often the case that a peasant chose *jinsi* in one year and opted for *zabti* the following year if he found the prices showing an upward trend. Similarly, if he felt that the crop had been over-estimated by *kankut*, he could ask for reassessment by *latai* i.e., by measuring and weighing after reaping and thrashing.⁸³ The choice of any of these systems in one season was not binding for the next season also.

In the *zabti* system, cash rates per *bigha* for different crops were worked out for different *parganas*, and were recorded in *dastur-al-amals*, which the revenue officials applied in the *parganas* after measuring the fields at each harvest, to yield the *jama*. From the *dasturs* we learn that cash rates per *bigha* (measured by an 84 *hath* long *jarib*) were worked out for the *Kharif* and the *Rabi* crops separately. As the rates for the same crop are found to vary from *pargana* to *pargana*, it seems that yield per *bigha* and prices prevailing in a locality were taken into account in sanctioning the rates. But in the absence of local crop rate schedules, it seems that the revenue rates were directly formulated in cash, the yield per *bigha* having been approximately worked out choosing a few average seasons for the purpose. As the *dasturs* for consecutive years have not been found so far, it is difficult to form a precise idea of the fluctuations in the revenue demand in different *parganas* of Amber State.

The revenue records show that in fixing the State's demand in respect of different crops, a number of factors were taken into account. Broadly speaking these were; the quality of the soil (*peeval pahli* or irrigated land of the first quality, *peeval* of second quality, *Rami dharti*, *Nalaik* or *banjar*, land newly brought under cultivation, forest land newly brought under cultivation, etc.); the source of irrigation (river, rivulet, pond, well — the rates being

83. For the alternative choice given to peasants in case they were dissatisfied with *kankut*, see Tod, II, 434. The practice of giving alternative choice of assessment was common in the states of Rajputana. For details about the *kankut* system, see Irfan Habib, 199-200.

different for old and new wells and for perennial wells, and wells where *charas* was used); the location of the field (*machil* or land being in level with the mouth of the well, *pedi*, etc); nature of the holding; and the crop sown.

The records show that the assessment under crop-sharing system showed less variations, and the demand was fixed irrespective of the crop grown. Though equal share of the produce between the State and the *raiyyat* was the general practice, the share of the cultivator did not exceed two-fifths of the produce after deducting the dues of the village artificers, and *qanungo*, *patel*, *chaudhari*, and *patwari*.⁸⁴

In elucidating further the above mentioned features of assessment of land revenue in Amber state, the *Dastur* dated 14 Jamadi II. 1114 H. of *qasba* Sanganer should prove useful.

“*Muafik Jama-bandi, Mal, fasl Kharif;*

Zabti rates per bigha:

San Rs. 1/8 *As.*; *Mehandi Khuta* Rs. 1/12; *Tobacco* Rs. 4/8; *Indigo (Nanti variety)* Rs. 4/8; *Indigo (Jethi variety)* Rs. 1/12; *Savno kakadi, karela, tinda, patnya, sakarkandi* Rs. 1/4 (when irrigated by river); *Savno kakadi, karela, tinda, patnya, sakarkandi* Rs. 1/0 (when irrigated by well); *Betel leaves* Rs. 7/0; *Vad-Machil bigha* Rs. 5/0; *Vad-Machil Pedi bigha* Rs. 1/0; *Gudgarin* (cane sugar) Rs. 7/0; *Moth, Guvar* Rs. 3/0 (when irrigated by well); *cotton (peeval or irrigated) of first quality* Rs. 2/4; *cotton (peeval) second quality* Rs. 2/0; *cotton (when irrigated by river or a well)* Rs. 1/8; *Makka, Juwari* Rs. 1/12; *vegetables (Methi, Muli, Torai, etc.)* Rs. 2/0; *brinjal (all the year round)* Rs. 2/0.

If any crop is not covered in the *Dastur*, the *hakim* will decide the rate.”

Similarly, for the *Batai*, the following paper will make the system clear. “*Dastur-al-amal, pargana Saneri, S. 1765, fasl Kharif, Mal Jihati (Mal-o-Jihat), batai* weight of 30. The proportion of the State share sanctioned is as follows: “Half of the produce is to be taken from the *raiyyat* from crops raised on rainfall; a third

84. See *Dastur-al-amal, Qasba Sanganer, S. 1660*, and of *Saneri pargana, S. 1765, J.S.A.*

A detailed study of the records might reveal other grades of land, classified on the basis of soil, location, source of irrigation, etc. See also *Basta* No. 20, *Do Varki Kagzat, S. 1759, Kotah Archives*, for mention of *nalaik bigha, dohli bigha, parti bigha*, and *Tod, II, 429, 433-34*,

from crops irrigated from old wells; a fourth from those irrigated from a new well; a third from *patels*, a fourth from *qanungos*, a third from the Rajputs, and two-fifths from Minas and Gujars."⁸⁵ Though the rates in other *parganas* might have differed to some extent, the general pattern could not have been much different. The total estimate of the produce and quantity demanded as the State's share was recorded in the *Arhasattas*.

Jinsi formed bulk of the State's share. It seems from the records that *hasil* in the form of produce (*jinsi*) formed bulk of the State's share from the land. The peasants preferring *batai* but desirous of paying the State demand in cash did so by commuting the demand into cash at the market prices. Part of the *jinsi* was sold (*bichoti*) to the traders on the spot, and the remainder was stored in the *ambars* of the *pargana*. That *jinsi* accumulated in considerable quantity is apparent from an incomplete letter of 1739 A.D., which says that on hearing of the arrival of the Deccani army in the Mukund-darra, 20,000 mds. of grain was promptly sold out by the officials, who also helped in selling out 9,000 mds. of grain under the charge of the *patels*.⁸⁶

Peasants' preference. As the *Arhasattas* show, the cultivators preferred cash rates for paying the State's dues for cotton, tobacco, *mehandi*, indigo, sugarcane, *chola*, *moth*, *mung*, *urd*, *nirini*, wheat, *ajwain*, and vegetables. They, however, preferred crop-sharing for *bajra*, *jowar*, *makka*, *barley*, *gram*, *bijhri*, *gochani*, etc.⁸⁷ This was especially true of the peasants having small holdings. To a petty peasant after all nothing gives greater sense of security than the fact that he has enough *jowar*, *bajra*, or *makka* to feed his family from October to March or April, and *barley*, *gram*, and if possible a little wheat, to support it till the spring harvest. He craved for nothing more than this, and ensured it by choosing

85. D.A. Saneri *pargana*, S. 1765, J.S.A. The *zabti* rates for a few crops in *pargana* Saneri are given as follows: Rs. 1/8 per *bigha* for *Makka*, *Jawari*; Rs. 3/8 per *bigha* for Tobacco; Re. 1/- per *bigha* for *Kodu*; -10/- per *bigha* for *Chola* and *Torai*; Rs. 2/8 per *bigha* for Cotton on land irrigated by river. In the *Dastur*, first the cash rates are given, followed by the proportion of the State demand by *batai* system.

86. An incomplete letter, Phalgun Sudi 15, S. 1796 (1739 A.D.), *Amber Record*, J.S.A.

87. This has been examined in great detail by Dr. S. Nurul Hasan, Mrs. K.N. Hasan and S.P. Gupta in "The Pattern of Agriculture Production in the territories of Amber (C. 1650-1750)", *P.I.H.C.*, XXVIII (1966), 244-64.

batai, or *kunt* systems, which enabled him to share with the State the risks from inconstancy of weather. Cash payment, on the other hand, was preferred where good facilities of irrigation existed and, for this reason, cultivation was comparatively secure.

Agencies for revenue assessment and collection. The records give the details of the cultivated area for the *zabti* crops and *hasil* or actual realization from each village. But there is evidence to show that the normal practice was to assess the peasants individually, though there are also instances when revenue demand on the whole village was fixed; such was the case when the revenue of the village was farmed out. The assessment of individual peasant holdings was done under supervision of the *amil*s and with the help of the records maintained by the *qanungos* and *patwaris*, but the responsibility for the collection of the revenue from a village was that of the *patel*.⁸⁸ The *ryots* of a village paid revenue (including cesses) due from them through him. The *patels*, like the *qanungos* and *patwaris*, formed an essential part of the local revenue administration. For their service, they received an allowance in the form of a percentage of the produce called *visod* or *bisondhi* in case of *patels*, and *nankar* in case of *chaudharis* and *qanungos*, and *virsa* in case of *patwaris*.⁸⁹ The *qanungos*, *patels* and *patwaris* also received as *dastur* a share from the *hasil* of the village, each receiving one-fourth of a seer per maund of produce. Also, their personal lands were assessed by the State at concessional rates.⁹⁰

Revenue concessions and relief. Passing on to revenue concessions intended to promote agriculture, we note that lower rates were prescribed for the lands newly brought under cultivation, lands irrigated by newly dug wells, and sometimes even full remissions were granted for a specific period in case of forest lands newly brought under tillage.⁹¹ It was in fact an important duty

88. For the role of *patels* in collection of revenue, see *Chitthi to the Amil of pargana Vahatri, Jyeshtha Vadi 7, S. 1870*, and other letters cited by Dilbagh Singh in "Position of the Patel in Eastern Rajputana during the Eighteenth Century", *P.I.H.C.*, XXXII, (1970), I, 360-66.

89. *Tankhwalidar Parganawati, Shri Madhopur pargana, 32.*

90. For *nankar*, *virsa* and *visod* see the *Dasturs*. Useful information on this point is also found in the disputes in respect of the claims of *patels*, *patwaris*, etc., brought before the *amil*s and the *divans*. Thus see *Sialha Adalati papers S. 1787; D.A. Saneri, 10*. No fee was charged from the *patels* when their fields were measured. See *D.A., Sanganer, 27*.

91. See *D.A., Saneri*.

of the *patels* to encourage extension of cultivation, and they were given wide discretionary powers in settling new *kashtkars*, and in offering them adequate incentives.⁹² We also come across references when the State sought to impress upon the *amils* and *jagir*-holders the need to maintain secure conditions in the *parganas*, so that *hasil* might not be affected by migration of people to other *parganas*. The State also took adequate measures and sanctioned revenue concessions to mitigate hardship caused to the peasants by draught and other calamities. We come across a significant order saying that to meet the distress caused by severe draught (1732), the State officials should provide work to all able-bodied persons, and to give free food to the weak and destitute. In the order it is specifically mentioned that a seer (of 28 *taka* weight) of gram, *moth*, *bajra*, *juwar*, whichever was cheaper, should be given to each man per day.⁹³ Full or partial remissions were made during draught conditions, and *taqavi* loans were sanctioned for purchasing seeds and bullocks.⁹⁴ The *patels* could also recommend cases for grant of agricultural loans, which, when sanctioned, were distributed through them.⁹⁵

Taxes and cesses other than land revenue. Besides land revenue the peasants paid some cesses, realized mostly in cash, e.g., tax per plough (*haloti*), tax on cattle (oxen, buffaloes, goats), *ghas charai* (5 *takas* per buffalo, 2 *takas* per cow and 6 *takas* per 100 goats), duty on carts laden with grain which they brought to the markets for sale, duty on the weighing of grain (*hasil tulai*), and *dasturs* or perquisites of *qanungo*, *patwari*, and *patel*, and *hasil bhent*, etc.⁹⁶ These no doubt increased the incidence of burden on the peasantry, which cannot be determined even by computing total demand on a village on account of the composite nature of the population in the villages and variation in the rates of revenue demand for different types of land, crops, and locality.

92. *Yaddashti Pradakhti*, *Pargana Malarna*; *chitthi* to the *amils*, *pargana Malarna*, Karar Miti Duji Vadi 10, S. 1812, and to the *amils* of *pargana Chatsu*, Ashadha Sudi 7, S. 1823 (*J.S.A.*), cited by Dilbagh Singh, *loc. cit.*, 361.

93. *Diwan* Naraindas Kirpa Ram to Vidyadhar, Kartik Sudi 1, S. 1789, *J.S.A.*

94. Viras Lal's *arzi* to Girdhardas, Shrawana Sudi 8, S. 1791, *J.S.A.*

95. *Chitthi* to the *amils*, *pargana Dausa*, Asoj Sudi 3, S. 1816, *J.S.A.*

96. *D.A.*, Saneri; *D.A.*, Sanganer, 14, 27, for charges to cover the expenses of the *patwari's* horse during the course of measurement of the fields.

The crop pattern. The available records, chiefly the *Arhsattas*, *Dastur-al-amal*, and *Nirkha Bazar* of the *parganas*, give us useful information for determining the crop pattern in different *parganas* of the State. Briefly, the principal crops for the *kharif* season (autumn harvest) were *makka*, *jowar*, *bajra*, *kodon*, *gudgarin* (sugarcane), *til*, *moth*, *gunwar*, *urd*, *mung*, *chola*, cotton; indigo, tobacco, and *san*. Of these, as has already been noted, sugarcane, cotton, tobacco and indigo were purely cash crops and came under the *zabt* system. The principal crops for the *rabi* (spring harvest) were wheat, barley, gram, mixed crops (*bijhri*, *gojai*, *gochani*), *sarson*, *ajwain*, *dhania*, *arhar*, etc. A recent study⁹⁷ of the revenue derived from different crops in four contiguous *parganas* of State, viz., Sawai Jaipur, Malarna, Vahatri and Chatsu, and of the proportion of revenue from the *kharif* and *rabi* harvests in these *parganas* during the period under review indicate an increase in the *zabti* crops of the *kharif* harvest (viz. of *makka* in Jaipur, Vahatri and Chatsu, of sugarcane in *parganas* of Jaipur and Vahatri, of cotton in Malarna and Chatsu, of *chola* in all the four *parganas*), and a corresponding decrease in the percentage of *bajra* and pulses. The increase in these cash crops along with "a general rise in prices and a comparatively stable cash demand per *bigha*" indicate that conditions were fast becoming favourable for the growth of money economy in the State.⁹⁸ It may however be mentioned that a study of the crop pattern in a few selected villages only, instead of a study of crop pattern in a few *parganas*, will give us a more faithful picture of the crop trends in different areas of the State. It is so because the size of the *parganas* continued to change substantially by addition or alienation of contiguous tracts, and increase or decrease in *zabti* and *jinsi* crops in a *pargana* was materially affected by soil and irrigational facilities in those tracts. Generally speaking, the desire of the peasants to have, first and foremost, grain sufficient to feed their families, the nature of the soil, facility of irrigation, the size of their holdings, and, to some extent, the price trends⁹⁹

97. See S. Nurul Hasan, Mrs. K.N. Hasan, S.P. Gupta, "The Pattern of Agricultural Production in the Territories of Amber (C. 1650-1750)", *P.I.H.C.*, XXVIII (1966), 244-64.

98. *Ibid.*, 247-48.

99. For a detailed study on this point see S. Nurul Hasan and Satya Prakash Gupta, "Prices of Food Grains in the Territories of Amber (C. 1650-1750)", *P.I.H.C.*, XXIX, Vol. I (1968), pp. 345 ff.

in the region, determined the crop pattern in different areas of the State.

Octroi (chungi), Customs, Taxes, Market and Transit duties (rahdari) :

In Jaipur, as in other Rajput states, market and transit duties (*sair-jihat*), fees or taxes on certain trades and manufacturers (*jihat*), and contribution at the time of some of the festivals were charged as a part of the State's revenue policy. Here these were all termed as *sair-jihat*.¹⁰⁰ Basically there was nothing unlawful about these taxes and duties. In fact, the imposition of these taxes and duties within equitable limits was economically sound and desirable. After all there was no reason why the peasants, even the poorest one, should share the burden of taxation, while small producers and traders, brewers and tobaccoists, contractors and brokers, oil manufacturers, coal and grain merchants, dyers and others, should enjoy total or liberal exemption from the burden. These, along with perquisites enjoyed by the officials, known as *abwabs*, were repeatedly abolished by the Mughal Emperors, but never effectually.¹⁰¹ Apparently, complete abolition of these 'unlawful taxes' was deemed unrealistic by a wide section of the Mughal official class. In fact, as Khafi Khan says, often the income from these cesses was included in the *jama* of the assignment, and it was obviously for this very reason that the assignment holders deemed it proper to realize these cesses despite a formal Imperial ban on them.¹⁰²

The rates of cesses were neither constant over a course of years nor uniform in all the *parganas*. In the following account, the rates, wherever mentioned, were for that particular locality and time only. Though on account of the paucity of relevant papers the information about the rates given in the following pages is inadequate, it will nevertheless help us in getting a broad idea of the rates sanctioned for the various cesses in other *parganas* also, and the manner in which these were realized.

100. See D.A., *Qasba Sanganer, Sair Jihati*, S. 1760; D.A., *Pargana Saneri*, S. 1765; *Jama Kharch* papers, Bundle No. 19, S. 1758, *Kotah Archives*.

101. For attempts of the Mughal Emperors to prevent realization of these cesses and duties, etc., see Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, 77-80; I. Habib, 66 and nn. 25, 26; 67, n. 35; 63 and n. 36.

102. See K.K., II, 88-9.

*Taxes and duties on the produce and sale of commodities:*¹⁰³

1. *Kaladi*—charged per *bhatti* from brewers or *kalals* in the *pargana*. In S. 1765 the rate in *pargana* Saneri was 10 *takas* per *bhatti* (per distillation).¹⁰⁴
2. *Ghani* — charged from oil manufacturers per *ghani*. Tax was also charged on *khali* or oilcake.¹⁰⁵
3. *Chhapa* — charged on cloth printing, the rate depending on the variety of the cloth. Thus we learn from *Dastur-al-amal* of *Qasba* Sanganer (S. 1760) that the rate was 1 *taka* and 16-1/2 *dams* per *than* of *Iktara*, *Malmal*, *Tamsukh* and *Khaso* — all fine varieties of cloth — and 25 *dams* per *than* of cloth for *Ghaghara Mehar*, *Ghagara Chobadi*, and *Ghagara Ratluko* varieties. The rates for the same variety of cloth but coming from different *parganas* differed. Thus the rates for *Reji* (undyed white cloth of rough variety) *thans* coming to Sanganer from Chatsu and Malpura were different. This might have been on account of difference in the quality of the cloth also. The rate for the printed cloth brought for sale by the *Vachayats* and *Chhipas* was 12-1/2 *dams* per rupee of the sale price.¹⁰⁶
4. Transit duty on vegetables charged in cash or in the form of produce. The duty was charged per maund, or per cart-load (bullock cart, and *gada chokhada* which was probably more commodious as the rates were higher for the *chokhadas*), or headload. The rate was the same whether vegetables were brought on the back of horses or oxen. The rates were different for different vegetables. Duty was also levied on *kachri*, *singhara* and *avlas* sold by *kunjadas* or peddlers.¹⁰⁷

103. The following account of the taxes, duties and fees charged by the State from different professions, the commission of the State, and the perquisites of officials is based on *Dastur-al-amal, gasba* Sanganer, S. 1760, *Dastur-al-amal* of *pargana* Saneri, S. 1765 (*sarkar subah* Agra), Bundle *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, and *Roznama* Chotra Deodhri Bazar, Jaipur, S. 1800. Until more documents, especially the *Dasturs*, are traced, we cannot have a more comprehensive study of *sairjihat* during Jai Singh's time.

104. *D.A.*, Saneri, 9.

105. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 31.

106. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 17; *D.A.*, Saneri, 7-9.

107. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 32, 33, 34. For instance, duty on a cart (*chokhada*) carrying melons was 5 *takas* and 5 melons; on a bullock cart loaded with melons 2 *takas*, 25 *dams* and 2 melons, and on a horse or a bullock-load 1 *taka*, 25 *dams*

5. Duty charged per head-load on earthen pots brought for sale. In Sanganer the rate was 8 *dams* per head-load.¹⁰⁸
6. Duty on *chara* (hay), *khakhala*, *pala*, *karavi* (stalks of *juwar* or *bajra*), the rate ranging from 1 *taka* 25 *dams* per cart from the *Vachayatis* to 1 *taka* per cart from the villagers.¹⁰⁹
7. Coal: the impost was 1 *taka* and 25 *dams* per cartload from *Vachayatis*, 8 *dams* per head-load and 12-1/2 *dams* per ox-load.¹¹⁰
8. Fire-wood for kitchen: 1 *taka* per cart-load.¹¹¹
9. Stone: the rate was 6 *dams* per cart-load in *Qasba* Sanganer.¹¹²
10. Leather : the rate was about 9 *takas* per *patti*. The duty, called *aghodi*, was charged from the leather dressers. On payment of the impost, the hides were stamped by the impost collector.¹¹³
11. Duty charged on iron wares brought for sale in the market.¹¹⁴
12. Duty on clay, used by potters and also for domestic ovens.¹¹⁵
13. Duty on the sale of rice, *khand*, *gur*, *ghee*, oil, *bajra*, *moth*, *juwar*, etc., the rate ranging between 12-1/2 *dams* to one

and 2 melons. On a cart (*chokhada*) of sugar-cane the rate was 10 *takas* and 5 stalks of sugar-cane. The same was the practice in respect of vegetables, when, besides cash, a few *phuls* were taken by the officials.

108. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 37. It is clear from this and other rates of cesses, etc., given in these pages, that the following traditional scale of copper money was used in the State of Amber: 6 *dams*=1 *chadmi*, 12 1/2 *dams*=1 *adhela*, 25 *dams*-2 *adhelas* or 1 *paisa*, 50 *dams*=1 *taka*, 2 *paisa*=1 *taka*, 4 *paisa*=1 *anna* or 2 *takas*, 32 *takas*=1 *rupya*. Of these *chadmi*, *dami*, *adhela*, *taka* and *rupya* were most commonly used by the people in cash transactions. We do not find the people using *paisa* or *anna* in commercial transactions, though *kauri* was used by them. In official accounts *rupya*, *anna*, *taka*, and *paisa* were used.

109. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 36.

110. *Ibid.*, 35.

111. *Ibid.*, 35. But on wood brought in a *kathi*, only a piece or two were to be taken by the official.

112. *Ibid.*, 21.

113. The rate was 1 *taka* per rupee worth of raw hide, 25 *dams* per rupee worth of coloured hide. (*D.A.*, Sanganer, 45).

114. *Ibid.*

115. *Ibid.*, 19.

taka per rupee worth of sale. The rate was the same for *kirana* — *mirich* or *chillies*, *long* (cloves), *kesar* (saffron), camphor, *haldi* (turmeric), *ajwain*, etc., and 37-1/2 *dams* per rupee worth of salt.¹¹⁶

14. Duty on the sale of cotton yarn, *ban*, and *munj*, the rate being 1 to 2 *pidis* on one *bhar* (head-load); on *jevri* (rope) brought by villagers from outside the rate was 2 *kouris* per *jevri*, and on spinning wheels 6 *dams* per machine.¹¹⁷
15. Duty on the sale of camels, horses, oxen, buffaloes in the *hatwara* or weekly market, the usual rate being 25 *dams* per rupee of sale price.¹¹⁸
16. Duty on dyes (used by the *regars*) brought for sale; for *khota rang* the rate was 4 *takas* per cart-load (*chaukhada*), 2 *takas* per bullock cart, 37-1/2 *dams* per ox-load, 25 *dams* per head-load and half the rate for non-*khota rang*, indicating that the rates were different for dyes of different quality.¹¹⁹
17. Duty on the sale of *babul* leaves (2 *takas* per cart-load): on lime (1 *taka* per cart-load, 1 *taka* 25 *dams* per *chaukhada* cart).¹²⁰
18. On betel leaves (duty charged per thousand leaves).¹²¹
19. On the sale of sheep and goats, the rate being 1 *taka* per sheep or goat.¹²²
20. On the sale of printed cloth: for the *chhipas* the rate was 12-1/2 *dams* per rupee worth of sale, and for the brokers 1 *taka* on the brokerage of 20 *thans*.
21. *Vachayat* — duty on carts carrying grain to the *mandi*.¹²³
22. *Varda Farosi* — on the sale of boys and girls, the rate being one-fourth of the price fetched.¹²⁴
23. *Nardi* or *Chamdi* — charged from shoe-makers and leather-

116. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 41, 43, 44.

117. *Ibid.*, 35.

118. *Ibid.*, 31, 50. Also mentioned in *Jama Kharch, Deodhri Bazar* (under Rai Sheodas's jurisdiction), S. 1800, *J.S.A.*

119. *Ibid.*, 37.

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.*, 15.

122. *D.A.*, Saneri S. 1764.

123. *Jama Kharch, Deodhri Bazar* (under Rai Sheodas's jurisdiction), S. 1800, *J.S.A.*

124. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 21; *D.A.*, Saneri, 10.

dressers.¹²⁵

24. *Bid Katai* — charged on wood and grass brought from the forests for sale.¹²⁶

Fees charged by the State on different professions; commission of the State; and perquisites of officials :

25. From brokers : The rate differed from commodity to commodity. Thus in the *Dastur* cited earlier 1 *taka* was charged on the brokerage of 20 *thans* of cloth and 12-1/2 *dams* on a pair of *dhotis*.¹²⁷
26. *Haloti* — charged from the peasants on the first ploughing of the season. The rate was about one rupee per plough.¹²⁸
27. Site rent of stalls in the weekly market: Except the cotton dressers who paid 12 to 25 *dams* for a day's sitting, the *chhipas*, goldsmiths, potters, cobblers, dyers, and shoemakers paid 12-1/2 *dams* per sitting, and the tobacconists 6 *dams* per sitting. The rent was however not fixed rigidly. At one place in the *Dastur* we find instructions to "charge rent according to the state of the *hat*," viz., more, if gathering was large and sellers and buyers had turned up in good number, and less if the *hat* was attended only thinly.¹²⁹
28. *Hasil Tulai* — charged on weighing corn, *kirana*, oil, *gur*, sugar, *sutli*, etc., brought for sale in the market. The rates were different for different articles, and the rates for the produce brought from lands held as *ijara* were higher than on those brought from the *khalisa* area.¹³⁰
29. *Bhens-barad* and *Chhali-barad* which were charged per buffalo and goat respectively.¹³¹
30. *Vesakh* — charged from the entire village for using common pasture.¹³²
31. Fee for hiring out camel-carts and camels, the rates being

125. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 30.

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*,

128. *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.*

129. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 29, 49, 50.

130. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 14, 49; *D.A.*, Saneri, 7-8.

131. *D.A.*, Saneri, 10. In *pargana* Saneri it was charged in the form of *ghas charai*:-

132. *Shamlat Record*, *J.S.A.*

1 *taka* per camel, 3 *takas* 25 *dams* per *gadi-chaukhada*, and 1 *taka* 37 *dams* per bullock-cart. The fee was charged from the *dalals*.¹³³

32. *Chakbandi* — fee for marking out the fields.¹³¹
33. *Dori* — charged by the measuring parties, the rate being 12 1/2 *dams* per *bigha*, besides daily expenses of the party till the work of measurement was over. Also, the *patwari* received 1 *taka* 25 *dams* per day as charges for his horse, the amount having been subscribed by the peasantry. The *patels* were exempted from it.¹³⁵
34. *Rahdari* — transit duty charged on goods, the rates in *pargana* Saneri being Rs. 3/- on 100 *valagha* of rice, Re. 1 on 100 *bols* of salt, 25 *dams* per *bol* of *gur*, 1 *taka* per *bol* of tobacco, 12-1/2 *dams* per *bol* of *kirana*, 2 *takas* per camel-load of cotton, 4 *takas* per cart-load of cotton. The State in return undertook to protect the routes.¹³⁶
35. *Mukhtar* — charged from *arzinavises* who drafted complaints, appeals, etc.¹³⁷
36. *Hundavadi* — charged from the *sahukars* on *hundis* or promissory notes.¹³⁸
37. *Mohrana ki lag* — fee charged for receiving stamped receipt.¹³⁹
38. *Talwana ki lag*.¹⁴⁰

Perquisites charges by the State on festivals and ceremonies:

39. Contribution of one seer of oil per oil press was charged on *Dipawali* when earthen lamps were lighted in the town.¹⁴¹
40. Fee (*tyohari*) on festivals charged per family of *sumar*, *khatik*, *chamar*, *regar*, *panigar*, *koli*, *mewati*, *khati*, *jat*, *patva*, *bharava kumhar* (potter), *kalal*, *manihar*, *mali*, *thathera*, *darji*, *kachhi*, *ahir*, *rathda*, *teli*, and *bhadabhunja* at the rate of 1 *taka* and 25 *dams* on *Dipawali*, 25 *dams* on *Holi*, and

133. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 17.

134. *D.A.*, Saneri, 17.

135. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 27, 28.

136. *D.A.*, Saneri, 10; for *rahdari* in Kotah, *Basta* No. 21, S. 1760, No. 22 of S. 1761, *Kotah State Archives*.

137. Bundle 13, *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.*

138. Bundle 13, *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.*

139. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 20.

140. Bundle *Safavat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.*

141. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 24.

25 dams on Rakhi.¹⁴²

41. Fee of 2 *takas* on the occasion of betrothal was charged from the following communities: *khatik, regar, chamar, teli, koli, kumhar, julaha, rathda, nilgar, manihar, panigar, nyariya*, and *kajera*; and 2 *takas* and 4 *kasas* on a daughter's marriage from *baniya, chhipa, mali, mewati, teli, rathda, koli, khati, tamboli, sunar, bharawa, thathera, darji, kalal, bhadabhunja, panigar, manihar, julaha, khatik, kagri, chamar, regar, nyarya*.¹⁴³
42. *Nata* and *kagri* — charged from the relations of the widow seeking permission for her re-marriage. This fee was not charged from the *dwijas*.¹⁴⁴
43. *Dharijano* or *Dharecha* — fine levied on an irregular marriage with a widow. The rate was Rs 2/- from *kolis, chamars, balais, chhipas, jats*, and *gujars*; and Re. 1/- from *dhobis*. If the first wife of a *julaha* or cotton dresser was alive and he took another woman to wife, he had to pay Rs. 5/- as fine, and if he was a widower then he paid Rs. 2/-.¹⁴⁵
44. *Kholdi* — The rate was 1 *taka* per family of *darji, kumhar, sunar, manihar, tagala, dharia, bharava, thathera, teli, tamboli, pinara, numjada, nyariya, mochi, chamar, panigar, kandera, koli* and *balai*.¹⁴⁶

Other taxes :

*Amadni Rahpani*¹⁴⁷; *Kari Aya*¹⁴⁸; *Kamkhid*¹⁴⁹; *Sugan Bhent*¹⁵⁰; *Jayafat*¹⁵¹ (tax for marrying a *jaya* or a married woman);

142. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 23.

143. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 21, 38.

144. *D.A.*, Saneri.

145. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 19, 38. In *pargana* Saneri, the rate was Rupee 1 and 7 *takas* (*D.A.*, 9).

146. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 30.

147. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 19, 38.

148. Bundle *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.* It might have been a village tax, *Kariah* meaning a village.

149. *Ibid.*

150. *D.A.*, Saneri, 5. It was probably the present made by the cultivator on settling his assessment.

151. Bundle *Safayat Khazana*, S. 1784, *J.S.A.*

*Rukhsadi*¹⁵² (or *rukhsatanah*); *Tahrir*¹⁵³ (fee for writing the manumission of a slave); *Patishahi*¹⁵¹ (charged from those holding royal grants of lands or titles); *Chowkai* (for guarding the crops).¹⁵⁵

Most of these taxes, duties and fees were charged in every Rajput state. The incidence of these taxes, however, does not seem to have been high, as these were so distributed that no class was burdened disproportionately.

Jagir, revenue assignments:

At the outset, we may note the position of the feudal lands held in perpetuity by the *thakurs*, e.g., of Chomu, Kasli, etc., the subdivisions of these feudalities, and the *thikanas* of Shekhawati, in the general framework of the State administration. Most of these fiefs and their sub-divisions were held by the Kachhwaha Rajputs. The *thakurs* enjoyed limited internal autonomy and were under "liability to both service and assessment,"¹⁵⁶ though, subsequently, the *thikanas* claimed and secured the position that the State had no revenue powers over them. The fief holders appointed their own agents to collect the revenue by methods convenient to them but broadly confirming to that of the State. It seems, however, that, except in the case of purely cash crops, crop-sharing was usually employed for assessing the demand, as the *zabti* system required maintenance of elaborate land records and fair cash rates, and needed constant check and revision. The holders of large *jagirs* sub-assigned parts of their *jagirs* to others in lieu of salary.¹⁵⁷ The *thakurs* had no direct contacts with the Mughal government, though, sometimes, on the ruler's request, *mansabs* were granted to some of them. The *thakurs* were duty-bound to protect the traders, caravans, *banjaras*, etc., passing through their *thikanas*, to

152. *Ibid.* Probably it was a fee charged from the officials granted leave of absence. In case it was the same as *rukhsatanah* (See Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, 85) then it was a fee charged by the royal messengers from the persons addressed.

153. *Ibid.*, Wilson, *A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms*, 500.

154. *Ibid.*

155. *D.A.*, Sanganer, 24-26.

156. Wills' *Report on Sikar*, 46.

157. But the *thakurs* could not assign land to others in perpetuity without the king's permission.

abstain from oppressing the people of their *thikana*, to remain in attendance at the king's court for a specified period, to attend the *Dashera darbar*, and when summoned, to report for duty with a specified number of troops.¹⁵⁸ They could always be warned against being oppressive with the peasantry, and could be punished for ignoring the directions of the ruler, or for committing any irregularity. For breaking their obligation of *chakri*, or for any gross misconduct, they could be banished, and even deprived of their estate by cancellation of their *pattas*. On the death of a *thakur*, his heir offered *nazar* or *nazrana*, which was about one-seventh of the *rekh* or the assessed revenue of the estate, for having the *patta* renewed. Although the *pattas* were not grants in perpetuity, and there are many cases when the grant was cancelled for disaffection, crime, or incapacity, the right of resumption was but rarely exercised by the ruler and never without sufficient reason.¹⁵⁹

We now come to the other kinds of *jagirs*, viz., *punyaudik*, *bhog*, *alufati*, *bhom*, *inam*, and *tankha*. *Punyaudik* and *bhog* were granted in charity or for religious purposes to the Brahmins, temples, temple-priests, etc. These were assignments not of the land but that of the revenue. We come across an order of 1737 A.D., ordering resumption of *punya jagirs* held by all except those of the Brahmins and *thakurdwaras*. The grants were heritable and inalienable, and were fully rent-free. The grantees were entitled to revenue from the land, and were exempted from all financial and service obligations. The grants did not in any way affect the rights of the

158. Thus Shiv Singh of Sikar had a *patta* of Rs. 20,000 for 35 horse and one *dil*, on a ten month *qarar*. This continued upto 1741. Before his death, his *jagir* was increased to a *rozina* or daily *jagin* allowance of Rs. 100 (Rs. 35,400 yearly) for maintaining 100 horse, (Wills' *Report on Sikar*, p. 26). See also the tables showing the personal quotas, which the chiefs of the fiefs of Jaipur had to furnish, in Tod, II, 353. In Marwar, says Tod (II, 131), the feudal chiefs brought 1 horseman and 2 foot soldiers for every thousand rupees of income from the fief.

159. This point has been discussed in detail by Tod, (I, 133-36). As he points out, though the right to resume may be presumed to exist, "the non-practice of it, the formalities of renewal being gone through, may be said to render the right a dead letter". For *nazrana* and *rekh*, see also G.N. Sharma, *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, 86. He points out that the authority of the chiefs over their vassals was greater in the states in eastern Rajputana (see 87-88). For specific references to annual tribute, e.g., by Kasuli, Khandela, see Tod, II, 323-24.

raiyat in their land holdings. The size of the grant varied from being a number of villages to a specified *bighas* of land in a village or two.¹⁶⁰ *Alufati* were grants given to the female relatives of the ruler for their maintenance (*alufa*) on life tenure. The *jagirs* lapsed to the State on the death of the grantee. *Bhom* were grants of allodial holdings transmittible to descendants, the holders (*bhumias*) paying a nominal sum as quit rent (*bhum-barar*). The holdings were assessed (*mal-o-jihat* as well as *sair-o-jihat*), though on a lower rate, to ascertain the expected return from them to the holders.¹⁶¹ The *Bhom* was granted for rendering some specific service, or as reward for some sacrifice made by the grantee's father or forefathers. The receiver was to enjoy return from the land, including cesses, in perpetuity. Sometimes some perquisites were also allowed to the receiver of the *bhom*, e.g., a seer on each maund of produce, or a specified number of platters on every marriage feast. As the holding passed on to all the children equally, a large number of *bhomias* had only small holdings. The *bhomias* also performed "local limited service", e.g., protecting the village from robbers, protecting tradesmen passing through the village, etc. When called to arms, they readily offered their services on receiving *paiti* (rations). They thus formed, what Tod calls, "a local militia."¹⁶² The *inam jagirs* were granted as reward for rendering some service, e.g., settling a village, or for some past service, and to poets and scholars for their literary creations.¹⁶³ The *tankha* (*tankhwah*) *jagirs* were granted for life time for rendering military service.¹⁶⁴

The *jagirs* granted in charity, *inam*, and also to *jagirdars* were resumable in the absence of any legitimate male issue in the direct line of the original grantee. The administrative control over the *jagir* areas (excluding the *thikanas*) also continued in the hands of the *pargana* officials, who protected the interest of the *jagir* holder as well as the rights of the peasantry in their holdings.

Law and Justice

In the State, the ruler was the highest judicial authority. He was

160. See *Jagir papers, Nuskha Udak, Inam, J.S.A.*

161. See *Arhsatta Bhomi, pargana Malarna, S. 1787, J.S.A.*

162. For *Bhom*, see Tod, I, 133-36; G.N. Sharma, *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, 88-89; Satya Prakash Gupta, Shireen Moosvi, "Bhomi in the territories of Amber (C. 1650-1750)", *P.I.H.C.*, XXXII (1971), Vol. I, 353-60.

163. See *Jagir papers of the period in J.S.A.*

164. *Ibid.*

the final court of appeal, and no subject of his could appeal to the Emperor against the judgment given by him in any case. In the records we find mention of *Nyaya Sabha* which was a moving court, probably because it was presided over by the King. Thus we find business being transacted by it at Mathura from Ashadha Vadi 1, S. 1786 to Vaishakha Vadi 3, S. 1787 (1730 A.D.), and at Pavta on Vaishakha Vadi 11, S. 1787. The cases which came before it were about money claims, breach of contract, disputes in respect of share among *patels* and *patwaris*, complaints of the *mahajans* for the recovery of loans, cases involving recovery of *baqaya* from the officials, and such other matters. There is no clear indication in the records that the cases brought before it had been heard in the lower courts.¹⁶⁵

At the lower level, as has already been noted, the *amils* and *faujdar*s enjoyed judicial powers. In fact, the *amils* of the *parganas* decided cases in their *kachehris* everyday.¹⁶⁶ From time to time, the *Diwan* sent them instructions regarding the punishment to be awarded by them in different types of cases. Though *kotwal* did not hear civil cases, he seems to have had enjoyed judicial powers in respect of criminal cases. Thus, he not only apprehended criminals, made on-the-spot enquiries in cases of theft etc., but also punished the guilty.

The *amils* and the *faujdar*s enjoyed very wide judicial powers. They were even empowered to award death penalty, and could order mutilation of limbs for certain offences. This we learn from an order dated Jyestha Vadi 6, S. 1794 (1737 A.D.) sent by *Diwan* Narain Das Kripa Ram to Vidyadhar, *Diwan Desh*. The former wrote: "I have received orders to write to you that you instruct the *faujdar*s and *amils* of every *pargana* that in a case of theft of a serious nature, and if the charge is proved, to award death sentence to the culprit; if the theft has been committed on the highway, in a pass, or in a market, and the charge is proved, then to deprive the thief of one of his hands; and if the theft is of a less serious nature, then to have him branded."¹⁶⁷ For obscene conduct towards women, for

165. *Nyaya Sabha* Papers, S. 1786-87, *J.S.A.* For a case involving recovery of *baqaya* from a *Qanungo*, brought before the *Nyaya Saba*, Radha Kishan to Nanagram, Phalgun Vadi 13, S. 1810, *J.S.A.*

166. See above, p. 287.

167. *Diwan* Naraindas Kirpa Ram to Vidyadhar, Jyestha Vadi 6, S. 1794,

violation of the rules and regulations of the State, and for hoarding, imposition of fine was the common punishment.¹⁶⁸

Justice was simple and easily obtainable, as the system was unencumbered by procedural formalities. The witnesses were examined on oath. No judgments, in the modern sense of the term, were written; only the charge and the punishment awarded were recorded.¹⁶⁹ There is no evidence that torture was permitted for extorting evidence or confession.

At the village level, the *Panchayats* decided the civil cases. An appeal could be made against their decisions to the higher court, and the parties to a dispute could, by mutual agreement, name two villages from which the *Panchas* could be invited to hear the case. We also find frequent mention of caste *Panchayats* which mostly settled disputes relating to marriages, irregular marriages, misbehaviour with women, illegal sexual relations, and inheritance disputes.¹⁷⁰ The records show that the *patels* played an important part in settling disputes, especially those involving ownership or inheritance of land. The *amil*s consulted the *patels* in settling disputes in respect of right to land or wells. We often find cases involving disputes in regard to ownership of land being settled jointly by the *patels* of five neighbouring villages.¹⁷¹

News Reporters

The surviving records of the news reporters of Jaipur State during the eighteenth century reveal that they were of much assistance to Jai Singh in bestowing upon his expanding State a well organized administration and in creating therein peaceful conditions.

We learn from the records concerning the *pargana* officials¹⁷² that in each and every *pargana* of the State, a *khufianavis* was appointed to report the events and conditions in the *pargana* and the working

J.S.A. The order does not give any indication of leniency being observed in case of first offence.

168. Thus see cases and judgments as recorded in *Nyaya Sabha Papers*, S. 1786-87, *J.S.A.* It may be mentioned that in England, during this very period, there were no less than two hundred offences punishable by death, including such trivial crimes as stealing in a shop to the value of a few shillings.

169. See *Nyaya Sabha Papers*, S. 1786-87, *J.S.A.*

170. Thus see *Panchayat Records*, S. 1789, S. 1792, *J.S.A.*

171. *Chitthi to Amil, pargana Chatsu, Margashirsha Vadi 10, S, 1820, and of Kartik Vadi 8, S. 1808, J.S.A.*

172. *Papers of 'Tankhadar Pargana', S. 1756, J.S.A.*

of the *pargana* administration. The following text of the report sent by the *khufianavis* of Vahatri *pargana* will show the usual pattern and contents of these reports.

'*Siyaha Khufia*, Shrawan Sudi 7, S. 1771 (1714 A.D.).

Amin's gumashta and the *amil* did not hold 'darbar'. It is being informed.'

News about Sah Harlal Jathmal, *sahukar* of Alwar: His shop is in *gasba* Baswa. The news had reached him that the *mutsaddi* of *mauza* Mehsara, *pargana* Dausa, was killed.

News: "In view of acute scarcity of rain in the *pargana*, *rolwai* has been remitted. Now, after Miti (?), it has rained. This may please be noted."¹⁷³

On examining a number of such reports sent by the *khufianavises* of different *parganas* of the State of Amber, we find that they usually sent to the Court information of the following nature:

1. Every *khufianavis* invariably mentioned in his report whether or not the *amil* of the *pargana* had sat in the *kachehri* in which important business concerning the *pargana* was transacted and civil and criminal cases were decided by him.
2. Position of rain in the *pargana*, and in case of drought, the relief measures taken by the *pargana* authorities.
3. Information about civil and criminal cases and decisions of the *amil* in those cases.
4. Information about the arrival and departure of senior officials of the State in the *pargana*.
5. Reports about misconduct of *jagirdars* and officials in the *pargana*.
6. Reports about disputes, thefts, murders, etc. in the *pargana*.
7. Any significant news, even rumours, reaching some State official, *jagirdar*, a trader, or any other person in the *pargana*, which might be of concern to the government.¹⁷⁴

Thus the *khufianavises* served as eyes and ears of the King and the *Diwans*, and contributed substantially to the efficient working of the administration in Amber state.

The Amber rulers also posted secret service officials at the Mughal Court and in the *subahs*. It seems some of these officials were attach-

173. *Siyaha Khufia*, Shrawana Sudi 7, S. 1771, *J.S.A.*

174. *Siyaha Khufia*, S. 1771, *J.S.A.*

ed to the *Puras* which the rulers of Amber had built in most of the important cities and towns of the Mughal Empire, e.g., at Delhi, Agra, Ujjain, Aurangabad, Lahor, Banaras, etc. These officials promptly sent intelligence of what was happening at the Emperor's Court and in different parts of the Empire. In times of crisis, they were able to send most detailed information about the activity of the Emperor — the persons who were received by him, the duration of their visit, and other details. These reports were called *Khabar Juwani Khabardar*.¹⁷⁵ Apparently, the Jaipur agents obtained information of this nature from some personnel of the Emperor's palace staff in their secret employment. The Amber *wakil* and his subordinate officials also gathered information from their informers at the Court, and through their close contacts with the Imperial officers they obtained highly secret information about the latest developments in the Empire. We have already given their reports¹⁷⁶ containing an excellent coverage of the developments on the eve of Aurangzeb's death, of the Wars of Succession of 1707 and of 1712, and of the developments at Delhi from 1712 to 1720. The reports are amazingly full, penetrating, and accurate, and based as they were on a careful study of the political currents and cross-currents of the times, unfold the events with a wealth of detail which enabled their master to assess correctly the tangled situations, and to make the right move at the right time.

As regards the *harkarahs*, the manner of their appointment and the nature of their duties in Amber State differed from those in the Mughal service. In Amber, *harkarahs* were not posted in the *parganas*, they had no fixed headquarters, and were not required to send written reports as part of their duty. The Mughal *harkarahs*, on the other hand, were posted in the provinces, and provided the provincial governors with the news of the *subah*, and sent their reports in sealed envelopes to the Emperor along with the provincial *dak*.¹⁷⁷

In Jaipur, the *harkarahs* were primarily couriers, though they also acted as wandering informers, and sometimes sent valuable information. Thus during the Rajput rising (1707-10 A.D.) when Emperor

175. Only a few of these reports are found in the Jaipur Archives.

176. See Ch. III, p. 27, Ch. VI, 93-94 and 97-100.

177. For the *harkarahs* in the Mughal service, see Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, 63; P. Saran, *op. cit.*, 199.

Bahadur Shah, then in the Deccan, appointed (October 1708) Saiyid Abdullah Khan to the government of *subah* Ajmer and he along with the newly appointed *Qiladars* of Amber, Merta and Jodhpur, which places had been recovered by the Rajputs, set out towards the north, Jai Singh's *harkarah* sent the news in time to enable the Rajputs to take suitable measures to meet the new threat.¹⁷⁸

The *harkarahs* were also sent on reconnaissance missions. We find in Bakshi Hemraj's letter (March 12, 1735) to Bakshi Zorawar Singh, both senior officers of Jaipur, that a *harkarah* was sent to spot the Marathas who were reported to be active near Mandasaur.¹⁷⁹

Though these *harkarahs* did serve as wandering informers, yet their main duty was to convey letters and messages of the ruler and other high officers of the State. No doubt these *harkarahs* must have been quick-footed, reliable, and resourceful — qualities absolutely essential for this service.

But Jai Singh's deep involvement in the contemporary politics required, especially in times of crisis, faster and safer couriers than the *harkarahs*, in order to know the latest developments at the Mughal Court and elsewhere. For this purpose pigeons were trained as couriers to carry messages of high consequence. One such report of this time, found in the Amber Records, reads:

"Pigeon brought the news:

Two and half *ghari* are left in sunset and the *Dewan* of the *Adalat* has not risen. Mir Jumla is present with the *Patshah* in the palace."¹⁸⁰

The message, though undated, appears to be of the time when Emperor Farrukh-siyar had tried again in 1718 A.D. to topple the Saiyids, and had recalled Mir Jumla from Lahor. With his surreptitious arrival in Delhi, events moved fast, and soon the stage was ready for the enactment of the final act of the drama. Unfortunately more such reports have not been traced so far, the reason probably being that these were destroyed for reasons of secrecy.

Such was in brief the organization and working of the intelligence

178. See Ch. V, p.66.

179. Hemraj to Bakshi Zorawar Singh, letter dated 12th March, 1735 A.D., *J.S.A.*

180. It is a small strip of paper, undated, but evidently of Jai Singh's time, and was found amidst other unclassified papers of this period, in the *Amber Record*, now a part of the *Jaipur Archives*.

service which kept Sawai Jai Singh fully informed about the conditions in his own expanding State and those in the vast though tottering Mughal empire, and helped him in his diplomatic dealings with the various powers. The peace and stability in Jaipur State, which in no small measure was due to the efficiency of the intelligence service, enabled Jai Singh to devote sufficient time to the study of astronomy and town planning, in which he made significant contribution.

Army, Weapons, etc. :

In the end we may briefly mention a few facts about the Jaipur army and its weapons during Jai Singh's time. Though in emergency, Sawai Jai Singh could easily muster upwards of fifty-thousand troops, as he did when he opposed the Saiyids in 1719, or when he proceeded against Jodhpur in 1740, the number of troops paid in cash or by land assignments was not large. The number of *jagir* troops, and those paid in cash (*naqdi*),¹⁸¹ was swelled by the *bhomas* and temporary levies. The personnel of the standing force were recruited by the *Bakshi*, who fixed their salaries and maintained their service record and muster rolls. The number of troops which each *jagir* holder was required to bring was fixed by the State.¹⁸² The *jagir* holders usually paid their troops by sub-assigning lands in their *jagirs*.

The troops were broadly classified as *pyadas* (foot) and *sawars*. The troops using matchlocks were called *bandughis*. Though the matchlocks were not convenient in handling, their accuracy and deadliness was being increasingly realized, which explains appreciable rise in the number of matchlockmen in the Rajput armies in the eighteenth century.¹⁸³ But the Rajput sword—slightly curved at the tapering end and with grip type hilt—and *barcha* or spear with steel shaft, continued to be the favourite weapons of the Rajput soldiers.

In fixing the salaries of the *sawars*, breed and quality of the mount seems to have formed an important criteria. The categories of the

181. For the mention of *Jagir ki Fauj* and *Nagdi ki Fauj*, see letters, e.g., draft *parwanah* to Rai Shivdas (1724 A.D.), *J.S.A.*

182. Thus see the schedule of the Kachhwaha clans and quotas of horse for each estate in Tod, II, 353.

183. Thus the Rajputs had achieved a notable success at Sambhar in October 1708 A.D., when they mowed down Saiyid Hussain Khan and his troops by a deadly volley from their matchlocks.

horses and the corresponding wages of the *sawars*, as given in the papers concerning the campaign of 1729, are as under :

No.	Horse	Monthly salary of the sawar
1.	<i>Kalara</i>	Rs. 20/-
2.	<i>Tazi</i>	Rs. 16/-
3.	<i>Rasmi</i>	Rs. 14/-
4.	<i>Padir</i>	Rs. 13/-
5.	<i>Jangli</i>	Rs. 10/- ¹⁸⁴

The horse of the *jagir* and *nagdi* (*naqdi*) troops were branded. The work of the branding department was looked after by an *amin*, a *darogah*, a *tawaichi*, and a *mushrif*, who all served under the *Bakshi's* supervision.¹⁸⁵ For any default, the *Bakshi* imposed suitable penalty upon the assignment holder; sometimes even the land assignment of the defaulter was resumed.¹⁸⁶

The gunners, called *golandaz*, were usually paid in cash. As there is no mention of rocket throwers, it seems the gunners also fired the *bans* or rockets.¹⁸⁷ Among the officers of the *Topkhanah* we find mention of *Bakshi Topkhanah*, *Darogah Topkhanah* and *Mushrif Topkhanah*.¹⁸⁸ Besides *ramchangis* or heavy guns, which were drawn by a number of oxen and could throw balls weighing 25 to 40 lbs, there were light guns like *gajnal* or *hatmal*, which were carried upon the backs of elephants, and, when needed, were unloaded and fired from the ground. The *shutarnals*, which were carried on camels, and were fired after making the camels kneel down, were small field pieces of the size of a double musket and threw balls weighing 1 to 2 lbs. In the records we also find mention of *rehkalahs*, which were small field pieces mounted on their own carriages pulled by oxen.¹⁸⁹

184. *Jama Kharch Khazanai*, Campaign Karauli side, 40, 45, *J.S.A.*

185. *Jama Kharch Dag Ghoda Mulazim*, and *Yaddashti*, S. 1791, *Shamlat Records*, *J.S.A.*

186. *Roznama Daftar Bakshi*, S. 1783. Document dated Bhadrapada Sudi [] S. 1783, *Shamlat Records*, *J.S.A.*

187. For a description of the *Ban*, see Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, 149-51.

188. *Tankwahdar Parganawati Papers*, *J.S.A.*

189. *Papers Jama Kharch Khazanai*, Campaign Karauli side, Bundle dt.

Though Amber state had no need to maintain as large a camel-corps as Jodhpur, which could dispatch, as in 1721, twelve thousand camels, each carrying two matchlockmen, adequate number of *oont sawars* or *shutar sawars*¹⁹⁰ had to be maintained, especially after large tracts of Shekhawati and a number of *parganas* on Ajmer-Jodhpur side had been brought under Jaipur's control.

The above account, though far from being comprehensive, does at least show that the administration in Sawai Jai Singh's State was well organized and functioned efficiently. That Jai Singh could give his people the blessings of peace and prosperity, in the midst of all round chaos and anarchy, is a fitting tribute to his wisdom and extraordinary talents. In fact, it is doubtful, if any region of India at that time was better administered than the state of Sawai Jai Singh.

S. 1786. In these papers we find mention of *Gadiwan Rehkalah*. For details about the *Gajnal* and *Shutarual*, see Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, 135-37. In the Jaipur records, the word *Ramchangi* occurs more than once for heavy guns. Cf. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, 137-38.

190. Papers *Jama Kharch Khazanai*, Campaign Karauli side, Bundle dt. S. 1786 (*J.S.A.*).

CHAPTER XII

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

It is significant that Jai Singh, though he remained ever busy in politics for more than forty years and often played a leading role, could yet make a significant contribution in the cultural field. In fact, none of his contemporaries had such versatility, and amazing power to plan for peaceful arts and sciences, in the midst of surging anarchy. He had the ability to give shape to his ideas which in most cases, with men of lesser gifts and talents, would have ended only as fond dreams. In this respect he was certainly one of the most remarkable men of his age, and far ahead of his other distinguished contemporaries in India, who had neither the vision nor ability to conceive what he could accomplish in the face of overwhelming odds. In his lifetime, he could make Jaipur the busiest centre of learning of those times, frequented by foreign astronomers from Bavaria, France, and Portugal who brought along with them maps, charts and latest works on Astronomy published in Europe, and a galaxy of scholars and poets from all parts of the country, especially from Banaras, Karnatak, and Maharashtra, shed lustre on his Court. Amidst the falling debris of the Mughal Empire, he continued to build one observatory after another, and an entirely new city sprang up under his personal care at a time when the Mughal Court, where he had to play a leading role for nearly three decades, was sinking in intrigues and frivolities, and the Marathas were sweeping over the land like a hurricane. This shows how clearly Jai Singh understood that wars and bloodshed, like natural visitations, never cease, and, hence, man must continue to strive for peace, knowledge, and progress, unperturbed by the follies of man and his great capacity to harm his own species.

Though Jai Singh's sharp intellect and wide interests left few branches of learning untouched, his chief passion was Astronomy, imbibed from his early tutor Samrat Jagannath, a Maratha brahman, who had been appointed (Jyestha Vadi 13, S. 1772, Sal S. 1771) to teach him the Vedas.¹ Later, Jagannath, who was a

1. Jagannath was son of Ganesh and grandson of Vithal. He taught Jai

great scholar of *Jyotish*, translated the Arabic version of Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Euclid's *Elements*,² into Sanskrit. According to Jai Singh's own account, he acquired by constant study a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of this science. As he found the astronomical tables in use defective, he set himself the task of preparing new ones. First he constructed several brass instruments³ which, however, did not come up to his idea of accuracy. Hence he constructed at Delhi huge masonry instruments. Later on, to verify the correctness of his observations, he constructed instruments of the same type at Jaipur, Mathura, Banaras and Ujjain.⁴

Singh the Gayatri mantra on the occasion of the latter's *yajyopavita* ceremony held on Chaitra Vadi 3, S. 1711 (1714 A.D.). The custom of teaching the Gayatri mantra by the descendants of Samrat Jagannath to the rulers of Jaipur was observed till the end of the Raj.

2. A Ms. copy (No. 5594) of *Rekhaganit*, the Sanskrit translation of Euclid's work by Samrat Jagannath, is preserved in R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

3. For a detailed description of these metal instruments, see Kaye, *The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh*, Calcutta, 1918, 16-34. He mentions eleven Astrolabes including Hindu, Arabic and Persian Astrolabes of different diameters (all but one of which, he believes, belonged to Jai Singh), an iron *Yantra Raj*, a brass *Yantra Raj*; *Chakra Yantra*, *Umatamsa Yantra* (a graduated brass circle, 17-1/2 feet in diameter), *Kranti-vritti Yantra*, *Dhruva-blurama Yantra*, an Armillary sphere at Jaipur and one at Kotah. Jai Singh chiefly used the flat type of astrolabe and this instrument seems to have played "the most important part in Jai Singh's work."

4. Kaye (41-68) describes each observatory separately with pertinent suggestions for their restoration. The Ujjain observatory is situated in the quarter known as Jaisinghpura, on the north bank of the river Sipra. He calls Ujjain, "one of the most ancient astronomical centres of the world," as "the Greenwich of India", and suggests setting up of a new observatory which is to be the position of zero longitude for Hindu astronomers. The observatory contains only the *Samrat Yantra*, the *Dakshino Vritti Yantra*, the *Nari Valaya Yantra*, and the *Digamsa Yantra*, all in a state of ruin. The Banaras observatory is built on the roof of the old part of Manmandir which was built by Raja Man Singh of Amber. The instruments include the *Samrat Yantra*, the *Nari Valaya Yantra*, the *Chakra Yantra*, the *Digamsa Yantra*, and the smaller *Samrat Yantra* and two *Dakshino Vritti Yantra*. Today the value of the observatory is chiefly historical though the instruments can be used, as Kaye suggests (p. 66) "for the demonstration of the elements of practical astronomy", for which "a better set of instruments could hardly be devised." Jai Singh built his last observatory on the top of an old fort at Mathura, known as *Kans ka Qila*, which was rebuilt by Raja Man Singh. The whole of it has now disappeared. The only actual, though brief, descriptions of the Mathura observatory to be found today are of Tieffenthaler and Hunter (see Kaye, 61-68; Growse, 131).

Of the five observatories built by him, the one at Jaipur is the largest, most perfect, and in the best preserved condition. The set of instruments in these observatories, which to a stranger to this science appear a fantasy in stone, contain the most accurate instruments of masonry and metal built in India till that time. In his preface to the astronomical tables "Zeij Muhammad Shahi,"⁵ prepared under the direction of Jai Singh and named after the reigning Emperor, he thus explains the need of building these observatories and the huge masonry instruments therein: "Praise be to God, such that the minutely discerning genius of the profoundest geometers in uttering the smallest particle of it may open the mouth of confession of inability; and such adoration, that the study and accuracy of astronomers who measure the heavens, on the first step towards expressing it may acknowledge their astonishment and utter insufficiency. . . . But since the well-wisher of the works of creation and the admiring spectator of the theatre of infinite wisdom and providence Sawai Jai Singh, from the first dawning of reason in his mind and during his progress towards maturity, was entirely devoted to the study of mathematical science, and the bent of his mind was constantly directed to the solution of its most difficult problems, by the aid of the Supreme Artificer he obtained a thorough knowledge of its principles and rules. He found that the calculation of the places of the stars as obtained from the table in common use, such

The first observatory built by Jai Singh at Delhi and the Jaipur observatory are in fairly well preserved condition.

5. Rieu's *Catalogue of Oriental MSS.* Add. 14373. Fall, 222. The manuscript is written in Nastalik. The work consists of three books: (i) on the current eras (Hijri, the Christian era and the Samvat) (ii) on the determination of the ascendants; (iii) on the motion of the planets, stars and their positions. The first two sections follow Ulugh Beg, and "the third section is simply Ulugh Beg brought up to date." The catalogue gives constellation numbers, their names, and stars, *Longitudes, Latitudes, Directions, Magnitudes according to Ptolemy, Magnitudes according to Sufi* (Abdul Rahman b. Omar Abdul Husam al-Sufi (d. A.D. 986) who wrote on the fixed stars, astrolabe etc.). See Kaye, 10. Kaye found an incomplete Devanagiri MS. of *Zeij Muhammad Shahi* at Jaipur. See his account of the manuscript, pp. 8-9. Two pages of the manuscript are shown in Plate I (Figures 1, 2). For the preface to *Zeij Muhammad Shahi* see tr. by W. Hunter. Some Account of the astronomical labours of Jayasinha, Rajah of Ambhere or Jayanagar, *Asiatic Researches or Transaction of the Society instituted in Bengal*, Vol. V, 1779, 177ff. The preface, as is apparent from its contents, was written by Jai Singh many years after the completion of his tables which are believed to have been completed in 1728 A.D.

as the new tables of Said Gurgani and Khaqani, and the Tasahilat-Mulla Chand Akbar Shahi,⁶ and the Hindu books, and the European tables,⁷ in very many cases give them widely different positions from those determined by observation, especially in the appearance of the new moons, the computation does not agree with observation. Seeing that very important affairs, both regarding religion and the administration of the Empire, depend upon these; and that in the time of rising and setting of the planets, and the seasons of eclipses of the sun and moon, many considerable disagreements of a similar nature were found—he represented the matter to the Emperor Muhammad Shah, who was pleased to reply:

“Since you, who are learned in the mysteries of science, have a perfect knowledge of this matter, having assembled the astronomers and geometricians of the faith of Islam and the Brahmans and Pandits, and the astronomers of Europe, and having prepared all the apparatus of an observatory, do you so labour for the ascertaining of the point in question, that the disagreement between the calculated times of those phenomena and the times which they are observed to happen, may be rectified.

“Although this was a mighty task which during a long period of time none of the powerful Rajas had prosecuted: nor among the tribes of Islam, since the time of Mirza Ulugh Beg,⁸ to the present, had any of the small kings turned his attention to this object. Yet to accomplish the exalted command he had received, he constructed here (Delhi) several of the instruments of an observatory, such as had been erected at Samarqand, agreeable to the Musalman books, such as *Zat-al-Halqa*⁹ of brass, in diameter three *gaz* of

6. Said Gurgani, says Kaye, was probably Ali b. M. al-Saijid-al-Sharif al-Gurgani, who lived at Shiraz (A.D. 1339 to 1414). Gurgani was a designation of Ulugh Beg's family, and his tables are sometimes called Gurgani tables. Maulana Chand was an astrologer “who was possessed of great acuteness and thorough dexterity in the science of the astrolabe, in the scrutinizing of astronomical tables . . .” and was deputed by Humayun to observe the exact moment of birth (of Akbar). The Khaqani tables were supplementary to the Ilkhanic tables of Nasir al-Tusi. (Kaye, II, n. 4, 5, 6).

7. Kaye suggests (p. 11, n. 7) that Jai Singh is probably referring to La Hire's *Tabulae Astronomicae* and Flamsteed's *Historia Coelestis Britannica*, 1725.

8. He was assassinated in 1449 A.D.

9. A ring instrument, armilla, sphaera armillaris. (Nallino, II, 329, cited by Kaye, 12, n. 10).

the measure now in use and *Zat al-Shabatain*¹⁰ and *Zat-al-Zaqatain* and *Sads Fakhri* and *Shamalah*.¹¹

“But finding that brass instruments did not come up to the ideas which he had formed of accuracy, because of the smallness of their size, the want of division into minutes, the shaking and wearing of their axes, the displacement of the centres of the circles, and the shifting of the planes of the instruments, he considered that the reason why the determinations of the ancients, such as Hipparchus and Ptolemy, proved inaccurate, must have been of this kind. Therefore he constructed in Dar al-Khilafat Shah Jahanabad (Delhi) instruments of his own invention, such as *Jai Prakash* and *Rani Yantra* and *Samrat Yantra*, the semi-diameter of which is of eighteen cubits, and one minute on it is a barely corn and a half — of stone and lime of perfect stability, with attention to the rules of geometry and adjustment to the meridian and to the latitude of the place, and with care in the measuring and fixing of them, so that the inaccuracies from the shaking of the circles and the wearing of their axes and displacement of their centres and the inequality of the minutes might be corrected. Thus an accurate method of constructing an observatory was established and the difference which had existed between the computed and observed places of the fixed stars and planets by means of observing their mean motions and observations was removed.

“And, in order to confirm the truth of these observations, he constructed instruments of the same kind in Sawai Jaipur, Mathura and Benaras and Ujjain. When he compared these observatories, after allowing for the difference of longitude between the places where they stood, the observations agreed.

“Hence he determined to erect similar observatories in other large cities¹² so that every person who is devoted to these studies, whenever he wished to ascertain the place of a star or the relative situation of one star to another, might by these instruments observe the phenomenon.

“But seeing that, in many cases, it is necessary to determine past or future phenomena; and also that in the instant of their

10. An astrolabe with two rings.

11. The *Jai Prakash Yantra* is called *Shamlah* by Hunter.

12. The project could not be carried out probably on account of multiple problems which Jai Singh had to face after 1730, and the rapidly changing political scene in the country after 1734, discussed in the preceding chapters.

occurrence cloud or rain may prevent the observation — or the power and opportunity of access to an observatory may be wanting — he deemed it necessary that a table be constructed by means of which the daily places of the stars being calculated every year and disposed in a calendar may always be in readiness.

“After having constructed these instruments, the places of the stars were daily observed. After seven years had been spent in this employment, information was received that about this time observatories had been constructed in Europe,¹³ and that the learned of that country were employed in the prosecution of this important work, that the business of the observatory was still carrying on there, and that they were constantly labouring to determine with accuracy the subtleties of this science. For this reason, having sent to that country several skilful persons along with Padre Manuel (de Figueiredo) and having procured the new tables which had been constructed there thirty years before under the name of *Lir* (La Hire’s *Tabulae Astronomicae*),¹⁴ as well as the Europe tables anterior to those.¹⁵ On comparing these tables with actual observations, it appeared that there was an error in the former of half a degree in assigning the moon’s place, and there were also errors in the other planets, although not so great, yet the times of solar and lunar eclipses he found to come out later or earlier than the truth by the fourth part of a *ghari* or fifteen *palas* (six minutes). Hence he concluded that, since in Europe astronomical instruments have not been constructed of such a size and so large diameters, the motions which have been observed with them may have deviated a little from the truth.

“Since in this place, by the aid of the unerring Artificer, astronomical instruments have been constructed with all the exactness

13. Some of the observatories built in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries were those at Leiden 1632; Paris 1667, Greenwich 1675, Berlin 1705, St. Petersburg 1725, Upsala 1730.

14. Published in 1702. As Kaye points out, Father Boudier, who went to Delhi and Jaipur in 1734, refers to this very edition of the tables. (*Letters edificantes et curieuses*, XV, 269, cited by Kaye, 14, n. 4.)

15. Jai Singh had with him the tables of La Hire, Ulugh Beg and of J. Flamsteed. Flamsteed’s tables contained also those of Tycho Brahe, the Landgrave Herse, and Havelius. Other possible tables, Kaye suggests (14, n. 5), could be *Toletan Table* of 1080 A.D.; *Alfonsini Tables*, 1252 A.D.; Reinhold’s *Prussian Tables*, 1551 A.D.; Keplers *Rudolphine Tables*, 1627 A.D.; Oassini’s *Tables*, A.D. 1668, 1693; Halley’s *Tables*, 1719 A.D., etc.

that the heart can desire and the motions of the stars have for a long period been constantly observed with them, agreeable to observations mean motions and equations were established; he found the calculation to agree perfectly with the observation. And although to this day the business of the observatory is carried on, a table under the name of His Majesty, comprehending the most accurate rules, and most perfect methods of computation was constructed so that, when the places of the stars and the appearance of the new moons and the eclipses of the sun and moon and the conjunction of the heavenly bodies are computed by it, they may arrive as near as possible at the truth, which, in fact, is every day seen and confirmed at the observatory. . . .”

Without entering into minute technical details of the instruments in Jai Singh's observatories, for which we may turn to the work of A.F. Garret and Pandit Chandradhar Guleri,¹⁶ and to Kaye's excellent monograph,¹⁷ which in some respects supersedes Lt. Garret's work, we may give a bare account of the instruments in Jai Singh's observatories.

Samrat Yantra. This *yantra* was built at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain, and Banaras. It is an equal hour equinoctial dial. It consists of a wall in the shape of a right angled triangle. In the Jaipur instrument the hypotenuse, about 147 feet long, is the gnomon pointing towards pole, the plane of the triangle being in the meridian, the angle where the hypotenuse joins the base being equal to the latitude of Jaipur ($26^{\circ} 56'$). The vertical side is about 90' high. As the hypotenuse has a fair width, its each edge serves as a gnomon. The gnomon is intersected by two arcs in the form of cylindrical strip about 9' wide and are graduated to read upto two seconds of an arc. The shadow of the gnomon on the arc gives the local time, and if a pointer he held on the gnomon such that its shadow falls also at the same point in the quadrant where the shadow of the gnomon is falling at that time, it will give the declination of the sun. Though the equinoctial sun-dials were fairly common even before Jai Singh's time, the use of gnomon to find declination of the sun was "an invention peculiar to Jai Singh's observatories."¹⁸

16. *The Jaipur Observatory and its Builder*, Allahabad, 1902.

17. G.R. Kaye's *The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh*, Calcutta, 1918, is by far the best work on Jai Singh's astronomical labours. The author was a Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society.

18. Soonawala, 26-30; Kaye, 36. He gives the dimensions of the instru-

The Nari-valaya Yantra: This instrument is found at Jaipur, Ujjain, and Banaras. It is a sun-dial, giving local time anti or post meridian. It consists of a cylinder, its axis parallel to that of the earth and in the meridian, and hence its face is parallel to the equator. A metal gnomon is fixed at the centre of the face. There are two instruments of this type at Jaipur, one facing north and the other south. "Sunlight falls upon the former when the declination of the sun is north of the equator from 21st March to 21st September, and upon the latter when the declination is to the south for the other half of the year. At the equinoxes, sunlight would just go grazing parallel to the faces of both the instruments. Twenty-four equally placed radii upon the face of the instrument would indicate hours commencing from direction of the shadow of the gnomon at noon."¹⁹

Rasi-valaya Yantra: It is a zodiacal dial at Jaipur consisting of twelve quadrants each used at an interval of two hours. The instrument is based on the principle of the *Samrat Yantra*, but the gnomons of these twelve instruments "follow the pole of the ecliptic in its journey round the pole at an angular distance of $23\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ during 24 hours." The shadow of the gnomon on the quadrant, which will be parallel to the ecliptic, will give longitude of the sun. The radii of the quadrant is about 5 feet.

*Digamsa Yantra*²⁰: It is an azimuth instrument consisting of two coaxial cylindrical walls of about 27' and 18' diameter, with a central pillar (3' high) as axis. The walls are graduated. The outer and the inner walls are about $6\frac{1}{2}'$ and 3' high. Two wires are stretched on outer wall in north-south and east-west

ment in the observatories at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain, and Banaras. For the account of the instruments, I have drawn from Prof. Sonawala's *Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II of Jaipur and his Observatories* (Jaipur, 1952), which gives a brief account of the broad principles upon which Jai Singh's instruments were based and a general description of the instruments. For more elaborate account, see Garret and Chandradhar Guleri, *The Jaipur Observatory and its Builder*, Allahabad, 1902 and Kaye, 35-66. See also Hendley, *Hand Book of the Jeypore Courts*, pp. 59-62.

19. Soonawala, 25-26; Kaye, 39.

20. In his list of instruments proper to an observatory, given in *Samrat Siddhanta* (Sanskrit tr. of Ptolemy's *Almagest*), Jagannath mentions this instrument. Jai Singh in his preface to his tables does not mention it. Jagannath writes that Jai Singh was "clever in exhibiting new methods with globes and other instruments."

direction. With the help of a string the azimuth of the sun can be found from the position of the shadow of the inter-section of the cross-wires. The azimuth of a star can be found by stretching the string in the direction of the star and the intersection of the cross-wires.²¹

Examples of this instrument are found only at Delhi and Jaipur, the latter instrument being rather of a much later period (1891).

The Ram Yantra : It consists of a cylindrical wall with diameter 23' and height 11' 4" with a central pillar of the same height. "From the pillar, at a height of 3' above the ground radiate twelve sectors of 12° each with similarly spaced empty spaces between them" meaning so much space lost for graduations, and hence the instrument is duplicated with sectors corresponding to the empty spaces of the first. The height of the wall above the sectors is equal to the radius of the wall; the sectors and walls are graduated to read the tangent of the altitudes. The shadow of the top of the rod falls either upon the sectors or upon the wall of the cylinder.²²

Jai Prakash: It is regarded by experts as the "most versatile" of Jai Singh's instruments, "an elaborate version of the Bowl of Berossus". but Jai Singh seems to have conceived it independently.²³ It is a concave hemispherical bowl of stone sunk into the earth, the diameter of the Jaipur instrument being 18' while of that in Delhi is about 27'. Its circular rim represents the horizon. The markings inside are the images on the sphere of the points in the heavens through the centre, and the circles indicate the altitude, azimuth, and latitude. Two wires are stretched over the rim in the north-south and east-west directions. From the point where the shadow of the intersection of the wires falls on the surface of the bowl, declination of the sun and its zenith distance are determined. "The circles of the signs of the zodiac are drawn such that when the shadow falls on any one of them the sign is on the meridian. For the observation of a star, the observer has to place his eye at the hemispherical surface of the instrument for which passages are left open. The effective loss of surface of the instrument is compen-

21. The instrument is found at Jaipur, Ujjain, and Banaras.

22. Kaye, 38.

23. Soonawala, 37. See also Kaye, 37, 40. Samrat Jagannath called it *Sarva Yantra Siromani*,

sated by the construction of a complementary instrument in which the working surface corresponds to the passages of the first one."²⁴

*The Kapali*²⁵ : It is an instrument (constructed in the observatory at Jaipur only) exactly like *Jai Prakash*, but with the difference that its rim represents solstitial colure, and not the horizon, the circle passing through the pole and solstitial points. "This will indicate a sign rising on the horizon when the centre of the shadow is passing its circle."

Misra Yantra ('mixed instrument'): It is found in the Delhi observatory. "It consists of a set of arcs inclined to the meridian plane of Delhi by $77^{\circ}16'$ W, $66^{\circ}34'$ W, $68^{\circ}1'$ E, and $75^{\circ}54'$ E. Two of these may be corresponding to the meridians of Zurich and Greenwich."²⁶

Chakra Yantra : It is an equatorial circle of brass of about 6' diameter, rotating about its axis parallel to that of the earth. Graduated circles give the hour angles.

The Dakshinovritti Yantra: It is a meridian or transit circle for determining altitude of the heavenly bodies when passing the meridian. The instrument consists of "two graduated arcs on an open wall built in the plane of the meridian. The radii of the arcs are about 20'."²⁷

Shasthamsa Yantra : This instrument, a sextant, was constructed at Delhi and Jaipur only. The instrument is used for determining declination of the sun. It consists of a high and narrow room "with arcs on its opposite walls parallel to the plane of the meridian each of radius about 28'." Through the hole in the ceiling at the centre of each arc, sunlight enters and falls upon the arcs at noon, giving declination of the sun. The spot of sunlight "glides silently down one wall, crosses the arc, and creeps up the opposite wall."²⁸

Kranti Vritti Yantra: It is for determining celestial longitude and latitude. It consists of two brass circles: one capable of rotation in the plane of the Equator and the other in that of the ecliptic.

24. Soonawala, 35-37. For more technical details, see Kaye, 37.

25. The instrument is found only in the Jaipur observatory. It is not mentioned in any of the contemporary lists of instruments.

26. Soonawala, 37. Kaye is of the view (39-40) that *Misra Yantra* and *Rasi Valaya* were not devised by Jai Singh and are later additions.

27. This instrument was built in all the observatories, but the one at Delhi has been destroyed.

28. Soonawala, 34-35.

Yantra Raj: It is an astrolabe, a favourite of the Muslim astronomers.²⁹ It is a brass disc, 7' in diameter, which can be moved in a vertical plane. Jai Singh wrote a book, *Yantra Raj Karik*, explaining the theory and practice of this instrument. The surface of the disc is marked with the 'stereographic projection of the heavens upon its surface'. There are circles of the equator, the tropics of cancer and capricorn, of the horizon, the altitudes, ecliptic, hour and meridian circles. The circle of the ecliptic is made into a separate disc graduated into the 12 signs of the zodiac such that it can rotate about a pivot. By rotating the ecliptic circle in the clock-wise direction, we can follow the movement of the sun. By observing the altitude circle, the sun's altitude at noon can be ascertained. Similarly, local times of sunset and sunrise can be ascertained for any position of the sun or time of the year. The time corresponding to an observed altitude of the sun can also be deduced from this instrument by adjusting the ecliptic and altitude circles and also the length of the day.³⁰

Jai Singh was apparently well satisfied with the instruments constructed by him as he says: "Since in this place, by the aid of the unerring Artificer, astronomical instruments have been constructed with all the exactness that the heart can desire, and the motions of the stars have for a long period constantly been observed with them, agreeable to observations, mean motions and equations were established; he found the calculation to agree perfectly with the observations."³¹

Jai Singh's pride in the accuracy of his own instruments was not unwarranted. Thus in 1727 A.D., he had determined with the instruments at Delhi the obliquity of the ecliptic to be $23^{\circ} 28'$, which was within $28''$ of what it was determined the following year by Godin (1704-60). Similarly, in 1793 A.D., when Dr. W. Hunter compared a series of observations on the latitude of Ujjain with that established by Jai Singh, he found a difference of $24''$ only while he himself did not rule out an error of $15''$ in his own

29. Garret says (p. 49) that the astrolabe "appears to be a very ancient type of instrument of Hindu origin." Cf. Kaye, 3.

30. For a detailed discussion of the different types of astrolabes at Jaipur, see Kaye, 16-34. Soonawala gives (38-42) a brief candid account.

31. See above p. 319. Kaye, however, is of the view (p. 13, n. 6) that we should accept Jai Singh's claim about perfect agreement with some caution as we have very few records of his actual calculations.

observations.³² On one ground, however, Jai Singh's decision to discard brass instruments, which he found faulty because of their mobility and small size, and to make large immovable instruments of stone and lime of perfect stability, has been criticised by modern astronomers. By doing so, Kaye says, "He stereotyped his designs, and hindered further improvements. The larger and more immobile an instrument is, the greater is the difficulty in making alterations and improvements. Jai Singh sacrificed facility for supposed accuracy."³³ Here we may examine as to what were the intellectual influences on Jai Singh's astronomical activity and in what manner they moulded his approach and method. Jai Singh, as already stated, first studied Hindu works on Astronomy, like *Jyotish Vedanga*, *Surya Siddhanta*, etc., and acquired a thorough understanding of the science. He also studied works written by the Muslim astronomers. Among the early astronomers and mathematicians referred to in the works attributed to Jai Singh are Abdul Rahman b. Omar Abul-Hussain al-Sufi (d. 986 A.D.), Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (born 1201 A.D.), Ali b. Muhammad al-Sayyid al-Sharif (1339-1414 A.D.), Jamshed b. Masud Jijat al-Din al-Kashi (circa 1440 A.D.), Ulugh Beg (d. 1449 A.D.), and Maulana Chand (circa 1550 A.D.). Nasir al-Din al-Tusi was in the service of Hulaqu Khan who had him built an observatory at Meregah (in north-western part of Persia) in 1259 "with instruments remarkable for their precision and dimensions, surpassed only by those of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601)".³⁴ He wrote a manual of astronomy, and started work on astronomical tables for calculating the movement of planets and giving a catalogue of stars based on new observations. He published his observations in the famous *Ilkhanic Tables*. Timur's grandson Mirza Ulugh Beg (1344-1449), assisted by Jamshed al-Kashi, built an observatory about 1420 A.D., and published new tables of planets and a catalogue of stars (which Jai Singh brought up to date) comprising those given by Ptolemy, besides newly observed by him, and for the first time stellar co-ordinates, celestial latitude and longitude were given degrees as well as minutes. Jai Singh is believed to have been deeply influenced by the astronomical works of the Muslims, especially of Ulugh

32. See Tod, II, 289-90. His value for precession was 51.6" a year.

33. Kaye, 35.

34. See Abetti, 48.

Beg, so much so that his masonry instruments are said to have been designed "after the notions taught by the Muslim astronomers and had absolutely nothing in common with those described in Hindu works."³⁵ Jai Singh, however, is credited with showing "very considerable ingenuity in the actual constructions."³⁶

As noted earlier, Jai Singh had also collected and studied some of the European astronomical works, such as those of Euclid (*Elements*), Hipparchus, Ptolemy (*Almagest*) and those of P. de la Hire (1640-1718 A.D.)³⁷, and J. Flamsteed (1646-1719 A.D.), the first Astronomer Royal at Greenwich. Jai Singh's keenness to become acquainted with the latest advancement in the field is well exemplified by his obtaining a copy of the *Historia Coelestis Britannica* by J. Flamsteed.³⁸ Flamsteed had been assigned the task of finding a precise method for determining longitude. For this he needed stellar catalogues and lunar tables based on better observations than hitherto made by his predecessors. For over thirty-three years, he took numerous observations, which are collected in his great work, published in 1712. His *Celestial History* contains his observations of fixed stars, comets, planets, sun-spots, Jupiter's satellites, and, as noted, a description of the instruments used by him, and by Tycho earlier, besides the catalogues of the fixed stars of Ptolemy, Ulugh Beg, Tycho and Hevel and the British Catalogue which gives the co-ordinates of 2884 stars. Flamsteed had adopted several new methods of investigations. Thus he devised a new method for the determination of the co-ordinates of the first point of Aries and was the first to make use

35. Kaye, 88-89. He points out (86-87) that the Arab, Persian and Tartar astrologers had also constructed huge instruments guided by the notion that "the only bar to accuracy of observation was the limit imposed by circumstances on the size of the instruments."

36. For example in the *Samrat Yantra* in which the shadow of the inclined gnomon falls on the circular arc lying in the plane of the equator and thus secures "in the simplest of manner, equal hours throughout the year". The Muslim astronomers, on the other hand, employed the horizontal plane for the shadow traces. (See Kaye, 86-87).

37. A French scholar, and author of many mathematical works including *Tabulae Astronomicae* (1702 A.D.).

38. The complete work was published in 1725. It contained the catalogue of stars and sextant observations, observations with Sharp's Mural Arc, description of the instruments used by Tycho Brahe, Hevelius, his own, etc., the star catalogues of Ptolemy, Ulugh Beg, Tycho Brahe, the Landgrave of Hesse and Hevelius and the British catalogue of 2935 stars.

of an accurate timepiece and optical means for determining stellar co-ordinates. Consequently, his celestial observations were far more accurate than of others. He was, says Giorgio Abetti, "the first to introduce in common usage meridian observations of the right ascension of the sun and stars. He also explained the real principles of the equation of time, and he improved the lunar tables by introducing the annual equation."³⁹ By acquiring Flamsteed work, Jai Singh brought himself in touch with the latest developments in astronomical studies in Europe.

It seems it was in the early twenties, i.e., about 1726 A.D. or so, after observations had been made for two or three years on his instruments at Delhi, that Jai Singh became fully aware of the recent progress made in some countries of Europe in this field, and he heard about de la Hire's *Tabulae Astronomicae* (completed in 1702) and the great work done by Flamsteed. Probably he received this information from Padre Manuel de Figueredo who had come in response to Jai Singh's request to the Goa authorities to arrange to send a learned scholar and physician. Shortly after his arrival, Jai Singh sent to Europe "several skilful persons along with Padre Manuel" to procure books on astronomy and instruments for studying astronomical phenomena.⁴⁰ Jai Singh also sent Muhammad Sharif⁴¹ to the place where "the southern pole was overhead" and Muhammad Mahdi to the "further islands."⁴² In August 1727, the Padre passed through Udaipur on his way to Surat. On Jai Singh's request, the Maharana had made suitable arrangements for his safe journey to Surat and had written to the concerned officers of Gujarat in this regard.⁴³ Father Figueredo returned in November 1730, bringing with him Father Pedro De Sylva Leitao, a scientist and a physician. Jai Singh also invited two French Jesuits, Claude Boudier being one of them. Leaving Chandranagar on January 6, 1734, they reached Jaipur

39. See Abetti, 137.

40. *Letters edifiantes et curieuses, ecrites des Missions etrangeres. Nouvelle Edition. Memoires des Indes. Tome quinziesme, Toulouse, 1810, 269f, cited by Kaye, 5, n. 7 and p. 6.*

41. There is a treatise on the astralabe (Br. Mu. Adit. MS. No. 7489) by Abdul Rahim b. Muhammad Sharif al-Sharif. The manuscript is dated 1751 A.D. (Morley, 2, cited by Kaye, 5, n. 5).

42. Garret, 20.

43. Maharana Sangram Singh to Jai Singh, Bhadrapada Sudi 11, S. 1784, J.S.A.

after taking readings in the observatory at Delhi. The account of⁴⁴ their astronomical work at Delhi and Jaipur is said to have been written by Father Boudier himself. In 1736, Father Antonie Gabelspervge and Andre Strobel from Bavaria reached Jaipur, Jai Singh paying all their expenses.⁴⁵ Andre Strobel stayed at Jaipur till 1749.

Among the Hindu astronomers who closely collaborated with Jai Singh in his astronomical studies were Samrat Jagannath and Kewal Ram. As already stated, the former was the author of *Rekhaganit* (a translation of the Arabic version of Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*), and *Siddhantasarkaustubha* (translation of Ptolemy's *Almagest*) Kewal Ram, who came from Modhasa in Gujarat, joined Jai Singh in 1725. He wrote eight works — *Jai Vinod*, *Ram Vinod*, *Vibhag Sarani* (logarithmic tables), *Mithya Jivachhaya Sarani*, *Drig Pakash Sarani* (a translation of de la Hire's tables), *Tara Sarani* (Ulugh Beg's tables), and *Brahma Prakash Niras* (a work on astronomy), and received from his patron the title of *Jyotish Rai*.

Jai Singh seems to have held the view firmly that no single man, however able, can know all about this grand and heavenly science, and that its knowledge, of necessity, has to be gained through the co-operation of many minds and many observatories. Successive generations of eminent astronomers have thought likewise and, as the Astronomer Royal at the Cape of Good Hope, Sir David Gill, said while emphasizing the international character of astronomy: "The science knows no nationality, and the common pursuit of truth for truth's sake affords 'one touch of nature' which 'makes the whole world kin.'" Jai Singh fully understood the importance of collaboration in the study of the sky, and tried his best to gather knowledge from whichever quarter it was to be found. But he did not feel the need to follow the line adopted by the European astronomers and to discard his own. By the time he became

44. *Observations géographiques faites en 1734 par des Peres Jesuites, pendant leur voyage de Chandernagar a Delhi et a Jaepour*, p. 269, in Kaye, 5, no. 9. As it is not mentioned in it that observations were made at Banaras and Mathura, also, Kaye suggests (p. 6) that the observatories at these places were probably built after their visit, i.e., after early months of 1734.

45. *Description historique et géographique de l'Inde*, Ed. by J. Burnouilli, 1876. Preface p. 5 (Kaye, 7). Tieffenthaler, a French Jesuit, had landed in India in 1743 A.D.

acquainted with the progress made by the European astronomers, he had already partially carried out his own scheme of astronomical research, and considerable work had been done on his tables with the help of the data given by the Delhi observatory built a few years previously. It is also possible, as Kaye suggests, that Jai Singh's European advisers, who were mostly Catholic Padres, did not fully emphasize the importance of the researches of Copernicus, Kepler and Galilei.⁴⁶ Also, Jai Singh did not enjoy the same advantages as many of his famous European contemporaries did. Thus, while his contemporaries, like Cassini (1625-1712), P. de la Hire (1640-1718), Newton (1643-1727), Flamsteed (1646-1719), Halley (1656-1742), Bradley (1692-1762), Godin (1704-1760), Tobias Mayer (1732-1762) and many others had the advantages of sharing each other's researches, and among some of them there was close collaboration,⁴⁷ and also they had the benefit of the great work done by their illustrious predecessors, especially Kepler (1571-1630) and Galilei (1564-1642), and enjoyed advantages of such bodies as the French Academy of Science and the Royal Society, Jai Singh had to carve out his own path. In India, astronomical research had virtually remained at a standstill for the past many centuries and after the *Surya Siddhant* nothing substantial had been achieved by the Hindu astronomers, nor after the death of Ulugh Beg the study of scientific astronomy in the Islamic world had made any progress. In a way Jai Singh had to bridge a long gap in the knowledge of astronomy in India. In Europe, on the other hand, fundamental changes had followed in the wake of the revolutionary theory of the solar system developed by Copernicus (1473-1543 A.D.). There is no doubt that instead of relying solely on the Ptolemaic system, Jai Singh tried his best to obtain information about the latest researches in Europe where the researches of Cassini, Halley and Newton were about to open new horizons in the knowledge of this science. Looking to the fact that Jai Singh could devote only a very small portion of his time to the study of astronomy, unlike his great contemporary figures in this field in Europe, his five observatories, the variety of instruments therein,

46. See Kaye, 89-90. Galilei (d. 1642) came in conflict with the *Inquisition*. His books were not removed from the *Index* until 1835. A.D.

47. Thus Halley collaborated with Newton and had also come in contact with Cassini. Kepler and Galilei, both exchanged information about their respective researches.

which, in Tod's words, "irradiate this dark epoch of the history of India",⁴⁸ and the astronomical studies made under his patronage and supervision, render his achievement remarkable even by most stringent standards. His observatories were undoubtedly the best built in India till his time and many of his instruments were indeed unique. Though only of historical value today, showing as they do a significant phase in the development of astronomy in India, these observatories and the various instruments constructed by Jai Singh are, to quote Kaye,⁴⁹ an appropriate monument to "one of the brightest intellects of India."

The same author indeed pays Jai Singh a truly fitting tribute when he says: "That Jai Singh made no new astronomical discoveries is hardly a fair criterion of the value of his work; for, indeed, a great deal of the most valuable astronomical work is not concerned with new discoveries. His avowed object was the rectification of the calendar, the prediction of eclipses, and so on—work which entails a great deal of labour, and generally shows no remarkable achievement. Considering the state of the country in which Jai Singh lived, the political anarchy of his time, the ignorance of his contemporaries, and the difficulties in the way of transmission of knowledge, his scheme of astronomical work was a notable one, and his observatories still form noble monuments of a remarkable personality."⁵⁰

Architecture : Jai Singh's architectural activity was also prolific. Though Amber, since long before Jai Singh's time, could boast of elegant palaces⁵¹ built on an eminence overlooking artificially laid out and well kept gardens, he imparted a new dimension to architecture, his contribution far surpassing the architectural activity of his predecessors both in extent and utility, without suffering in dignity either. First he made extensive additions to the palace of his ancestors, but finding that his growing State needed a new capital, he chose to build an entirely new city. To the south of the hills of

48. Tod, II, 291.

49. Kaye, 59-60.

50. Kaye, 90.

51. While Fergusson regards (II, 176-77) the Amber palace to rank after that of Gwalior "as an architectural object among the Rajput palaces", Percy Brown (*Indian Architecture—Islamic Period*, p. 119) consider it as rivalling even "Akbar's deserted pavillions at Fatehpur Sikri in the richness of its architecture. . . ."

Amber is a stretch of depression about five miles in length and three miles in breadth, a major part of the eastern half of which was covered by Man Sagar (in the midst of which Jai Singh built Jal Mahal) and in the western half were broad swamps in which lotus grew in abundance. Where the depression ends, there is gradual elevation for a few furlongs, and then a sprawling plain could be seen for miles, surrounded on three sides by low hills, and an abrupt fall towards the east. Sometime after 1720, Sawai Jai Singh started building below the northern edge of the plain a palace, which was ready by July 1726.⁵² Shortly afterwards, when he decided to build a new capital, he assigned to his palace, other royal buildings, and the observatory a large sector in it. The site of the city was so chosen as to connect it with the Amber fort by the range Kali Khoh, at the apex of whose re-entering angle he built Sudarshangarh,⁵³ which commanded his new capital. *In planning and construction of the city, Jai Singh is said to have been greatly assisted by a Bengali architect, Vidyadhar, who was also a senior state official.*⁵⁴ The foundation of the city, as already noted, was laid on November 18, 1727. Almost simultaneously, work was started on a canal to bring water from the Jhotwara river to the new city, then under construction. The preliminary proposal about the project was submitted in July 1726.⁵⁵ By 1729 a major part of the capital, including the temples, markets, the huge mansions of the rich and the smaller houses of the common men were ready, as the records of Jai Singh's frequent visits to the town show. Here a few of the entries from *Siaha Hazur Papers*, concerning these visits, are being given which give an idea of the town as it appeared in 1733 A.D. "Shriji (Jai Singh) seated in a

52. *Siaha Hazur Papers*, S. 1783, J.S.A.

53. The upper storey of the palace in the fort was built by Ram Singh in 1868-69. Later, some additions were made in 1902-3 by Madho Singh II.

54. Vidyadhar's garden is in the Purana Ghat on the Agra Road. A number of letters sent by Vidyadhar, *Diwan Desh*, to junior officials can be seen in the Jaipur Archives.

55. Anand Ram to Jai Singh, *arzdasht*, Shravana Vadi 13, S. 1783 (July 16, 1726). The writer informed that a canal from Bandi river, about nine *kos* from Jai Niwas, would prove a more difficult and costly undertaking than one from the Jhotwara river, which was about 2 *kos* from the palace, and intervening sand dunes were also not very high.

palki came from the Govind Deo's temple,⁵⁶ had had the *darshan* of Sita-Vallabhji on the occasion of *Phul Dol*, after which he returned to Brahmapuri⁵⁷ via Chandni Chowk,⁵⁸ Manak Chowk, and after having the *darshan* of Shri Ramji (in the Manak Chowk)"; "Chaitra Sudi 9, S. 1790 (March 13, 1733): After having the *darshan* of Sita-Vallabhji, Shriji sat in a chariot drawn by elephants, reached Manak Chowk for the *darshan* of Shri Ramji. After that he went to the *haveli* of Paundarik Gangaramji⁵⁹ in Brahmapuri to have Paundarikji's *darshan*. On his return, Shriji sat for some time in the *Yajyashala* near the Sarsuti Kund"; "Chaitra Vadi 10, S. 1790 (29th March 1733): Seated in an elephant chariot, Shriji came to Ram Pol (Sanganeri Gate) via Chandni Chowk, playing *Holi* on the way. From Ram Pol came to Manak Chowk, then to the *talav* of Badal Mahal. from where he returned to the Palace"; "In Jaleb Chowk, Shriji sat in an elephant chariot, and passing through Chandni Chowk, Ram Chowk, and Pahad Ganj, came to Suraj Pol, playing *Holi* on the way. There Shriji sat in a *miyana* and went to Galtaji." "From Jaleb Chowk seated in a chariot drawn by elephants, Shriji came to Chandni Chowk, from where he went to Ramganj, and returned to the palace via Rajamal ki *haveli*"; "Chaitra Vadi 4, S. 1790 (Wednesday, 21st February 1733): Seated in a *palki*, Shriji went to the *Thakurdwara* to play *Holi*. After playing *Holi* and after having the *darshan*, Shriji mounted an elephant, and with Thakurs too mounted on elephants, came via Chandni Chowk, playing *Holi* on the way, to have the *darshan* of the Thakur and of Natani's *dehra* (shrine) in Manak Chowk; then came to Chand Pol, playing *Holi* all the way. From Chand Pol, moving along the *Kot* (city wall), he came to Shiv Pol

56. The temple, dedicated to Govind Deo, is situated about midway between the Chandra Mahal (City Palace) and Badal Mahal. It is one of the most venerated shrines in Jaipur.

57. The colony built for the scholars and pandits by Jai Singh is just outside the town on the northern side. The *havelis* associated with the names of Paundarikji and Samrat Jagannath are in ruined condition today.

58. Formerly, this chowk was much more open and extensive than we find it today. It extended almost unhindered from the south of the Chandra Mahal to the present Tripolia, with the Observatory on the eastern corner. Later, a number of buildings, including two large temples, were constructed, restricting its size considerably.

59. He was the son of Ratnakar Paundarik. He died in A.D. 1755.

(Ghat Darwaza). From Shiv Pol, Shriji came amidst revelries to Ramganj, then returned to the palace via Raja Ayamal's haveli."⁶⁰

These entries show that the gates, the markets, and the chief hall-marks of the town, as well as its plan, have not undergone much change during the past three and half centuries. Sawai Jaipur or Jai Nagar, as it was named, was indeed the first city of this size to be built from the blue-print, and so remarkable in uniformity and design, and unlike Fatehpur-Sikri, which though unique in some respects, was built mainly for the Emperor, his family, and court, and was "destitute of all natural advantages as a residence."

In accordance with the plan, the city was divided into nine sectors. Of these, as noted, the two sectors on the north were reserved for the palace, other royal buildings, and the observatory. The central avenue, about 2 miles long and 120 feet wide, which joined Suraj Pol (Sun Gate) in the east to Chand Pol (Moon Gate) in the west, was intersected at right angles by three other roads running from north to south, thus dividing the city into eight sectors. The ninth sector was outside the rectangle towards the east. The main roads were intersected by long straight lanes, thus forming blocks of houses, each facing a lane or an alley. The main roads were exceptionally broad. Father Jose Tieffenthaler, who was a friend of Father Andre Strobl and visited India in 1739, mentions "the wide and long streets" of Jaipur which were in contrast to "the unequal and narrow streets" of the other towns. He wrote that on the principal road, viz. the one joining Suraj Pol and Chand Pol, six or seven carriages could be easily driven abreast. The three roads running from south to north form, where they intersect the main avenue, three spacious squares⁶¹ which lend openness to the busiest part of the town.

The uniformity of the city was very striking.⁶² The houses were generally two storeyed high, though some had three or four storeys,

60. *Sialha Hazur Papers*, S. 1790, *J.S.A.*

61. These are the Amber ki Chaupar, Manak Chowk, and Ram Chowk (or Ghat Darwaza ki Chaupar).

62. See Heber's description of the town, palace, etc., in *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India*, Vol. II, pp. 401 ff. Reginald Heber was the Lord Bishop of Calcutta. His account of his journey from Calcutta to Bombay undertaken during 1824-25 is one of the best travel accounts written during this period.

with decorated doors, windows, and balconies with graceful balustrades, or perforated screens. In between the buildings on the main road and in the lanes, temples were interposed, but in a manner as not to obstruct the harmony of the scheme or the style of the buildings. These temples with their cupolas, curvilinear roof with five finials, and often flanked by two smaller cupolas, the arced pavillions, pillared kiosks and imposing stairs leading up to them lend dignity to the streets and break the monotonous uniformity of the scene.

The town is protected by a high wall, crenelated and relieved at intervals by towers, bastions, and kiosks. The finest buildings are in the royal sector. They are surrounded by walls and enclosures, accessible from the east by the Sireh Deorhi and Udai Pol, the latter being the principal entrance to the palace. Most of the Pols have arched recesses with semi-domes, decorated by different patterns in colour. Both these gates were built by Sawai Jai Singh. To reach Udai Pol, one passes through two imposing portals and a spacious square (Jaleb Chowk). On reaching Udai Pol we pass through three other Pols to reach the fourth court which houses the *Diwan-i-Am*, which now serves the purpose of a Museum. The hall, since much altered, was, when Heber saw it, "a noble open pavillion." It is a large hall which was at that time open on three sides, surrounded by a verandah having scalloped arches on three sides, the fourth side having latticed galleries for the use of the ladies. Its high ceiling and stately marble pillars make it an impressive hall. The *Diwan-i-Khas* is situated in an adjoining court on the west. It is a pleasing structure square in plan, built on a raised platform, and is open from all sides. It too has double rows of marble pillars and scalloped arches. Through a portal on the north we enter the pillared verandah of the Chandra Mahal.

This seven storeyed palace is the most picturesque of all the buildings in the royal sector. The main rectangle is in five storeys of different height, the first three defined by cornices and mouldings, their plain facades being relieved by a pleasing arrangement of the arched windows and a variety of detail. In the fourth and fifth storeys, the terraces, protected by graceful hand-rails, lend an air of openness to the whole structure. The sixth storey of the palace is substantially smaller, while the seventh is an arcaded marble pavillion with curvilinear form of roof,⁶³ flanked by two cupolas.

63. This feature in the architecture of Bengal was first introduced in Amber

The principal facade is on the northern side facing a large ornamental garden with water channels, fountains, parterres, and paved pathways which extend down below the Govind Deo's temple up to Badal Mahal or the Cloud Palace. The formal entrance to the palace is on the eastern side through a number of imposing portals, and squares, including the two comprising *Diwan-i-Am* and *Diwan-i-Khas*. The ground floor has a pillared loggia looking out on an extensive garden. The refined taste of its builder is visible everywhere—in the structural and artistic features of the palace as well as in its picturesque settings. As a structural composition, some may be inclined to regard it even more pleasing and graceful than the famed Datia palace, and though not giving the same impression of solidity and massive grandeur as the latter, has no feebleness in its conception and ideals either. It is, on the other hand, more balanced structurally, and has a quiet grace about it to be found but rarely in the structures of this period. The palace, Govind Deo's temple, and still further and at a lower level the Badal Mahal, which is built on the southern bank of the Talkatora, all are enclosed within high walls for purpose of privacy.

The Govind Deo's temple built by Jai Singh, though not conceived on the same grand scale as the one built by Raja Man Singh, is in some respects of the same architectural character. It is also without a porch or a *sikhara*. The idol is installed in a rectangular hall round which runs an arcaded procession-path with a flat decorated ceiling, its heavy but finely proportioned marble pillars supporting the arches being in the characteristic Amber style. The shafts of the pillars, round and bulging at the base, taper upwards, the base and the abacus having broad petals carved in relief. In this and other temples of this period, one noticeable feature is an almost total absence of figure carving, which besides involving much time and expenditure, often became the chief cause of inviting the attention of the iconoclasts, and hence of its destruction. Other decorative motifs and structural features, however, were introduced in these temples, which were in harmony with their plain yet

by Raja Man Singh. Probably its earliest examples here are the pavillions in the garden at the foot of the palace fort of Amber and in the Govind Deo's temple near the ascent to the Amber valley. Later, this feature, along with two others—curved cornices and heavy marble pillars—became characteristic of Jaipur architecture. For the Chandra Mahal, see also Heber, II, 402-404; Hendley, *Notes on Jeypore*, 32; Dundlod, 78-79.

dignified facade.

Jai Singh built some other edifices also such as the Jal Mahal in the midst of Man Sagar, Kalkiji's temple in the Sireh Deorhi Bazar, and Varadaraja's temple on the hillock near the site where he performed the *Asvamedha* in 1741 A.D. He also built a palace outside the town which later on was converted into the Residency. Like some other buildings of this period, it has also undergone extensive alterations more than once, and so it is difficult to vouchsafe its original form. This palace, like many other buildings, erected by Jai Singh, such as Badal Mahal and Jal Mahal, etc., is in rubble and plaster. It is a characteristic feature of the buildings of this period that the use of marble is confined, as in Govind Deo's temple and Badal Mahal, to the pillars, the arches and balustrades. The outside of these buildings was painted in light yellow colour, which from a distance looks singularly pleasing, especially during the rains, and in the twilight when it acquires a golden hue. The Jal Mahal, a large building on a square plan built in the midst of a lake, though made of inexpensive material and without any carving or use of marble, is not wanting in interesting features. The substructure of the palace consists of a number of arcaded rooms which generally remain immersed in water. Placed at the corners of the square shaped building are elegant *chhatris*, while four large curvilinear *chhatris* rise gracefully in the centre on all four sides. These, and the arrangement of the arcaded loggias and of the double stairs with balustrades leading to the top storey, combine to impart a romantic touch to the palace befitting its picturesque surroundings.

Besides the above mentioned buildings, Raghunathgarh and Ambagarh, two fortresses to the north and south of the Sun temple built by Rao Kripa Ram (Jai Singh's representative at Delhi) on the ascent to the Galta, are attributed to Jai Singh. Jai Singh also provided Sanganer (7 miles south of Jaipur) with a protective wall, and built a few temples and palaces and Puras outside Jaipur. At Mathura he is said to have built a temple dedicated to Sita Ram, and another temple dedicated to Govardhan at Govardhan. According to Jonathan Scott, who wrote his work in 1786, Jai Singh erected "a caravanserai and market in every province of Hindustan for the convenience of the travellers, at his own expense."

64. Though a Jain, Rao Kripa Ram is said to have built no less than seven temples dedicated to Sun. See Benn, 57.

It is the volume of Jai Singh's architectural activity, and the simplicity in outline and decoration and grace and strength of his buildings, characterised by a few distinguishing structural and artistic features described already, that put his architectural labours apart from those of his predecessors. Though not of the highest quality, his buildings will bear comparison with any other built during the eighteenth century and also with most of the buildings of the same class built in the semi-autonomous states and the provinces during the seventeenth century. Looking to the fact that the times were exceptionally chaotic and Jai Singh's chief love was astronomy, his building activity remains a befitting testimony to his creative genius and not an undeserving subject for a fuller study and appraisal.

Religion, religious festivals, and reforms. Before taking up the literary activity in Jaipur during Sawai Jai Singh's time, we may briefly review Jai Singh's religious leanings, and his attempts to divest some of the religious orders of their evil practices, as well as his attempts to introduce certain reforms. Throughout his long reign, he made an unceasing effort to encourage the Vedic learning and to revive the Vedic sacrifices. Besides the two *Asvamedhas*, other *srauta yajnas* performed by him were *Vratyastoma*, *Sarvamedha* (*Agnistoma*, *Vajapeya*, *Atiratra*, *Aptoryama*, *Ukathya*, *Sodasin*), *Purusamedha*, etc. These we have discussed in detail earlier.

Jai Singh was a devout *Vaishnavite*. This is evident not only from the temples he built and which he visited often, but also from the religious ceremonies which were held in Jaipur on different *tithis*. At the time of performing the *Asvamedha*, he built a temple dedicated to Varadaraja near the *yajna shala*.⁶⁵ In Rajasthan, the worship of Vishnu and of his several incarnations dates back to a few centuries before Christ, the earliest inscriptional evidence of it being the *Ghosundi Inscription* of the 2nd century B.C., recording the construction of a wall round the temple of Sankarshana-Balram and Vasudeva by Sarvatata of the Gaja family.⁶⁶ All through the succeeding centuries, worship of Narayan, Krishna, Vasudeva, Ram, and other incarnations of Vishnu remained popular in

65. The temple is on a small hillock a few furlongs on the west of the road to Amber and about midway between Jaipur and Amber.

66. *Annual Report of Rajasthan Museum*, Ajmer, 1926-27, p. 2; *E.I.*, XVI, 25; G.N. Sharma, *Social Life*, 195.

Rajasthan. The Krishna cult, as preached by Vallabhacharya, and known as *Pustimarga* viz. the path of ardent love, devotion, and longing for the object of love for acquiring God's grace, readily appealed to the people of this region as to those of other parts of the country. The installation of Shrinathji's idol at Nathdwara, of Dwarkadhish at Kankroli and of Mathuradhish at Kotah in the seventeenth century contributed to the growth of *Pustimarga* order in Rajasthan. Accompanying it were elaborate worship, rich offerings, devotional music and dance.⁶⁷ In Amber, worship of Lord Krishna was widely practised long before Sawai Jai Singh's time. In fact two of the finest temples built here by Raja Man Singh are dedicated to Krishna. In Mirza Raja Jai Singh's time, his court poet, Bihari, immortalized in his verses the romantic aspect of Krishna's life, thereby providing the successive generations of painters countless themes to depict in their paintings. Sawai Jai Singh built a temple dedicated to Govind Deo, as described already. The idol of Krishna installed there has since been held in highest veneration in Jaipur. In the contemporary papers⁶⁸ there are frequent references to Jai Singh's visits to Govind Deoji's temple. Outside Jaipur, he is said to have built a temple dedicated to Krishna at Govardhan and another at Mathura.

As a Vaishnavite, Jai Singh also worshipped Shri Ram, and frequently visited the temple dedicated to Ram at Manak Chowk, and occasionally visited another temple dedicated to the same God near the Galta Kund.⁶⁹ That Lord Ram received especial adoration from the Kachhwaha rulers, who claimed to belong to the same *Vansha*, is indicated by two other facts. At the time of the *Rajtilaka* ceremony of a new Kachhwaha ruler, which was always held at Amber, an elephant carrying the idols of Sita and Ram led the procession.⁷⁰ Secondly, the rulers of Amber used in their *kharitas* the invocatory phrase "Shri Ramji" on the top and "Shri Sita Ramji" on the right side of their letters.⁷¹ Jai Singh is said to have built a temple dedicated to Sita-Ram at Mathura also.

Like other Vaishnavites, Jai Singh worshipped the Supreme Being Lord Shiva, one of the Gods of the Hindu Trinity. There

67. See G.N. Sharma, *Social Life*, p. 199.

68. *Siala Hazur Papers*, S. 1790, 1794, *J.S.A.*

69. *Siala Hazur Papers*, S. 1790 (entries dated Chaitra Sudi 9, and 11).

70. *Dastur Kachhwaha Papers*, *J.S.A.*

71. See Jai Singh's *kharitas* in the Jodhpur Archives,

are references in the documents of Jai Singh's visits to the temple of Shri Mahadeva in the Jaipur city and to another temple of Mahadeva in Brahmपुरi.⁷² Both these temples seem to have been built by him. These temples like others enjoyed rich endowments for their maintenance.

Among the *devis* worshipped by Jai Singh is mentioned Shiladevi of Amber. In the month of Asoj, on Maha-ashtami day, a number of buffaloes and goats were sacrificed at the foot of the Shiladevi's temple. Once in a year Jai Singh visited Jamwahnmata's temple near Ramgarh. Mention of his visit to another *devi* — Shitlamata — is also found in the contemporary papers. He also worshipped Durga, Saraswati, Radhika, Parvati, Bhawani, Bhagwati, and other forms of *Shakti*.⁷³ Whenever Jai Singh happened to visit Pushkar,⁷⁴ he visited the temples dedicated to Brahma and to other gods and goddesses.

A number of religious festivals and ceremonies, in which Jai Singh personally took part, fostered religious fervour among the people, and lent colour and gaiety to the life in the capital. In the month of Chaitra, on the occasion of *Holi*, the idol of Sita Vallabhji was taken out in a richly decorated chariot drawn by elephants, Sawai Jai Singh following it with his nobles, playing *Holi* all the way. On Chaitra Sudi 9, Ramnavami was celebrated in the palace, temples and in the homes of common men. In the month of Shravana, Nagapanchami and Janmashtami were celebrated, and in the month of Bhadon, Ganesh Chaturthi (birthday of Ganesha) and Jal-Jhulani Gyaras were observed. On Jal-Jhulani Gyaras, the idol of Krishna in the Jagat Shiromani temple was brought from Amber to Talkatora for a colourful ceremony. In this very month, on Radha Ashtami, the ladies of the Royal family worshipped branch of a fruit tree. In the month of Asoj, on Vijaidashmi day, the idol of Sita Vallabh was taken out ceremoniously, the Raja taking part in the *sawari* of the Lord. On this day a grand *darbar* was held. On the occasion of Dipawali in the month of Kartik, goddess Lakshmi was worshipped. In the month of Magha, the

72. *Sialha Hazur*, Phalguna Vadi 14, S. 1790. The oldest surviving Shiva temple linked with the history of the Kachhwahas of Amber is Ambikeshwara Mahadeva temple, which is at a short distance to the north-west of the old palace at Amber.

73. *Sialha Hazur Papers*, S. 1790, *J.S.A.*

74. *Sialha Hazur*, Ashadha Sudi 6, S. 1790 (June 6, 1790).

idol of Sun, installed in the Sun temple on the ascent to Galta, was taken out in a procession, Jai Singh, the Mahants, and others following the idol. Two other festivals, which were observed in Jaipur with especial gusto, were those of Gangor and Tij. Gangor was celebrated on Shravana Sudi 3. On this day idols of Isar (Mahadeva) and Gouri or Isari (Parvati), which the women of all castes and status worship for 15 days prior to the 3rd of Shravana, were taken out for immersion in a tank or a river. The king, surrounded by his nobles, took part in the colourful procession. The spectacle in Jaipur on the occasion of Gangor during the days of its greatest prince must have been truly spectacular. There were some other festivals also which were observed in Jaipur. Soon after Diwali, the three important festivals which used to be celebrated here were the Govardhan Puja, Annakuta and Bhaidoja. In the *Dastur Komwar* records, there are references to the amount given by Jai Singh to his sister, the wife of Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi, on the occasion of Bhaidoja.⁷⁵

Jai Singh was deeply devout, and visited, whenever possible, the holy pilgrim centres, like Mathura, Banaras, Prayag, Govardhan, Ujjain, Pushkar, etc., and tried his best to improve the facilities for the pilgrims visiting these places. There are a number of documents recording purchase of land by Jai Singh in Mathura, Vrindavan, etc., from private persons,⁷⁶ where subsequently he built *dharmashalas*, or *ghats* if the plots happened to be on the banks of rivers. The great reverence in which the Rajputs held Mathura, Prayag and other holy places is indicated by the fact that in their correspondence they invariably refer to these places as Mathuraji (Islamabad in the Imperial records), Piragji (for Prayag), Gayaji (for Gaya), etc. In 1733, through his efforts, the tax charged from the Gujaratis and Marathas coming to *subah* Allahabad for a holy dip in the Ganges, was abolished.⁷⁷ In 1733, he secured the *faujdari* of Gaya.⁷⁸ He already held the *faujdari* of Mathura and the government of *subah* Agra, which he retained for a long time.

75. The above account of the religious festivals celebrated during Sawai Jai Singh's time is mainly based on *Sialia Hazur Papers*, S. 1790, S. 1794, and the *Dastur Komwar* Volumes.

76. *K.D. Papers*, Nos. 215/R, 218, 231/R, 224/R. These are the Deeds of sale executed by the owners of the plots in the name of the *wakil* of the Maharaja.

77. *K.D.*, No. 273.

78. *K.D. Papers*, No. 71. The *farman* is dated June 30, 1733.

In the latter capacity, he was in a position to do much for Mathura, Vrindavan, and other holy centres of the Hindus.

Jai Singh also took keen interest in the socio-religious controversies of the day. For that, his usual method was to secure opinion of the learned of different sects on various controversies. We have only very brief extracts from some of the *sammati patras* received by him which give us some idea of the points under discussion in the religious circles at that time. In a *sammati patra* in Bengali, one Raja Krishna Chandra intimated Jai Singh about the rights of the *shudras* and whether they were entitled to worship in the same manner as the Hindus.⁷⁹ In another *patra*, Sabhanand Deo Sharma, Jagannath Deo Sharma, and Gopi Raman Sharma conveyed their views about the relation between God and soul.⁸⁰ Shridhar Bhatt, Jai Deva, Brij Nath and Vishnu Rai sent their views on *nirguna* and *saguna* forms of God.⁸¹ From Madhava Narsinghacharya, Jai Singh enquired about the relation between God and soul,⁸² and from Krishnadeo Bhattacharya about the question whether the Kanishtha Bhagatas have the right to "*swalpa karma*" or not.⁸³ From Swami Brindavandas, he sought to know the differences in the principles of Shankaracharya, Nimbarkacharya, Balkrishna, and Nand Saraswati.⁸⁴ Jai Singh was deeply interested in the life and teachings of Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, and, more than once, he made enquiries about the Gauranga Sampradaya. Chaitanya, whose whole life was "the most effective commentary on the theory of *Raganuga* or *Pustimarga*," and whose passionate love for Krishna, sublimated by his burning purity, had eradicated to a considerable extent the erotic fervour which had crept in Vaishnavism, seems to have drawn Jai Singh towards the Gauranga Sampradaya. On his inquiry, he was assured by one Shyam Charan Sharma that Chaitanya was the incarnation of Lord Krishna.⁸⁵

Jai Singh, in accordance with the directions of the exponents of *Pustimarga*, laid stress on observance of the laws of worship as

79. *K.D.*, No. 1506.

80. *K.D.*, No. 1521.

81. *K.D.*, No. 1527.

82. *K.D.*, No. 1528.

83. *K.D.*, No. 1526.

84. *K.D.*, No. 1522.

85. *K.D.*, No. 1519.

enjoined by the *Sastras*,⁸⁶ and emphasized that the followers of different sects and orders should follow tenets of their own sects. Though he did not interfere in the affairs of different sects and orders, his attitude was different towards the *sanyasis* and *bairagis*. He laid down that *bairagis*, *swamis*, and *sanyasis* would not keep arms with them, nor would they try to accumulate wealth, or keep women.⁸⁷ To remove growing corruption among certain sections of the *bairgias* and *sadhus*, who were known to keep women, he induced them to lead the life of *grahasthas*, and even established a colony, which he named *Vairagyapura*, for them in Mathura.⁸⁸ At the same time, using his influence at the Mughal Court, he had had an order issued by the Emperor forbidding confiscation of property of *mahants*, *faqirs* and *sanyasis* after their death.⁸⁹ As regards the *Ramanandi Mahants*, he made them promise that though the people of the four *Varnas* would not dine together, only one man would serve a line at a feast. This made at least the sub-castes among the Brahmans and other *Varnas* come closer. He could induce six septs of the Pancha Gaur Brahmanas to agree to this measure. These Brahmanas came to be called Chenniyat. He, however, agreed that no Vaishnava mahant might accept an *Antyaja* as his disciple.⁹⁰ Though Jai Singh was liberal in his religious leanings, he did not favour the *Lal Panthis*, the followers of Laldas, a Meo, whose teachings resembled those of Kabir. Laldas, who lived about the middle of the seventeenth century, sought to reconcile Hinduism and Islam. Jai Singh made the *Lal Panthis* living in his state to give an undertaking in writing that they would follow *Vaishnava dharma*.⁹¹

86. This is an inference from *K.D.*, No. 1284.

87. *K.D.*, No. 1483, 1277.

88. Diwan Naraindas Kirpa Ram to Vidyadhar. Margashirsha Vadi 6, S. 1784 (1727 A.D.), *J.S.A.*; Bankidas, No. 1447.

89. *K.D.*, Nos. 271, 364. The orders were issued in May 1722 and were sent to all the *subahs*.

90. *K.D.*, No. 1520. The Chenniyat Brahmans include the *Daimas* or *Dadhichas*, the *Gujar Gaur*, the *Parikhs*, the *Khandelwals*, the *Saraswata*, and the *Gaurs*. These six endogamous septs could be fused, but with partial success, into one community; they can eat together but do not intermarry. See for details *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. III-A, compiled by K.D. Erskine, (Allahabad, 1909), 89.

91. *K.D.*, No. 1145.

Though a devout Vaishnavite, Jai Singh, in the true catholic spirit of a Hindu, paid due reverence to other religions also. A number of Jain temples, some in close proximity to the Vaishnava temples, were built in Amber and Jaipur during his time. In the documents, mention of his visits to the shrine of Khwaja Muinud-din Chishti occurs more than once. On each such occasion he made suitable offerings at the Dargah.⁹² Since he came in close and prolonged contact with many Christian fathers, whom he had invited to Jaipur in connection with his astronomical studies, we can presume that he had a fair acquaintance with Christianity. There was no petty-mindedness about him in any sphere, and this applied to his world of religion also.

Literary Activity: Great literary activity under Jai Singh's patronage was another significant feature of his reign. Though Jai Singh's chief interest was in astronomy, he invited a large number of scholars and poets from all parts of India, offering them full facilities to pursue their studies amidst peaceful conditions prevailing in his State. He built amidst picturesque surroundings a new colony, Brahmapuri, for their residence, which has been the subject of much good versification by the contemporary poets. Jai Singh's father, Raja Bishan Singh, had extended cordial welcome to Sivanand Goswami, a Telanga Brahman, who formerly resided at Chanderi. Sivanand was a voluminous writer. His creations discovered so far include works on *Dharmasastra*, Grammar, and Astronomy. A few of his works are *tikas* and *bhashyas*.⁹³ After staying at Amber for some time, Sivanand went away to Bikaner, but his two younger brothers — Janardan Bhatt Goswami and Chakrapani—continued to stay at Amber. Janardan Bhatt, who too later on went away to Bikaner, composed *Srangarasatak*,⁹⁴ *Vairagyasatak*,⁹⁵ *Mantrachandrika*,⁹⁶ and *Lalitachi Pradipika*⁹⁷ (a work on *Tantra*), and his brother, Chakrapani, who

92. *D.K.*, Vol. XVIII, entries of S. 1780 and 1781.

93. See Prabhakar Shastri, *Jaipur Ki Sanskrit Sahitya Ko Den* (1699-1834 A.D.), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1964, pp. 73ff.

94. *Kavyamala Series*, 11th *Guchhak*, Bombay.

95. *R.O.R.I.*, Jodhpur, MS. No. 11227.

96. Composed in S. 1731.

97. Composed in S. 1730.

was a Tantrik scholar, composed *Panchayatan Prakasa*.⁹⁸ Niketan Goswami, the eldest son of Sivanand, composed *Sabhedarya Saptasati*,⁹⁹ a work on erotics, in which he describes the amorous play of the *naikas*.

One of the most revered scholars at Jai Singh's court was Ratnakar Paundarika, a Maharashtrian Brahman and the chief disciple of Nagesh Bhatt, the celebrated grammarian who resided at Banaras. As noted, Ratnakar was thoroughly well-versed in the various *srauta* ceremonies and *samskaras*. In 1713, he completed *Jaisinghakalpadruma*,¹⁰⁰ the celebrated work for determining the *tithis* for the observance of different *vratas*. He performed *Vajapeya* and *Paundarika* sacrifices. After performing the latter *yajna*, he became well-known as Paundarikji. His son, Sudhakar Paundarika, was the author of *Sahityasarasangraha*.¹⁰¹ Later, when Jai Singh performed the *Purusamedha*, Sudhakar conducted the sacrifice.¹⁰²

Ratnakar's nephew, Vrajanath Bhatt Dixit (son of Prabhakar Bhatt), was the author of *Brahmasutranubhashyavritti*¹⁰³ and *Padyataringini*.¹⁰⁴

Another well-known poet and scholar at Jai Singh's court was Shri Krishna Bhatt who received the title of *Kavikalanidhi*.¹⁰⁵ He composed a number of works on a variety of subjects of which three Sanskrit works — *Padyamuktavali*,¹⁰⁶ *Vrattamuktavali*¹⁰⁷, and *Isvaravilasamahakavyam*¹⁰⁸ — have been published so far. *Vrattamuktavali* is a unique work on metrics. It illustrates meters from the Vedic times to those in the poet's own time, all the verses illustrating the meters being the poet's own composition. Shri Krishna Bhatt's *Isvaravilasamahakavyam* is a good work, themati-

98. See Shastri, *loc. cit.*, 96-99.

99. MS. in R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

100. MS. No. 6924, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

101. MS. in Parvanikar Sangrahalaya, Jaipur.

102. Shastri, *loc. cit.*, 131.

103. *Ibid.*, 137ff.

104. Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series. No. 24 (Kashi, 1905).

105. For a detailed assessment of his literary works, see Shastri, *loc. cit.*, 149-213.

106. Published by R.O.R.I., Jodhpur, 1959.

107. Published by R.O.R.I., Jodhpur, 1963.

108. Published by R.O.R.I., Jodhpur, 1958 A.D.

cally as well as from literary point of view. His *Raghavagitam*¹⁰⁹ or *Ramgitam* is composed after the style of Jaideva's *Gitagovindam*. The work is regarded as his best creation, excelling both in the use of meters and metaphors, and won for the author the title of *Ramrasacharya* from his patron. His *Prasastimuktavali*¹¹⁰ is a work on the art of letter writing and essays, and *Sundaristavaraj*,¹¹¹ based on *Saundaryalahiri* of Shankaracharya, is an important contribution to Sanskrit *stotra* literature.

Another scholar, Shri Hari Krishna, a Karnatakeya Brahman, who was invited to Jaipur on the eve of the performance of the *Asvamedha* by Jai Singh, wrote *Vedicevaishnavasadachar*¹¹² which deals with the duties of the Vaishnavas and the rules of conduct prescribed in the *Dharmasastras*. The works on astronomy written by Samrat Jagannath and Kewalram have been noted earlier. Kewalram's literary works which have survived are *Abhilashshatkam*¹¹³ and *Ganga-stuti*.¹¹⁴

Besides these Sanskrit works, a few works in Dingal and Pingal were also composed. Among these are a few commentaries, such as *Bhaktiamal Tika*¹¹⁵ and *Bhagwata Bhashya*¹¹⁶ by Priyadas. Suratā Mishra, who was a court-poet of Bikaner, and later of Jaipur, wrote *Amarchandrika*, a commentary on *Bihari Satsai*¹¹⁷ He also wrote *Kavyasiddhanta*¹¹⁸ and *Kavyasiddhanta Sartha*.¹¹⁹ Shri Krishna Bhatt Kavi Kalanidhi, whose contribution to Sanskrit literature has already been noted, composed *Sambhar-Yuddha*, *Jajavyuddha*, *Alankarakalanidhi*, *Vrattachandrika*, *Bahadurvijaya*, *Shrangararasamadhuri*, *Jaisinghagunasarita*, *Ramchandrodaya*

109. Shastri, *loc. cit.*, 153, 181-93.

110. MS. No. 9751, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

111. See Shastri, *loc. cit.*, 209-11.

112. MS. No. 148, Hari Narain Purohit Collection, R.O.R.I., Jaipur branch

113. M.S. No. 11204, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

114. MS. No. 3300, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

115. MS. No. 2274, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

116. Minaria, *Pingal*, 126.

117. MS. No. 2296, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

118. M.S. No. 1129, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur.

119. MS. No. 1128, R.O.R.I., Jodhpur. For other compositions by Surat Mishra (*Alankarmala*, *Kavipriya ki Tika*, *Rasik Priya ka Tilak*, *Prabodhachandrodaya Natak*, *Bhaktivinod*, *Ramcharitra*, *Zorawarprakashya*, etc.) see M.L. Menaria, *Rajasthan ka Pingal Sahitya*, Bombay, 1958, p. 132.

and *Ramrasa*.¹²⁰ Some *khyats* were also written in Dingal but from literary point of view they are not substantial.

Thus, while the country was in the throes of anarchy, and momentous political changes were taking place, Jai Singh, despite his deep involvement in the contemporary politics, continued to strive for the development of science, art, and literature, and did not permit the worsening political situation to hamper his pursuit of knowledge. The din of the wars waging all around failed to distract his mind from the creative efforts he had been making all through his life in the fields of arts and sciences, and splendid structures arose and works were written under his care and patronage to tell the tale of the man who valued peace and who understood the objects for which a man should strive.

120. Menaria, *op. cit.*, 126.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note : The abbreviation 'A.S.L.' represents the Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner ; 'Br. M.', the British Museum; 'I.O.' the India Office Library. 'J.S.A.' indicates the Jaipur State Archives; 'P.P.L.', the Pustak Prakash Library, Jodhpur; 'R.A.', Rajasthan Archives, Bikaner; 'R.O.R.I.', the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur.

(A) ARCHIVAL RECORDS.

This book is based primarily on the Archival sources. In the following pages a brief account of these sources is given without citing particular documents used in this book, their number being too large to permit separate mention here.

Jaipur Archival Records : Among the archives of the various covenanting states of Rajasthan, those of the Jaipur state are the most valuable for the present work, and form the prime source for this book. I have used the following categories of documents preserved in the Jaipur Archives.

(1) *Kharitas*: These are the letters written by one ruler to another, including those of the states outside Rajputana. The letters are of the highest importance for a study of the political history of the period. From these letters we come to know about the relations among the different rulers, their attitudes and policies towards the Mughal government, the Marathas, and other powers, their secret moves, pacts, and political manoeuvring, and the reasons why their actions and policies took a particular course and culminated in a particular development. In this work, a large number of *kharitas* sent by Maharana Amar Singh, Maharana Sangram Singh, and Maharana Jagat Singh of Mewar, Maharaja Ajit Singh and Maharaja Abhai Singh of Jodhpur, Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi, Maharao Bhim Singh, Maharao Arjun Singh, and Maharao Durjansal of Kotah, Raja Indra Singh (ex-chief of Nagor), Maharawal Akhai Singh of Jaisalmer, Maharaja Zorawar Singh of Bikaner, Raja Chhatrasal Bundela, Raja Uddot Singh of Orcha, Raja Ram Chandra of Datia, Raja Chhatra Singh

of Narwar, and the chiefs of some other states have been used. Excepting a few, most of these *kharitas* are addressed to Jai Singh. The *kharitas* preserved in the archives of other states have also been used.

It is a pleasure to handle these documents, most of which are adorned with sober floral designs, while some have exquisitely decorated borders. The letters coming from different states of Rajputana, Bundelkhand, Malwa, etc., have their own characteristic features, and a trained eye can often tell the source of a *kharita* simply by looking at the paper, its colour, texture, thickness, and decorative designs on it. While some of the *kharitas* were long strips of fine paper about 8" to 10" in width, and were sent neatly folded, the usual size of the *kharitas* was between 8" to 10" in length and 11" to 12" in breadth.

As the *kharitas* were seldom written in a code or veiled language, unlike some of the *Wakil Reports*, no problem arises in understanding them. These letters, however, cannot claim any literary merit; in fact they generally suffer from lack of precision and cogency of language, and the essential points in them have to be often sifted with some effort. In some of the *kharitas*, either the date has been entirely omitted, or the month or the year is not given, while in some though the month, date, and the *Samvat* are mentioned but not *Vadi* or *Sudi* (the dark half or the bright half of the moon). In such cases we have to infer the date of the letter from its contents keeping in mind whether the *Shravanadi* or *Chaitradi Samvat* has been used.

(2) *Draft kharitas*: Equally valuable are the drafts of the letters sent from Jaipur to the various rulers, including Chhatrapati Shahu and the chiefs of various principalities of Malwa and Bundelkhand. In many cases, the drafts preserved in the Jaipur Archives have been tallied with the original letters written on the basis of these drafts found in the archives of the other states. In some cases, e.g., the letter sent to Shahu, the original letters are not traceable. But it is an established practice to accept such drafts as reliable evidence in the construction of history. Thus, some of the most important drafts of the letters sent from Udaipur have, in fact, been used by Kaviraja Shyamaldas in *Vir Vinod*. The credibility of the original drafts preserved in the Jaipur Archives has been accepted in this work on the same analogy which justifies acceptance of draft letters in such epistolary collections as

Ishma-i-Haft Anjuman, *Balmukund-nama*, *Ajaib-ul-Afaq*, etc. We have used only the final drafts of the letters presuming, quite reasonably, that the formal letters written on the basis of these drafts reached their respective destinations.

(3) *Parwanahs*: These are the letters written by the rulers to their senior officials or to those of the other states. Some of the *parwanahs*, e.g., those addressed to Ram Chand, *diwan* of Amber, Biharidas of Mewar, Raghunath Bhandari and Khivsi Bhandari (both of Jodhpur State), Khande Rai of Narwar. Salim Singh Hada of Karwar. etc., have proved very useful for this work. Often the *parwanahs* contain Jai Singh's precise assessment of a particular situation (e.g., the situation which developed as a result of Emperor Bahadur Shah's drastic decision to resume the Kachhwaha state, or the situation which arose soon after Farrukh-siyar's deposition); his specific directions to the addressee to carry out a particular task in the manner suggested by him; his own view of an offer of a transfer, posting, etc., made formally or informally by the Imperial authorities, his suggestions to counter a hostile move which might have emanated from the Saiyids, Saadat Khan, or Maharaja Abhai Singh or any other person, his polite directions to some senior official of a friendly state to arrange escort for an European astronomer on his way to Surat or Bengal or desiring him to apprise his master of a particular situation. The drafts of a number of *parwanahs* sent to the officials of the other states are preserved in the Jaipur Archives, a few of which have been used in these pages. Some of the *parwanahs* sent by Jai Singh to his officials contain useful information about the *jagirs* acquired by him as *inam*, *tankwah* or *ijara*. These have been used in Chapter XI which deals with the administrative institutions in the Jaipur state during Sawai Jai Singh's time.

(4) *Wakil Reports* : These are the reports sent to the ruler by the *wakils* of the state posted at the Mughal court. After 1710, most of the *Wakil Reports* are in Rajasthani. Of all the reports, probably the most informative are those which were sent by Jagjiwandas Pancholi, especially during the period 1707-14. The account of the developments during 1712-14 is mainly based on his reports. The *Wakil Reports* are invaluable for knowing the various stages in the negotiations between the Rajput rulers and the Mughal government, for example those which the Rajputs conducted with the Mughal government during 1708-10 or during 1712 to

1714. Apart from this, these reports give first hand account of the political atmosphere at the Imperial Court, of the news circulating there or in the Imperial camp, of gradual formation of the power groups at the Court and subsequent fluctuations in their strength and fortunes, of the position and influence of the Mughal princes and princesses, officers and courtiers, and of their ways and methods of working. These reports also inform us about the activities of the *wakils* of the other states at the Court, about the attempts of their masters to secure promotions, honours, and advantageous postings, often at the cost of others, about their intrigues and method, which was not infrequently plain bribery, to secure their *matalibs*, and supply a variety of information, significant as well as petty, but which sometimes proves valuable for understanding subsequent developments of greater import. The *Wakil Reports* have been extensively used in the account of the period 1700 to 1720 A.D. After 1720, the importance of these reports diminishes, as the rulers, especially of Jaipur and Jodhpur, themselves are often at the centre of the affairs, and have direct and unhindered contacts with the Emperor. The *Wakil Reports* of other states have also been used in these pages.

(5) *Arzdashts*: The *arzdashts* sent by the officials of the Jaipur state, or of other states to the Kachhwaha rulers, also constitute an important category of record. Some of the *arzdashts* have proved very useful, for example the *arzis* of *Diwan* Bhikharidas of Amber sent by him in 1711 A.D. from the Emperor's camp in the Punjab, Pancholi Rai Chand's *arzdasht* (October 1722) informing about the abortive attempt of a Rathor army to help the Jats, Kesari Singh Naruka's report which gives a graphic description of the situation in Marwar following Maharaja Ajit Singh's murder, the *arzis* of Khande Rai (*diwan* of Narwar), of Salim Singh Hada of Karwar, Thakur Sangram Singh Chandrawat of Rampura, the *arzis* of Raghunath Bhandari and Khivsi Bhandari of Jodhpur which are important for the developments during A.D. 1711-12, 1713-14, and in 1719, of Biharidas Pancholi of Mewar, of Deep Singh Kumbhani from Satara giving an account of his visit to the Maratha Court in 1730, etc.

The drafts of the *arzdashts* (in Persian) sent by Jai Singh to the Mughal Emperors, and the Mughal princes, like Prince Shah Alam, Prince Muiz-ud-din, etc., containing formal requests, are also important and have been used in these pages.

(6) *Waqiya Records* : These papers record personal and official activities of the ruler, and contain information about his movement, his meetings with the other Rajas, the Emperor, and nobles, like Raja Girdhar Bahadur, Daya Bahadur, Saiyid Hussain Ali, the Nizam and others, the Maratha officers and *wakils*, and other dignitaries, the place of encampment of the ruler, the visits paid by the Mughal nobles, and by the Pandits and Purohits of other states, who brought formal letters and, occasionally, a marriage proposal. The *Waqiya* entries are written on small slips of handmade brown paper of about 7" by 4½", the entry of each day being recorded on a separate strip. The records are useful in determining the chronology of the period, and in the study of Jai Singh's relations with other important personages of that time.

(7) *Khatut Ahalkaran* : These are the letters written by one official of the State to another. The letters give detailed news of the place where the officials were posted or sent on purpose. Some of these letters supply information of considerable importance, such as Ami Rai's letter to Mishra Chakrapani (14th April, 1696), Deep Singh's letter to Bakshi Hem Raj giving an account of his visit to Shahu (1730 A.D.), Zorawar Singh's letter to Hem Raj (February 1730) informing about Nanu Nagar's rebellion and the problem created by it, Dan Singh's letter to Zorawar Singh (Vaishakha Vadi 4, S. 1792), and Hem Raj's letter to Zorawar Singh (Bhadrapada Vadi 11, S. 1792, August 3, 1735 A.D.) giving the details of the negotiations between Sindhia and Holkar on the one side and Jai Singh and Khan Dauran on the other. *Khatut-i-Ahalkaran* have been extensively used in these pages.

(8) *Dastur Komwar Papers* : These papers constitute an important category of records and give more varied information—social, cultural, economic and political—than is probably provided by any other records. A major part of these records which, excepting a few gaps, cover the period A.D. 1718-1918, and are based on *Taujih* records, has been transcribed in thirty-two well classified volumes by the staff of the *Diwan-i-Hazuri*, Jaipur. The entries are arranged castewise and in alphabetical order. Thus the entries about the Kachhwahas, Kumbhanis, Kalyanot, Kavishwar, Kayasthas, *Kanungo*, etc., are in Volume I; entries concerning the Musalmans, whether an Emperor, or nobles, like Khan-i-Dauran and Saiyid Abdullah Khan, or a humble mace-bearer

who had been recipient of some gift, are in volumes XVIII and XIX. Similarly, in different volumes we have entries about the Jats (Vol. VII), Thakurdwara (deities) (Vol. VIII), the Dakhinis (Vols. IX and X), Naruka, Nathawat, Nai, etc. (Vol. XI), Brahmans (such as the great Sanskrit scholar Ratnakar Paundarik, Khande Rai, *diwan* of Narwar, Raja Bhawani Ram and others) in Vol. XVI, of the Bundelas in Vol. XVII. Hadas (Maharao Budh Singh, Bhawani Singh, etc.) in Vol. XXXII. These documents record the *dastur* or protocol, or usage observed in respect of persons of different castes, communities, and social status who met the ruler, or whom the ruler paid a visit. Thus these papers record details of Jai Singh's first and subsequent meetings with and presents given to the Mughal Emperors, the imperial officers, like Girdhar Bahadur, Khan-i-Dauran, Muhammad Amin Khan, etc., important Maratha personages, like Radha Bai, Baji Rao Peshwa, Balaji Baji Rao, Jadu Rai Prabhu (*wakil* of Raja Shahu), Malhar Holkar, and Mahadji Sindhia, Dhondo Pandit and other Maratha envoys, the Rajput rulers, and chiefs like Badan Singh, State officers such as Raja Ayamal, Jagjiwandas Pancholi, Bakshi Zorawar Singh, and officials of other states, like Bihari Das Pancholi of Mewar, Khande Rai of Narwar, etc., and also record the gifts given to the members of the royal family, priests, pandits, writers, and poets, to Firingis, and even to a deserving *farrash*, or a venerable *faqir*. The entries, being dated, are very useful for determining the chronology of this period, and throw useful light on political and social relations between the Jaipur ruler and his distinguished contemporaries. These records also inform us about the caste, parentage, and career of various officials, nobles, diplomats, poets, and scholars, etc., who figure during this period, thereby enabling us to have a more intimate picture of these personages.

(9) *Akhbarat* : No less important and equally useful are the *Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Muala*. These Persian *Akhbarat* record Court incidents, including orders and doings and observations of the Emperor, appointments, promotions, the news received from the provinces and commanders of campaigns, which were often read out in the Court, requests of the officers for transfer, promotion, or pardon, the reports of the heads of the departments, reports of unusual phenomena, etc. As the *Akhbarat* provided the most comprehensive coverage of the news reaching the centre, the Princes,

prominent officers and provincial governors had made it a practice to keep their agents at the Court to write and report the occurrences at the daily *darbar* of the Emperor. As a result of this practice, large and small collections of the *Akhbarat* have survived at different places. In the Jaipur Archives, *Akhbarat* dating from Aurangzeb's accession till about 1730 are found, though there are a few gaps. The *Akhbarat*, in small collection and of a later date, are found at other places also. Thus the *Akhbarat* covering the years 1753-56 are preserved in the *Peshwa Daftar*. But the largest collection of the *Akhbarat* for the later Mughal period is in the Jaipur Archives. The *Akhbarat* are written in plain terse language on small slips of handmade brown paper. Usually only one slip was used for recording the news of each day, though more sheets were used when more news were to be recorded. These *Akhbarat*, though of first-rate importance, suffer from one basic defect, viz., they were official bulletins, and therefore it is not surprising that often unpalatable facts were either entirely omitted in the *Akhbarat*, or were distorted to such an extent as to give an erroneous picture of a situation, for example of the Rajput rising of 1708-10, or of the Maratha successes against the Mughal arms. For this reason, *Akhbarat* should be used cautiously and, whenever possible, should be corroborated by the sources of the other side, such as, in the case of the Rajputs, by the *Kharitas*, *Wakil Reports*, etc. I have used the *Akhbarat* mainly in Chapters V and VI, covering the period from A.D. 1707 to 1719.

(10) *Farmans* : The *farmans* of the Emperors, chiefly of Jahandar Shah, Farrukh-siyar, and Muhammad Shah have been used in these pages. Some purely formal *farmans* have been omitted. Though the formal character and contents of the *farmans* restrict to some extent their utility in constructing history, they have an importance of their own, coming as they do from the highest authority, and also because they contain varied types of information, such as the Emperor's orders, his approval or disapproval of some action of the receiver of the *farman*, information about conferment of a *jagir* or increase in *mansab* of the receiver of the *farman*, Emperor's exhortation to render some service, a promise of reward, or reasons for taking some unpleasant step (such as Ajit Singh's removal from the government of Gujarat in 1717), a condolence message or acknowledgement of a congratulatory message, news of a victory, rebellion or of some impending threat

from any quarter, etc.

(11) *Nishans* : Some of the most important *nishans* (in the present context, the letters written by the Mughal princes to the Rajput rulers) used in this book have been taken from *Vir Vinod*. The *nishans* in the Jaipur Archives are mostly of Mirza Raja Jai Singh's time. In some respects, the *nishans* are more informative than the *farmans*, the former being less formal and more explicit in their contents. Some of the *nishans*, for example Prince Jahandar Shah's, are of much use for this book.

(12) *Siaha Hazur* : These reports record daily occurrences at the Court of the Jaipur rulers, their visits to the town, temples, or the residence of some celebrated scholar, like Ratnakar Paundarik, or visit to a newly built palace, or a lake, such as Mansagar, or a visit to a friendly state, like Mewar. These papers also record visits of high imperial officers, and chiefs, like Badan Singh Jat, Rao Raja Dalel Singh of Bundi, and others. As all the entries are dated, these reports are of much use in determining the chronology of the life and activities of Jai Singh, and inform us about his relations with other important personages of that period. *Siaha Hazur* papers have been used profitably at more than one place in these pages.

(13) *Iqrarnama* : These are the documents recording agreements (in some cases only copies are available), such as the one which Jai Singh signed with Mewar in 1708 A.D., or the agreement which Dalel Singh concluded with Jaipur when marrying Sawai Jai Singh's daughter in 1732, or which Jai Singh concluded with the Marathas in 1730 A.D.

(14) *Hasb-ul-hukm* : These are the letters of high Imperial officers issued 'By Order' of the Emperor under seal. A few of these orders have been used in these pages.

(15) *Mahzarnama* : These are the reports of enquiry, such as the one which Jai Singh instituted to ascertain the facts about the adoption of a son by Maharao Budh Singh of Bundi.

Though a very large part of the documents, which literally run into lacs of pages and which were formerly preserved in the Archives of the Jaipur State, are now preserved in the Rajasthan Archives, Bikaner, a few hundred documents (including the *farmans*, *nishans*, *iqrarnama*, and *hasb-ul-hukm*) are lying in the Kapatdwar. Of these, transcript copies of only a few documents are available in the Rajasthan Archives,

For the administration in Sawai Jai Singh's state, described in chapter XI, a variety of documents have been used. For the agrarian system in the State, *Arhsattas* are our main source of information. Besides these, *Dastur-al-amal*, *Yaddashti Pardakhti*, orders to the *amils* of different *parganas*, and *arzis* of junior officials provide useful information about the land-revenue administration in the State. For the *pargana* administration I have used mainly the *Arhsattas*, *Tankhwahdar Parganawati* (of Newai, Chatsu, Toda Bhim, Toda Rai Singh, Narnaul, Khandari, Vahatri, and Malarna), *Yaddashta* of *pargana* Khori, *Sialha Adalat* Papers which record disputes in respect of claims brought forth by *amils*, etc., *Sialha Khufia*, general orders issued by the *Diwans* directing the *amils* in regard to their duties, *Bahi Khazana Hazur* of S. 1774, and some other papers. For an account of the taxes and duties on produce and sale of commodities I have mainly relied on *Dastur-al-amal* of *Qasba Sanganer* and *Saneri*, *Safayat Khazana* papers of S. 1784, *Roznamcha Chotra Deodhri Bazar*, Jaipur, S. 1800, *Jama Kharch Deodhri Bazar* (S. 1800), and a few other documents from the *Shamlat Records*. The brief outline of the *Jagir* system given in this chapter is based on *Nuskha Udak*, *Inam* papers, *Arhsatta Bhomi*, *Pargana Malarna* (S. 1787), *Awarija* and *Baqiat* papers, and *Mawazana* papers. For the judiciary, the only papers used are the *Nyaya Sabha* papers of S. 1786-87, some *chitthis* to the *amils*, a few general orders of *Diwan* Naraindas Kripa Ram to *Vidyadhar*, *Diwan Desh*, and to the *amils* of the *parganas*. For the news reporters *Tankhwahdar Pargana Papers* (S. 1756), *Sialha Khufia* (S. 1771), *Khabar Juwani Khabardar*, and some letters and news reports have been used; and for the army organization a few *parwanahs*, *Jama Kharch Khazana* (campaign undertaken towards Karauli side), *Roznama Daftar Bakshi* (S. 1783), *Tankhwahdar Parganawati*, *Jama Kharch Dag Ghora Mulazim*, and a few other documents have been used. The chapter on administration is no more than an outline of the administrative institutions in Jaipur State during Sawai Jai Singh's time, and no claim is being made for it to be an exhaustive study, for which archival records abound and are being exploited advantageously by a number of scholars working on different aspects of the system.

Kotah Archives : Hundreds of *Bastas* and files containing records yearwise from A.D. 1692 to 1930 are preserved in the Kotah Archives, now at Bikaner, but require proper classification.

The papers of historical importance are the one classed as *Siga Mutfarrikat* in which we find incidental references about military campaigns, expenditure of the army, arrival and departure of the Kotah rulers and high Imperial officers from Kotah, *mataliba* sent to the *subah* treasury, expenditure incurred on the visits of dignitaries, and on marriages, etc., the number of *parganas* in the State during the reigns of different rulers of Kotah, expenses incurred on the *qasids*, information about the *jagirdars* in the *parganas*, resumption of *jagirs* on complaints of the people, daily wages of the workers in different professions, etc.

Archival Records of Bundi : The Bundi records go back to the time of Jahangir and come uptodate. There are several categories of records but they are neither arranged systematically nor are they continuous, probably on account of vicissitudes in the life of the State, especially after 1730. For the present work, the utility of the surviving Bundi archival records of the period under review was found to be negligible.

Archival Records of Jodhpur : After the Jaipur archival records, those of Jodhpur come next in importance and utility, not only for this book but also for a wider historical theme. This is because the rulers of Jodhpur, especially Maharaja Ajit Singh, played a conspicuous role not only in the affairs of Rajputana but also of Delhi during the post-Aurangzeb period. Also, the archival records of Jodhpur are fuller, better arranged and preserved, and so their utility increases. The important categories of records are the *Kharitas*, *Ruqqas*, *Tahrirs* (notes) addressed to the rulers of Jodhpur by the rulers and officials of other states and are preserved in portfolios, *Kharita Bahis*, *Farmans*, *Arzi Bahis*, Marriage or *Byaha Bahis*, etc. Some of the important documents of the time of Ajit Singh and Abhai Singh have been published by P^r. Visheshwar Nath Reu. The documents used in these pages have been cited at appropriate places.

Udaipur Archives : A large number of important *farmans*, *nishans*, *kharitas*, *parwanahs*, and *arzdashts* have already been used by Kaviraja Shyamaldas in his great work. A number of these have been used in these pages. For an exhaustive study of the material available in the Udaipur Archives, *Kharita Bahis*, *Parwanah Bahis*, *Farmans*, *Nishans*, *Patta Bahis*, *Haqiqat Bahis* and land-revenue papers need be explored. Copies of a number of *kharitas*; *arzdashts*, etc., collected from different sources, some

from the *jagirdars* of the *thikanas*, are preserved in the historical section of Vidyapeeth, Udaipur. A few of these have been used in these pages.

Bikaner Archival Records : Although there are a number of *Bahis*, like the *Byaha Bahis*, *Shahar Lekha Bahi* of S. 1727, *Hasil Bahi* of S. 1761, *Mahal-talka Bahi* of S. 1764, etc., containing useful information about the administration in Bikaner state, these are not of much use for this work. The same is the case with the revenue records of the period extending from S. 1624 to 1800. Unfortunately, political correspondence of this period is not available in the Bikaner Archives. It is believed that a large number of *kharitas*, *bahis* and other documents have been either damaged irretrievably or lost for good through neglect and greed. But some of the letters sent by the Bikaner rulers to Amber are preserved in the Jaipur Archives and have been used in this book. As Bikaner's role in the history of the period under study was of a very limited importance, the paucity of sources for this period in the Bikaner Archives did not prove a serious handicap and was adequately compensated by the archival records of the other states.

(B) MARATHI

The Marathi records are invaluable for understanding some of the chief problems of this period. The Rajput states had long-standing relations with the Marathas. Jai Singh's own contacts with the Marathas lasted up to the end of his life. These relations and their changing tenor have been discussed in different chapters of this book. The Marathi sources have been used mainly in Chapter IX which covers the period A.D. 1730 to 1743. The following sources have been used in this book :

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V.K. Rajwade.

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XV, XVII, XXII, XXIX, XXX, ed. G.S. Sardesai, Volumes

and numbers of the letters cited, except when page is explicitly mentioned.

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Shahu Roznishi, Vol. I, ed. Vad.

Thorle Sahu Maharaj yanche Charitra, Chitnis (ed. 1924).

(c) PERSIAN

Equally important are the Persian histories and epistolary collections for writing a history of this period. The rotograph copies of the British Museum and India Office Library manuscripts, available in the Research Library of the History Department of Aligarh Muslim University, have been used.

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Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Nama*, MS., Bankipur, Patna.

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